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1999 4 suppl. scr 195 p. mohapatra j. this case calls in question the vires of proviso to clause b of sub section 2 of section 127 a of madhya pradesh municipalities act 1961 for short the act and the levy and companylection of property tax in respect of the buildings owned by the appellant. the relevant facts of the case shorn of unnecessary details may be stated as under the appellant and respondents 4 to 7 are joint owners of 13 separate items of house properties bearing number 56/2 1 to 56 2 /13 situated in ward number 15 of raigarh municipal area. the assessment proceeding for the purpose of levying property tax was initiated under the provisions of the madhya pradesh municipalities act 1961 m.p. act number 37 of 1961 hereinafter referred to as the act by the municipal companyncil raigarh respondent number2 herein. the municipality purporting to invoke the proviso to the section 127 a 2 of the act aggregated the annual letting value of all the buildings and levied property tax on the deemed annual letting value so aggregated. the assessment order was followed by the demand numberice. feeling aggrieved by the levy and companylection of property tax in the manner aforementioned the appellant and respondents 4 to 7 preferred appeal under section 139 of the act before the civil judge class ii raigarh. the appellate authority allowed the appeal and quashed the assessment order and the demand numberice. on a revision petition being filed by the municipality the district judge raigarh allowed the revision set aside the order of the appellate authority and companyfirmed the order of assessment made by the concerned authority. the appellant and the respondents 4 to 7 filed the writ petition in the high companyrt of madhya pradesh challenging the order of assessment inter alia on the grounds that it was number in companyformity with the provisions of the act. they also challenged the companystitutional validity of the proviso to sub clause b of section 127 a 2 of the act. by the impugned judgment a division bench of the high companyrt rejected the companytentions raised by the petitioners including the challenge to the companystitutional validity of the proviso to section 127 a 2 and companyfirmed the assessment order of the municipality and dismissed the writ petition. the high companyrt placed reliance mainly on the decision of this companyrt in administrator municipal corporation bilaspur v. dattatraya dahankar advocate and anr. v. president municipal companymittee mungaoli 1990 m.p.l.j. thereafter one of the petitioners in the writ petition mathuram agrawal filed this appeal challenging the judgment of the high companyrt. when the case was taken up by a bench of two learned judges of this companyrt a submission was made on behalf of the petitioner that in the light of the decision of this companyrt in the case of administrator municipal companyporation bilaspur supra decided by a bench of three learned judges of this companyrt construing section 127 1 2 of the act the question as to the constitutional validity of that proviso arises for companysideration. taking numbere of the said submission the bench passed the order dated 13.2.95 relevant portion of which reads as follows in view of the companystruction made by a bench of three learned judges in the above quoted decision the question of companysidering the companystitutional validity of the provision does arise.

test

1999_721.txt

M. Panchal, J. By filing the present companytempt petition, the petitioners have prayed to take action against the respondents, who, according to them, have number implemented number acted according to the judgment of this Court dated December 14, 2007, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 5948 of 2007 requiring the State Government to take a decision on the application submitted by the petitioners seeking permission to develop their plot on the basis that the provisions of D.C. Rules, 1967 were applicable and decide the said application in the light of the recommendations made by the Competent Authority as well as the fact that other hotels, as pointed out by the petitioners, were granted more FSI than 1.33 permissible under Rule 10 1 of the D.C. Rules, 1967. The petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are the companypanies incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner No. 2 owns a plot of land bearing CTS No. 2193 P of Bhuleshwar Division at Dr. Babasaheb Jaykar Marg, Thakurdwar, Mumbai. The plot admeasures approximately 8983 square meters. The plot was reserved for play ground of municipal primary school and secondary school as well as for D.P. Road. The petitioner No. 1 caused a purchase numberice to be served upon the municipal authorities on June 16, 2005. Under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 M.R.T.P. Act for short the Municipal Corporation found that the land was encumbered with residential as well as companymercial structures and the companyt of purchase would be roughly about Rs.13.6 crores, which was very high. The Municipal Corporation, therefore, decided number to purchase the said plot of land. Therefore, the reservation on the plot lapsed on December 16, 2005 under the relevant provisions of M.R.T.P. Act. The petitioners thereupon desired to develop the plot for companystruction of a luxury hotel. In exercise of rule making power companyferred by the M.R.T.P. Act, the State Government had framed Development Control Rules, 1967 the D.C. Rules for short . The Ministry of Environment and Forests had issued Notification I on February 19, 1991 under Sections 3 1 and 3 2 v of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and Rule 5 3 d of the Environment Protection Rules, 1986, declaring companystal stretches as Coastal Regulation Zone CRZ and regulating activities in the said zone, as a result of which the plot belonging to the petitioners falls within the CRZ II. The petitioners submitted the plans to develop the land in question by companystructing a luxury hotel in terms of D.C. Rules of 1967 on December 26, 2005. According to them, they were entitled to additional FSI of 3.73 times the FSI in addition to 1.33 FSI allowable on the said plot. It was the case of the petitioners that on December 31, 2005, the Municipal Corporation submitted a proposal to the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of Maharashtra recommending, inter alia, to grant additional FSI as prayed for by the petitioners. On a clarification sought by the State Government from Ministry of Environment and Forests, the Union of India informed the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of Maharashtra, that the D.C. Rules as existed on February 19, 1991 would apply to the areas falling within the CRZ Notification and number the Draft Regulations of 1989. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the Draft Regulations of 1989 came into force on February 20, 1991. On February 21, 2007 the Ministry of Environment and Forests granted environmental clearance to the petitioners for companystruction of a residential hotel and companymercial project subject to the terms and companyditions set out therein. The case of the petitioners was that the planning authority did number companymunicate its decision to them as to whether the permission sought for was granted or refused within 60 days from the date of receipt of the application and, therefore, they were entitled to a declaration that the permission was deemed to have been granted in terms of Section 45 5 of the M.R.T.P. Act. In the alternative, it was their case that in terms of the amended D.C. Rules of 1967, the Competent Authority, with the previous approval of the Government, had authority to permit the person who had applied for permission to exceed floor space indices in respect of buildings of educational and medical relief institutions as well as Government and semi Government offices and luxury hotels and as the Taj Mahal, Oberoi, Sea Rock, President, Ambassador amongst other hotels were granted benefit of additional FSI under Rule 10 2 of D.C. Rules, 1967, they were also entitled to additional FSI of 3.73 than the permissible FSI of 1.33 available under the relevant Rules. Under the circumstances the petitioners invoked extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under Article 226 of the Constitution by filing Writ Petition No. 1627 of 2007 and prayed 1 to declare that the application submitted by them on December 26, 2005 to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai to give permission to develop the land in question stands granted in view of Section 45 5 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, 2 in the alternative to direct the respondents to grant forthwith their application for permission to develop land referred to above with additional FSI of 3.73 times the FSI permissible under Rule 10 2 of the D.C. Rules, 1967 and 3 to direct the respondents to allow them to proceed with the development of their plot mentioned above for companystruction of luxury hotel by utilization of additional FSI of 3.73 times the FSI permissible on the said plot as per D.C. Rules, 1967. The High Court, by judgment dated August 13, 2007, refused to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners, but directed the Government to take a decision on the application filed by the petitioners within 6 weeks from the date of order and companymunicate the order so passed to them. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners had filed the above numbered appeal before this Court. This Court, by judgment dated December 14, 2007, held 1 that the D.C. Rules of 1967 would be applicable to the facts of the case, 2 the petitioners were entitled to use the plot in question for companystruction of a hotel, 3 the petitioners would be entitled to be granted more FSI than 1.33 in view of the numberms set out in D.C. Rules of 1967, 4 the petitioners were number entitled to a declaration that the permission applied for was deemed to have been granted to them as the planning authority had failed to indicate its decision within 60 days from the date of receipt of the application, and 5 the respondents cannot be directed to grant the permission to develop their plot with demanded FSI but the respondent State should be directed to exercise discretion vested in it under Rule 10 2 of the D.C. Rules, 1967 after taking into companysideration the relevant material including the fact that other hotels were in past granted additional FSI. In view of abovereferredto companyclusions the appeal was partly allowed and the State Government was directed to take a decision on the application submitted by the petitioners seeking permission to develop their plot on the basis that the provisions of D.C. Rules, 1967 were applicable and decide the application submitted by the petitioners in the light of recommendations made by the Competent Authority as well as the fact that other hotels, as pointed out by the petitioners, were also granted more FSI than 1.33 permissible under Rule 10 1 of the D.C. Rules, 1967. The petitioners have claimed that they made an application on December 17, 2007 to the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to pass necessary orders in the light of the directions given by this Court in the above numbered appeal. By letter dated April 22, 2008, the respondent No. 5 informed the petitioners that the respondent No. 4, i.e., the Maharashtra Government, had approved additional FSI of 3.67 on the net plot area subject to payment of premium at 25 for first 100 additional FSI, 50 for second 100 additional FSI and 100 for remaining additional FSI. According to the petitioners, the respondent No. 4 asked the petitioners to pay the premium to the Government as well as to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and informed that on payment of the amount of premium, the order for grant of additional FSI would be companymunicated to Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. The assertion made by the petitioners is that they are entitled to FSI of 6.29 on gross plot area as per Rule 10 2 of D.C. Rules, 1967, but the respondents have approved additional FSI of 3.67 times of net plot area, which is companytrary to the directions issued by this Court in the above numbered appeal. The petitioners companytend that as the other hotels were granted additional FSI over and above the FSI of 1.33 permissible under the Rules, the decision to grant additional FSI of 3.67 on the net plot area is in breach of the directions issued by this Court. What is claimed by the petitioners is that the petitioners are number liable to pay any premium at all as other hotels were granted additional FSI without payment of premium to the Government and, therefore, the respondents should be hauled up for willful disobedience of the directions issued by this Court. In the alternative, it is claimed by the petitioners that even if the premium is to be calculated, the same works out at Rs.28 crores as against Rs.128 crores, which is calculated by the respondents and, therefore, by imposing premium the respondents have brushed aside the directions issued by this Court for which appropriate action should be taken against them. Under the circumstances the petitioners have filed the instant companytempt application and claimed reliefs to which reference is made earlier. were companycerned, as those hotels were located in Backbay Reclamation Area of A Ward and in addition to the base FSI, Hilton Tower was granted additional FSI of 1.95, Oberoi Hotel was granted additiona FSI of 1.00 and Hotel President was granted additional FSI of 0.82 whereas in the case of Taj Mahal Hotel the base FSI of 2.45 was taken because it was number located in the Backbay Reclamation Area and the said hotel was granted additional FSI of 2.28 and, therefore, the claim of the petitioners that on the basis of additional FSI granted to the abovenamed hotels, the petitioners were entitled to FSI of 6.29 has numberbasis at all. The respondents have stressed in the reply that in Civil Appeal No. 5948 of 2007, decided by this Court on December 14, 2007, there was numberspecific mandamus issued directing the respondents to grant FSI of 6.29 to the petitioners number specific prohibition was issued number to charge premium on the additional FSI and, therefore, the order dated April 22, 2008, passed by the Government of Maharashtra, should number be treated as companytemptuous at all. According to the respondents the Chief Engineer Development Plan , MCGM had requested the Government by letter dated December 31, 2005 to grant additional FSI, but neither MCGM number Municipal Commissioner had recommended grant of additional FSI of 3.73 times of permissible FSI of 1.33 and, therefore, the present companytempt application should be rejected. In paragraph 11 of the reply the respondents have tried to justify the premium of Rs.128.06 crores sought to be charged from the petitioners and pointed out that the hotel of the petitioners, which is situated in C Ward as per D.C. Rules, 1991, is number entitled to more FSI than granted by the Government of Maharashtra vide order dated April 22, 2008. By filing the reply the respondents have prayed to dismiss the companytempt application with exemplary companyts. The petitioners have filed rejoinder affidavit reiterating what is averred in the companytempt application and, therefore, this Court does number deem it fit to deal with the same in detail. This Court has heard the learned companynsel for the parties at length and companysidered the documents forming part of the instant application. As is clear from the directions issued by this Court vide judgment dated December 14, 2007, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 5948 of 2007, the prayer made by the petitioners to direct the respondents to grant FSI of 6.29 was specifically refused and the State Government was directed to decide the application submitted by the petitioners for sanction of the plans in the light of the provisions of D.C. Rules, 1967. As pointed out by the respondents the base FSI was 3.5 in cases of Hotels Hilton Tower, Oberoi and President as those hotels were located in Backbay Reclamation Area of A Ward and Hilton Towers was granted additional FSI of 1.95, Oberoi was granted additional FSI of 1.00 and Hotel President was granted additional FSI of 0.82. It is averred in the reply that as far as Taj Mahal Hotel is companycerned the same was number located in the Backbay Reclamation Area and, therefore, base FSI was taken to be 2.45 and additional FSI of 2.28 was granted. Under the circumstances it becomes evident that the additional FSI of 3.67 granted to the petitioners is much more than the additional FSI granted to the other hotels. As explained by the respondents the Chief Engineer Development Plan , MCGM had requested the Government vide letter dated December 31, 2005 to grant additional FSI, as demanded by the petitioners, but neither MCGM number Municipal Commissioner had recommended for grant of additional FSI of 3.73 times of permissible FSI of 1.33. Moreover, it is stated by the respondent in paragraph 10 of the reply that the decision to grant additional FSI of 3.67 over and above the basic permissible 1.33 companyes to 93.06.

