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ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ASPECTS OF CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT FM 3-11.21 MCRP 3-37.2C NTTP 3-11.24 AFTTP (I) 3-2.37 DECEMBER 2001 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

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FOREWORD This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate. PATRICIA L. NILO Brigadier General, USA Commandant US Army Chemical School EDWARD HANLON, JR. Lieutenant General, USMC Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command R.G. SPRIGG Rear Admiral, USN Commander Navy Warfare Development Command LANCE L. SMITH Major General, USAF Commander Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center This publication is available on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library at www.adtdl.army.mil

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PREFACE 1. Scope This publication is designed for use at the tactical and operational level. It defines the roles of military units and staffs involved in planning and executing integrated military operations other than war (MOOTW) actions/missions in a possible nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment. This manual provides multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) on the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) role in consequence-management (CM) operations. Congress has determined and the National Command Authority (NCA) has directed that the military become more involved in supporting crisis and CM operations. Acknowledging the services’ inherent capabilities for supporting federal, state, and local governments, the Congress has passed numerous laws providing for CM support. These laws also recognize that the National Guard (NG) may provide the initial support when military assistance is required. They also institutionalize interdepartmental and interagency coordination/planning, linking it to the national strategy. The planning and coordination that takes place does so with the realization that the potential NBC environment could be one in which there is deliberate or accidental employment of NBC weapons; deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with toxic industrial materials (TIM), including toxic industrial chemicals (TIC); or deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with radiological materials (see Joint Publication [JP] 3-11). Additionally, as coordination and planning is conducted, it is also understood that DOD assets and resources could be used to support a United States Government (USG) CM response to a nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, or high-yield-explosive incident. Although some of the procedures contained here may apply to man-made disasters, nonterrorist instigated WMD incidents, or nuclear weapons accidents, this MTTP is most readily applied to CM in response to a nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) (or a chemical biological, and radiological−nuclear [CBR−N]) event. 2. Purpose This publication provides a reference for mitigating the NBC aspects of CM; bridges the gap between service and joint doctrine; and contains tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for planning and executing NBC operations in MOOTW in support of JP 3-07 and JP 3-07.7. This manual addresses concepts, principles, and fundamentals, to include planning, operational considerations, and training and support functions. It serves as the foundation for developing multiservice manuals and refining existing training support packages (TSPs), mission training plans (MTPs), training-center and unit exercises, and service school curricula. It drives the examination of organizations and materiel developments applicable to military support of CM operations. Further, the TTP in this manual also supports Universal Joint Task List Tasks (UJTL) Strategic National (SN) 8.3.4, Perform Consequence Management in the Interagency Area; Strategic Theater (ST) Task 8.5.4, Coordinate Theater Consequence Management; and Operational (OP) Task 5.7.8, Coordinate Consequence Management in the Joint Operational Area. i

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Development Command (NWDC). Distribution is according to the military standard requisitioning and issue procedures (MILSTRIP) Desk Guide. Air Force. The US Air Force (USAF) will validate and incorporate appropriate procedures according to applicable governing directives. Distribution is according to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360. Coast Guard. The US Coast Guard (USCG) will validate and refer to appropriate procedures when applicable. No material contained herein should conflict with USCG regulations or other directives from higher authority, supersede, or replace any order or directive issued by higher authority. 5. User Information a. The US Army Chemical School developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving service commands. b. This publication reflects current service and joint doctrine and command and control (C2) organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in service protocol, appropriately reflected in service and joint publications, will be incorporated. c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and recommendation directly to— 3. Application The audience for this publication is the combatant command (COCOM); the joint task force (JTF); functional and service component staffs in foreign and domestic locations tasked with planning, preparing for, and conducting CM and crisis-management operations. For foreign operations, this MTTP is subject to applicable host-nation (HN) laws and agreements. 4. Implementation Plan Participating service command offices of primary responsibility (OPR) will review this publication, validate the information, and reference and incorporate it in service and command manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows: Army. The Army will incorporate this publication in United States (US) Army training and doctrinal publications as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is according to Department of the Army (DA) Form 12- 99-R. Marine Corps. The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Marine Corps (USMC) training and doctrinal publications as directed by the Commanding General, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Distribution is according to the Marine Corps Publication Distribution System (MCPDS). Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy (USN) training and doctrinal publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare ii

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Army Commandant US Army Chemical School ATTN: ATSN-CM-DD 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 1029 Fort Leonard Wood MO 65473-8926 COMM (573) 596-0131 extension 3-7364 Marine Corps Commanding General US Marine Corps Combat Development Command ATTN: C42 (Director) 3300 Russell Road Quantico VA 22134-5001 DSN 278-6234 COMM (703) 784-6234 Navy Commander Navy Warfare Development Command ATTN: N5 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207 DSN 948-4201 COMM (401) 841-4201 Air Force HQ Air Force Doctrine Center ATTN: DJ 216 Sweeney Boulevard Suite 109 Langley AFB VA 23665-2722 DSN 574-8091 COMM (757) 764-8091 E-mail Address: [email protected] iii

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Coast Guard 2100 Second Street, S.W. Washington DC 20593-0001 Staff Symbol G-MOR, G-OPD Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. iv

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FM 3-11.21 MCRP 3-37.2C NTTP 3-11.24 AFTTP(I) 3-2.37 FM 3-11.21 MCRP 3-37.2C NTTP 3-11.24 AFTTP(I) 3-2.37 US Training and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe, Virginia Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia Navy Warfare Development Command Newport, Rhode Island Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 12 December 2001 v

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Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... x PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................ xii Page CHAPTER I CHAPTER II CHAPTER III CHAPTER IV NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ASPECTS OF CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT Background ............................................................................................ I-1 Environment ........................................................................................ I-2 Military Role (Domestic Response) ....................................................... I-7 Military Role (Foreign Response) ...................................................... I-10 Response Measures ............................................................................ I-13 COMMAND AND CONTROL Background .......................................................................................... II-1 Domestic Operations ........................................................................... II-1 Foreign Operations .............................................................................. II-4 Other Command Considerations ........................................................ II-5 Reporting Requirements ..................................................................... II-7 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Planning and Response Concept......................................................... III-1 Deliberate Planning ........................................................................... III-1 Crisis Action Planning ....................................................................... III-3 Information Management .................................................................. III-6 Toxic Industrial Materials .................................................................. III-8 RESPONSE Background ......................................................................................... IV-1 Notification ......................................................................................... IV-3 Common Responsibilities ................................................................... IV-3 Immediate Response .......................................................................... IV-4 Critical Response Tasks ..................................................................... IV-4 Initial Response .................................................................................. IV-5 Response-Execution Considerations .................................................. IV-7 CHAPTER V RECOVERY, TRANSITION, AND REDEVELOPMENT Background .......................................................................................... V-1 Recovery Operations ............................................................................ V-1 Transition ............................................................................................. V-2 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. vi

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CHAPTER VI APPENDIX A APPENDIX B APPENDIX C Redeployment ...................................................................................... V-3 Documentation ..................................................................................... V-3 EDUCATION AND TRAINING Overview ............................................................................................. VI-1 Education ............................................................................................ VI-1 Training .............................................................................................. VI-2 Exercises ............................................................................................. VI-3 Simulation and Modeling ................................................................... VI-3 Rules of Engagement........................................................................... VI-3 Public Affairs ...................................................................................... VI-3 CONTAMINATION-AVOIDANCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES Background ..........................................................................................A-1 Preparedness .......................................................................................A-1 Response Measures .............................................................................A-4 Summary ..............................................................................................A-6 PROTECTION—INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE Individual Protection ...........................................................................B-1 Shelter/Protection In Place .................................................................B-4 Summary …………………………………………………………… ...........B-6 Expedient Actions.................................................................................B-7 DECONTAMINATION TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES Background ...........................................................................................C-1 General .................................................................................................C-1 Decontamination Basic Concepts .......................................................C-1 Decontamination Planning .................................................................C-2 Personnel and Casualty Decontamination-Station Overview............C-2 Contamination-Reduction Considerations (Personnel Decontamination-Station Operations) ...............................................C-4 Decontamination Procedures (Entry Point) (See Figure C-2)............C-5 Decontamination Procedures (SCBA Removal) (See Figure C-2) ......C-6 Decontamination Procedures (Showers) (See Figure C-2) .................C-6 Decontamination Procedures (Medical Evaluation) (See Figure C-2) ....................................................................................C-7 Casualty Decontamination .................................................................C-7 Casualty Decontamination (Triage Point) (See Figure C-3) ..............C-8 Casualty Decontamination (Emergency-Treatment Area) (See Figure C-3) ....................................................................................C-9 Casualty Decontamination (Nonambulatory Decontamination) (See Figure C-3) ....................................................................................C-9 Casualty Decontamination (Ambulatory Decontamination) (See Figure C-3) ..................................................................................C-11 Casualty Decontamination (Clean Treatment Area) (See Figure C-3) ..................................................................................C-12 Casualty Decontamination (Patient Disposition Point) vii

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APPENDIX D APPENDIX E APPENDIX F APPENDIX G APPENDIX H (See Figure C-3) ..................................................................................C-12 Casualty Decontamination (General Patient Decontamination Considerations) ..................................................................................C-13 DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE RESPONSE AGENCIES General .................................................................................................D-1 Response Agencies ...............................................................................D-1 TECHNICAL REACH-BACK CAPABILITIES Background ........................................................................................... E-1 National Response Center (NRC) and Chemical/Biological Hotline (1-800-424-8802) .................................................................................. E-1 Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) ........................................ E-2 Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) (301) 295- 0316 or (301) 295-0530; FAX (301) 295-0227 ..................................... E-2 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) (1-888-USA-RIID) .......................................................... E-3 US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (1-800-424-8802) .................................................................................. E-3 National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) (202) 324-8186...... E-3 DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE INSTALLATION FORCE-PROTECTION PLANNING CONSIDERATION Background .......................................................................................... F-1 AT/FP planning process ....................................................................... F-1 RESPONSE TO TOXIC INDUSTRIAL-MATERIALS EVENTS Background ..........................................................................................G-1 TIM-Operations Planning ....................................................................G-2 TIM Information-Management Resources .........................................G-3 Protective-Action-Zones (PAZ) Determination ...................................G-4 Vulnerability Mitigation .....................................................................G-6 TIM Precautions ..................................................................................G-7 Risk-Management Summary ..............................................................G-9 FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN FOR A TERRORISM-INCIDENT RESPONSE Background ...........................................................................................H-1 Policies .................................................................................................H-2 Situation ...............................................................................................H-3 Concept of Operations .........................................................................H-4 Responsibilities ..................................................................................H-11 Funding Guidelines ...........................................................................H-15 APPENDIX I FEDERAL RESPONSE-PLAN SUMMARY FOR EMERGENCY- SUPPORT FUNCTIONS Background ............................................................................................ I-1 Concept of Operations .......................................................................... I-2 viii

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REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... References-1 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................. Glossary-1 INDEX ................................................................................................................................ Index-1 FIGURES I-1 Tokyo Nerve-Agent Incident....................................................... I-4 I-2 DOD Response to WMD Incident .............................................. I-9 I-3 CM Foreign Response .............................................................. I-11 II-1 JTF-CS C2 Structure ........................................................ II-3 II-2 Notional CM JTF............................................................... II-5 II-3 Components of the ICS .............................................................. II-7 IV-1 Graduated-Response Overview ................................................ IV-2 IV-2 Emergency-Department Treatment of Contaminated Patients.................................................................................... IV-11 B-1 Level A Protection ......................................................................B-2 B-2 Level B Protection ......................................................................B-3 B-3 Level C Protection ......................................................................B-4 B-4 Level D Protection......................................................................B-4 C-1 Establishing Safety Zones at a Hazardous-Materials Incident Scene ............................................................................C-3 C-2 Sample Personnel Decontamination-Station Layout ...............C-4 C-3 Sample of a Casualty Decontamination Corridor Layout........ C-8 D-1 CB-RRT Capabilities..................................................................D-3 D-2 CBIRF Organizational Structure ..............................................D-8 D-3 CBIRF Incident Site Organization..........................................D-10 D-4 WMD-CST Organization..........................................................D-12 F-1 AT Planning and Response Elements ....................................... F-2 F-2 AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format)........................ F-6 H-1 Relationship Between Crisis Management and CM ................H-2 H-2 Relationship Among Federal Agencies Under PDD-39............H-3 H-3 Multiagency Crisis-Management Structures ...........................H-6 H-4 FBI JOC Structure.....................................................................H-7 H-5 Preincident CM ..........................................................................H-9 H-6 Trans-Incident CM...................................................................H-10 H-7 Postincident CM .......................................................................H-11 H-8 Relationships Among Federal Plans to Implement PDD-39 . H-14 TABLES II-1 ICS and JTF Staff Counterparts ............................................... II-6 B-1 Protection-In-Place Options.......................................................B-6 G-1 Example Hazard-Response Guide (Mixed Load/Unidentified Cargo)................................................................................. G-5 I-1 Emergency-Support-Function Designation Matrix ................... I-5 ix

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Aspects of Consequence Management (CM) Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management Chapter I introduces the definition and purpose of the NBC aspects of CM. It focuses on CM actions taken in response to an NBC incident/accident in a domestic or foreign area that requires the support of US forces. The chapter further outlines that support to civil authorities would be according to applicable federal emergency plans. It concludes with a discussion of the military’s role in either a domestic or foreign response. Command and Control Chapter II provides a delineation of C² responsibilities for domestic and foreign operations. It identifies key responsibilities for units such as the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) and addresses other command considerations for the Incident Command System (ICS) supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Planning Considerations Chapter III discusses key aspects of CM as it relates to deliberate planning and crisis- action planning. It discusses other key planning considerations such as information management (IM) and TIM. Response Chapter IV provides guidelines on response actions for a CM incident. The chapter indicates important common responsibilities for detection, assessment, and contamination- control considerations. The chapter also outlines critical response tasks during response execution. Recovery, Transition, and Redeployment Chapter V describes key aspects of preparing and executing a mission recovery plan. The transition addresses factors such as transition of responsibilities and functions to other organizations. Other key areas addressed in this chapter include requirements for providing important documentation such as documenting lessons learned and after- operation follow-up. x

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Education and Training Chapter VI addresses key education and training considerations for support of CM. It addresses key areas such as exercises and simulation and modeling that are important for individual and collective training. xi

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PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication: Joint United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center, 116 Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23535. Airland Sea Activity, 114 Andrews Street, Suite 102, Langley, VA 23665. United States Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, 1562 Mitscher Street, Suite 250, Norfolk, VA 23551. Joint Task Force Civil Support, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA 23551. United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, 116 Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23535. United States Special Operations Command, 7701 Tampa Point Boulevard, MacDill AFB, FL 33621. United States Forces Command, 1283 Anderson Way SW, Fort McPherson, GA 30330. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060. Office of Secretary of Defense, Director, Chemical/Biological Defense Programs, DATSB NCB (CP/CBD), 3050 Defense Pentagon, Room 3C257, Washington, DC 20301. Pacific Command, J54319, Camp H.M. Smith, HI 96861. Army United States Army Chemical School, 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 1029, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473. Unites States Army Medical Department Center and School, 1400 E. Grayson Street, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234. United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027. Directorate of Military Support, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310. United States Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21040. xii

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United States Army Nuclear Chemical Agency, 7150 Helter Loop, Suite 101, Springfield, VA 22150. United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. Marine Corps United States Marine Corps NBC Defense School, 1273 Iowa Avenue, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473. United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, ATTN: C42, 3300 Russell Road, Quantico, VA 22134-5001. Navy Navy Warfare Doctrine Command, 686 Cushing Road, Sims Hall, Newport, RI 02841. Navy Environmental Health Center, 2510 Walmer Avenue, Norfolk, VA 23513. Air Force Air Combat Command, 124 Andrews Street, Suite 102, Langley AFB, VA 23655. United States Air Force Civil Engineer Support Activity, 14a Barnes Drive, Suite l, Tyndall AFB, FL 32403. United States Air Force Doctrine Center, Detachment 1, 216 Sweeney Boulevard, Suite 109, Langley AFB, VA 23665. Coast Guard United States Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team, Building 5614, Doughboy Loop, Fort Dix, NJ 08640. xiii

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Chapter I NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ASPECTS OF CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 1. Background a. Consequence management is a comprehensive US counterproliferation strategy that consists of a set of mutually supporting core capabilities. These core capabilities are counterforce operations, active and passive defense, and CM operations. As part of this strategy, CM (in the context of the Federal Response Plan [FRP]) includes measures to protect public health and safety; restore essential government services; and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. Conversely, within the framework of DOD Directive (DODD) 3025.15, CM is defined as “those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes.” Such services and activities may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information planning, mass care, resources support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. As part of an overall federal response to CM, DOD assets could be notified by the NCA to provide support to a lead federal agency (LFA) such as FEMA or the Department of State (DOS) (depending on the location). Specifically, within the context of this MTTP manual, the discussion will focus on CM actions taken in response to a terrorist NBC incident/accident. b. Interagency involvement is one of the fundamental aspects of CM. DOD planners understand that other federal agencies will likely have the lead role, and there must be an understanding of their functions and terms of reference (i.e., understanding the civilian incident command system [ICS] and definitions for terms such as CM). For example, the definitions for CM will vary depending on the source document (i.e., FRP versus DODD 3025.15). NOTE: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 defines the LFA as the federal department or agency assigned lead responsibility to manage and coordinate a specific function, crisis, or CM. c. US forces may be required to support civil authorities in domestic or foreign situations/incidents due to deliberate or unintentional use of NBC weapons or materials. Commanders must prepare an appropriate response to meet the full spectrum of NBC incidents, both deliberate and unintentional, to support civilian, HN, or military installation recovery. Support to civil authorities from DOD would be according to applicable federal emergency plans and would likely require coordination and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and individuals outside the military’s chain of command or direct control. A joint force commander (JFC)/JTF may be in a supporting role to the US ambassador and his Country Team or to a LFA such as the US FEMA. The JTF’s task organization will likely be a composite organization of conventional forces (i.e., security, support elements, etc.) and units with specialized capabilities such as explosive-ordnance- disposal or other special-response teams. I-1

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(1) Support Role (Foreign). The primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of a foreign incident resides with a HN government. If the HN government would request US assistance, DOS serves as the LFA. DOD support could be part of the US response and would be coordinated through the appropriate chief of mission (COM) and the country team. DOD assets would be under the command of the applicable geographic combatant commander, and all US-government support would be coordinated by the resident COM and the country team. (2) Support Role (Domestic). As directed in PDD-39, FEMA is the LFA for CM. DOD support to FEMA (as the LFA for CM) could be to render “technical-operations” support to identify, assess, dismantle, transfer, and dispose of a contaminant or conduct decontamination operations. For example, decontamination operations may be conducted by military units to support casualty decontamination or for support of long-term restoration operations. Additionally, an incident involving an NBC environment would likely require a response according to a specific federal emergency operations plan (OPLAN) (FRP, National Contingency Plan [NCP], Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan [FRERP], etc.). These plans designate a LFA to coordinate the federal response. The type of emergency determines the LFA. In general, an LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct support to the LFA. Appendix I shows the LFA for each of the designated emergency support functions (ESFs) in the FRP. In only one case (Public Works and Engineering) is DOD (Army Corps of Engineers) the LFA. In all other ESFs, DOD provides support but does not lead. d. For DOD’s support role (domestic or foreign), JFCs conduct planning to meet the various NBC and radiological threats. The actions of the JFC could include measures to anticipate, prevent, and resolve a terrorist threat or incident. 2. Environment a. Potential Adversaries. (1) Potential adversaries who might possess NBC capabilities include nation- state and nonstate groups. Nation-state and some nonstate groups have traditional territorial and population bases of power. Other nonstate groups rely on the shared interests and capabilities of members and are relatively unfettered either by geographic and political boundaries or the international norms of state conduct. Nonstate groups can also include terrorist (see Figure I-1); guerrilla and criminal organizations; and individuals with the motivation and resources to hold US interests, forces, allies, designated friends, and nonstate actors at risk. Nation-states may threaten to use or use NBC capabilities against nonstate groups within their country. In 1988, shortly after the first Gulf War, Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurds, a minority ethnic group in Iraq seeking autonomy. Shortly after the second Gulf War, Iraq threatened to use chemical weapons against rebellious Kurds and Shiite Moslems. Only through the threat of US military intervention was Iraq deterred from carrying out its threat. In the event of a future incident, the US needs the option to be prepared to conduct foreign CM in a nonpermissive environment. I-2

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(2) Regional powers may use NBC weapons for coercion or aggression against US allies or other friendly states. Armed adversaries may also directly or indirectly threaten US forces, citizens, and other interests. Transnational and nonstate groups with NBC capabilities may pose similar threats abroad and to the US homeland. States with these capabilities may succumb to internal turmoil that creates the possibility of NBC or radiological dispersal device (RDD) events within their territory or smuggling of NBC materials or weapons to other states or nonstate groups. (3) Civilian populations, critical infrastructures, and unwarned and unprotected military forces are especially vulnerable. Joint and multinational operations, in areas where indigenous friendly forces and populations have less protection than US forces, are similarly vulnerable. Adversaries may employ NBC weapons to assail these vulnerabilities and to seek to overcome the advantages of the US operational method— superior leader development and training, technology, combat doctrine, and high operating tempo. In so doing, adversaries may believe they can dictate the terms of the conflict to the disadvantage of the US. (4) An adversary may have incentives to employ or threaten to employ NBC weapons, thus seeking to deter US intervention and attempting to gain an early tactical advantage. During a MOOTW situation, an adversary could employ NBC weapons to prevent, limit, or reverse US involvement and fracture coalition public support and unity. Late in a conflict or as a last resort, an adversary could employ or threaten to employ NBC weapons to avoid defeat and influence the terms of conflict termination. (5) Adversaries may deliver weapons by conventional delivery means, by special-operations forces (SOF), or through the use of terrorists. Potential adversary objectives and targets could include civilian populations and infrastructures, as well as military forces and facilities, home and abroad. Clandestine attacks could seek to cause terror among the populace, alter the political objectives of the US and its coalition partners, and take revenge against US and coalition actions. Adversaries with long-range delivery means could seek to deny the US forces a sanctuary, hold civilian populations and infrastructures hostage, and retaliate directly against the US and coalition partners distant from the area of conflict. (6) The threat for foreign and domestic operations is increasingly nonlinear and unpredictable. In the event that DOD is required to support CM, timely information and intelligence is critical. Given the case of the Tokyo Subway incident (see Figure I-1) and other terrorist incidents, procedures must be in place to detect, identify, and mitigate the effects of these types of weapons. Terrorist threats must be recognized as legitimate and planned for accordingly. The threat could include conventional explosive devices with NBC materials. I-3

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DEATH IN THE SUBWAY Until last week, Kasumasa Takahashi was just another faceless Japanese bureaucrat, the deputy stationmaster at Kasumigaseki subway station in central Tokyo. The blue-suited mandarins of the nation’s key ministries who poured from the commuter trains every morning were his customers: Takahashi took their tickets, pointed them up the proper escalators and kept the sprawling station - where three major subway lines converge - so clean that the white gloves he wore on the job were seldom soiled. Then last Monday, suddenly and quietly, the 50-year old career subway man became a hero. The 8:14 a.m. Chiyoda Line train bound for Yoyogi- Uehara pulled in on track 5 with an obvious problem. Passengers were spilling out of its first car with tears streaming, choking, some foaming at the mouth. Takashashi walked into the car, picked up a foul-smelling, 6- inch high package wrapped in newspaper and carried it onto the platform. Drops began leaking from it onto the platform tiles, and Takashashi started to mop them up with his handkerchief. Then, he collapsed and lost consciousness. The man whose son and brother were also subway workers never came out of the coma, and he died later that day in a nearby hospital. The poisonous nerve gas that killed Takashashi and nine other Japanese and injured more than 5,000 was Sarin (GB), invented by the Nazis and applied with deadly efficiency, suggested Japanese authorities, by members of Aum Shrinrikyo, an apocalyptic religious sect. In the following days, gas-masked police, accompanied by a few Japanese military personnel and several caged canaries used to detect deadly fumes, raided two dozen sites throughout Japan where sect members lived. They made several arrests and seized bags and barrels of chemicals - tons of toxic material in all - which authorities said could be used to make Sarin. For the rest of the world, the deadly Tokyo attack was yet another shocking reminder of how vulnerable most societies are to terrorism. The weapon wasn’t an exotic nuclear device, but a relatively unsophisticated mixture of chemical agents, most of them readily available. And the alleged perpetrator was not a distant hostile government closely watched by intelligence agencies but a shadowy, global and unpredictable religious band. SOURCE: Mike Tharp, U.S. New & World Report, April 3, 1995 Figure I-1. Tokyo Nerve-Agent Incident b. Use of NBC Materials. I-4

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(1) Nuclear-Materials Incident. An adversary could use nuclear materials to cause blast, thermal, radioactive, and/or electromagnetic effects on personnel or property. The shock waves and high pressures cause damage; thermal radiation can cause burns and secondary fires; and ionizing radiation is likely to be the main cause of casualties. (2) Biological Incident. A biological incident may result from any device or vector that intentionally uses or carries bacteria, viruses, or toxins to cause mass casualties. The means of dissemination of these agents encompass four primary methods of entry into the body: inhalation, ingestion, absorption, and injection. While inhalation and ingestion are the most common methods of infection, casualties resulting from absorption or injection are also possible. Many of these agents, such as cholera or anthrax, are easily adapted for use as a terrorist weapon; only the biological agent and an effective dispersal system are required. Some dispersal methods, such as using an aerosol spray, can spread agents over vast areas and affect large numbers of people. Biological agents typically have a delayed onset of signs or symptoms, aiding migration, hampering identification, and complicating decontamination. As such, response forces may inadvertently spread the agent and escalate the incident rather than contain it. (3) Chemical Incident. Chemical incidents can be caused by any device that uses nerve, blister, blood, choking, or irritating chemical agents, or TIC, to produce mass casualties. Chemical agents typically are effective via inhalation, ingestion, or absorption (injection is also possible but less likely). c. NBC Materials Incidents/Accidents. Large-scale challenges can arise from incidents/accidents involving the release of NBC materials. In the following paragraphs are brief descriptions of incidents that occurred in India, the former Soviet Union, and Iraq. (1) Bhopal Incident. To illustrate the potential for disaster from an inadvertent incident associated with a TIC, the Bhopal Indian Incident is a classic study. On December 3, 1984, over 40 tons of methyl isocynate (MIC) and hydrogen cyanide leaked from a pesticide plant at the northern end of Bhopal into the surrounding city of one million people. The leak was caused by a series of operator errors. These chemicals are but two of the many extremely TIC that are manufactured and stored in facilities across the world. Bhopal has been called the “Hiroshima of the Chemical Industry.” According to the Bhopal Peoples Health and Documentation Clinic (BPHDC), 8,000 people were killed in its immediate aftermath and over 500,000 people suffered from injuries. (2) Sverdlovsk Incident. In April 1979 at a Soviet military facility about two and one-half miles from Sverdlovsk, USSR (now Ekaterinburg), an accidental release of biological material occurred. A few days later, some of the townspeople started developing fevers, chills, and other symptoms and some were complaining about chest pains. As time passed, more individuals started displaying these same symptoms and some of the earlier victims died. Attending medical personnel diagnosed this occurrence as an outbreak of anthrax. Eventually, 77 cases of anthrax were reported, with 66 deaths resulting. The autopsies listed anthrax as the cause of death. In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin admitted that the nearby military installation had been part of an offensive biological weapon program and that an epidemic had been caused by an unintentional release of 1 to 2 kilograms of anthrax spores during the process of uploading artillery shells. I-5