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2008_1831.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 206 , 2861 , 250 , 320 , 1607 , 3548 , 379 , 769 1280 of , 979 and 1476 1483 Of 1985. From the Judgments and Orders dated 10.1.79 , 28.9.79 , P 16.1.79 , 26.4 79 , 27.9.79 , 15.1.79 , 8.1.79.19.4.79 , of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 4327/78 , 3430/79 , 4713/78 , 4937/78 , 1345/79 , 3217/79 , 5121/78 , 24/78 , 5195/18 , 4340/78 , 4613178 , 4793178 , 41J3/78 , 4386/78 , 4545/18 , 4585/18 and 1257/79. G K. Ranamurthi , R.C. Pathak , Arvind Kumar , Mrs. Laxmi Arvind , Miss K. V. Lalitha , Arun Madan , Sarwa Mitter , Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli , for the appearing Appellants. The Full Benches of the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh , Karnataka , Punjab and Haryana and a Division Bench of the Patna High Court 1 have upheld the validity of such provisions. But litigants , particularly those who are in a position to companymand funds arc rarely deterred by such unanimity of judicial opinion. 11 So , several Co operative Societies of Punjab have chosen to prefer appeals to this Court questioning the vires of sec. Considering next the question whether the new Board was a companyporation , the companyrt had numberdifficulty in answering the question with reference to sub section 2 of section 3 which stated that the Board shall be a body companyporate having perpetual succession and companymon seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued.

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1985_102.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 2084 2085/74. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 10/11/10/1974 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 160 and 173 of 1966. R. Lalit, V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. V. D. Khanna for the appellant. D. Bal, P. H. Parekh and M. Mudgal for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J. These two appeals by special leave arise from a suit filed by the respondents plaintiffs for recovering possession of land bearing Survey Nos. 487/1 to 487/6 situated at Shirwal Peta Khandala from the appellant defendant. During the pendency of this suit a portion of the land in dispute was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and as both the plaintiffs and the defendant laid a claim to companypensation, a reference was made under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act for determining the eligibility for the amount of companypensation. The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit and First Appeal No. 160 of 1966 was preferred by the defendant to the High Court of Bombay. Following the decision of the trial Court, the reference under s. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act was answered in favour of the plaintiffs respondents and the defendant preferred First Appeal No. 173 of 1966 to the High Court. Both the appeals were heard together and by its judgment dated 10/11 October, 1974 a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed both the appeals with companyts. Thereupon the appellant preferred the present two appeals. As both the appeals arise from a companymon judgment, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. Facts necessary for appreciating the point of law canvassed in these appeals lie within a narrow companypass. One Dattatraya Govind Kulkarni, husband of plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiffs 2 to 6 had borrowed a Tagai loan of Rs. 12,000/ by making an application Exhibit 129 accompanied by prescribed form, Ext. 128 on 7th February, 1949. The loan was borrowed for companystructing wells in Survey Nos. 167 and 170 and he offered as security the lands bearing Survey Nos. 165, 166, 167, 170 and 172. In the application Ext. 129 that accompanied the prescribed form it was stated that wells have to be sunk to bring barren land under cultivation. In other words, the loan was for improvement of the land. The loan was advanced and the borrower failed to repay the loan as per the stipulations. A revenue recovery proceeding was companymenced and as by the sale of the land offered as security the Government companyld number reimburse itself the total amount outstanding, a proclamation of sale was issued and ultimately the suit land was auctioned and it was purchased by the defendant and the sale in his favour was companyfirmed and he was put in possession on 20th May, 1960. The plaintiff stated that prior to the date of auction there was a partition between the father and his sons on 6th July, 1956 evidenced by Ext. 53 and at this partition the suit land with its sub divisions came to the share of the plaintiffs and therefore, the father had numbersaleable interest in the suit land and it companyld number have been sold at a revenue auction for recovering the personal debt of the father. So companytending, the plaintiffs brought an action for a declaration that the sale is number binding upon them and possession may be restored to them. With these findings the appeals were dismissed. 167 and 170 being described by the plaintiffs themselves as joint family property.

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1978_206.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 118 of 1957. appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated january 31 1956 of the circuit bench of the punjab high court at delhi in civil writ number 243 d of 1954. k. daphtary solicitor general of india r. ganapathy iyer and r. h. dhebar for the appellant. purshottam tricumdas t. s. venkataraman and k. r. chaud hury for the respondent. september 18. the following judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkatarama aiyarj this is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the high companyrt of punjab in an application under art. 226 of the companystitution setting aside an order dated september 16 1954 dismissing the respondent herein from government service on the ground that it was in companytravention of art. 311 2 of the companysti tution. the respondent was at the material dates an assistant controller in the companymerce department of the union govern ment. sometime in the middle of march 1953 one shri bhan a representative of a calcutta firm styled messrs. gattulal chhaganlal joshi came to delhi with a view to get the name of the firm removed from black list in which it had been placed and for that purpose he was companytacting the officers in the department. information was given to sri tawakley an assistant in the ministry of companymerce and industry company plaints branch that sri bhan was offering to give bribe for getting an order in his favour. he immediately reported the matter to the special police establishment and they decided to lay a trap for him. sri bhan however was willing to pay the bribe only after an order in his favour had been made and companymunicated but he offered that he would get the respondent to stand as surety for payment by him. the police thereafter decided to set a trap for the respond ent and it war accordingly arranged that sri tawakley should meet by appointment sri bhan and the respondent in the kwality restaurant in the evening on march 24 1953. the meeting took place as arranged and three members of the special police establishment were present there incognito. then there was a talk between sri tawak ley sri bhan and the respondent and it is the case of the appellant that during that talk an assurance was given by the respondent to sri tawakley that the amount would be paid by sri bhan. after the companyversation was over when the respondent was about to depart one of the officers the superintendent of police disclosed his identity got from the respondent his identity card and initialled it and sri bhan also initialled it. on march 28 1953 the respondent received a numberice from the secretary to the ministry of companymerce and industry charging him with aiding and abetting sri bhan in offering illegal gratification to sri tawakley and attempting to induce sri tawakley to accept the gratification offered by sri bhan and in support of the charges there were detailed. allega tions relating to meetings between the respondent and sri tawakley on march 17 1953 on march 21 1953 a telephonic conversation with reference to the same matter later on that day and the meeting in the kwality restaurant already mentioned. the respondent was called upon to give his explanation to the charges and he was directed to state whether he wished to lead oral or documentary evidence in defence. the enquiry was delegated to mt. j. byrne joint chief companytroller of imports and exports. on april 10 1953 the respondent submitted a detailed explanation denying that he met sri tawakley either on the 17th or on the 21st march or that there was any telephonic companyversation that day with him and stating that the companyversation which he had in the kwality restaurant on the 24th related to an insurance policy of his and had numberhing to do with any bribe proposed to be offered by sri bhan. the respondent also asked for an oral enquiry and desired to examine sri bhan sri fateh singh and sri jai narayan in support of his version. on april 17 1953 mc. byrne gave numberice to the respondent that there would be an oral enquiry and pursuant thereto witnesses were examined on april 20 1953 and the following days and the hearing was companycluded on april 27 1953. on this a companymunication was issued to the respondent on august 29 1953 wherein he was informed that it was provisionally decided that he should be dismissed and asked to show cause against the proposed action. along with the numberice the whole of the report of mr. byrne omitting his recommendations was sent. oil september 11 1953 the respondent sent his explanation. therein he again discussed at great length the evidence that had been adduced and submitted that the finding of guilt was number proper and that numberaction should be taken against him. he also companyplained in this explanation that the enquiry was vitiated by the fact that he had number been permitted to cross examine. the witnesses who gave evidence against him. accepting the finding of the enquiring officer and the recommendation of the union public service companymission made an order on september 16 1954 that. the respondent then filed the application out of which the present appeal arises in the high companyrt of punjab for an appropriate writ to quash the order of dismissal dated september 16 1954 for the reason that there was numberproper enquiry. as many as seven grounds were set forth in support of the petition and of these the learned judges held that three had been established. they held that the respondent had been denied an opportunity to cross examine witnesses who gave evidence in support of the charge that further he was number allowed to make his own statement but wag merely cross examined by the enquiring officer and that likewise his witnesses were merely cross examined by the officer without the respondent himself being allowed to examine them. the examination of witnesses began on april 201953 and four witnesses were examined on that date among them being sri c. b. tawakley. if as stated by the respondent he asked for permission to crossexamine witnesses and that was refused it is surpris ing that he should number have put the companyplaint in writing on the subsequent dates on which the enquiry was companytinued. to one of the witnesses sri. it is number suggested that there was any specific matter in respect of which cross examination companyld have been but was number directed.

dev

1957_112.txt

These appeals relate to the period from 1 3 1971 to 31 10 1976. The short question for companysideration is whether the multifold yarn or doubled yarn prepared by the appellants out of duty paid companyton yarn and nylon filament yarn attracts duty under Item 18A/18E of the Central Excise Tariff. The facts reveal that the appellants are manufacturers of paper makers companyton dryer felts. They purchase companyrse companyton yarn and duty paid nylon filament yarn from others, they take a few strands of companyton yarn and nylon filament yarn the numbers depending on the varieties of felts and twist them together on a doubling machine and thereafter use the multifold yarn having both the companystituents for weaving of felts. This is the process through which companyton yarn and nylon filament yarn is put for the purposes of manufacturing the felts. Relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Union Carbide India Ltd.1978 2 E.L.T. J 1 , the Tribunal held that the test of general marketability is number a sound test in the case of monopoly products since the multifold yarn was prepared for weaving felts which was monopoly product. Since the intermediary product was neither companyton yarn or nylon yarn but a mixed One. In support reliance was also placed on its previous decision in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Collector .

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1995_239.txt

The following Order of the companyrt was delivered Special Leave granted. We heard Mr. J.S. Bali, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, learned Counsel for the respondents. His Writ Petition having been dismissed, he has filed this appeal, by special leave. It appears that appellant joined service as a sweeper in the High Court on April 25, 1958. By an order dated April 28, 1978 he was placed under suspension and thereafter he was dismissed from service on November 30,1978.

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1984_261.txt

The workmen are the appellants in these two appeals. By a companymon judgment, the High Court allowed the writ appeals of the respondent management, setting aside the judgment of a learned single judge, dismissing the writ petitions challenging the award of the labour companyrt which directed the management to reinstate the workmen into service without payment of back wages but with companytinuity of service. They were permanent employees of the management from 1979 and were working as fitters. After holding the domestic enquiry, the workmen were dismissed from service with effect from 11.7.1984. In 1985, the dispute about the dismissal being justified or number was referred to the labour companyrt. The labour companyrt held that though there was numberjustification for their absence, the punishment of dismissal was harsh and disproportionate for the said absence. Instead of dismissal, the punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect and denial of back wages was directed. In writ appeal, the management succeeded to the extent that the direction of the labour companyrt in respect of the companytinuity of service was set aside and to that extent the award was modified by judgment under appeal. The workmen are in appeal under these circumstances. 15868/1996, the labour companyrt while directing reinstatement had number only denied back wages to the said workman but also the companytinuing of service. It held that the labour companyrt had number assigned any valid reasons for giving a different treatment to the appellants herein and thus the award was directed to be modified and companytinuity of service denied to the appellants herein.

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2002_251.txt

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jabalpur dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in short the Act . Challenge in the appeal was to the award made by the Motor Claims Appellate Tribunal, Ratangarh Churu in short MACT in Claim Case No.89 of 2004. By the said award, a sum of Rs.4,03,650/ was awarded to the claimant respondent No.1 in the appeal. It was pointed out that the driving license of the driver of the offending vehicle was number in force on the date of accident. Factual position in detail need number be indicated because the issue relates to the liability of the insurance companypany as the driving license was number valid on the date of the accident. In the instant case the date of accident was 11.6.2004. The drivers license was initially valid for the period from 15.12.1997 to 14.12.2000 and thereafter from 29.12.2000 to 14.12.2003. Thereafter, it was again renewed from 16.5.2005 to 15.5.2008. The appellant filed its objections before MACT taking the stand that since the driving license was number valid on the date of accident it had numberliability.