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(3) The Chernobyl Disaster. On April 26, 1986 at 1:23 a.m., local time, technicians at the Chernobyl Power Plant in Ukraine (former Soviet Union) allowed the power in the fourth reactor to fall to low levels as part of a controlled experiment, which went wrong. The reactor overheated causing a meltdown of the core. Two explosions blew the top off the reactor building releasing clouds of deadly radioactive material in the atmosphere for over 10 days. The people of Chernobyl were exposed to radioactivity 100 times greater than the Hiroshima bomb. The people of northern Europe were exposed to clouds of radioactive material being blown northward through the sky. Seventy percent of the radiation is estimated to have fallen on Belarus. It is estimated that over 15 million people have been affected by the disaster in some way. More than 600,000 people were involved with the cleanup—many of whom are now dead or sick. The health impact of the Chernobyl accident can be classified in terms of acute health effects and of late health effects; moreover, there are also psychological effects, which can influence health. All the acute health effects occurred among the personnel of the plant or in those persons brought in for fire-fighting and immediate clean-up operations. Two deaths were immediately associated with the accident, one person was killed by the explosion and another suffered a coronary thrombosis. A third person died early the morning of the accident from thermal burns. Twenty-eight other persons died later in the treatment centers, bringing the total to 31 deaths in the first weeks after the accident. All symptomatic exposed persons from the site were placed in hospitals. Of the total 499 persons admitted for observation, 237 of these were initially diagnosed as suffering from acute radiation syndrome and most of these were hospitalized in the first 24 hours. The severity and rapidity of onset of their symptoms depended on their dose. The initial early signs and symptoms of radiation sickness from high doses included diarrhea, vomiting, fever and erythema. In the highest exposure group, the first reaction was usually vomiting, occurring within 15 to 30 minutes of exposure. These patients were desperately ill; fever and intoxication as well as diarrhea and vomiting were prominent features. Mucous membranes were severely affected— becoming swollen, dry, and ulcerated—making breathing and swallowing extremely painful and difficult. Extensive thermal and beta-radiation burns often complicated the illness. Within the first two weeks, white blood cells and platelets fell dramatically, indicating a very high dose of radiation. This compromised the production of blood cells in the bone marrow, making it virtually impossible for the patients to fight infection or to retain the natural clotting activity of the blood. Almost all the patients with such high doses died (20 of 21) in spite of the intensive specialized medical treatment provided. At lower exposures, the symptoms, signs and laboratory findings improved. Vomiting began later, platelet and white blood-cell counts did not drop so precipitously, and the fever and toxemia were less pronounced. Beta-radiation burns to the skin were a major complicating factor, and mucous-membrane damage was difficult to treat. However, survival improved markedly at lower doses, so that no early deaths were noted in the less-exposure group. (4) Kurdish Incident. In 1988, following the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein deliberately employed chemical weapons against the Kurdish ethnic group in Iraq. In September 1988, two congressional staffers from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted interviews at five refugee camps in southeastern Turkey. The following is an excerpt of testimony related to the incident: “At 6:00 a.m. on August 25, 1988, eight planes flew over our village. All eight dropped weapons … when they dropped the bombs, a big sound did not come out -- just a yellowish color and a kind of garlic smell. The people awoke, and some of them fainted. Those who poured water on themselves lived; those who could not reach water died. I went to the river. Almost 50 women died. Some I-6

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died who went to help their families. Seventy-five people died.” In the entire area, thousands of people may have perished. Immediately after the chemical warfare (CW) attack, 60,000 to 100,000 Kurds fled across the Iraq-Turkish border. Among them was Dr. Yossef Hamed, a Kurdish physician. The following comment describes his experience: “People died under my hands. It took us one week to walk here. I think in that time I saw 200 people die from chemical weapons. There are thousands dead . . . At Ismasewa, three people were suffering from what I believe was nerve gas. They were hallucinating and could not move in a straight line. They vomited continuously and had severe spasms of the body.” d. Summary. There are critical points to consider in these types of operations. They can occur in a domestic or foreign area in an operation other than war; may involve deliberate or inadvertent intent and will likely occur without advance notice; and may in the case of advertent use in a foreign area, require forced entry. 3. Military Role (Domestic Response) This section briefly addresses how the federal government might respond in the event of an incident with DOD assets such as the JTF-CS. The military’s role in domestic support operations (DSO) and for support of crisis management and CM is also briefly discussed. a. Introduction. The military’s role in domestic emergencies is well defined and, by law, is limited in scope and duration. Military resources temporarily support and augment, but do not replace local, state, and federal civilian agencies that have primary authority and responsibility for domestic disaster assistance. The employment of military forces has a myriad of legal considerations. Commanders prepare for disaster crisis-management and CM operations by understanding the appropriate laws, policies, and directives that govern employment of the military. Specifically, there are legal considerations that should be considered. (1) Stafford Act (42 USC 5121). The Stafford Act gives the federal government the authority to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property. This assistance requires reimbursement to DOD for the incremental costs of providing support. Approval authority and reporting requirements vary, depending on the duration and type of support requested. (2) Constitutional Responsibility. The US Constitution allows for the use of the military to execute or enforce the law when necessary to protect federal or civilian property and functions. For example, Limited Military Support to Law Enforcement Agencies (MSLEA) Title 10 USC allows the military to share information and provide equipment, facilities, and other services to law-enforcement agencies (LEAs); however, DOD units must comply with the directions found in DODD 3025.15 before providing support to civil LEAs. (3) Command Authority. In the event of an emergency or an attack (as described in DODD 3025.1 and DODD 3025.15), a commander may legally assist civil authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property I-7

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damage under immediate serious conditions before a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. b. Federal Response. (1) When directed to do so, DOD responds to domestic emergencies according to the FRP and any other supporting plans as tasked by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Coordinated by FEMA, the FRP is the most important of these plans. Along with DOD, 26 other federal agencies provide support when the FRP is fully implemented. The FRP is an umbrella plan to guide federal support to state and local governments. It outlines federal, including DOD, responsibilities and provides the framework for coordinating civil-military requirements. (2) Following a Presidential declaration of an emergency/a disaster declaration under the provisions of the FRP, the President appoints a federal coordinating officer (FCO) to manage the federal assistance efforts. The defense coordinating officer (DCO) is appointed by the supporting commander in chief (CINC) and serves as the principal DOD point of contact (POC) at the Disaster Field Office (DFO) for providing military support. The commander, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), as the lead operational authority, may task a US Continental Army (First and Fifth US) to conduct planning and coordination for disasters and domestic emergencies as well as to appoint DCOs following a disaster declaration. The DCO supervises the defense coordinating element (DCE) and, at the discretion of the CINC, the DCO may assume control of all federal military units involved in the disaster. However, the severity of an incident could warrant the deployment of the JTF-CS (see paragraph c) to render comprehensive support (see Figure I-2). I-8

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Federal Response Plan Consequence Mgt Director FEMA FEMA HQ Emergency Spt Tm Federal NCA SECDEF Crisis Mgt Attorney General OSD E X O R D CJCS JS USJFCOM JSOTF FBI OSC Disaster Field Office SCO FCO DCO JTF-CS INCIDENT Incident Cdr & First Responders Local Units Responding Chain of Command Chain of Command Coordination Coordination State Governor EOC TAG WMD CST, Other NG & State Assets City Mayor EOC Figure I-2. DOD Response to WMD Incident c. Joint Task Force-Civil Support. According to the JTF-CS Implementation Plan, approved September 23, 1999, the SECDEF established the JTF-CS to support LFAs in responding to WMD threats, incidents, and national security special events (See Figure I- 2). The JTF-CS concept uses a small, permanent staff to execute daily operations involved in shaping, responding, and preparing for DOD’s crisis management and CM WMD response. Once the JTF is given an operational tasking to deploy or respond, the small, permanent staff is augmented with trained staff personnel to perform the necessary functions required of a deployed JTF headquarters (see Chapter II for more information on the JTF-CS). d. Domestic-Support Operations. DSO are generally conducted in three stages: response, recovery, and restoration. The military’s primary role is in the response stage. As the operation moves into the final stage (restoration), their role steadily decreases. Response activities by JTF-CS assets will likely focus on those actions to save lives, preserve life and safety, protect property, and prevent further damage to the environment (Response operations are addressed in detail in Chapter IV). Recovery activities begin the process of reestablishing the infrastructure and services. Restoration is a long-term process that eventually returns the community/installation to its predisaster state. I-9

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e. CM Planning in Support of Crisis Management. Joint forces may conduct CM planning in support of an LFA during crisis-management operations. Normally, these operations may be conducted in support of the following types of situations: (1) National Security Special Events. When an event has been designated by the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury as a “national security special event,” the LFA’s request for DOD assistance goes to the DOD Executive Secretary and, upon SECDEF’s approval, joint forces deploy in support of the LFA, as required. During national security special events, such as the 1996 Atlanta, Georgia, Olympic Games, the LFA could be conducting routine surveillance and tracking operations while the JTF staff does generic planning and predictive analysis. If a significant threat is identified, planning and unit alert postures can be adjusted, as necessary. Since this operation is typically well forecasted, the C2 relationships within DOD will be established before the event. The JFC will be prepared to provide C2 of all or any portion of DOD forces deployed in support of the event except the JSOTF and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). NOTE: For more information on JSOTF operations, duties, and responsibilities, see JP 3-05.3. (2) Short-Notice Events. Should a significant threat be identified, joint forces, when directed by SECDEF, deploy in support of the LFA to plan for CM. The tasks to be accomplished will focus on detailed planning, predictive analysis, and adjusting alert postures for CM units should it be needed. During this mission, the LFA (typically the FBI) will be conducting crisis management operations. Since this operation is typically reactive in nature, any DOD forces deployed in support of CM planning will normally be assigned operational control (OPCON) to the JFC, unless exempted by higher authority. f. Consequence Management. As with combat operations, planning for CM requires mission analysis and command-estimate processes to clearly define potential threats, including NBC weapons and other toxic materials, and associated vulnerabilities. Further planners (JFC or installation) realize that CM measures could be undertaken for support of domestic or foreign operations. Overall, the purpose of DOD CM operations is to minimize the impact of the incident on a specific area of operations. These CM plans are also visibly and successfully exercised periodically in order to enhance the credibility of US deterrence on potential adversaries. Commanders understand their responsibility to coordinate with applicable civilian authorities and agencies to prevent and, if necessary, mitigate and manage the consequences of deliberate or accidental NBC employment or similar toxic material incidents. This process is aided in the US as detailed interagency processes (contained in documents such as the FRP and/or the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan) guide the US Armed Forces in providing MACA to such events. 4. Military Role (Foreign Response) For foreign operations, the DOS and the US ambassador coordinate US activities through the Country Team (see Figure I-3), with US-agency representation (including the DOD) as required in the specific situation. The military chain-of-command from the NCA to the JFC remains in effect, even though a non-DOD agency (i.e., the DOS) may have I-10

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overall lead responsibility for NBC-related CM actions. To support the foreign elements, response elements such as the JTAC or FEST (composed of specialized personnel) are available to US force commanders for assistance in conducting CM actions to mitigate and manage the consequences of an NBC attack or other toxic-material contamination. Foreign CM operations can be designed around five basic phases: situation assessment and preparation, immediate assistance, extended operations, disengagement/handover, and redeployment. SECDEF SECDEF Joint Staff Joint Staff USJFCOM US JFC NCA USAID/OFDA DHHS-PHS DOE Recommended USG Aid Package DOSDOS Ambassador Ambassador FEST FEST CMRT CMRT Request for Assistance JTAC/Follow-on Forces JTF-CM Assigned Forces HN Regional CINC Regional CINC Figure I-3. CM Foreign Response a. Phase 1, Situation Assessment and Preparation. Actions during this phase could include— (1) Determining the incident type. (2) Conducting a mission analysis and the activation of the C2 structure and/or CM assets for an immediate response. (3) Determining the availability of combatant command theater and continental US (CONUS)-based assets. (4) Determining the adequacy of existing HN plans to resolve WMD incidents and the status of HN, allied, international, and nongovernmental assets responding to the incident. (5) Determining the status and the availability of required movement assets. I-11

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(6) Conducting necessary medical preparation of US forces and perform initial disease and environmental health threat assessments on deploying forces and the local civilian population. (7) Preparing initial public-affairs (PA) guidance and plan formulation. (8) Identifying deficiencies in the status of forces agreements (SOFA) that provide for the protection of US personnel. (9) Identifying and preparing the required forces for deployment. Establishing liaison with HN and allied/coalition assets. b. Phase 2, Immediate Assistance. Actions during this phase could include— (1) Deploying the required forces. (2) Preparing to assume responsibility for the transportation of a recovered weapon to a point of disposition. (3) Assisting HN forces in isolating the incident area. (4) Collecting and analyzing samples. (5) Determining the downwind/fallout hazard. (6) Assisting HN forces in evacuating civilians from the incident site and the surrounding area to facilitate operations. (7) Providing security for relief personnel and facilities involved in the incident response. (8) Providing advice and assistance to local medical authorities. Assist the HN in monitoring disease/injury trends (epidemiological surveillance) and in performing disease and environmental health threat assessments. (9) Assisting HN forces in conducting triage and providing emergency medical treatment for initial casualties. (10) Assisting HN forces in providing mortuary support. (11) Assisting with search-and-rescue (SAR) operations. (12) Assisting with fire-fighting operations. (13) Assisting the HN in decontaminating personnel, equipment, and facilities involved in initial-response operations. I-12