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2008_1307.txt

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. 41 and 77 of 1973. Appeals under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 from the, Judgment and Order dated the 5th February, 1973 of the Orissa High Court at Cuttack in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 8 of 1972. K. Ser, G. L. Mukhoty and C. S. S. Rao, for the appellant in Cr. A. 41./73 . Rath, and B. Parthasarathy, for the appellant In Cr. A. 77/73 . S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General, B. M. Patnaik and Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent No. 1 in Cr. A. 41/73 and respondent NO. 2 in Or. A. 77/73 . Rath and U. P. Singh,for respondent No. 2 in Cr. A. 41/73 , K. Sen and C. S. S. Rao, for respondent No. 1 in Cr. A. 77/73 . The judgment of the Court were delivered by PALEKAR J. This is Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1973 an appeal by one Baradakanta Mishra from his companyviction and sentence under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Full Bench of fiVe of the. Orissa High Court. The Judgment is reported in I.L.R. 1913 Cuttack, 134 Registrar of the Orissa High Court v. Baradakanta Mishra and Ors. The appellant started his career as a Munsif in 1947. His career as a Judicial Officer was far from satisfactory. In 1956 he was promoted on trial basis to the rank of a sub Judge with the observation 28 7 that if he was found incompetent, suitable action would be, taken. In due companyrse, he, was companyfirmed as a Subordinate Judge. As his work was for unsatisfactory, he wag reverted to his substantive post of a Subordinate Judge on January 4, 1963. The order of reversion was challenged by him in a Writ Petition which was dismissible by a Bench of C.J. and , J. The case is reported in I.L.R. 1966, Cutback, 503. An appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on February 6,he 1967. While working as a Subordinate Judge, after reversion, was suspended from service from 15th May, 1964 to 9th April, 1967 during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding against him. that proceeding ended in a light punishment of two of his increments being stopped. From the. above order of punishment, the appellant filed on 10 10 1967 an appeal to the State Government. The State Government by its order dated 15 7 1970 allowed tie appeal on the ground that the Public Service Commission had number heed companysulted by the High Court before imposing the punishment, and that the Charge Sheet served on the appellant having indicated the proposed punishment vitiated the disciplinary proceedings. After the case, Was sent back to the High Court the charges which had been earlier established, were framed again and served on him on 13 2 1971 and we are informed that the proceeding is still pending. In the meantime, it appears, he was promoted to the post of the Additional District Maggistrate in February, 1968 though the High Court was of opinion that he was unbalanced, quarrelsome, reflect and undisciplined. The High Court specifically observed that though the appellant suffered from these defects, It was sincere and working and the other officers who had superseded him as Additional Districting Magistratres were number much better. The promotion was made on trial basis for a period of one year with the. observation that if during that period his work was found to be unsatisfactory, he would be reverted to the rank of Sub Judge. In that year the High Court had to face an abnormal situation by the retirement of many District Judges on account of the decision of the Government reducing the age of retirement from 58 to 55 years Many, vacancies occurred and the appellant was then promoted as an Additional District and Sessions Judge on trial basis for six months in July, 1968. In January, 1969 he was allowed to companytinue on a temporary basis till further orders subject to further review of his work at the time of companyfirmation. It is worthy of numbere that this decision to companytinue was taken on the report of the present Chief. Justice O. K. Mishra who was at that time the Administrative Judge. On May 12, 1969 his services were placed at the disposal of the Government in the Law Department, who appointed him as Joint Secretary. Law, till October 12, 1969. From October 13, 1960 to December 4, 1970 he was appointed by the Government as the Commissioner of Endowments. The Government was thoroughly dissatisfied with his work and on December 5, 1970 his services were replaced at the disposal of the High Court. The appellant went on leave. On his return to the Judicial cadre, he functioned as Addison District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack till July 14, 1971 when he was ,posted to act as District and Sessions Judge for 12 days in the temporary leave vacancy of the permanent District Judge Mr. P. K Mohanty. When he was thus acting as District and Sessions Judge for a short period by way of stop gap arrangement, the High Court placed several restrictions on his administrative powers,. In the brief period that he was working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack, the appellant showed gross indiscretion by defying a request made by the Distr ict, Judge in due companyrse of administration. He also companymitted a avejuiudicial misdemeanors. He heard an appeal and posted it for judgment on June 22, 1971. The judgment was delivered on that date and the, appeal was dismissed. The Order Sheets of the judgment were signed by the appellant and the judgment was duly sealed. Later in the day, however, the appellant scored through his signatures both in the Order Sheet and in the judgment and returned the record of the appeal to the District Judge for disposal by making a false statement that the judgment had number been delivered and that the parties being known to him it was number desirable that he should further hear the appeal, after taking additional evidence for which a petition had been filed. This was something quite extraordinary from a Judge of the appellants standing. When these matters were brought to the numberice of the High Court the Registrar by Order of the High Court recommended to the Government that the appellant be reverted to the post of the Additional District Magistrate Judicial . There were already three departmental proceedings pending against the appellant and he had also been companyvicted in a companytempt case. The High Court expressly informed the Government that these four matters had number been taken into companysideration in recommending his reversion and that his reversion was solely due to the fact that his work was found unsatisfactory. The recommendation was accepted by the Government who on September 1, 1971 reverted the appellant to the post of the Additional District Magistrate. On September 10, 1971 the appellant made a representation to the Chief Minister praying for the withdrawal of the order of reversion and, if necessary, to suspend him after drawing up a regular depart7 mental proceeding. The representation was forwarded to the Government with the companyments of the High Court. Something unusual happened. Without any further companysultation with the High Court, the Governor cancelled the reversion order by numberification dated March 21, 1972 And on the same day the Chief Minister wrote a companyfidential D.O. to the Chief Justice by name explaining the circumstances under which the reversion. order was cancelled. The Chief Minister appeared. to rely upon a decision of the Orissa High Court which had number application to the facts of this particular case. But any way. it would appear that by reason of the Order dated March 21, 1972 the reversion of the appellant to the post of the Additional District Magistrate stood cancelled and he companytinued to act in the post of the Additional District Sessions Judge, Cuttack. The D.O. letter of the Chief Minister remained unopened till the return of the Chief Justice from New Delhi where he had gone to attend the Chief Justices Conference. It was opened by the Chief Justice on return on March 26, 1972. But in the meantime, the appellant, who had gone on leave, having known about the order passed on March 21, 1972 asked for his posting. The rules required that on return from leave he should produce, a medical certificate and he was, accordingly directed to produce one. On March 28, 1972 the Chief Justice placed the letter of the Chief Minister for companysideration before the Full Court. The Full Court took the decision to start a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant and, pending the same, to place him under suspension in exercise of their powers under Article 235 of the Constitution. Accordingly on March 30 1972 the appellant was placed under suspension and his headquarters were fixed at Cuttack. The present companytempt proceedings arise out of events which took place after the suspension order. On receiving the suspension order the appellant addressed by letter an appeal to the Governor of Orissal for cancelling the order of suspension and for posting him directly under the Government. That is Annexure 8. As the High Court was of the view that numberappeal lay from an order of suspension pending disciplinary charges, it did number forward the appeal to the. Governor. In fact on April 28, 1972 the Registrar of the High Court intimated the State Government that the appeal filed by the appellant to the Governor had been withheld by the High Court as numbersuch appeal lies against the order of suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. The appellant was also intimated accordingly. On April 29, 1972 charges in the disciplinary proceeding were, framed by the High Court and companymunicated to the appellant and the appellant was directed to file his reply to the charges by a certain date. On May 14, 1972 the appellant wrote three letters. One was to the Registrar and is Annexure 13. By this letter the appellant intimated that he had moved the Governor to transfer the disciplinary proceedings to the Administrative Tribunal and that he would take all other alternative steps administrative and judicial to avoid the proceeding being dealt with by the High Court. The second letter was addressed to the Governor and is Annexure 15. It purports to be a representation with a prayer to direct the High Court to forward the appeal withheld by it. There was a third letter of the same date addressed directly to the Governor purporting to be a representation. That is Annexure 16. The prayer was that the departmental pro . seedings be reference to the Administrative Tribunal. 29 0 On May 22, 1972 the appellant addressed a letter Annexure 14 to the Registrar intimating him that he would number submit any explanation to the charges framed against him until his representation to the Governor was disposed of. Accordingly, it was filed on 7 8 1972 and the appellant again pressed for a decision on his preliminary objection. The Division Bench refused to deal with the preliminary objection and so on 30 8 1972 the appellant filed Criminal Appeal NO. 174 of 1972 in this Court praying for cancellation of the companytempt proceedings challenging therein the maintainability of the proceeding and companyplaining of bias and prejudice of the High Court particularly the Honourable the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice R.N. Mishra. He said apprehended that he would number get a fair deal if the matter is disposed of by the High companyrt On 21 11 1972 the Supreme Court appeal was withdrawn. At the instance of the Division Bench, a PM Bench of five Judges was companystituted by the Chief Justice, and the case came on for hearing before the Full Bench on 4 12 1972. In the meantime the appeal memo filed by the appellant in the Supreme Court was available and since it companytained matter which amounted to companytempt, additional, charges were framed and a show cause numberice was issued to the aPPellant in respect of these additional charges. A companyy of, the appeal memo companytaining the statements amounting to companytempt is Annexure 20. On a full and prolonged companysideration the Fall Bench came to, the unanimous companyclusion that Annexures 8,13,14,16, and 20 companytain matters which accounted to gross companytempt of companyrt and since the appellant had number even offered an apology, this was a matter in Which serious numberice ought to be taken, especially, in view of previous companyvictions for companytempt, and, accordingly sentenced the appellant to two months simple imprisonment though in their opinion he deserved the maximum sentence of six months. Annexure 8. As already stated this is a letter in the, form of an appeal addressed to the Governor of Orissa companyplaining against the suspension and praying for stay of operation of the suspension order on the basis. of the advance companyy sent to the Governor for its cancellation and for posting the appellant directly under the Government. it is dated 10 4 1972. The appeal had been routed through the High Court but the High Court did number forward the same. In this annexure reference is made to the previous appeal filed by him against the order of the High Court stopping his two increments after a departmental proceeding and how the Governor in appeal had cancelled even the very departmental proceeding in the appeal. An interpretation was, put on that order which it did number bear and it was made out, though falsely, that the punishment had been set aside on the basis of the allegations made by the appellant that some Honourable Judges of the High Court had been biased and prejudiced against him. The appellant also asked the Governor to appreciate that by the said departmental proceedings the High Court had put the Exchequer to a very heavy loss all on accounts of the palpable incorrect views of the High Court. Then the appellant says that the present action,. namely , the order of suspension clearly disclosed mala fides. He suggested that there were several embarrassing events which he companyld offer for companysideration of the Governor but he was companytent at this stage to refer to only one of them. In this companynection he referred to the fact that when he intimated to the High Court that he desired to join duties after his leave on March 20, 1972 he was informed by the High Court on March 23, 1972 that his re posting after leave would be decided after the medical board reported as to his fitness. to join after leave. This, according to the appellant, showed that the High Court had already taken a decision in the absence of the Chief Justice that the appellant should be re posted. But on the return of the Chief Justice from New Delhi there was a sudden change., The High Court at para 61 of the judgment has observed as follows In the appeal memo Annexure 8 the companydemner attributed mala fides, bias and prejudice to the High Court. He made false insinuations that the Governor cancelled the previous disciplinary proceeding against the companydemner on the ground that the same was vitiated as the High Court had prejudged the matter and the Government set aside the punishment on the ground that three of the Honourable Judges were biased and prejudiced against him. He alleged that the disciplinary proceeding involved the Government in heavy expenses on account of the palpably incorrect views of the High Court. He asserted that the order of suspension as per Annexure 6 was mala fide. He stated that he would produce more facts relating to the mala fides of the High Court before the Governor. He alleged that the High Court did number gracefully accept the Governments order cancelling his demotion, and the High Court resorted to a subterfuge to companynter act the said decision of the Government by taking a numberel step, and that the High Courts action suffered from patent mala fide. He stated that there was a turn of event after return of the Chief Justice from the Chief Justices Conference and that the High Court did number accept Governments decision. Annexure 13 is a letter by the appellant to the Registrar dated May 14, 1972 in which he told him that he had moved the Governor, Orissa with a prayer to refer his matter to the Tribunal under the provisions of the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules, 1951 and also that he would take all other alternative steps administrative and judicial to avoid this proceeding being dealt with by the High Court and for this purpose would have to companysult some prominent Advocates of Calcutta and Delhi. Annexure 14 is a further letter dated May 22, 1972 to the Registrar intimating him that he would number submit any explanation to the charges framed until his representation to the Governor was disposed of. In this letter he further pointed out that it would number be possible for him to wait for the permission of the High Court to leave headquarters, because he may be called by his legal advisers at any moment and in those circumstances he said I hereby inform the Honourable Court that I may be absent during the entire period mentioned in my letter dated the 14th May, 1972 and the Honourable Court may kindly approve of the same. The effect of Annexares 13 and 14 has been summarised by the Full Bench in these words Thus, in Annexures 13 and 14, the companytemner exhibited a companytemptuous defiance of the Courts order, by declaring that he would number obey the order. and would leave the station without waiting for permission from the High Court, as his first companysideration was to go out in companynection with legal advice and filing applications and appeals in the Supreme Court in matters connocted with his suspension, and to take all steps to avoid the proceeding being dealt with by the High Court. It Is dated May 14, 1972 and purports to be a representation made by the appellant direct to the Governor without routing it through the High Court. The following passages have been underlined by the Full Bench as being grossly companytemptuous. If on two such allegations, bias and prejudice of the High Court was disclosed by strongly pleading for demotion of the petitioner, the multiple number of such charges may naturally make the petitioner, apprehensive of the result of the proceedings, if companyducted by the High Court. 3559 Gen., dated the 15th March 1958, have placed the petitioner under suspension The High Court have also taken unusual move in placing the petitioner under suspension in a companytemplated proceeding . the High Court on the administrative side, is seriously prejudiced and biased against him, and they act, as if the charges stand established, requiring extreme punish ment and as such, justice, may number be meted out to the petitioner by the High Court, if they companyduct this departmental inquiry. the petitioner companysiders it risky to submit his explanation to the High Court. the High Court in the best interest of justice,should number enquire into these charges. A companyy of the above representation was sent to the Registrar and the following endorsement appears thereon. As the Honourable Court are likely to withhold petitions this is submitted direct with companyy to the Honourable Court for information. The Honourable Court may be pleased to send their companyments on this petition to the Governor. The summary of the effect of Annexure 16 is given by the Full Bench in para 70 of the judgment which is as follows In Annexure 16 the companytemner has suggested that the Court has already prejudged the matter and has taken a previous decision to impose a heavy punishment. Bias and prejudice on the part of the Court were also alleged by the companytemner. He suggested that the Court is number in a position to weigh the evidence. and companysider the materials on record and to impose a sentence companymensurate with his delinquency. The action taken by the High Court has been branded as unusual A companyy of this Annexure 16 was sent to the High Court with a companytemptuous remark that since the High Court was likely to withhold the representation it was submitted direct to the Governor. Not being satisfied with that, he issued a further directive to the companyrt to send their companyments on his representation to the Governor. The above summary of the effect of Annexure 16 is, in our view, companyrect. Annexure 20. This annexure is the memo of appeal filed by the appellant in the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 1972. The appeal had been filed because the Division Bench had refused to companysider his preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the present companytempt proceedings. six companytempt proceedings against him and in view. of what happened in some of those proceedings, the appellant entertained apprehension that the companyrt may impose substantive punishment and may refuse bail or time to the appellant for getting redress from the Supreme Court if the present companytempt proceedings were also to go on before the same High Court. In the first companytempt proceeding though the proceedings were dropped, Adverse companyments were made against his companyduct thus depriving him of an opportunity to go in appeal and have the adverse companyments exnged. in one of the other cases he says the appellant was brought down to the Court hall, and the Honourable Judges companyvicted and sentenced the appellant and without affording him an opportunity to obtain stay of the sentence from this Honourable Court, executed the sentence by administering admonition in the, open companyrt and sounding warning that, if at any time such companytumacious companyduct of his was numbericed, a very serious view would be taken about punishment. In the other companytempt matter, he alleged, a Judge wanted to add a new charge. The appellant objected to the same and went in appeal to the Suprerac, Court. The appellant says that when the appellant filed his appeal in this Court and brought this fact to the numberice of the Honourable Judges,, they dropped the additional charge. In another proceeding, he says, the Honourable Judges while dropping the proceeding found out a very innocent and inconsequential mistake in the sworn companynter affidavit of the appellant and on that account ordered the filing of a criminal companyplaint for an offence under section 199 of the I.P.C. In ground 1 the appellant alleged that the appellant fears bias of the Honourable High Court against him in view of the facts and circumstances stated above. The Full Bench in its judgment has companysidered each one of them allegations in the appeal memo and shows how the insinuations were false and how plain facts were distorted, They are entirely right in ,ummarising these facts of Annexure 20 in these words Thus in Annexure 20 the companytemner has, in clearest terms, alleged bias and prejudice against the High Court and its Chief Justice. He has taken the plea that the companyrt itself has become disqualified to deal with the case In his view the Judges of this Court have fallen from the path of rectitude, and are vindictive, and have already decided to impose substantive sentence and refuse bail, and they are number in a position to mete out even handed justice., 522SCI/74 disrespectful fulminations of an angry insubordinate officer, there is hardly any doubt that Annexures 8, 16 and 20 companytain statements which are deliberately made to grossly scandalize the High Court. The Judges of the High Court and especially the Chief Justice are charged with mala fides, improper motives, bias and prejudice. It is insinuated that they are oppressing the appellant, have become vindictive and are incapable of doing him justice. What was that action about ? Against the appellant in his judicial capacity, for acts of judicial misconduct. The companytrol was. lie heard it, delivered judgment dismissing the appeal signed the order sheet and judgment and sealed the judgment. Later in the day, the companytemnor scored off his signatures in the order sheet and judgment, and returned the record to the principal District Judge for disposal falsely stating that the judgment had number been delivered. The representation was forwarded by the Prime Ministers office to the Chief Secretary from whom it reached the District Magistrate.

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1973_278.txt

To quote A resolution was moved in the Lok Sabha on 21st April, 1962, for the abolition of Capital Punishment. In the companyrse of the debate on the resolution, suggestions were made that a companymission or companymittee should be appointed to go into the question. However, ultimately, a companyy of the discussion that had taken place in the House was forwarded to the Law Commission that was, at that time, seized of the question of examining the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code. The appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court was dismissed companyfirming the companyviction and sentence under Section 307. Thus aggrieved, the present appeals. The appellant was married to a woman named Sangita. They had three children, one daughter and two sons. They were staying in two rooms in a house belonging to his maternal aunt. He was a tailor by profession and employed as such in a cloth shop. One of his sons, Aakash had been suffering from asthma which required companystant medication. The appellants income was hardly sufficient to maintain his family and he was under stress in that regard. On 08.07.2008, it is stated that during the early hours of the morning while the members of the family were sleeping, he assaulted his wife Sangita and his two sons with the separated parts of a pair of sharp scissors and inflicted multiple stab injuries causing their instantaneous death. On his daughter Gaitri alias Pooja also, he inflicted stab injuries. However, she somehow companyld speak and asked why her father, the appellant was injuring her. The appellant father told her that the entire family had to go and he would also follow them. However, he gave her water to drink. Thereafter, he took her on his lap and pressed her mouth with a pillow with the intention of suffocating her, and yet the child did number succumb to death. He left the child in that companydition, bolted the door from outside and went straight to the police station and reported the incident. An FIR was registered. His statement was recorded. In the meanwhile, the daughter Gaitri got assistance from a neighbour and was immediately treated at a hospital and thus she survived. She is the key witness PW1. The neighbour is the maternal aunt of the accused and she is PW4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses and based mainly on the version of PW1 Gaitri, the appellant was companyvicted under Sections 302 and 307. Gaitri alias Pooja was clear and companysistent during the investigation as well as before the Sessions Court. In her evidence before the Court, she stated My father, mother and all we children were in the house. My father assaulted my mother, my two brothers and me with the help of scissor. My two brothers and mother died on the spot. I was assaulted over my chest and abdomen and to my both hands. Then my father gave me water to drink. He then took me on his laps and then pressed my mouth with the help of pillow. He then went to Police Station. While going out he bolted the door from outside. One Sakharbai Sadashiv Sonwane was staying in the same house in their neighbourhood. Then my uncle Anil Gaikwad came there and we were taken to Govt. Hospital at Gevrai for treatment. From there I was brought to Beed in the Civil Hospital by my uncle. Police came to me for making inquiry in the Hospital. I narrated the whole incident to them. The accused in the dock is my father. The accused was a tailor and he was working in somebodys shop owned by one Anil. She has stated that the elder son of the appellant was suffering from asthma. She also deposed as follows When I was sleeping in my house I got at about 5.30 a.m. I was washing utensils. I heard a sound from Gaitri asking me to open the door and that her father had assaulted them. I went near the room and found that the door was bolted from outside which I opened and went inside the room. I saw Sangita, Omkar, Aakash were lying in a pool of blood and they were dead. Gaitri had also bleeding injuries to her chest, stomach and chin. She told me that her father assaulted all of them with a scissor in that night. I shouted and went to Baban, Anil and called them. The said Anil took Gaitri to Hospital. Gaitri is also known by name Pooja. Emphasis supplied In cross, she submitted that the accused was a tailor. It is true that his financial companydition was poor. PW5 is the one who sold the scissors to the appellant. PW6 is the panch witness to the recovery of weapon of offence and other dress worn by the accused. The statement Exhibit No.29 was recorded by him and appellant signed the same. PW8 is the Police Inspector who companyducted the investigation. PW9 is the Police Inspector who prepared the inquest and spot panchnama. He companylected the blood from the spot and the pillow companyer soaked in blood. He also made the recovery of the scissors as disclosed by the accused. Photographs were also taken. We may also refer to the statement made by the appellant himself before the police on the basis of which the FIR was registered In my family my son Omkar is companystantly ill due to asthma. For the treatment of his ailment money was required which I had to borrow and hence I had become debt ridden. Due to the tension I companyld number companycentrate on my work and I had to go on leave frequently. Since I was fed up, I decided to leave the house, my wife and children would have died of hunger and ailment. As far as assault on the daughter is companycerned, he stated as follows Thereafter I dealt 2 3 blows on chest of my daughter due to which she woke up and having seen me dealing blows she asked weepingly earnestly papa why did you do so. At that time I replied we all have to go, I am also companying. By saying so, I gave her water to drink and took her head on my lap. In order to kill her I pressed her mouth and numbere but she was number dying. I waited for some time. Due to the incident which had happened I was terrified. Then I kept water near her and left her in injured companydition. Thereafter I removed my clothes worn by me at the time of companymission of the crime. I wrapped the scissors used for the crime in a cloth and went to the police station and presented myself and informed the incident.

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2013_518.txt

Venkatachala, J. This is a joint Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution filed by Mr. David Patrick Ward as Petitioner 1, Mr. Steven Hillman as Petitioner 2, both being British Nationals, challenging the legality of the Detention Orders dated 31st January, 1992 made against them under Sub sections 1 and 2 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 hereinafter referred to as the Act and seeking their release forthwith by issuance of Writs of Habeas Corpus to Respondents 1 the Union of India, 2 the State of Uttar Pradesh, 3 the State of Nagaland. Detention order made against each petitioner discloses that it had been made by Nagaland State Government with a view to prevent the companycerned petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, the security of India, the security of the State of Nagaland and maintenance of public order. The ground of detention pertaining to each detention order being companymon and in identical terms, reads On 30th January, 1992 around 2030 hrs, four vehicles i.e. A Car NLK 8701, A Car NLH 6103, Tata truck NLH 8093 and Maruti Gypsy NLH 1115 were moving on road from Meluri to Kiphire. When they were signalled to stop by a patrol of 14 A.R. near Meluri, instead of stopping, fire was opened on the 14 A.R, patrol from M Gypsy in which one rifleman of A.R. No. 143685 Shri Praveen Das was hit on the right shoulder. Assam Rifles returned fire on the M Gypsy killing Nipielie Chucha on the spot. At this, the occupants of the front three vehicles raised their arms and came out and were arrested by Assam Rifles. The arrested at this time included British national Shri Hillman Stephen Neil, nine insurgents and three drivers of these vehicles. Some documents, one diary and cash amounting to Rs. 8286 were recovered. One Chinese LMG and three Chinese rifles with 107 rounds of ammunitions, two VHF radio sets, one video camera with 30 cassettes, one Pentax camera and a video camera charger set were also recovered. In the meantime, M Gypsy being the last Vehicle quickly turned back and went towards Jessami. This Maruti Gypsy was finally intercepted around 2230 hrs by the 111 BSF jawans near Lanyie Bridge. From the M Gypsy British national David Patrick Ward and one insurgent were arrested and the dead body of one insurgent was also recovered. Also from this M Gypsy Rs. 3795 in each 30 US Dollar, three self cheques of 2,000 each and nine rounds of ammunition were recovered. The list of the persons arrested from these four vehicles is as follows David Patrick Ward Stephen Neil Hillman SS 2/Lt. Vevochu S o Mr. Vepahi SS Sqt. Major Cupanyi S o Mr. Thevio SS Sgt. Major Nasu S o Chasli SS Sqt. While the said ground of detention is put under the head Schedule in the Annexure to the Grounds of Detention companymunication, the latter is addressed to each petitioner by furnishing the following information for his guidance You have a right to make a representation to the State Government against above said order. You have also a right to claim personal hearing before the Advisory Board. Each petitioner being served with the detention order made against him along with the ground of detention on 4.2.1992 is detained in pursuance thereof. Both the petitioners being lodged in 1/5 G.R. at Jessami Jail, to being with, are shifted on 12.2.1992 to Imphal Central Jail and thereafter on 15.2.1992 to Naini Jail, Allahabad where they are said to have been lodged finally for security reasons. Pursuant thereto, the Advisory Board having fixed its meeting at Imphal on 15.3.1992 has heard the petitioners in person on their detentions. After such hearing, the Advisory Board being of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for detention of the petitioners, a report is sent to Nagaland State Government which on companysideration of that report has companyfirmed the detention orders on 2.4.1992. Petitioners have subsequently on 24.4.1992 filed the present joint Writ Petition challenging the legality of the said detention orders made against them and their companytinued detention. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Counsel for the petitioners, urges the following points for our companysideration Neither of the petitioners was served with the detention order and grounds of detention made against him. As a matter of fact, it has been categorically stated so in the companynter affidavit of the third respondent, the State of Nagaland, annexing the companyies of acknowledgements to it. This will clearly prove service of the detention order. The incident on 30/31.1.1992 which forms the grounds of detention discloses that the occupants of the motor vehicle in which one of the petitioners was moving, fired on the patrol party and injured one Assam Rifles jawan, by name, Praveen Das. Only after a chase, the DIG of Assam Rifles was able to arrest at 2230 hrs petitioner 1, David Patrick Ward, Certainly these grounds companypled with recovery of arms and ammunition would clearly establish that there is numbervagueness at all as far as the grounds of detention are companycerned. That was received on 5.5.1992 by the State Government. While the State Government took necessary steps to process the same for companysideration, the Writ Petitions came to be filed on 5.5.1992 on which the State Government received numberice on 13.5.1992. Petitioners are known to belong to a U.K. based organisation called Naga Vigil as is disclosed in the companynter affidavit of Home Commissioner of Nagaland State Government. It is said in that companynter affidavit that the petitioners had entered Nagaland without obtaining Restricted Area Permit as required under the Foreigners Protected Areas Order, 1958 issued by the Government of India. It is further said there, that the petitioners were moving from place to place in the districts of Kohima, Phek and Tuensang in the companypany of insurgents and secessionist groups and indulging in activities, which were detrimental to the security of India, maintenance of public order of the State of Nagaland and also maintenance of relations of India with foreign powers. Then, it is said that petitioner 1, David Patrick Ward during his visit to various places in the State of Nagaland was inciting the feelings of Naga people against the established Government. A reference is made to a signed Press release said to have been issued by petitioner 1 on 3.12.1991 on his views that the Naga people should freely exist in peace as an independent nation. From the companynter affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India, it is disclosed that the petitioners 1 and 2 took Visas from the High Commission of India at London to visit India for a holiday and the places they desired to visit in India were Delhi Agra Calcutta. Coming to the profession of Petitioner 2, the High Commission of India at London is said to have been informed as Chef. After companying to India, they have entered the State of Nagaland without the Restricted Area Permits and joined the Naga Federal Government activists whose goal was the achievement of Peoples Republic of Nagaland and had prepared a documentary without the permission of the authorities, to incite the people of Nagaland againstthe Government of India, As is seen from the incidents adverted to in the grounds of detention, petitioner 1 had even tried to evade arrest from the Indian security forces. The petitioners have lived with Naga insurgents in their gang and participated in their activities, for almost three months. If regard is had to be pretext on which the petitioners had entered India, the number disclosure by them of the real purpose for which they were visiting India, and attempts made by them to evade arrest from the Indian security forces by opening fire against them, it would be difficult to think that their deportation from India will number make them return to India by some means or the other to carry on the prejudicial activities which were carried on by them before their detention, along with Naga insurgents and secessionists, against the established State Government and the Central Government.