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(14) Assisting HN forces in initiating a public information campaign to provide necessary information to affected civilians, as well as global and regional media. (15) Establishing a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to coordinate military operations with the civilian response effort. c. Phase 3, Extended CM Operations. Actions during this phase could include— (1) Continuing to assist the HN in isolating the incident area. (2) Being prepared to receive additional forces based on the NCA’s decision and the severity of the incident. The geographic combatant command’s initial response force will assume control of follow-on DOD forces and deployed military assets. (3) Assisting the HN in establishing displaced civilian centers (DCCs) with adequate shelter and food for civilians affected by the incident area. (4) Assisting HN forces with mortuary affairs and casualty recovery, classification, and processing. (5) Assisting in the removal and the disposal of contaminated debris. (6) Assisting in infrastructure repair. (7) Assisting the HN with reconstruction efforts to minimize long-term disruption to the civilian population. (8) Assisting HN forces in decontaminating US, HN, and allied personnel and equipment engaged in CM operations. (9) Continuing to assist the HN with PA and psychological-operations campaigns. d. Phase 4, Disengagement and Handover. Based on NCA guidance, hand off operations to HN forces to complete the CM mission. e. Phase 5, Redeployment. CM forces redeploy according to applicable command guidance. 5. Response Measures The US military uses the NBC defense principles of contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination to support civil authorities during CM operations. These principles help the military response elements facilitate a standard response to an incident. a. Contamination Avoidance. Measures such as detection, warning, and contamination control can be undertaken to support a military response. (See Appendix A for further information on contamination-avoidance measures). During peacetime, units I-13

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undertake selected measures (i.e., vulnerability reduction measures, drills and exercises to support crisis-management and CM preparation, etc.) to maintain readiness. These actions are generally taken as part of an integrated approach to exercise established programs/plans. These preparedness actions can take many forms. Possible measures could include— (1) Conducting assessments of vulnerabilities that could compromise preparedness given the potential threat against various targets, military, and/or civilians. (2) Performing assessments of the threat. Commanders also assess the criticality of key infrastructures that are essential for functions such as staging and deploying operations. (3) Exercising antiterrorism/force-protection (AT/FP) plans to provide a maximum deterrent effect on potential adversaries. Commanders also coordinate with civilian authorities and agencies to ensure that applicable measures such as Mutual Aid Agreements are in place to ensure a fully coordinated response. (4) Accomplishing key measures to further reduce vulnerability through: enforcing operational security; maintaining emergency response plans; ensuring that FP capabilities and redundancy in capability are identified; maintaining NBC defense equipment; conducting joint and interagency planning (i.e., coordinating with FEMA and DOS); and conducting assessments to ensure that response elements (active and reserve components) are properly trained and/or certified for crisis-management or CM operations. b. Protection. NBC protection conserves capability by providing individual and collective-protection. Protective measures are further discussed in Appendix B. (1) Individual protective measures can include the use of individual protective equipment (IPE) (protective masks and clothing), medical prophylaxis, pretreatment, antidotes, or other medical treatments. For example, wearing a properly fitted protective mask provides respiratory tract protection, and wearing the protective ensemble provides virtually complete protection against a biological aerosol attack. Some other protective measures may include the use of field expedients. In summary, essential individual protective guidance involves two basic elements: adhering to the levels of protection established at the incident site and respecting the boundaries that establish control zones to minimize or preclude exposure to contaminants. (2) Collective protection will likely not be used for support of CM operations because activities such as the incident command (IC) will be positioned outside the hazardous areas. Select locations (i.e., high-value C2 facilities) may use collective protective equipment as a norm, or preincident planning (before a National Security Event) may result in the use of collective protective equipment. However, IPE will be the primary means of protection in contaminated areas. Available collective protective equipment does provide a toxic-free area (TFA) for conducting operations and performing life-support functions such as eating and resting. Contamination transfer into the TFA could compromise the health and safety of all occupants and jeopardize their ability to support the mission. When collective protection is not available, building occupants gain limited protection by closing all windows and doors; turning off air-handling systems; and moving I-14

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to closed, inner rooms. With advanced warning, occupants can increase protection by sealing windows, doors, and openings although the building or space may quickly become uninhabitable without cooling or ventilation. c. Decontamination. Decontamination (or decon) operations support the postattack restoration of forces and operations to a near-normal capability. As forces don NBC protective equipment, mission degradation will occur. This degradation continues until forces can resume operations without wearing IPE. Decon can help minimize the time that forces/response personnel are in protective equipment by reducing, neutralizing, or destroying NBC hazards on personnel and mission-essential resources. Since decon actions are labor intense and assets are limited, commanders must prioritize decon requirements and decontaminate only what is necessary. Commanders may choose to defer decontamination of some items, and depending on the agent type and weather conditions, to defer the use of equipment and/or allow natural weathering effects (temperature, wind, and sunlight) to reduce hazards. Further, the extent and time required for decontamination depends on the situation, mission, and degree of contamination. Decontamination measures are further discussed in Appendix C. I-15

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Chapter II COMMAND AND CONTROL 1. Background Effective C2 is essential to fully use available assets in accomplishing CM missions. C2 relationships in CM may be tailored to a particular situation whether domestic or foreign. Unity of effort focuses on the commander’s intent and in maintaining coordination with the LFA. In summary, an effective C2 system supports the synchronization of military and civilian-agency operations to ensure an effective and efficient response to CM operations. 2. Domestic Operations a. The USJFCOM established the JTF-CS as a C2 HQ responsible for the planning and execution of military support to civil authorities (MSCA) for CM of WMD incidents within the 48 contiguous states. The principles that guide a JTF-CS operation include the following: (1) The JTF-CS will always operate in support of a LFA and will participate as a follow-on CM force behind first responders and local/state assets. (2) The JTF-CS will respond when the President issues a federal emergency/disaster declaration and the NCA approves an execution order (EXORD) through the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for their assistance. (3) The JTF-CS will operate within the guidelines of current plans and procedures used by the LFA, such as the FRP that FEMA uses. (4) FEMA is the LFA for domestic CM. The FBI is the LFA for domestic crisis management. Subject to SECDEF’s approval, the JTF-CS may provide support to other LFAs in certain circumstances. (5) The JTF-CS does not duplicate the technical response capabilities that currently exist throughout DOD and the federal government. (6) The JTF-CS is organized and trained to rapidly tailor the scale and character of its response to the requirements of the LFA. (7) The JTF-CS’s relationship to the LFA in a WMD CM mission will parallel the lines of coordination and cooperation that currently exist for any disaster-response mission involving a DOD response. The JTF-CS will generally assume OPCON over designated DOD forces as well as the DCO and his staff. (8) The JTF-CS establishes effective administrative controls for documenting approval/disapproval of expenditures from the Disaster Emergency Relief Fund. After initial-response operations begin, the JTF-CS submits an estimate of the total funding requirements for the duration of the disaster operations. The JTF-CS responds only to II-1

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validated requests for assistance (RFA), captures all costs for support provided, and requests timely and suitable reimbursement from the LFA according to the FRP or other appropriate authorities. (9) The technical augmentation cell (TAC) serves as the JTF-CS special staff for coordinating and managing chemical-biological (CB) defense response support for an incident. The TAC consists of technical personnel from agencies such as the Chemical- Biological-Rapid-Response Team (CB-RRT), the Defense Threat-Reduction Agency, and the USMC Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). This cell provides technical advice and assessments to the technical response assets to address CM operations at an incident, as necessary. b. The JTF-CS will be the USJFCOM standing JTF HQ for all WMD CM within the US and its territories and possessions. In this role, when directed by the SECDEF through USCINCJFCOM, the JTF-CS will assume OPCON of allocated DOD forces (less United States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] elements and USACE assets) responding to WMD incidents in support of the LFA. (1) The JTF-CS is organized on a functional basis, as defined in JP 0-2. The USJFCOM exercises COCOM over the JTF-CS. The USJFCOM organizes the JTF-CS, as necessary, to perform CM WMD missions and may elect to assign other forces, over which it exercises COCOM, to the JTF-CS. The SECDEF, through the CJCS, apportions forces (not currently assigned to the COCOM) to the USJFCOM for CM planning and operations. (2) When delegated OPCON of DOD forces, the JTF-CS will coordinate with the USJFCOM to ensure that adequate C2 elements are requested and established to handle the potentially large numbers of DOD forces provided for CM responses. Additionally, other task force (TF) HQ could be subordinate to the JTF-CS for planning and execution of CM operations (see Figure II-1). When the JTF-CS conducts a CM operation, another TF HQ may be employed, operating either as an integral part of the JTF-CS or as a separate HQ. As with other designated DOD forces, the commander of the JTF-CS is designated by the appropriate authority to command this TF. II-2

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Governor EOC TAG CINC IAJOC Disaster Field Office SCO FCO DCO All RFAs JTF-CS Commander Staff TAC Reach-back TACON TF Liaison Base Support Installation(s) Installation(s) Installation(s) ARFOR AFFOR NAVFOR MARFOR TF LOG TF MED Chain of Command Chain of Command Coordination Coordination TACON TACON DoD WMD Labs Subordinate TF As Needed Figure II-1. JTF-CS C2 Structure (3) For CM operations conducted in the 48 contiguous states, the USJFCOM is the supported combatant commander for all DOD forces except USSOCOM and USACE assets. For operations in these areas, the JTF-CS, if employed, operates under the OPCON of the USJFCOM. (4) For CM operations conducted in Puerto Rico or the US Virgin Islands, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO) is the supported combatant commander for all DOD forces except USSOCOM and USACE assets. For operations in these areas, the JTF-CS, if employed, operates under the OPCON of the USCINCSO. (5) For CM operations conducted in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American Samoa, or any of the US possessions or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in the Pacific area of responsibility, the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) is the supported combatant commander for all DOD forces except USSOCOM and USACE assets. For operations in these areas, the JTF-CS, if employed, operates under the OPCON of the USPACOM. (6) During an incident, the JTF-CS exercises OPCON over the DCO and the DCE. The DCO continues to operate in the DFO in close coordination with the FCO, the senior FEMA authority on the scene. II-3

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(7) As required, the JTF-CS establishes liaison with the state’s adjutant general and direct liaison with NG assets such as the WMD-CSTs. For example, WMD- CSTs are Title 32 NG assets employed by the state/territorial governor to assess the size and the specific nature of the situation. Further, other coordination (see Figure II-1) occurs through the DFO. This office serves as a focal point for coordination between the state and defense coordination officers for receipt of actions such as validated RFAs. (8) Examples of implied operational tasks for the JTF-CS could include identifying contaminated areas, conducting surveys of and identifying NBC hazards, supporting medical operations, and providing logistics support. 3. Foreign Operations a. Based on the size and the nature of a response to a foreign WMD incident, a geographic combatant commander may designate a JTF to conduct the operation. This brief section provides an overview of a typical JTF HQ staff. The geographic combatant commander develops the mission statement and concept of operations (CONOPS) based upon the direction of the NCA. Input—including requests from the DOS, situational factors, and the time military forces enter the area—affects the mission statement. The geographic combatant commander develops a list of requisite capabilities and tasks his components to identify capable forces. The components establish the force list (e.g., personnel, equipment, and supplies) and movement requirements. The geographic combatant commander approves or disapproves the components’ force lists, establishes the JTF HQ, assigns approved forces to the JTF, and determines the command relationships. b. The geographic combatant commander establishes the JTF when the mission has a specified, limited objective and does not require centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF requires the execution of responsibilities and the close integration of effort involving two or more services. The JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created is achieved. JP 3-0 provides general guidance relating to joint operations and JP 5-00.2 provides information on the JTF. JP 4-0 provides general guidance for logistics support of joint operations. c. The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations with a commander, command element, and forces required to execute the mission. The primary purpose of the JTF HQ is command, control, and administration of the JTF. During operations, the JTF HQ provides the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. See Figure II-2 for an example of a JTF staff organization. II-4

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4. Other Command Considerations a. The ICS is a FEMA-supported civilian system used to manage operations at a domestic incident site. The ICS is commonly used by civilian local and state organizations that respond to hazardous-material (HAZMAT) (i.e., WMD, etc.) incidents, and its use is becoming standardized in all civilian emergency operations. The principles of the ICS include the following: (1) Modular Organization. DOD personnel must understand how and where they “plug into” the existing ICS structure when they arrive on scene. CINC JTF Commander Staff TAC DoD WMD Labs Reach-back TACON TF Liaison Base Support Base Installation(s) Support Base Installation Support Installation ARFOR AFFOR NAVFOR TF LOG TF MED TF GEOGRAPHIC Subordinate TF As Needed Chain of Command Chain of Command Coordination Coordination TACON TACON Figure II-2. Notional CM JTF (2) Integrated Communications. The incident commander should have an established, integrated communications plan and standing operating procedures to ensure that information distribution and active frequency management is enforced. An effective communications plan supports functions such as the conduct of liaison and the coordination of mitigation plans. (3) Unity of Command. Responders report to one designated person. (4) Unified-Command (UC) Structure. All responding agencies must have a common set of incident objectives and strategy. (5) Consolidated Incident Action Plans. The incident commander and his planning section should have a clear view of the future action plan to support the end state of the operation. II-5