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1992_767.txt

C. Gupta, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a Judgment of the Calcutta High Court setting aside in revision the finding of the trial companyrt on the issue whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between the parties in a suit for ejectment. The issue which arises on the interaction of two statutes, the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Temporary Provisions Act, 1950 and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which repeals the earlier Act but keeps it alive for proceedings pending on the date of repeal, involves the question, is the right companyferred on the sub tenant by the 1956 Act of being declared a tenant directly under the superior landlord available to a sub tenant against whom a suit for ejectment was pending when that Act came into force ? The appeal turns on the answer to this question. The material facts leading to the impugned order are these. The respondent was a tenant of premises No. 17/1E Gopal Nagar Road, Alipore, Calcutta, and his landlord was one Jagabandhu Saha, the owner of the house, Dilip Narayan Roy Chowdhury was a sub tenant under the respondent in respect of the ground floor flat paying a monthly rent of Rs. Sub tenant Roy Choudhury served a numberice under Section 16 2 of the 1956 Act upon the superior landlord and applied under Section 16 3 for being declared a tenant directly under him. On July 31, 1956 the Rent Controller recorded a finding on this application that Roy Choudhury was entitled to the declaration asked for overruling the objections raised by the respondent. On February 23, 1957 the Rent Controller companycluded the proceeding under Section 16 3 by finally declaring that the sub tenant was a tenant directly under the superior landlord with effect from that date, and fixing the rent payable by him. The appeal preferred by the respondent from this order was dismissed by the appellate authority. In the meantime, on August 21, 1956 the respondent had made an application under Section 14 4 of the 1950 Act in the suit for eviction which was pending. Section 14 4 of the 1950 Act permitted the landlord to make an application in the suit for an order on the tenant to deposit month by month the rent at the rate at which it was last paid and also the arrears of rent, if any, and provided that on failure to deposit the arrears of rent or the rent for any month within the period prescribed for such deposits, the companyrt would make an order striking out the tenants defence against ejectment so that the tenant would be in he same position as if he had number defended the claim to ejectment. On this application the Munsif on September 26, 1956 directed the appellant to deposit a certain sum as arrears of rent and also rent month by month at the rate of Rs. After the declaration of tenancy under Section 16 3 , Roy Choudhury was permitted to amend his written statement in the suit by adding a paragraph questioning the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and himself. It is unnecessary to refer to the various proceedings in the suit that followed, in the companyrse of which the High Court was moved more than once by either party. On January 24, 1965 Roy Choudhury died and the present appellants were substituted in his place in the suit as his heirs and legal representatives. On November 1, 1965 the Munsif framed an additional issue, being issue No. 9, which was as follows Has the alleged relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties been determined by final orders dated 31 7 56 and 23 2 57 passed by the R. C. Rent Controller Calcutta in Case No. 243B of 1956 ? The Munsif took up for companysideration the application under Section 14 4 and the additional issue No. 9 together and by his order dated February 20, 1967 found that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to pass the order under Section 16 3 declaring the defendant to be a direct tenant under the superior landlord, and that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased by virtue of the order made under Section 16 3 . The additional issue No. The plaintiff moved the High Court in revision against this order. The propriety of this order is challenged by the tenant defendants.

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1976_467.txt

Having failed to companyvince the trial Court and the High Court to entertain their prayer for restraining respondent number 1 Municipal Corporation of Mumbai for short, the Corporation from demolishing the buildings companystructed on Plot No. 9, Scheme 58, Worli, Mumbai, the petitioners have filed these petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution. The petitioners are the Cooperative House Building Societies for short, the societies and their members, who are said to have purchased flats in the buildings companystructed by the developers on the plot in question. Their grievance is that even though the flats were purchased under a bona fide belief that the buildings have been companystructed in accordance with law, the trial Court and the High Court did number injunct the Corporation from demolishing the same on the ground that the latter had taken action in furtherance of the orders passed in Writ Petition Nos. The Corporation leased out the plot in question, of which the total area is 17907.60 sq. meters to M s. Pure Drinks Pvt. Ltd. on 17.1.1962 for general industrial use. After 18 years and about 11 months, the State Government issued order dated 1.12.1980 under Section 37 2 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and sanctioned the change of use in respect of 13049.45 sq. meters land from industrial to residential. Between 1980 and 1982, M s. Pure Drinks transferred that portion of land to the developers for companystruction of residential buildings. The building plans submitted by the developers for companystruction of 6 buildings companyprising of basement, ground and 5 upper floors were sanctioned by the companypetent authority on 8.6.1981. The amended building plans submitted by the developers for companystruction of 9 buildings with ground and 5 upper floors were also sanctioned by the companypetent authority. In 1984, the developers submitted new building plans proposing companystruction of two buildings on stilts with 24 and 16 upper floors respectively, additional 6th and 7th floors in building number 2 and additional 6th floor on a portion of building number 3. The new plans were rejected by the companypetent authority on 6.9.1984. Notwithstanding this, the developers companytinued the companystruction and did number stop their activity despite the stop work numberice dated 12.11.1984 issued by the Corporation. After the purchasers of flats formed societies, they along with the societies filed writ petitions for issue of a direction to the Corporation to provide water companynections. During the pendency of those petitions, the Division Bench of the High Court took companynizance of the fact that the buildings had been companystructed in violation of the sanctioned plans and passed order dated 11.10.2005 and directed the Additional Commissioner of the Corporation to appear in person to explain the reason for number taking action against the illegal companystruction. That order reads as under In all these writ petitions, arguments were heard on behalf of the parties. None appeared for respondent number4 in Writ Petition No.2904 99, for respondent No.4 in Writ Petition No.2403 99, for respondent Nos.4 and 5 in Writ Petition No.2402 99, for respondent number.4 and 5 in Writ Petition No.1808 2000. Shri V. Patil, Sub Engineer Building and Proposal City was present in Court to assist the Advocate for the Corporation. In the companyrse of the argument, it was revealed by the Advocate for the Corporation on taking instructions that original licence for companystruction was granted in favour of four persons viz. Shri Manjit Singh Madanjit Singh, Power of Attorney Holder of S. Karanjit Singh, Chief Executive Officer of Pure Drink Pvt. Ltd., Shri Ishwarsingh Chawla of PSD Construction Pvt. Ltd., Shri D.K.Gupta of D.Y. Builders Pvt. Ltd. and Abdula Yusuf Patel. Pursuant to the illegality in companystruction having been found, numberices were issued under Section 53 1 of the M.R.T.P. Act on 20th February, 2002 to all the four persons mentioned above. Thereafter, sanction was granted for prosecution of all the four persons and decision in that regard was taken on 19th May, 2003 by the Executive Engineer Building Proposal , CT/1 of the Corporation. Meanwhile, the panchanama of the illegal companystruction was carried out on 13th November, 2002. Besides, the prosecution was launched against builder, developer and all the occupants of the building and they were companyvicted on admission of guilt and sentenced by way of imposition of fine from Rs.600/ to Rs.2000/ imposed by the Magistrate. Apart from the above actions, numberother action has been taken by the Corporation in relation to the illegal companystruction. The affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the Corporation before issuance of rule in the petition by Shri Kurmi Deonath Sitaram, Executive Engineer, DP City I discloses that initial approval was granted for six wings companysisting of ground plus five upper floors and it was issued on 9th June, 1981 and Commencement Certificate was granted on 10th June, 1981. The amendment plans were approved for nine wings of ground plus five upper floors on 2nd February, 1983. Thereafter, amendment plans proposing stilt plus twenty four floors and stilt plus sixteen floors with additional sixth and seventh floor to building number.2 and 4 and additional sixth floor for the part of building number3 were submitted but they were refused on 6th September, 1984. In spite of that, the companystructive activities companytinued and the work beyond the approved plans was carried out, and therefore Stop Work numberice was issued under Section 353 A of the MMC Act on 12th November, 1984. However, the work companytinued. Again new architect submitted further plan with a fresh numberice under Section 337. The same was rejected by the Corporation. The Registrar General is required to fax the companyy of this order to the Corporation apart from the fact that of the same is being numbered by the Advocate for the Corporation. The societies and their members sent reply dated 28.11.2005 through their advocate and pleaded that they were in numberway responsible for the unauthorized companystructions. Deputy Chief Engineer, Building Proposals City did number accept the reply sent by the advocate of the societies and their members and passed orders dated 3.12.2005 and 8.12.2005 and directed the petitioners to remove the illegal companystructions. Thereupon, the petitioners filed Long Cause Suits for declaring numberices dated 19.11.2005 and orders dated 3/8.12.2005 to be illegal. They further prayed for grant of permanent injunction restraining the Corporation, its servants, agents and representatives from taking any action demolishing the buildings. The petitioners also filed numberices of motion for grant of temporary injunction. On 17.12.2005, the trial Court passed ad interim orders and directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit structures. In short on that date the upper floor companystruction was number sanctioned by the Corporation. Not only this it is appeared from the letter of Jayant Chitnis, Architect who specifically mentioned in his letter that he already addressed a letter dated 5.1.1990 and informed to the companycerned developer about the show cause numberice issued by the Corporation about the companystruction of upper floors which were number sanctioned. This letter also addressed to the said society by the said Architect.

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2012_93.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1611 of 1971. appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 29 70 of the judicial companymissioners companyrt tripura agartala in civil misc. 1st appeal number 4 of 1964. v. gupte d. n. mukherjee and g. s. chatterjee for the appellant. k. chatterjee and rathin das for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by chandrachud j. by a deed of mortgage dated february 10 1943 the respondent mortgaged a tea garden called the ishanchandrapar tea estate to m s. das bank limited on january 19 1950 the bank instituted mortgage suit number 2/1950 againstthe respondent on the original side of the tripura high companyrt for recovering the amount due under the mortgage. on reorganisation of the judicial administration in tripura the suit was transferred to the companyrt of the district judge agartala. on january 20 1950 the bank applied for the appointment of a receiver. on the district judge directing that the bank should numberinate a receiver in terms of clause 12 of the mortgage deed first the secretary of the bank and later anumberher employee called adhir ranjan dutta was appointed as the receiver subject to his furnishing security in the sum of rs. 50000. the receiver took possession of the estate on 22nd january but since the security was number furnished the companyrt directed on an application of the respondent that the receiver should furnish the requisite security within the time allowed to him. on february 26 1950 the tea garden was damaged by a fire which destroyed over 3000 tea saplings. on 28th february the respondent moved an application asking for damages from the receiver on the ground that the fire had occurred due to his negligence. the respondent also renewed his request that the receiver be asked to furnish security. on august 26 1950 the appellant m s. howrah insurance co. limited executed a surety bond in the sum of rs. 50000 in favour of shri r. m. goswami district judge agartala his successors successors in office and assigns. the bold was approved and accepted by the district judge on october 10 1950. by virtue of the powers companyferred by the tripura companyrts order of 1950 which came into force on december 31 1950 the district judge transferred the mortgage suit to the companyrt of the subordinate judge agartala. the transferee court was created under the order of 1 950. c the application filed by the respondent on february 28 1950 for damages was heard along with the mortgage suit. the learned subordinate judge decreed the suit on may 31 1956 but he also allowed the respondents application for damages to the extent of rs. 32525. he directed that the receiver should pay the amount within two months failing which the amount should be recovered from the security of rs. 50000. civil miscellaneous first appeal number 22 of 1956 filed by the receiver against that order was dismissed for default by the judicial companymissioner tripura on december 18 1959. but he allowed the respondents cross objections and enhanced the damages to rs. on october 4 1961 respondent filed in the companyrt of the subordinate judge execution petition number 39 of 1961 against the receiver and the appellant praying that execution do issue against the appellant as directed by the companyrt. the appellant filed this objections to that petition but the learned judge rejected the objections and directed that the damages awarded to the respondent be recovered from the appellant. the appellant filed an appeal against that order but it was dismissed by the learned judicial companymissioner on june 29. this appeal by special leave is directed against that judgment. learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised two companytentions l the subordinate judge who tried the suit is incompetent to enforce the surety bond executed by the appellant as he is neither the successor number the successor in office number the assign of the district judge and 2 under the terms of the bond the appellant is number answerable for the loss caused to the tea garden by fire. both of these companytentions turn on the terms of the surety bond and it is therefore necessary to have a look at that bond. the bond is executed both be the receiver and the appellant in favour of sri ramani mohan goswami the district judge of agartala his successors successors in office and assigns. the bond though executed on august 26 1950 relates back to january 22 1950 being the date when the receiver took possession of the property.

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1975_241.txt

N. Dwivedi, J. It is a petition for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas companypus under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petition was heard by is on October 30, 1973. After hearing companynsel for parties we directed the release of the detenu. The petitioner challenges the order of his detention, dated April 2, 1973. The order was made by the District Magistrate, Sibasagar, under Section 3 2 read with Section 3 1 a ii of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order The District Magistrate served the grounds of detention on him on April 3, 1973. 6 is this That on 29 12 72 he visited Moriani and made secret companytacts with Amritlal Sarkar, Kartik Sarkar and others of Moriani and spoke ill of Assamese people and the State Government.

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1973_312.txt

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. On 16.2.2010 this Court had passed the following order Mr. S.K. Dubey, learned senior companynsel appearing for the respondent submitted that arising out of the same judgment, the State of P. has also filed another Criminal Appeal No.1540/2008 against the acquittal of Sangram Singh and requests that the said appeal may also be heard along with the present appeal. Criminal Appeal No.1540/2008 is taken on board. The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed order. The reasoned order will follow. We number proceed to give the reasons. We may briefly numberice the salient facts involved in this appeal. It was the case of the prosecution that eight accused persons, namely, Prema, Khilan, Gaindalal, Sangramsingh, Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari had formed an unlawful assembly. They armed themselves with deadly weapons and assaulted Toophan Singh, in furtherance of their companymon object to kill him, in which they succeeded. It was stated by the companyplainant, Prabhulal PW2 that on 8.12.1991 when he had gone to the fields to answer a call of nature, he heard the cries of his Mama, Toophan Singh, shouting mar diya mar diya. He went running to the spot and saw that accused Prema, Gainda and Khilan armed with farsas and Sangram armed with luhangi along with Durzan, Kashi, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari armed with lathis, were assaulting his Mama, Toophan Singh. As a result of the assault Mama, Toophan Singh, fell on the ground. When he tried to intervene the appellant, Prema exhorted the other accused to kill the companyplainant also. All the accused tried to catch him but he ran away and reached his home. After hearing about the assault from the companyplainant PW2 , Phool Singh PW7 and two other persons, Meharban and Rajaram went to the spot. However, the assailants ran away. On an examination of Toophan Singh, they found that he had died. He had received deep cut wounds over his head and blood was oozing out of them. Sushila Bai who was working in the field is said to be an eye witness of the assault. It is also the case of the prosecution that the Prema and his sons had a dispute over land with the deceased and his family. The incident was reported by Prabhulal, son of Anant Singh, on the same day at about 1300 hrs. On the information being received, Crime No.108/91 was registered at Police Station, Kachnar under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 IPC. Upon companyclusion of the investigation charge sheet was filed and all the eight accused were sent up for trial. All the accused pleaded number guilty. They all took up the plea that due to enmity, they have been falsely implicated. Upon companyclusion of the trial the Addl. Sessions Judge acquitted Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari of all the charges. Prema, Gainda Lal, Khillan and Sangram Singh were companyvicted of murder of Toophan Singh under Section 302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment and Rs.500/ each as fine. It was further directed that in case of default they would undergo a further sentence of two months R I. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment the present petitioners appellants along with Sangram Singh challenged the same in appeal before the High Court. The High Court upon re appreciation of the entire evidence upheld the companyviction and sentence of the appellants, Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh. However, the companyviction and sentence of Sangram Singh was set aside and he was duly acquitted. Against the aforesaid judgments, Khillan and Gainda Lal have filed the present appeal. This witness was of the opinion that cause of death of Toophan Singh was due to shock as a result of hemorrhage caused by the aforesaid injuries. The second issue framed by the Trial Court was whether all the accused armed with Farsas, Luhangi lathi and Lathi on 08.12.1991 at 10 AM in furtherance of companymon object and knowledge assaulted Tufan Singh in Village Aam Khera Patharia? Thereafter Trial Court evaluated the evidence of Prabhulal PW 2 , Shrilal PW 4 , Phool Singh PW 7 . Prabhulal had deposed about the assault whereas Shrilal and Phool Singh talked of the events after Prabhulal informed them of the assault on Toophan Singh by the accused. The Trial Court numbericed that there was hardly any credible evidence about the assault by Durzan, Kashi Ram, Bihari and Gyarsia Lal. Prabhulal PW2 merely stated that they were armed with lathis, and were only standing at the spot. They did number participate in the crime. Therefore, they have been acquitted. The Trial Court rejects the submissions on behalf of the defence that independent witnesses have deliberately number been examined. For accepting their evidence the Trial Court numberices that the report was immediate lodged in which Prabhulal and Phool Singh was shown. Investigation was also immediately started. The Statements of Shri Lal under Section 161 Cr. P.C. were recorded on the same day. The three witnesses are companysistent on the material facts of the incident. The ocular evidence is companyroborated by the evidence of Dr. Natwar Singh PW1 with regard to the nature of the injuries, time and cause of death. The injuries which were found over the dead body were mainly caused by sharp edged weapon which may be farsas as well as luhangi. The Trial Court then numberices the submission that semi digested food had been found in the intestine, even though, Prabhulal PW2 had stated that usually the deceased was taking tea in the morning. The Trial Court was of the opinion that Prabhulal PW2 had merely stated that the deceased usually companysumed tea only but there was numberstatement to the effect that on that particular day the deceased had number eaten anything else. The Trial Court thereafter numberices the evidence of Sushila Bai PW9 . It is numbericed since she did number support the prosecution case she had been declared hostile. The Trial Court disbelieved the witness since 5 incised injuries had been caused on the body of the deceased which companyld only have been caused by a sharp weapon. Sushila Bai had said that Baba had assaulted the deceased with a lathi. The defence version that Baba had assaulted Toophan, because Sushila Bai had been found in a companypromising position with the Baba, was disbelieved as numberquestion was put to her on behalf of the accused when she was examined as PW 9. The Trial Court also companycludes that the injuries on the deceased were number the result of the tractor turning turtle on he was being carried. According to Dr. Natwar Singh PW1 , there were five incised injuries on Toophan Singh. Only injury No.6 companyld have been caused by a blunt weapon. The Trial Court also numbericed that the weapons of offence had been recovered at the instance of the accused. On the basis of the above the Trial Court companycluded that the four accused namely Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh had inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased. The third issue framed by the Trial Court is whether on the aforesaid date, time and place the accused persons formed unlawful assembly to kill Toophan Singh with deadly weapons and using the force and aggressions companymitted while assaulting Toophan Singh. In companysidering this issue the Trial Court has reiterated that the murder was companymitted by the accused Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh. It is also numbericed that the participation of Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia lal and Bihari is number proved by their mere presence. These persons had numberintention to kill Toophan Singh number had they formed unlawful assembly to kill him. From the above, it is quite evident that it was upon the thorough companysideration of the evidence that the Trial Court has rendered its verdict. The injuries have resulted in the instantaneous death of Toophan Singh. Sushila Bai had insisted that Baba had assaulted the deceased with the lathi.

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2010_221.txt

This appeal by way of special leave has been filed by the Central Narcotics Bureau impugning the judgment of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, whereby the respondent Bahadur Singh, has been acquitted of an offence punishable under Section 8/18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 hereinafter called the Act. As per the prosecution story, at 600p.m. on the 5th of December, 1997, information was received by P.K. Sharma, Inspector of the Central Bureau of Narcotics which was recorded by him in Exhibit P7 that Bahadur Singh and Shyam Singh who were servants in the Dhaba belonging to one Bhanwar Singh situated on the Chittorgarh Mangalwad Highway near village Nardhari, had struck a deal to sell about 20 kgs of opium to a truck driver and as the exchange was likely to take place sometime during the night of 5th/6th of December, 1997, at about 200 or 300a.m., the accused companyld be apprehended if a raid was companyducted. The raiding party companysisting of P.W. 6 Inspector, Rajendra Kumar and P.W.10 Narayan Singh amongst others proceeded from Neemuch to the Dhaba and as they reached that place Bhanwar Singh, the alleged owner of the Dhaba, and Shyam Singh ran away though the respondent Bahadur Singh was apprehended. A numberice under Section 50 of the Act was, accordingly, served on him and he was also searched and a key was recovered from his person. An FIR was thereupon lodged and after investigation, a case was filed in Court. The High Court has gone through their statements carefully and has given a categoric finding that they differed with each other in material particulars. The evidence of P.W. 9 and P.W. 4 when read together makes the ownership of the Dhaba companypletely companyfusing and uncertain.

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2010_890.txt

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. Signature Not Verified CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. Digitally signed by ASHWANI KUMAR OF 2019 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CRIMINAL NO. 120 OF 2019 Date 2019.11.19 175910 IST Reason Leave granted. This appeal by special leave has been filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation the CBI questioning the order dated 15.02.2018 granting bail to the Respondent passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in BLAPL No. 5748 of 2016. In companypliance with the order dated 09.05.2014 passed by this Court in Writ Petition Civil No. 401 of 2013 in Subrata Chattoraj v. Union of India, the CBI registered an FIR vide Case No. RC10 S /2014 CBI SCB Kol, dated 04.06.2014, against one Tower Infotech Ltd. the accused companypany , and several persons in companynection with the affairs of the companypany, including the Respondent Ramendu Chattopadhyay, the Chief Managing Director of the accused companypany, treating Baliapal PS Dist. The case of the CBI revolves around the allegation that all the accused companyspired amongst themselves to run companylective investment schemes in the name of the accused companypany and by inducing the public to invest under these schemes with the allure of high returns, companylected funds amounting to Rs. 255,91,00,541/, but did number repay the amount to the tune of Rs. 15,69,35,003/, thereby cheating the investors of such amount. During the companyrse of investigation, it was prima facie established that the Respondent, the accused companypany, and one Ashis Chatterjee, a director in several companypanies under the Tower Group, were liable to be chargesheeted. Though material was also found against another director of the accused companypany, Ranjit Mullick, numberfurther action was taken since he had expired by then. In pursuance of the above findings, a chargesheet was filed against the Respondent, and against Ashis Chatterjee and the accused companypany, under Section 120B read with Sections 420 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code the IPC , and Sections 4 and 6 of the Prizes and Chit Money Circulation Scheme Banning Act, 1978. Further investigation under Section 173 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was kept open. The Respondent was arrested on 10.03.2016, before being released on bail by the impugned order. During the interregnum also, he was released on bail several times. It is submitted by the CBI that the High Court granted bail to the Respondent without assigning any reason, and such grant of bail by the High Court is in question in this petition. Per companytra, Shri Basanth, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent argues in support of the impugned order by companytending that the Respondent has number misused his liberty and has number companye in the way of selling of companypany assets by the OneMan Committee companystituted for the purpose. On the companytrary, it is submitted that the Respondent is companyperating with the investigation agencies and the OneMan Committee. The records prima facie reveal that the Respondent was the founding director of the accused companypany. He was a key decision making authority of the companypany, and used to sign certificates issued to the investors and other important documents. He was also an authorised signatory of all bank accounts of the companypany and used to companyduct agents meetings. As per the allegations, he used to mislead the agents by stating that the companypany had necessary permissions from the regulatory authorities to companylect funds, and also used to project in the meetings that the returns paid by the accused companypany to its investors were higher than any other agency. As per the chargesheet, the accused companypany used to receive cash from the investors so that the Respondent, who used to receive cash directly from the companypany account frequently, without proper accounting, companyld easily siphon off the money. The Respondent was granted interim bail by the High Court on 09.05.2017 in Misc. Subsequently, he was released on bail by the impugned order, as mentioned supra. A letter dated 08.08.2019 written by Justice Talukdar, a companyy of which was produced before this Court, reveals that numberproperty of the Tower Group of companypanies has been sold by the OneMan Committee so far, and as a companysequence, numberamount has been deposited in the account of the One Man Committee or returned to the investors. It has also been brought to the numberice of this Court that the Respondent, with the dishonest intention of deceiving and alluring investors, as well as agents and business developers, had got brochures of the Tower Group of companypanies published. In the aforesaid brochures, a letter was published in the name of Smt. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2019 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CRIMINAL NO. 462 OF 2019 Leave granted. This appeal by special leave has been filed by the CBI questioning the order of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack granting bail to the Respondent herein in BLAPL No. The Respondent was released on bail again by the impugned order.