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(6) Use of Common Terminology. Use of common terminology helps to ensure a coordinated response action and also supports standardization and consistency. (7) Span of Control. Safety as well as sound management influence and dictate span-of-control considerations. Within the ICS, the span of control of an individual with emergency management responsibility should range from three to seven subordinates. b. The ICS is a modular system that uses common terminology and implements incident action plans in five component (functional) areas: command, operations, logistics, planning, and finance/administration (see Figure II-3). c. Further, there will generally be a need for the civilian incident commander’s staff to coordinate with a supporting JTF staff on technical, operational, or logistics issues. The coordination points between the ICS and a JTF staff could be conducted through staff- to-staff interaction or could be through a CMOC. (1) Staff-to-Staff Coordination. As the ICS terms in Figure II-3 imply, Table II-1 represents what could be the focal points for staff interaction between ICS and JTF staff organizations (see Appendix A for more information on incident management system [IMS] command and staff functions and responsibilities). Table II-1. ICS and JTF Staff Counterparts ICS Command Operations Logistics Planning Communications Finance Law Enforcement JTF Commander J3 J4 J3/J5 J6 J4 or J1 J2 (2) Civil-Military Operations Center. The JTF could form a CMOC to coordinate military actions for support of the LFA. The CMOC is an ad hoc organization that is normally established by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC to assist in coordinating with other military forces, other US-government agencies, international organizations (IOs), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Its specific size and composition are situation dependent. The CMOC can provide a structure for establishing coordination and cooperation with primarily nonmilitary groups. For example, the CMOC could serve as a focal point for interaction with IOs, NGOs, or civil authorities on topics such as civil defense warning and reporting procedures, response capabilities, medical assistance, and other actions to mitigate the effects of NBC use or other toxic- material contamination. If civil-affairs units are available, they could perform many of the liaison duties. Additionally, during foreign operations, a CMOC could be formed to receive direct taskings direct from the chief of mission’s country team to support such actions as receiving validated LFA requests, assigning project numbers, preparing project numbers, and submitting requests to the JTF operations center. II-6

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NOTE: See FM 100-23-1/Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP), 7- 16/Naval Doctrine Command Tactical Note (TACNOTE), 3-076.6/Air Combat Command Publication (ACCP), 50-56/Pacific Air Force Publication (PACAFP), 50- 56/US Air Force Europe Publication (USAFEP), 50-56 for more information on the CMOC. OPERATIONS Reports to the Incident Commander Directs Tactical Actions LOGISTICS Facilities Services Materials Communications COMMAND Has Overall Responsibility Is In Charge of all Functions PLANNING Prepares Action Plan Maintains Resource and Situation Reporting FINANCE ADMINISTRATION Tracks Cost Evaluates Fiscal Considerations, Personnel Issues Figure II-3. Components of the ICS 5. Reporting Requirements a. Reports. Reports will be submitted per JTF guidance as described in the OPLAN/operation order (OPORD). Additional reporting requirements may include service- specific reports, but such reports will be routed with the concurrence of the JTF commander. b. Unit Records. Unit record keeping and reporting are critical. Unit records include data on personnel according to applicable theater medical-surveillance directives. The accuracy of unit record keeping will enable the tracking of a required audit trail to monitor postincident information for key areas such as long-term health effects on personnel that were exposed to HAZMAT. Detailed accounts could support multiple tasking that could occur following an incident (i.e., tracking individual exposure and key events). As a part of the record keeping, after-action reports (AAR) will also be prepared. II-7

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Chapter III PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 1. Planning and Response Concept a. A challenge for commanders conducting CM operations is to adequately protect personnel, materiel, and equipment from an NBC incident. There is a need for a response capability to save lives, contain an incident, and recover to a point that permits operations to resume. Confronting this challenge requires a comprehensive and integrated approach from threat identification to incident response and recovery. This comprehensive planning ensures that measures of effectiveness are considered. These measures serve to provide a tool to help assess when the mission’s established end state is met. b. No single agency at the local, state, federal, or private level possesses the capability and expertise to act unilaterally on many complex issues that may arise in response to threats from NBC accidents or incidents. For example, an act of terrorism, particularly an NBC event directed against a large population center within the US, may produce major consequences that could overwhelm the capabilities of local and state governments. Planning and coordination by local, state, and federal governments must be proactive and should be accomplished before an incident. Deliberate and crisis action planning considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs. 2. Deliberate Planning a. The deliberate planning process provides for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. Well-developed and detailed planning becomes increasingly important when planning for operations in any number of possible locations, facing any number of unknown threats, and coordinating operations with a wide variety of emergency-response forces. To improve coordination and integration with civilian responders, commanders work through the military planning process and maintain awareness of the current threat. Key planning considerations include the following: (1) Liaison with Civil Authorities. Commanders identify all response agencies within their area of operations (AOs) and coordinate preincident planning, exercise, and training opportunities. All emergency-response teams conduct liaison frequently with their civilian counterparts. (2) Coordination with Supporting and Supported Military Organizations. Response elements need to be aware of the many DOD agencies that they may have contact with in a response role. Close coordination with reserve-component forces within their respective states, JTF personnel, and any other active emergency response elements (i.e., US Army Technical Escort Unit [TEU]) is required. (See Appendix D for more information on other units.) III-1

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(3) Operations in an NBC Environment. There are unique characteristics regarding operations in an NBC environment. When developing plans, response elements account for the challenges inherent in operating within these environments. (4) Risk Analysis and Vulnerabilities. A risk analysis is a commander’s tool for ensuring the safety of his unit while operating in a hazardous or threatening environment. Risk analysis is not meant to replace sound judgment on the part of a commander. A detailed analysis of known threats assists the commander in identifying the level of FP. b. Military units develop deliberate plans to respond to incidents within their assigned regions. Response plans should be updated regularly and coordinated with the appropriate response agencies in the region. Plans should focus on both the unanticipated event (e.g., Chernobyl-type disaster, nation-state weapons use against its own population) and potential terrorist targets, such as special events, high-profile buildings, medical- and scientific-research centers, and air- and rail-transportation platforms. Response elements also should prioritize planning efforts in coordination with the other response agencies within their region. Planning efforts should be prioritized based on the most likely threats. The following examples indicate specific items that plans could address. (1) Vulnerability-analysis considerations. • Identify sources for threat information, potential targets, and likely threat scenarios (i.e., type of agent; likely number of casualties; identification of high-profile facilities, significant events, and/or adversary’s entry denial capabilities and doctrine). • Assess possible delivery methods. • Obtain detailed maps of the area including imagery and blueprints if available, etc. NOTE: Standard military mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear is not effective against some TIM and does not meet civilian requirements for protection. Standard military detectors do not work against many TIM. For more information, see Appendix B. (2) C2 considerations. • Establish C2 relationships. • Know the locations of the incident command post (CP) and joint operations center (JOC). • Identify critical support facilities and resources and capabilities that could assist in CM. • Maintain coordination with civilian agencies. III-2

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• Use liaison officers and execute FP requirements (alert means, evacuation plans, security). (3) Logistical considerations. • Ensure that critical resupply requirements are addressed (e.g., self- contained breathing apparatus [SCBA] refills). • Identify primary and alternate transportation routes and staging areas. • Ensure maintenance support for military-unit commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items and anticipate resupply requirements for NBC-related consumables. (4) Coordination considerations. • Maintain current technical reach-back points of contact. • Coordinate with civilian authorities to remain aware of applicable emergency-response plans (FEMA, state, local, etc.). • Determine augmentation requirements (e.g., liaison, linguist support, and technical medical expertise). 3. Crisis Action Planning Crisis action planning involves time-sensitive planning for deploying, employing, and sustaining of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occur in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. For an incident, essential elements of information (EEIs) may include the following: a. Damage and Injury Profile. Assess the damage and casualty estimates. NBC devices or vectors each present unique considerations that impact CM contingency planning. Planners use available decision support tools to conduct the assessments. b. Information Management. Timely collection, analysis, reporting and dissemination of information are paramount. Establish measures to coordinate IM activities. Other requirements include IM measures that ensure the following: (1) civilian ICS. Interoperability for reports being submitted to and received from the (2) Measures that provide for situational awareness to support the commander and staff (e. g., number of casualties, boundaries of contamination). c. Containment. Planners receive information where perimeters have been established from the incident commander. The contaminated site should be clearly marked to prevent personnel from mistakenly entering. Personnel who have been in contaminated areas must be identified and requisite actions taken (medical treatment, decontamination, III-3

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etc.). Site containment also provides for actions to consolidate and confine any contaminated material (water runoff). Personnel exposed during the incident, subsequent cloud passage, or postincident entry into the contaminated area are given a high priority in response actions. This includes responders and other contaminated individuals. Early definition of the perimeter is important so that potentially contaminated people may be identified and measures taken to prevent the contamination of additional people. The potential contamination of critical infrastructure and transportation assets presents a health problem for both responders and bystanders. Procedures to be considered include the following: (1) Initial monitoring upon arrival to determine preliminary site characterization and personnel contamination. (2) Procedures to minimize the spread of contamination. d. Decontamination. Planners identify and understand the casualty, personnel, and equipment decontamination requirements and standards. Coordination is required with local, state, and federal authorities. Resources must be provided that can monitor, detect, and identify the degree and source of contamination. Subject matter experts (SMEs) conduct risk assessments to determine options for the conduct of decontamination and recommend the allocation of necessary resources to support the decontamination process. Safety is a paramount concern in the decontamination planning process to ensure that first responders’ exposure is minimized. Control measures are also taken to minimize the exposure to and the spread of any contamination. (1) Contamination control. Contamination-control measures ensure contamination is not transferred from an area that is already contaminated to an uncontaminated area through the orderly processing of personnel, equipment, and vehicles entering and leaving the contaminated area. The actual amounts of material used for contamination control depend on conditions at the incident site. (2) Equipment decontamination. Military-specification equipment should be decontaminated according to pertinent military technical publications; however, similar guidelines may not exist for other equipment. Some equipment used by the response force in the contaminated area may remain there for future use and will not require immediate monitoring or decontamination. Some equipment may not be salvageable and will require proper disposal. If civilians in the contaminated area are sent or go to processing points using their own vehicles, the vehicles should be monitored before moving away from the area. All outer surfaces and the air filters may have been contaminated by airborne contamination. Wheel wells, tires, and the rear end may be contaminated from driving across contaminated areas. Unless the windows were down or ventilators open, detectable contamination of the interior is most likely on those surfaces contacted by vehicle occupants (e.g., floorboards, seats). e. Evacuation. Planners determine if personnel in downwind hazard areas were directed to seek shelter in place or evacuate. This planning is coordinated with local, state, and federal authorities. Specific planning factors include resourcing protective-equipment requirements for large numbers of people and medical support. Personnel or equipment evacuated from a hazard area are checked for the possibility of residual contamination. III-4

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Contaminated casualties are decontaminated before evacuation to avoid health-care-facility contamination. For example, the presence of a contaminated casualty in a hospital and the passage of chemical vapors throughout a building’s ventilation system could close the entire hospital. f. Medical Requirements. Medical planners need any available epidemiological and diagnostic patterns resulting from the incident. Military medical units can provide either specialized NBC advisory response capabilities or augmentation that can expand existing medical capabilities. This process includes receiving input from first responders reporting information on signs and symptoms from casualties or agent characteristics (i.e., smell/odor). Medical planning addresses preventive medicine (PVNTMED), laboratory services, casualty evacuation, and decontamination, and treatment of casualties. g. NBC Reconnaissance Measures. Military forces conduct sampling, surveying, and surveillance. Typical military units generally have only basic sampling and detection capabilities. Specialized military units, such as those listed in Appendix D, have more specialized capabilities and may be required to conduct— (1) Sampling. Units conducting sampling ensure that the chain of custody is maintained, and samples are placed in sealed containers to eliminate the possible spread of any contamination. (2) Surveying. Surveys determine the presence or absence of contamination. Surveys also determine the type of contamination (i.e., gamma; blood and blister; and etc.) and level or type of contamination (i.e., centigrey [cGy]; persistent and nonpersistent; and etc.) and its’ boundaries. Planning also identifies the need for a capability to conduct low- level monitoring (e.g., chemical or radiological) to support CM actions. This type of capability will likely come from specialized response teams including military and/or civilian personnel. (3) Surveillance. Surveillance supports early warning of a potential hazard (e.g., chemical or biological aerosol). Response elements may be tasked to conduct surveillance of the ambient air to determine the absence or presence of contaminants. The information from the surveillance is used to influence protection and/or support medical- treatment decisions. h. Weapon Disposition. Determine what type of weapon is involved. If the military is tasked, units are prepared to dispose of the weapon or provide assistance as required to the agency with the task. Planners determine what type of unit is best capable of accomplishing the task. i. Transition and Disengagement. The termination of military support to civil authorities during a CM operation is a politically sensitive phase requiring detailed planning. The “end state” defining the point at which military forces disengage from the CM operation is based on the policy that the DOD will withdraw from the operation after eliminating the immediate danger of weapon/agent effects, saving lives, and restoring critical services. DOD will generally not remain to conduct site-recovery operations. When it is agreed that local authorities are capable of assuming responsibilities for the remainder III-5