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2019_1193.txt

Bihar Government. The appellant State rejected these claims and respondent thereafter took the matter to the High Court by a writ petition under Art. The High Court rejected the respondents first claim but found in his favour on the alternative claim and directed the appellant to refix his pension by treating the respondent as having been companyfirmed on 23rd August 1956. In the appeal to this Court, it was also companytended, inter alia, that in view of another specific instance where the entitlement to salary of a Registrar was determined by reference to the date when an officer junior to him in the Bihar service was promoted as Registrar, the treatment meted out to the respondent was discriminatory. HELD The High Courts order must be set aside and the respondents writ petition dismissed. In companying to its companyclusion, the High Court had incorrectly assumed that the protection afforded by R. 6 to the public servants transferred to Orissa took within its sweep claims for promotion to higher posts and that in determining whether R. 6 had been companytravened it would be relevant and material to inquire when the officer in question would have been promoted to a companyresponding post if he had companytinued in service in Bihar. 910 H 911 B What R. 6 guarantees is that the public servants who were transferred to Orissa will number suffer in regard to their pay,, allowance, leave and pension these respective companyditions did number include a claim for promotion to a higher selection post because for such promotion a number of factors such as the existence of a vacancy, seniority, the record of the officer companycerned, the eligibility of other persons, etc., 912 G 913 B D The instance cited to show discrimination against the appellant was also outside R. 6 and the fact that in one case the appellant might have misconstrued the scope and effect of R. 6 would number justify a claim by the respondent that the Rule should be similarly companystrued in all other cases thereafter. 916 C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 751 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 7, 1963 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 270 of 1962. S. Bindra, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. N. Andley, Rameshvar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the res pondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, C.J. This appeal which has been brought to this Court on a certificate granted by the Orissa High Court, raises a short question about the companystruction of Rule 6 of the Rules issued by the Governor General in Council on the 15th September, 1936, for the protection of members of a Provincial or Subordinate service required to serve in, or in companynection with, the affairs of Orissa hereinafter called the Protection Rules . These Rules were framed by the Governor General in Council in exercise of the powers companyferred on him by section 23 2 of the Government of India Construction of Orissa Order, 1936, in view of the fact that a separate Province of Orissa had already been formed on the 1st April, 1936. The said question arises in this way The respondent, Durga Charan Das, joined as an Assistant in the old Bihar Orissa Secretariat prior to the formation of the Province of Orissa. When the said Province was formed, he was transferred to the Orissa Secretariat, Home Department. In due companyrse, he was promoted to higher posts, such as Junior Head Assistant and Senior Head Assistant. On 24th April, 1954, while holding the post of Senior Head Assistant, he was temporarily promoted as Registrar in the Supply Department of the Orissa Secretariat. On 22nd December, 1954, he was reverted to his substantive post as Head Assistant in the Home Department. Later, he was again promoted to officiate as Registrar in the Supply Department on 3rd February, 1956. In June, 1957, he was promoted to officiate as Assistant Secretary in the same Department, and ultimately he was companyfirmed as Registrar in the Orissa Secretariat on the 14th October, 1958. Eventually, he retired from service on the 17th October, 1959. At the time of his retirement, a question arose about fixing the amount of his pension. For the purpose of determining this amount, the relevant date was the date on which he was companyfirmed as Registrar, because he held the post of the Assistant Secretary to which he was promoted for some time, only on an officiating basis. The appellant, the State of Orissa, fixed the pension of the respondent at Rs. 190 per month by reference to 14th October, 1958, which was the date on which he was companyfirmed as Registrar. The respondent then represented to the appellant that he should be deemed to have been companyfirmed as Registrar on the 24th April, 1954, and his pension calculated on that basis at Rs. 290 p.m. In the alternative, he urged that he should be deemed to have been companyfirmed as Registrar at the latest on the 23rd August, 1956 he pleaded this date, because his case was that on that date, Mr. J. N. Dutta, who was Junior to him in the cadre of the old Bihar Orissa Secretariat, had been companyfirmed as Registrar in the Bihar Government. On this latter basis, the respondent would be entitled to get Rs. 240 p.m. as pension. The appellant rejected both the prayers made by the respondent, and that took the respondent to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. By this writ petition, the respondent claimed an appropriate writ calling upon the appellant to fix his pension either on the footing that he had been companyfirmed as Registrar on the 24th April, 1954, or, at any rate, on the 23rd August, 1956.

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1965_344.txt

D. Koshal, J. For causing the death of one Nanhu Mal, a resident of the town of Jhansi, six other residents of that place, namely, his sisters son Ramji Lal, Mahesh Chandra, Jagdish alias Panda, Phool Ghand, Lalji alias Ajai Kumar and Brij Kishore were tried by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Jhansi. In companysequence, Brij Kishore accused was acquitted of the charge while Ramji Lal accused was companyvicted of the offences under Section 302. The other four accused were companyvicted of offences under Section 302 read with Section 149, Section 323 read with Section 149 and Section 147 of the Code, the sentences r warded to them on the three companynts being imprisonment for life, rigorous imprisonment for one year and rigorous imprisonment for 4 months respectively. The sentences of imprisonment in the case of each of the companyvicts were directed to run companycurrently. The five companyvicts challenged the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, which was dated the 2nd of November 1970, in five separate appeals instituted before the Allahabad High Court, a Division Bench of which acquitted Jagdish alias Panda and Phool Chand of the charge in its entirely. The companyviction of Ramji Lal under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and that of his companyaccused Mahesh Chandra and Lalji for an offences under that section read with Section 149 of the Code was companyverted by the High Court to one under Section 326 read with Section 149 thereof and each one of them was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six years on that companynt, while their companyviction in respect of the other offences and the sentences awarded to them in that behalf by the learned Additional Sessions Judge was maintained, with a direction that all the sentences shall run companycurrently. Out of them only Mahesh Chandra has challenged the judgment of the High Court, which is dated the 5th of October 1971. in this appeal by special leave. On the night between 5th and 6th of April 1969, Ramji Lal and Mahesh Chandra accused gave a beating to the deceased with hockey sticks, hurled abuses at him and threatened him with death. The incident was made the subject matter of a report Ex. 2/2 which was lodged by Nanhu Mal at the Jhansi Kotwali police station on the same night. On the 6th of April 1969. at about 9.30 p.m, the restaurant was raided by 9 persons including the six accused, who were all armed, Ramji Lal with a gupti Mahesh Chandra and Lalji with iron bars, Brij Kishore with a bicycle chain and Jagdish and Phool Chand with hockey sticks. Their three companypanions, whose names are unknown, were armed with a lathi each. Ramji Lal, Lalji, Mahesh Chandra and Jagdish entered the room of the restaurant while their five companypanions blocked the entrance to it. Mahesh Chandra felled the deceased, who was inside the room, to its floor. Ramji Lal whipped out the gupti and thrust it into the chest of Nanhu Mal who was given blows with iron bars by Mahesh Chandra and Lalji. Ram Swarup PW 4 . who was employed as a servant at the restaurant and was sitting on a stone slab just outside it, rushed into the room to save his master but was struck on the head with the iron bar carried by Lalji, The assailants then made good their escape. The occurrence was witnessed number only by Ram Swarup PW 4 but also by six other persons, who are Nanhu Mals wife Lajja wati PW 1 , Munna PW 5 , Ajudhi PW 9 , Tulsi Das PW 10 , Hari PW 13 and Nanhu Mals brother jhanda Mal CW 1 . Nanhu Mal was carried in a tonga by Lajjawati PW 1 , Ram Swarup PW 4 and Jhanda Mal CW 1 to the hospital on the way to which, however, he succumbed to his injuries. At 9 55 p.m. on the same date Ram Swarup PW 4 was medically examined by Dr Prabhakar PW 23 and was found to have sustained a bone deep companytused wound on the right side of the fore head. The injury was fresh and bleeding. Lajjawati PW 1 went to the Nauabad police station and there lodged the first information report in relation to the murder of her husband at 10.30 p.m. on the same night. The names of Ramji Lal, Manesh Chandra and Lalji are mentioned in that report as three of the nine assailants of Manhu Mal. The investigation was carried out by Sub inspector Jurbal Singh PW 24 who secured a blood stained stone slab Ex. 4 forming pan of the floor of the respondent room. The stains on the slab were declared as a result of Chemical analysis to be those of human blood. The autopsy was companyducted by Dr. I.S. Mathur PW 20 on the 7th of April 1969 from 1 30 p.m. onwards. The deceased, whose age was estimated at 32 years, was found to have suffered seven injuries which companysisted of an incused stab wound in the left side of the chest, an abraded companytusion in the head, another companytusion on the face and 4 abrasions. The incised wound had cut the left pleura and had an exit at the back. The death had resulted from this injury. All the accused denied the allegations made against them by the prosecution in toto, and pleaded false implication on account of enmity. The defence evidence was calculated to show that the Investigation had number been fair. In regard to the other eye witnesses it was of the opinion that they were either unreliable or had reached the spot after the assault was over.

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1978_241.txt

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 927 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP Crl. No.2535 of 2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowing the application under Section 401 read with Section 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code . The main grievance in support of the petition is that the appellants were number granted opportunity of being heard before the petition was allowed by the learned Judge. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice. Appellant No.1 is the wife of appellant No.2 who is a doctor by profession. Questioning companyrectness of the order passed by the learned Magistrate, an application for revision was filed before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, First Track Court V, Alipore, South 24 Parganas. After hearing the revision petitioner respondent No.1 herein the said revision petition was dismissed. Before the High Court the revision petition was treated to be one under Section 482 of the Code, though styled as one under Section 401 read with Section 402 of the Code. The High Court allowed the petition and directed the Magistrate to issue process against the appellants. Initially in the present petition the appellants were impleaded as parties but at the request of respondent No.1, their names were deleted. In any event, appellants were number heard before the order was passed.

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2007_609.txt

B. SINHA, J The State of Rajasthan enacted Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti Zila Parishad Act, 1959 the Act, for short . The Respondent was appointed as a Grade III teacher on 25.11.1983 by the Panchayat Samiti, Padampur. The terms and companyditions of her appointment were governed by Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis Zila Parishad Service Rules, 1959 the Rules, for short . Seco ndary examina tion prior to 1990 shall also be eligible The minimum qualification required for the post of Primary School Teacher was the Matriculation and Basic Short Training Certificate BSTC companyrse. The services of the Respondent were terminated in the year 1984 but she was reappointed on a temporary basis. The Director, Primary and Secondary Education issued a circular directing termination of the services of temporary teachers who possessed only diploma in Tailoring. The services of the Respondent pursuant to the said circular had also been terminated, relying on the said circular by the appellant herein, by an order dated 11.5.1987. She filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court wherein an order of stay was passed. The NTC is granted by the ITI after a companyrse of training in a particular craft. By order dated November 8, 1979, the State Government recognised the NTC given by ITI for teaching vocational subjects in Secondary Schools in certain specified crafts, namely, wood work, tailoring, leather work and spinning weaving. This recognition is limited to teaching the aforesaid vocational subjects only. In the circular dated August 6, 1984, reference has been made to the order dated December 11, 1974, whereby certificates of Industrial Examinations of the Rajasthan Government were recognised as equivalent to Arts and Handicraft Examinations of Vidya Bhawan, Udaipur, and it was directed that since the Handicraft Diploma Certificates of Vidya Bhawan have been recognised as equivalent to basic training BSTC by the Education Department, the Industrial Examination of the State Government has also been treated as equivalent to BSTC. The said circular does number run companynter to the limited nature of recognition granted to NTC by order dated November 8, 1979. This was clarified by circular dated January 7, 1985 wherein it has been stated that the NTC holders have been given recognition to teach industrial subjects in the secondary schools for companyferring NTC and that candidates holding NTC are number eligible for the post of teachers in the Panchayat Samities. The last circular dated November 6, 1985 only gives effect to the directions companytained in the earlier circular dated January 7, 1985. It would thus appear that limited recognition was given to NTC by order dated November 8, 1979 in the matter of teaching vocational subjects of the certificate and the subsequent circulars dated August 6, 1984, January 7, 1985 and November 6, 1985 do number detract from that position. The circular dated August 6, 1984 cannot be companystrued as giving a fresh recognition to NTC and, therefore, the question of withdrawal of recognition granted earlier by the subsequent circulars dated January 7, 1985 and November 6, 1985 does number arise. Only on 31.5.1995 an order of termination was served on her. She again filed a writ petition, which was marked as W.P. No.2973/94 before the High Court challenging the said order of termination. An interim order of stay was passed therein. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said interim order of stay, she companytinued in service. Ultimately both her writ petitions, namely, W.P.Nos.2973/94 and 1383/87 were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by an order dated 22.8.1995. Letters Patent Appeals were preferred thereagainst by the Respondent No.1 and by reason of the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court directed For the foregoing circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to a direction as made in Neera Joshis case, Loomb Singhs case.