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of the operation, DOD forces will disengage. This could be phased either by function or area. Development of an exit strategy should begin as soon as possible during the response. j. Force Protection. FP is a top priority during CM operations; it begins from the time units are alerted to move, involves impacted personnel and evacuees, and does not end until redeployment is complete. The following FP considerations are provided as a guide: (1) Protection from potential threats. Ensure that proper protective equipment is available to response personnel. (2) Safety. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful operations. On-scene command authorities and response personnel must implement requirements established by the appropriate site safety and health plans. (3) Security. Security elements protect against all acts designed to, or which may, impair the effectiveness of the military forces. This includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. (4) Individual Awareness. Commanders and supervisors stress the significance of hazards and the importance of being aware of what is going on around them. (5) Health. Take measures to protect personnel from contaminants. This will require avoiding contaminated areas and observing their boundaries. Protection of the response personnel includes proper PVNTMED and mental health considerations. 4. Information Management a. Civilian and Political Considerations. Operations associated with CM are very sensitive to civilian and political considerations. Planners modify and tailor information activities to meet the unique challenges presented in each operation. Information resources at every echelon are structured to provide support that is proactive, predictive, and flexible. The commander ensures all sources of information are considered and fully involved. b. Legal Considerations. Support to missions such as DSO is limited to those actions that do not violate existing EXORDs and DOD Service regulations and policies prohibiting intelligence collection on US citizens. Before a plan that uses various information assets and personnel in the DSO arena can be implemented, it must receive thorough legal review and approval from the staff judge advocate (SJA). Imagery, if approved, can provide information concerning the extent of damages and could be useful for operational planning. c. Information Gathering. Support to CM requires a multidisciplined approach. A single-source approach cannot support all requirements. (1) EEIs that drive the collection-management process require an understanding of all aspects of the area and its cultures, politics, religion, economics, environment, technology, and other related factors. III-6

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(2) CM will likely involve in-depth coordination or interaction with civil authorities and NGOs. The term “information gathering” should be used rather than the term “intelligence.” Nonmilitary organizations may resent being considered a source of intelligence. By using the term “information gathering,” military forces may be able to foster better communications with other agencies and thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge. (3) The importance of mapping, charting, and geodesy should not be overlooked. It is essential that maps, charts, and support data (to include datum and coordinate systems) are coordinated in advance. d. Information Support. Successful support during CM relies on continuous information collection and analysis. The commander’s information needs in CM are in some ways more complex than operations in war. Peace operations often require augmentation of the staff, and the supporting commander (e.g., the CINC) normally provides detailed analytical support to the deploying commander through split-based operations. This includes anticipating and initiating collection against long lead-time requirements, synthesizing available information on the AOs, and orchestrating the collection efforts of existing organizations. The degree of support needed depends on the size and sophistication of the deploying unit’s staff and should be tailored as the operation develops to ensure seamless support. (1) Technical Information Support. The provision of technical information about possible agents and weaponized materials, the methods of dissemination, and the impact on targets are essential to planning. This information is required during the conduct of an operation. A responder at an incident site should be able to provide information to technical and scientific agencies and receive further information about the type of device or material found on site. (2) Remote Information Support. A remote (“reach back”) information- collection capability is needed. The JTF must be able to access assets such as national-level scientific support, which could be at a fixed or mobile analytical facility. e. Information Requirements (IR). (1) During the initial response phase (that includes predeployment and deployment), IR will be tracked and briefed to the commander. This information provides input to support the commander’s situational awareness and to support the decision- making process. IR also focus the staff’s efforts, assist in the resource allocation, and assist the staff in making recommendations. Liaison and effective coordination with local, state, and federal agencies assist the commander in gaining required information. The intent of IR is for the commander to have the best available information on activities within the AO. (2) IR that are significant to emergency-response operations during an NBC or radiological incident include, but are not limited to the following: • Threat conditions/situations/capabilities. III-7

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• Determination of FP status and shortfalls. • Detailed knowledge of the area. • Detailed information on the type of material used. Consider worst and best case scenarios for options. The types of protection possible against such weapon(s), materials, or vectors; their size, weight, description, and capability; and the methods that could neutralize them. • Medical facilities or equipment available and shortages of such equipment that could impact on any attempt to neutralize the threat or lessen the consequences. The number of people they can handle and the emergency transportation methods available. • Number and location of victims and/or other damage. • Description and status of lines of communication (LOC) including major roads, railroads, waterways, ports, and airports. • Weather conditions. Refer to meteorological conditions including precipitation, fog, cloud conditions, temperature, relative humidity, prevailing winds, and sunrise/sunset data. • Characteristics of physical damage in the specific disaster area. • Population of areas such as trailer parks, apartments, and subdivisions. School buildings and warehouses in these areas are excellent candidates for shelter, feeding, and life-support sites. • Status of sanitation systems. • Relief and drainage systems. • Surface materials. Identify the type and the distribution of soils and subsoils in the area and soil trafficability. • Sources of all classes of supply needed for critical restoration of normal activities. • Availability of civilian engineer equipment and personnel. 5. Toxic Industrial Materials a. TIM Release. The accidental or deliberate release of TIM could also necessitate a request for support from DOD assets. For example, 40 tons of methyl isocyanate was accidentally released from the Union Carbide Plant at Bhopal, India. According to the BPHDC, 8,000 people were killed in its aftermath and over 500,000 people suffered from injuries. This incident was the result of the release of TIM. TIM are often available in III-8

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enormous quantities, do not require extensive research, and can be mass-produced. TIM could be released from industrial plants or storage depots through accidental or deliberate damage as a consequence of a strike against a particular facility or as a desperation measure. TIM could also be attractive as improvised weapons and have the potential for inclusion in clandestine weapons programs or contingency plans. b. Planning for TIM Operations. Before any operation, the response element develops an understanding of the potential hazard from TIM in the area of concern. Note: See Appendix G for further information on TIM response procedures. III-9

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Chapter IV RESPONSE 1. Background a. Incidents involving NBC materials may occur without warning and at a time of day and location that will produce chaos, confusion, and casualties. In a no-notice incident, local emergency service and possibly state and federal agency personnel will be the initial responders. Local emergency-response assets are likely to be overwhelmed by the effects or the threat of an incident. On the other hand, local or state responders may have quickly organized at or near the incident using a response-management system that is typically called an ICS. The ICS is used to coordinate actions among various federal, state, and local responders. The ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure and is used to manage assigned resources to accomplish the stated objectives. The domestic challenge to the JFC is to coordinate the merging of DOD support into the ICS. Significant incidents may warrant multijurisdictional responses and the formation of a UC structure within the ICS. A civilian UC system would include all individuals or agencies that have jurisdictional responsibility (i.e., city, county, state officials). This organization would help coordinate federal, state, local, and private resources together in a response-management system to mitigate the consequences of an incident. b. The President will issue a proclamation to activate a federal response (to include DOD support) to an incident. The response could involve DOD elements responding to an event at their own installation (foreign/domestic) or to an incident that may have occurred within the civilian community (see Figure IV-1). This chapter addresses the general process flow and potential DOD-asset involvement in response support should an incident occur in an area such as an adjacent community or a joint AO. The USJFCOM provides forces for an incident response within the US and its territories. The USCINCSO (Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands) or the USPACOM (Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American Samoa, etc.) would request support from the USJFCOM for forces to support an incident response in their AOR. For responses in other areas, the appropriate military unified commander may establish a JFC for support to the DOS. IV-1

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c. The initial actions taken in the early minutes and hours of a WMD response can determine the outcome of an incident—success or failure. WMD Incident No No DOD Response Required Exceeds Local Response Capability? Yes Stafford Act Immediate Response From Nearby DOD Yes Organization Continuing Threat To Life And Property? No DOD Response May Not Be Required On RFA Yes State/HN Capabilities Yes State/HN Capabilities Exceeded? Yes State/HN Request DOD Support? No DOD Response May Not Be Required No No DOD Response Domestic JTF-CS Initial Response Begins Foreign JFC Response Begins WMD CST Deployment Domestic Only LFA Submits RFA Yes RFA Approved? Yes No No DOD Response Figure IV-1. Graduated-Response Overview IV-2

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2. Notification Notification begins when an incident report is submitted. Notification of the event triggers a potential immediate response under the Stafford Act. Subsequent notification of an approved FEMA RFA triggers the domestic response provided by DOD. Furthermore, unit-level or national notification could occur. a. Unit-Level Notification. All DOD personnel should be trained to notify the chain of command and proper authorities of a suspected incident. Typically, units would use an emergency net to notify fire and medical personnel, security forces, and response elements. b. National Notification. According to applicable directives, commanders submit reports and follow-up reports (as required) (where national-level interest has been determined) directly to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). 3. Common Responsibilities General on-scene tasks include detection, assessment, and containment. These tasks must be accomplished deliberately, but with caution and safety. The senior on-scene official would assume control of the incident site and ensure the safety of the responders. Responders will— a. Approach the incident area with care from upwind or crosswind, maintaining a safe distance from the site. If NBC materials are suspected, detected, or identified, ensure that the appropriate notification and reporting requirements are met. Treat the incident site and area as a crime scene. b. Be aware of warning signs indicating the presence of lethal agents or potential hazards. c. Be aware that incidents may be masked by a hostage situation, a disgruntled employee, protests, or accidents. d. Notify the FBI for domestic incidents or the DOS for foreign incidents. While the FBI or the DOS assumes jurisdiction for the investigation, the installation commander provides the initial and immediate response to any incident occurring on an installation in order to isolate and contain the incident. In all cases, the command of military elements remains within military channels. e. Begin determining the nature of the incident. If no detection capability exists, the first responders continue response operations safely. They observe signs and symptoms to further define the hazard until a follow-on team with detection capability (or other coordinated support) arrives. If follow-on forces are required, the first responders remain on site to alert follow-on forces to the extent and the characteristics of the incident. IV-3

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4. Immediate Response a. The DOD policy for an “immediate response” authorizes military commanders to respond to civil authorities’ requests for emergency military support. It gives the commander the authority— • To support an incident response without formal activation or direction when immediate serious conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher HQ. • To save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under immediate serious conditions where there has not been a Presidential declaration of a catastrophe, a major disaster, or an emergency. The policy is based on the Stafford Act. b. While the policy allows for an immediate response, it requires commanders to advise the DOD executive secretary through command channels by the most expeditious means available and seek approval or additional authorizations as needed. Although an immediate response can be provided on a reimbursable basis (if possible), it will not be delayed or denied because of the inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a commitment to reimburse the DOD. Commanders must exercise extreme caution if electing to deploy under the auspices of an immediate response. While this policy allows for great flexibility, commanders ensure that immediate-response deployment authority is used as a last resort. The SECDEF’s approval is required for DOD forces to respond to terrorist or WMD events. c. The OSC will exercise C2 of the immediate-incident scene, unless responding to an off-installation event where the civilian incident commander will accomplish C2. DOD forces responding to an off-installation event are generally in a supporting role and will not take control of the situation from the LFA or the incident commander. Based on the severity of the incident, first responders may require follow-on response elements from other locations. The OSC may request follow-on elements from the various functional and technical areas, depending on the situation. d. Follow-on response elements stage at an assembly area. The initial assembly point is a safe distance from the incident site to prevent interference and to protect personnel. If needed, the unit coordinates for follow-on resources. Response-force elements review both their individual and functional-area responder checklists. 5. Critical Response Tasks Responders will be working with other agencies and must be aware of the protection measures being used at the incident site. Critical response tasks could include the following: a. Initiating Protective Measures. Responders will use the appropriate level of protective gear. Only those personnel trained and qualified in using the selected level of protective equipment will be allowed within the hot zone. IV-4

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b. Initiating Detection/Assessment. If the OSC does not have appropriate detection capabilities, he will develop incident information using signs and symptoms, as well as personal observations and interviews of casualties or personnel within the immediate area. Until adequate detection and identification capabilities are on scene, the OSC uses worst- case risk assessments. Included in the risk assessment should be consideration for the potential of secondary devices, to include chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive devices. When the threat data is known, analysis of the geographic extent of the risk and its consequences can be calculated locally or at a remote analysis center and conveyed to local command/management authorities. c. Containing the Threat. Before any rescuers enter the hot zone, the senior on- scene official determines the safety zones based on hazard risk assessment. The security forces establish a perimeter and control access to the site by establishing an entry control point (ECP), which will serve as the sole entrance and exit from the incident site. Only personnel with verified authorization are permitted to enter the incident site. To contain the threat, critical requirements include— • Response elements (if capable) to establish decontamination lanes (for both victims and responders); the lanes must be properly equipped and staffed by adequate numbers of qualified personnel. • Medical personnel to ensure that personnel donning entry suits receive preentry physical screening. • Civil authorities and personnel to operate and protect critical civilian infrastructures and systems (e.g., public utilities and medical facilities). • Security forces to institute a personnel accountability system using identification such as badges, hats, armbands, and vests. • The OSC to establish and maintain communications between the incident site and site installation CP. • Responders to begin stabilizing the incident and limiting its impact. 6. Initial Response a. Domestic. DOD resources would likely be requested in support of a federal response to a domestic WMD incident. Requests for DOD support originate from civilian authorities in the aftermath of a WMD detonation or release. An approved RFA from FEMA is required to trigger a response from the JTF-CS (refer to JP 5-00.2). When requested through appropriate channels, the DOD makes resources available to assist local, state, or federal authorities in response to a WMD incident. (1) Upon appropriate notification, a JTF HQ deploys to support the LFA that is tasked with managing the coordinated federal response to a WMD incident. The JFC is normally delegated OPCON of DOD forces assigned to the mission. The JTF commander is the DOD operational commander on scene for CM actions in support of the LFA. IV-5

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(2) Upon activation, the JTF provides a response capability, establishes liaison with military elements, supports crisis-management and CM operations associated with a WMD incident, and conducts requisite predeployment and deployment actions. (a) Predeployment. During crisis-action planning, the JTF advance survey party moves to the vicinity of the incident to coordinate with the LFA, the state’s EOC, and the on-scene response element. In addition to providing liaison officers, the JTF, with the DCO and the DCE, begins to plan and coordinate military support with FEMA. The advance survey party identifies mission requirements, as coordinated with the LFA. Based on mission requirements, the advance survey party establishes the main-body reception center/base. (b) Deployment. Once established, the JTF is normally delegated and maintains OPCON of designated DOD forces responding to the WMD incident. The DCO and the DCE function as part of the JTF and lend expertise to CM planning and coordination. Once staged, the JTF executes the mission in support of the LFA. b. Foreign. In a foreign scenario, the HN may request assistance through the DOS, which becomes the LFA responsible for requesting DOD support. To support a foreign scenario, a JTAC may be deployed. (1) The JTAC Concept. A number of geographic combatant-commander assigned forces, service assets, and defense agencies exist to respond to various aspects of WMD CM. However, no single organization possesses the comprehensive CM capabilities required to address the spectrum of issues of a WMD incident. (2) The USJFCOM as a Joint Force Provider. Based on the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, the USJFCOM is tasked to identify, coordinate, exercise, and—upon NCA directive deploy a joint cadre of technical experts—advise and assist geographic combatant commanders to conduct CM operations. The JTAC provides a single-source mechanism, which is dedicated to the needs of the supported geographic combatant commander. The USJFCOM defines the joint cadre through an implementation plan describing organization, C2 relationships, forces, notification sequence, deployment timing, and exercise support. The cadre is composed of CONUS-based unified commander and service assets. When directed by the NCA, the USCINCJFCOM deploys specialized CONUS-based assets to augment the geographic combatant command’s organic assets. (3) The JTAC Initial-Reaction/Deployment Process. After an incident or when a credible threat exists of an NBC-related event, the geographic combatant commander identifies the need for technical expertise to augment his staff to assist in planning for CM operations in support of the HN. The supported geographic combatant commander requests through the SECDEF that the JTAC be deployed. Upon NCA approval, the SECDEF directs the USJFCOM to deploy the JTAC. The USJFCOM JOC receives notification of a deployment order and notifies the various members of the JTAC. The USJFCOM assists in coordinating transportation for the members of the JTAC to the supported geographic combatant commander’s HQ. IV-6

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(4) The JTAC’s Composition. The JTAC’s composition could include SMEs and response assets from several organizations. The organizations that could be tasked to provide personnel might include the following. (For more information on JTAC support elements, see Appendix D.) • USMC’s CBIRF. • US Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command’s (USASBCCOM’s) CB-RRT. • Defense Threat-Reduction Agency (DTRA). 7. Response-Execution Considerations The JTF’s objectives are safeguarding lives, preserving health and safety, securing and eliminating the hazard, protecting property, preventing further damage to the environment, and maintaining public confidence in the government’s ability to respond to a WMD incident. Responding forces initiate actions to restore conditions at and in the vicinity of the incident site. During this stage, the JTF develops a transition plan and a redeployment plan. The DOD response phase ends when civil authorities or other designated agencies are self-supporting and approve the release of the JTF. Additionally, to support the primary objectives of the JTF, key areas such as information management, logistics, technical support, public affairs, communications, safety, medical support, and public works are addressed. a. Information Management. During the initial response phase (that includes predeployment and deployment), IM is critical to maintaining effective C2 and coordination. IM tools provide the commander with the input needed to support incident visualization and decisions making. b. Logistics. The logistics process facilitates the obtaining, maintaining, storing, moving, and replenishing of resources used in responding to a WMD incident. For example, transportation support is required to move assets, both human and materiel, in response to a WMD incident. This includes the ability to protect the transportation means and the operators during the response support. Elements of the sustainment process used to support an incident include contracting, negotiated support, military support, or support from other federal agencies. (1) Contracting. Contracting, purchasing, renting, or leasing supplies or services from nonfederal sources are effective and efficient ways to provide support in a crisis. Included are all classes of supply or maintenance used in a WMD response situation. During the initial stages of an operation, contracting officers are required to procure supplies and services. (2) Negotiated Support. In some cases, civil authorities have enough logistical resources to support not only themselves but also the military providing assistance. For example, civil authorities may provide housing, food, and fuel to JTF assets. Such support is negotiated on a case-by-case basis with the civil authorities. IV-7

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(3) Military Support. Installations continue habitual relationships with units. Installations may also have to support personnel with whom they have no established support relationship. These personnel include civil authorities and elements from other services. If an installation or other sources discussed below cannot provide the required support directly, planners tailor a support force. (4) Support From Other Federal Agencies. Federal agencies such as the General Services Administration (GSA) provide support to civil authorities. GSA provides general supplies and services that are common to more than one department of the federal government. While GSA can provide an extensive amount of support to the DOD, other federal agencies and organizations provide assistance depending on the nature, scope, and duration of the operation. (5) Other. Special events package (SEP) containing caches such as decontamination, detection, and medical equipment may be pre-positioned as part of a preparedness program. This equipment can be transported by air and ground on a short notice and is available for use by both civilian responders and JTF elements. c. Technical Support. The JTF staff conducts liaison and coordination and receives reports to remain updated on key operational, personnel, and logistical information. The JTF staff uses this information to support several tasks. These tasks include— (1) Preparing reports, assessments, vulnerability analyses, and hazard predictions. (2) Monitoring the augmentation of civilian and military NBC response elements. (3) Maintaining incident information boards that include the following: event situation, event casualty and damage summary, weather and evacuation status, area closing and shelter facility status, resources status, hospital-bed availability, contracts and agreements, and incident logs. (4) Collecting, processing, and disseminating information about the WMD incident to other elements. (5) Preparing employment strategies for the separate WMD response elements. d. Public Affairs. The principal PA objectives are to ensure that accurate information is provided to the joint information center (JIC) and communicates a calm, measured, and reasonable reaction to the ongoing incident. The PAO prepares draft media releases and conducts briefings (as required). The PAO stays fully apprised of the situation as it develops. Experience has shown that by bringing in media early under reasonable conditions, credibility is maintained and freedom of information is preserved. e. Communications. C2 communications systems must incorporate telecommunications, data-transfer, cell phone, and simultaneous phone-line capabilities and be secure and satellite based. In addition, communications systems should be IV-8

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independent of military switching and stand-alone systems so that competing communications requirements (e.g., civilian systems and military systems) will not interfere with incident communications requirements. A crucial aspect of the response plan is establishing and controlling communications among the forces in the incident area, the operations center, and the various response elements. Communications elements respond to changing needs during the incident and maintain over a period, control of all incoming and outgoing communications as well as the communications channels. The commander ensures that adequate warning means, response and management means, nets, frequencies, equipment, and redundancies are available to link the efforts of all (internal and external) incident response elements. Separate nets are established for the command net and the security net. Nonoperational traffic communicates via landlines or cellular telephones. f. Safety. The JTF staff and its assets support the incident commander with continuous updates. For example, tools such as the site safety plan are kept updated to ensure the safety of responders and citizens. Site safety considerations that the JTF staff monitor include— (1) Analyzing the hazards at the incident site and conducting a risk analysis of those hazards. (2) Maintaining and updating the site map or sketches. (3) Updating the site work zones (hot, warm, and cold). (4) Monitoring decontamination-area operations. (5) Ensuring that the site communications diagrams remain updated. (6) Updating information on the location of CP(s) or command centers. (7) Maintaining and updating hazard-monitoring overlays and results. g. Medical Support. Following an incident, health-services support includes providing selected health and medical care, as required, and augmenting local support capabilities. Large numbers of casualties in short periods of time can compromise both the quality and quantity of health care and constrain mobility and evacuation. Coordination by the JTF staff with HN, state, and/or local medical facilities is necessary to ensure that medical plans include procedures to treat and care for contaminated or infected personnel (see Figure IV-2). PVNTMED specialists and pathologists need a database of naturally occurring diseases and procedures to quickly assess and identify suspicious illnesses and diseases. Medical teams require special training in the identification, treatment, and handling of contaminated casualties and remains. Medical facilities have areas designated to treat and segregate contaminated patients. While decontamination of nonambulatory casualties is performed before evacuation, many casualties, during a terrorist incident, will self-evacuate, arriving at the hospital still contaminated. Hospitals should have the capability to detect contamination and to decontaminate. Antidotes and treatments for potential agents from commercial or industrial sources are considered in the casualty- management plan and stockpiled based on threats. Contaminated-patient transport and IV-9

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contamination-control measures are incorporated into litter and ambulance operations. Planners coordinate the establishment of the on-site medical-treatment area. h. Public Works. DOD CM assets support the local public works to ensure that facilities remain operational or critical infrastructure damage is remedied or mitigated. Selected support measures that assist public works personnel may include— (1) Helping to establish plans for the hazard area and disposal of hazardous waste. (2) Supporting the production, transportation, maintenance, and medical monitoring of potable water supply. (3) Deploying damage assessment teams. (4) Providing power sources and water for on-site decontamination. (5) Providing backup power to the incident site. (6) Assisting with hazard containment. (7) Providing environmental expertise and technical assistance. (8) Providing emergency clearance of debris for passage of emergency personnel and equipment. IV-10

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CHEMICAL-CONTAMINATED PATIENTS INTRODUCTION. Hospital medical-emergency-department (ED) staff caring for patients contaminated with toxic chemicals are at risk for developing toxicity from secondary contamination. SITUATION. On April 11, 2000, a 40 year-old man intentionally ingested approximately 110 grams of a veterinary insecticide concentrate. On clinical examination at a local hospital ED (approximately 20 minutes after the ingestion), the patient had profuse secretions, vomiting, and respiratory distress. He was intubated for airway management and ventilation. To control secretions, he received pralidoxime and atropine. The patient was brought to the ED by a friend, not by emergency medical services, and the friend also developed symptoms that required treatment. ED personnel exposed to the patient had symptoms within an hour of his arrival. The staff noted a chemical odor in the ED and contacted the regional poison center, which recommended decontaminating the patient’s skin and placing the gastric contents in a sealed container to minimize evaporation; however, no decontamination was performed. During this incident, health-care workers were exposed to a patient contaminated with an organophosphate insecticide. These health-care workers were not wearing appropriate respiratory or skin protective equipment while caring for the patient. As a result, three health-care workers developed symptoms consistent with organophosphate intoxication and required treatment. For example, one health-care worker providing care to the patient developed respiratory distress, profuse secretions, emesis, diaphoresis, and weakness. She had contact with the patient’s skin, respiratory secretions, and emesis. She was admitted to the hospital and required intubation for 24 hours to support respiration. After medical management and serial doses of atropine and pralidoxime for 7 days, her respiratory function improved, and she was discharged after 9 days of hospitalization. SUMMARY. Depending on the extent of the contamination, health-care workers for chemically contaminated patients should use level C protection (i.e., a full-face mask and a powered/nonpowered canister-/cartridge-filtration respirator) or level B protection (i.e., a supplied-air respirator or a self-contained breathing apparatus). To prevent dermal absorption, chemical-barrier protection appropriate to the contaminant is needed; latex medical gloves are of little protection against many chemicals. In addition to the need for surface decontamination of patients, body fluids also must be contained to prevent dermal and inhalation exposure. To limit the distant spread of the contaminant, the EDs ventilation exhaust should also be directed away from the hospital’s main ventilation system. Figure IV-2. Emergency-Department Treatment of Contaminated Patients IV-11

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Chapter V RECOVERY, TRANSITION, AND REDEPLOYMENT 1. Background Recovery, transition, and redeployment operations start when civil authorities or other designated agencies relieve the JTF commander of selected CM tasks. The operational duration of the response mission is determined by the requirements established by the appropriate authority (the LFA for domestic operations or the HN/DOS for foreign operations). There is not an established timetable. A transition plan is implemented and CM tasks are transferred from the JTF commander to the appropriate civil authorities (i.e., the DOS, FEMA) commensurate with their ability to continue to conduct operations. NGOs and/or contracted services may augment these civil authorities. Upon completion of the required recovery support, the JTF commander executes transition and redeploys. 2. Recovery Operations a. Start the Recovery Phase. The recovery phase begins when the immediate hazards are contained or controlled to the point that military assets are replaced or are no longer needed. During the recovery phase, emergency-response elements initiate the action to restore conditions at and in the vicinity of the incident site to a technically feasible and acceptable state. During the recovery phase, the response commander will facilitate the orderly transition of C2 and conduct the withdrawal of military forces from the incident site when the capabilities and services of the response elements are no longer required. b. Develop and Implement a Mission-Recovery Plan. This plan must be coordinated with civil authorities to determine the requirements. Clearly defined goals and objectives ensure that tasks between civil authorities and JTF commanders are understood and completed. Top priorities are reestablishing mission capability, developing a plan to cover short- and long-term recovery requirements, and returning to normal operations. Special consideration is given to minimizing and mitigating environmental damage. The mission- recovery plan can address the following areas: (1) Logistical support and resupply. (2) Force protection. (3) Documentation and reporting requirements, to include resource expenditures, losses, and environmental-exposure data that is necessary to estimate exposure (to determine long-term and short-term health effects). (4) Decontamination. (5) Environmental considerations to prevent pollution and restore the area. (6) Medical issues to include: V-1

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• • Personal protection. Casualty-handling operations. • Medical screening and documentation and critical-incident stress management. • • 3. Transition PA activities. Liaison with federal, state, local, and HN officials as required. a. Transition in CM operations involves the transfer of responsibilities and functions to other organizations. Transition occurs between units, to the civil authorities, or to local or HN agencies. Transition and/or termination is initiated once objectives are met and authority is given from national decision makers. b. If DOD forces are transitioning functions between units, then the transition requirements follow standard military handover procedures. If transition involves the transfer of DOD forces’ functions or areas to the civil authorities or to local or HN agencies, then the mechanics of the transition will reflect operational procedures and existing agreements. c. A transition plan helps the staff identify transition issues in relation to the desired or projected end state. It is especially important to identify those parties or agencies that will receive functional responsibilities from the JTF commander. Considerations include which staff sections will write annexes, based on what the transitioning organization will do. The transition plan should identify organization, operating procedures, and transition recommendations and considerations. When implementing the transition plan, the transitioning parties should discuss criteria for transferring operations. The plan should be unclassified, clear, and concise—using terminology appropriate to all parties. (1) Transitioning may be by function or by specific areas of the incident site. The transition process should be event-driven and not tied to calendar dates. Functions or areas transfer only when a similar capability becomes available or is no longer needed. Procedures for the transfer of equipment or supplies—either between DOD units, to civil authorities, or to local or HN agencies—must be established according to regulation and command guidance. (2) Planners identify other key transition factors within functional areas that may include logistics, medical services, communications, security, and technical services. Planners should develop a series of transition criteria to monitor progress; the important part of choosing indicators is to have a consistent method by which to measure progress during the transition. V-2

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4. Redeployment a. Simultaneous with deployment, the JTF commander begins planning redeployment. Redeployment decisions are based on civil and military considerations. Redeployment begins as soon as objectives are accomplished or the need for military forces diminishes. Redeployment planning should follow normal guidelines and protocols. Careful consideration should be given to what physical assets can be safely removed from the incident and which should be contained or controlled and whether or not it should be left at the incident site. b. Redeployment includes the use of the AAR process to help evaluate mission and task performance. The AAR addresses the following: (1) What was the original mission? How was it stated, and how was it interpreted at the various levels of command? (2) What should have happened (e.g., the mission or plan)? What actually happened (e.g., a description of the event)? (3) How it happened (e.g., key facts that led up to the event)? (4) Why it happened (e.g., inferences about probable causes)? (5) How to improve performance next time (e.g., alternative courses of action)? 5. Documentation During a response, incoming/outgoing data (questions and responses) should be captured and archived so that when personnel review the data later, they can be confident that it is complete and accurate. a. After conducting a response mission, the JTF addresses two areas: documenting lessons learned and identifying what can be termed as after-operation follow-up. Key areas of documentation include personnel and equipment expenditures or costs, incident event logs, and medical documentation for response personnel. b. Lessons learned should be collected and then consolidated in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) format, if possible, or through individual service systems such as the US Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). c. It is in the postemergency period that documentation of the incident occurs. Actions that occurred during the notification, response, and recovery phases will be critical to providing answers to the questions that will be asked (i.e., in areas such as fiscal/resource management, medical surveillance, medical treatment, mortuary). d. Accurate record keeping also addresses the monitoring of DOD response-element personnel for long-term health problems that could be incident related. V-3

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Chapter VI EDUCATION AND TRAINING 1. Overview JP 3-07 outlines a two-pronged approach of general professional military education for all officers and noncommissioned officers. Education and training should encompass general awareness and specific functional AORs. Competency is developed through institutional education, training, practical exercises, and simulations. Training should be conducted with other organizations and civilian agencies that would be involved in CM operations. 2. Education CM operations need to be emphasized in appropriate programs of instruction. For those military units without experience in civilian CM exercises on a local, state, regional, or national basis, limited opportunities exist to incorporate lessons learned from these events into the training environment such as institutional education, simulations, and exercises. Commanders should educate all personnel in basic CM awareness, with more specific operational instruction for personnel assigned CM tasks and responsibilities. Numerous courses and training opportunities are available from various government and private sources. A compendium of these resources is available from FEMA. Some of the educational opportunities available are in the following areas: a. General Awareness. (1) Force Protection/Antiterrorism. One component of combating terrorism includes defensive measures against terrorist attacks. All personnel train on the fundamentals necessary to defend installations, units, and individuals against terrorist attacks. AT is a FP measure and is the responsibility of commanders at every level. (2) Overview of CM Operations. Based on the roles and responsibilities of the audience, this may include the fundamentals of the FRP, the ICS, and service-specific issues. b. Specific Operational Education. (1) Command and Staff. • The role of the action agency and LFAs. • Legal authorities, constraints, and limitations. • Logistics and support requirements, including fiscal reimbursement issues. • C2 structures. VI-1

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• The role and function of the DCO and other DOD liaisons. NOTE: An example of this type of training is the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course. This course prepares emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs), DCOs, and staffs to plan and execute joint military operations that support civil authorities responding to domestic emergencies and disasters. The US Forces Command offers the course eight times a year at the FEMA Mount Weather Emergency Assistance Center, Berryville, Virginia, and conducts mobile training teams within the USPACOM’s and the US Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM’s) AORs each year. This training is authorized by DODD 3025.1. (2) Technical and functional areas. • HAZMAT operations. • Reconnaissance and survey. • Decontamination. • Casualty handling. • Medical operations. • Communications. NOTE: Examples of functional-area courses are the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Emergency Response to HAZMAT Incidents; the National Fire Academy (NFA) HAZMAT Operating Site Practices; and US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD)/US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) Field Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties and the Medical Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties. (3) Disaster Assistance. FEMA and other government agencies provide numerous resident and nonresident training courses related to disaster-assistance operations. Personnel assigned duties such as EPLOs or SCOs benefit from familiarity with such training. 3. Training Training opportunities exist both internally and externally and should include— a. Individual, collective, and unit training. b. Initial and sustainment training. c. Intraagency and Interagency training. VI-2

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4. Exercises Exercises provide the opportunity to interact with other units or services and federal, state, or local agencies. Exercises developed by non-DOD agencies provide an opportunity to improve military capabilities for support of CM operations with minimal resources. These exercises emphasize interoperability requirements and stress staff coordination. They also serve to identify shortfalls in communications or other capabilities that must be corrected. 5. Simulation and Modeling Distributed simulations provide training technology that permits multiple organizations or agencies to participate in the same simulation exercise from remote locations. JTFs and other units involved with CM operations can use simulations such as the hazard prediction and assessment capability (HPAC) to help portray various scenarios. This includes training in the organization and processes of supported civilian agencies. 6. Rules of Engagement Situational-training exercises provide deploying forces with training on events and circumstances they can expect to encounter during CM operations. By reviewing lessons learned and AARs of similar operations, leaders can identify likely situations that their units can expect. Unit leaders prepare the proper response based on the rules of engagement (ROE), applicable lessons learned, policy directives, instructions, regulations, doctrine, tactics, and legal advice for each situation and train personnel accordingly. This response becomes an immediate action drill and should be published and well rehearsed by members of the deploying force. Standing ROE should be published as part of the CM training process. 7. Public Affairs Personnel in units conducting CM operations benefit from familiarity with PA principles and procedures. CM operations are of great interest to the news media, and units are aware that PA releases are conducted through the JIC. Commanders accomplish their mission under close scrutiny of the media. They have to react rapidly to developing issues and changing perceptions while simultaneously fulfilling the information needs of their troops. An additional training resource is the National Response Team (NRT) JIC Manual. The NRT JIC Manual provides guidance for establishing and organizing a JIC. VI-3

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Appendix A CONTAMINATION-AVOIDANCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 1. Background This appendix addresses preparedness (i.e., understanding the IMS) and response measures such as detection, marking, and contamination control that could support a possible military response to an NBC incident. 2. Preparedness During peacetime, units and installations undertake measures (i.e., contamination- avoidance measures, drills and exercises to support crisis-management and CM preparation) to decrease vulnerability. This is part of an integrated approach to an overall unit/installation AT/FP program/plan; a key element in developing an integrated AT/FP plan includes understanding the civilian IMS and being aware of where and how the IMS process may influence response actions by military units. a. Key information about the IMS’s command and staff structure (i.e., incident commander; operations, plans, logistics, and administration sections; IC special officers; and safety, liaison, and PA) is important as a preparedness measure in understanding the responsibilities and functions at an incident site. (1) Incident Commander. The incident commander is responsible for managing incident operations. His decisions (i.e., establishing a protection level) can directly impact military response elements. His directives support accomplishing major tasks such as— resources. • • • • • Establishing control of the incident scene. Ensuring the safe approach and positioning of emergency-response Establishing staging as a method of controlling arriving resources. Establishing a security perimeter. Establishing hazard-control zones to ensure a safe work area. Factors that influence the size of hazard-control areas and the establishment of protective levels include considering whether an oxygen-deficient atmosphere exists (i.e., an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life and health [IDLH] contains 19.5 percent oxygen or lower); flammability (i.e., if dealing with an open-air release, the initial action level can be 20 percent of the lower explosive limit); radioactivity; and toxicity (i.e., guidance may indicate to use an estimated IDLH of 10 times the threshold-limit value/time-weighted average if there is no published IDLH or to use IDLH or short-term exposure-limit values). A-1

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• Assessing the need for immediate rescue and implementing public protective actions. (2) Operations Section. The operations section manages and controls all on- scene tactical operations. This control will generally include the responsibility for supervising HAZMAT branch operations. Specific HAZMAT branch-related tasks can directly impact the where and when of military unit support. Functions can include the following: • Site-control operations. Establish control zones and monitor access routes at the incident site. • Decontamination operations. Develop, setup, and operate a decontamination area. • Entry operations. Perform entry and backup operations within the hot zone to include reconnaissance, monitoring, sampling, and mitigation. • Medical operations. Perform preentry and postentry medical monitoring and evaluation of all entry personnel and provide technical medical guidance. (3) Plans Section. The plans section is a critical element for support of the IMS process. An effective flow of information is critical at an incident site for all parties. Responsibilities include— • Collecting, evaluating, and disseminating incident information. • Maintaining information on the current and forecasted situation. • Maintaining information on the status of resources assigned to an incident. • Preparing and documenting action plans. (4) Logistics Section. The logistics section is another critical coordination point for military units. Military units may rely on local resources for site-support services, and the logistics section may coordinate service, communications, food, and facility support. (5) Administration/Finance Section. The administration/finance section supports the IMS process by getting funds where they are needed and ensuring that financial controls are in place. (6) Command and Staff Officers. The following officers are appointed by and report directly to the incident commander. These include the safety officer, liaison officer, and public information officer. Supporting military units must also understand the roles and responsibilities of these personnel to help ensure effective and efficient communications. A-2

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• Safety Officer. The safety officer is responsible for monitoring and assessing safety hazards and unsafe situations and developing measures for ensuring personnel safety. Assistant safety officers, such as the HAZMAT safety officer, may also be designated and have the authority to stop any activity that poses an imminent danger. • Liaison Officer. The liaison officer serves as a coordination point between the incident commander and any assisting or coordinating agencies not involved in the UC structure that have responded to the emergency. The liaison officer is the point of contact for all assisting and coordinating external representatives who are not represented within the UC structure. • Public Information Officer. The public information officer coordinates all media contact and activities during an emergency, assembles and prepares all news information and press releases, and establishes communications with all representatives and agencies. b. Other preparedness actions can take many forms. Possible measures could include: (1) Conduct of NBC threat-vulnerability assessment. (2) Integration of efforts with other USG agencies, including applicable law enforcement and intelligence organizations. Commanders also assess the criticality of key infrastructure essential to functions such as staging and deploying operations. (3) Coordination of commanders with civilian authorities and agencies to ensure that applicable measures such as Mutual Aid Agreements are in place to ensure a fully coordinated response. (4) Actions to further reduce vulnerability may include— • Enforcing operational security. • Maintaining emergency NBC-response plans. • Identifying FP capabilities and capability redundancy. • Monitoring and analyzing public health information. • Maintaining NBC defense equipment, to include medical supplies. • FEMA and DOS). Conducting joint and interagency planning (i.e., coordinating with • Assessing response elements’ (active and reserve) certification for crisis-management or CM operations. A-3

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c. Constraints that confront overall preparation include the following: (1) Military operating base and civilian community (foreign and/or domestic) populations often lack the training and equipment necessary to survive should an incident occur. First-responder elements (i.e., medical, law enforcement, fire fighters, HAZMAT, emergency planners, etc.) require training to ensure they do not become casualties when responding to an incident. Responder elements need the required level of realistic, integrated training (awareness, HAZMAT technician, etc.) to protect themselves so that they are able to contain an incident. For example, awareness-level first responders need an individual protection capability, and HAZMAT response teams need an immediate response capability to be able to conduct actions such as saving lives. Tactical plans on how to deal with these challenges also need to be developed and exercised. (2) Much of the infrastructure that is a potential target is not hardened. Most of the structures in key facilities are not designed to withstand blast damage or the pervasive nature of a lethal CB-agent aerosol cloud. 3. Response Measures Response measures include those actions needed to detect, assess, and contain an incident. These actions help avoid, control, or mitigate NBC hazards. a. Detection. Detection includes both preincident defensive actions and incident actions. Preincident measures could include defensive measures taken by an installation to help reduce the probability of an incident. Detection primarily involves incident-related actions. Initial response begins with incident reporting by an observer and provides the commander/incident commander with information on contamination hazards and clean areas. Responders should be aware that standard military NBC detection equipment will not detect the presence of many toxic agents. Reliance on reported information and visual indicators (both positive and negative) from the site may be the sole indication that a toxic environment exists. b. Assessment. Assessment is a continuing process throughout any incident. The situation must be quickly evaluated to determine the response objectives based on available incident-response capability. Information such as the type of incident, probable size of the affected area, and physical or environmental conditions must be reported. Using available emergency communications, notify concerned personnel of the hazard. Actions besides warning and reporting (and associated alarms and signals) include contamination marking and hazard prediction. (1) Initial information on the type of incident and actual on-the-ground conditions must be received, analyzed, and disseminated. This information is crucial to support many key functions. Among these is deciding what areas should receive instructions on whether to evacuate or to seek shelter in place. (2) Assessment-decision support tools may also help to identify possible locations of hazards at an incident site or locate populations within a community potentially affected by hazards. This information is intended to give an estimate of the A-4