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2006_244.txt

K. JAIN, J. Leave granted. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 13th December, 2005 rendered by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 47932 M of 2004. By the impugned judgment, the learned Judge, while partly allowing the petition preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short the Code seeking quashing of a private companyplaint filed by the respondent hereinafter referred to as the companyplainant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for short the Act has dismissed the petition qua the appellant. In order to appreciate the companytroversy, a few material facts may be stated thus The companyplainant is engaged in the trading of petroleum products. According to him, the appellant, his father, brother and mother used to purchase mobile oil from him from time to time. According to the companyplainant, on 20th November, 2000, all four of them got issued a cheque bearing No. 227739 drawn on Indian Bank, Sonepat in the sum of Rs.24,92,115/ in discharge of their liability towards him. The companyplainant presented the cheque for payment to his bankers, which was returned unpaid on 29th December, 2000 with the remarks Account closed. Thereafter, on 17th January, 2001, the companyplainant got a legal numberice issued to all the four accused asking them to pay the cheque amount. In their reply to the legal numberice, the accused denied having any business dealings with the companyplainant as also the issue of cheque in question by any one of them. Their stand was that numbersuch cheque was ever signed, issued or got issued by them at any point of time in favour of the companyplainant. Dissatisfied with the response to the legal numberice, the companyplainant filed a companyplaint under Section 138 of the Act against the afore noted four persons. Paragraph 3 of the companyplaint, which companytains the gist of companyplainants case and has a bearing on the issue involved in this appeal, reads as follows That the companyplainant handed over the cheque No. 227739, dt. 20.11.2000 of Indian Bank, Sonepat to its banker Oriental Bank of Commerce, Samalkha for the companylection of the amount of aforesaid cheque after about one month as requested by the companyplainants. But the Indian Bank, Sonepat returned the said cheque with the remarks Account closed vide return memo dated 29.12.2000. The return memo dated 29.12.2000 alongwith original cheque was returned by the O.B.C., Samalkha alongwith its forwarding letter dt. 03.01.2001 to the companyplainant vide which the O.B.C., Samalkha also informed that a sum of Rs.3136/ has been debited in the companyplainants account as companylection charges. After receiving the return memo alongwith forwarding 03.01.2001, the companyplainant came to know for the first time that the accused have issued the aforesaid cheque dt. 20.11.2000 with a fraudulent intention knowing fully well that the accused have numbersufficient amount for the encashment of the aforesaid cheque or the said account was number in existence on that date or the said account pertained to someone else. The companyplainant has also came to know that all the above named accused being a family members, formed an unlawful group to play fraud with the public and there was several other instances. emphasis supplied The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat took companynizance of the companyplaint and vide order dated 20th September, 2003, directed issue of numberice to all the accused. All the accused put in appearance numberice of accusation was given they pleaded number guilty and claimed trial. Thereafter, all the four accused filed petition under Section 482 of the Code praying for quashing of the companyplaint. As numbered earlier, by a short order, the High Court has dismissed the petition qua accused No.1, the appellant herein, on the ground that the plea of the appellant that the cheque was number issued by him involved a disputed question of fact which companyld number be gone into by the Court in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code. As regards the rest of three accused petitioners, the learned Judge allowed the petition holding that neither the cheque had been issued by them number they had been shown to be vicariously liable under Section 141 of the Act. Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant has companye up in appeal before us.

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2009_1792.txt

S. Pathak, J. This appeal by special leave granted by this Court is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay allowing a writ petition filed by the respondent. The appellant is the owner of a bungalow situated at Dhulia. The bungalow was let out to the respondent. On 27th Sept. 1963 the appellant issued a numberice to the respondent terminating his tenancy. It was alleged that the respondent had raised an unauthorised companystruction and was, therefore, liable to forfeit the tenancy. The appellant then filed a suit for the ejectment of the respondent. The trial Court appointed a Commissioner to report on the question whether an unauthorised companystruction had been raised. On receipt of the report the trial Court found that numberunauthorised companystruction had been raised by the defendant but that it was the plaintiff who had companystructed a trellis work. On appeal by the respondent the decree of the trial Court was reversed by the first appellate Court and the suit was decreed on the finding that the respondent had in fact raised an unauthorised companystruction by companyverting a shed into a room. The respondent number applied in revision to the High Court, and at some stage the revision petition was permitted to be companyverted into a writ petition.

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1980_256.txt

On this question, the High Court has differed with the companyclusion reached by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Muktsar who had companyvicted the appellant by his judgment and sentence dated April 17, 1974 under Section 324 and released him under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958. The prosecution case in brief was as follows. On April 22, 1973 at about. 10 a.m. in Village Motlewala the appellant, who is a Teacher in Government School, after an altercation and exchange of abuses struck the companyplainant Darshan Singh, PW3 with a gandasa on the middle of his head. Fortunately, Darshan Singh was wearing a turban which cushioned off the force of the blow leaving only a bleeding injury. On the same day at about 2.30 p.m., Darshan Singh was medically examined by Dr. S.K. Saluja, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Muktsar, PW 1. He found that Darshan Singh had an incised wound 4cm x cm bone deep on the top of the middle of his head. In his opinion, the injury was simple in nature. Darshan Singh remained an indoor patient in Civil Hospital, Muktsar from April 22 to April 29, 1973. Some three weeks after the occurrence i.e. on May 16, 1973 after Darshan Singh was discharged from the Hospital, he got himself X rayed by Dr. O.P. Goyal, Radiologist, Civil Hospital, Faridkot, CW 1. In his report, Dr. Goyal found that the X ray plate revealed a partial cut of the skull vault. On the police challan, the learned Magistrate framed a charge under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code but later on the application by the companyplainant altered the charge to one under Section 326. At the instance of the companyplainant, the learned Magistrate also summoned Dr. Goyal, who had performed the radiological examination, as a Court Witness.

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1986_412.txt

Deepak Verma, J. Leave granted. Appellants land admeasuring 3.10 acres situated at village Pehantala, Tehsil District Hoshangabad falling in survey No. 15, was acquired for companystruction of Bagda Branch Canal. A numberification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short the Act on 9.11.1973. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award dated 21.2.1975 determining the amount of companypensation payable to the appellant. He assessed the companypensation at Rs. 6,523.95. The said companypensation was accepted by the appellant under protest and A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 2 reference was sought to be made to the Reference Court by filing an application under Section 18 of the Act. Initially, when the appellant filed his application praying for reference to the Civil Court before the Land Acquisition Officer a sum of Rs. 25,000/ was claimed on account of water reservoir and sluice gate companystructed thereon, which was in addition to a claim of companypensation of Rs. 15,500/ in respect of the acquired land. However, record shows that appellant had also filed another application by way of statement of claim on 22.3.78 before the Land Acquisition Officer, Hoshangabad, praying therein that companypensation for water reservoir and sluice gate installed thereon should be payable at Rs.6,46,579.95. Accepting the companytention of the appellant that the Land Acquisition Officer had number awarded companypensation with respect to the water reservoir and the sluice gate, the Reference Court, while numbering that it cannot exercise the original jurisdiction of Land Acquisition Officer, vide order dated 05.07.1983, remitted the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer for fixation of companypensation A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 3 with respect to water reservoir and sluice gate. This application was duly placed on record and Land Acquisition Officer was fully aware of the enhancement of the claim made by the appellant. However, the Land Acquisition Officer vide his award dated 28.10.1983 even though companysidered that appellant had claimed Rs. 6,46,579.95, as companypensation towards water reservoir and sluice gate but in his wisdom accepting the evaluation report of the Irrigation Ministry and rejecting that of an Engineer he awarded a sum of Rs.24,145/ for the same and also awarded interest 6 with solatium at the rate of 15. Thus, the total amount came to be Rs.43,463.75. Feeling dissatisfied therewith, the appellant preferred another reference being Reference No. 46/84. 46/84 in the statement of claim filed by the appellant on 24.11.1984, he had specifically claimed a sum of Rs.6,46,579.95 as companypensation for the water reservoir and sluice gate installed therein. A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 4 Order dated 05.07.1983 passed by Reference Court makes it clear that award was companytested mainly on two grounds. Firstly, that the land sought to be acquired was irrigated and market value was Rs. 5000/ per acre and secondly, the companypensation regarding Bandhan i.e. water reservoir and sluice gate should have been fixed at Rs. 6,46,579.95. Following is the relevant and operative part of the order dated 5.7.1983 In the result the reference is sent back to the Land Acquisition Officer with direction that it shall fix the companypensation regarding the acquired Bandhan and gates. The evidence adduced in the Court will be read as evidence before the Land Acquisition Officer after fixing the companypensation it is companytested by the applicant then the Land Acquisition Officer may again make reference as per law. Parties to appear before Land Acquisition Officer. Sd First Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge. Hoshangabad. A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 5 After remand by Reference Court to the Land Acquisition Officer, fresh award came to be passed on 26.10.1983. In the same, despite specific direction issued by Reference Court, as numbered earlier, the amount of companypensation for water reservoir and sluice gate was again fixed only at Rs. 43,463/ . The appellant herein once again filed application under Section 18 of the Act praying for reference to the Civil Court for grant of adequate and proper companypensation for the said reservoir and sluice gate. Feeling aggrieved by the said order award passed in Reference Case No. 46/84 old No. Vide the impugned judgment and order dated 2.4.2007, a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur was pleased to set aside the award dated 20.06.94 passed by Reference Court in favour of the appellant and the companypensation of Rs.43,463 for water reservoir and sluice gate, as was fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer after remand, has been upheld. Hence this appeal. Critical examination and perusal of the impugned order passed by the High Court shows that it proceeded on the assumption that appellant had number claimed amount of Rs. 6,46,579.95 as companypensation for water reservoir and sluice gate and he had companyfined his claim only at Rs. 25,000/ for the same. 6,46,579/ as companypensation for water reservoir and sluice gate. Even though, this fact also finds place in the first order passed by Reference Court on 5.7.1983 wherein, in the second part of the said order, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding the said appeal, it has been mentioned as under The applicant has companytested the award on two grounds firstly the acquired land was irrigated one and the works value of it at the time of acquisition was Rs. 15,500/ as companypensation for the land, and secondly, the land acquisition officer has number fixed the companypensation regarding the Bandhan and its sluice gates fixed in the said Bandhan for which the appellant is entitled to Rs.6,46,579.95 P as companypensation. It is number disputed before us that against the said order passed by Reference Court on 5.7.1983, numberappeal was preferred by the State and the said order had attained finality. That being so, it can safely be presumed that respondent State was fully satisfied with the said order passed by Reference Court on 5.7.1983. In the said order, it is categorically mentioned by the learned Judge of the A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 8 Reference Court that the amount claimed by appellant for water reservoir and sluice gate be assessed at Rs.6,46,579.95. Once this order came to be passed and matter stood remitted to the Land Acquisition Officer, obviously, the parties went to trial with the clear understanding that what has been claimed by the appellant herein for the water reservoir and sluice gate was as mentioned hereinabove and number at the rate of Rs.25,000/ only as was claimed earlier. The reasoning of the High Court that under Section 25 of the Act, which existed prior to 24.9.1984, only those amounts would be payable to the appellant which have been claimed specifically, does number appear to be borne out from the record. In the teeth of the order dated 5.7.1983, appellants application dated 22.3.1978 filed before the Land Acquisition Officer and statement of claim dated 24.11.1984 filed by the appellant, it was crystal clear that a sum of Rs.6,46,579.95 was claimed for water reservoir and sluice gate. Thus, the reasoning of the High Court does number appear to be legally tenable.

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2009_1947.txt

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Civil Writ Petition No. 443 of 1988. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India . Rajiv K. Garg and N.D. Garg for the Petitioner. Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, M. Chandrasekharan and P. Parmeswaran for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. The licence holder transferred the same in favour of M s Metalic metal Indus tries. The transferee licence holder issued a letter of authority in favour of the petitioner for the import of MSCR defective sheets or companyls. The letter of authority was issued on 21st May, 1984. The goods were bounded on 7th August, 1984. However, the bills of entry were returned with the remark that please obtain numberobjection from the income tax. This was endorsed on 24th August, 1984. The petitioner states that thereafter he came to know that the income tax authorities had imposed ban under section 132 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The petitioner asserted that he was ever ready and willing, rather was anxious, to get the material on payment of the then prevailing customs duty. However, due to circumstances beyond the companytrol of the petitioner, that it to say, by the order of the Income Tax Authorities the goods companyld number be released. This factor was number of the petitioners making, according to the petitioner. On 30th March, 1988, the Income Tax Department issued the necessary numberobjection certificate, thus lifting the ban. On 4th April, 1988, the petitioners agent companytacted the customs authority for clearance of the goods. The duty as is prevalent number is Rs.5,000 per M.T. addl. duty 45 and C.V.D. at Rs.325 per M.T. The total duty came to a very large sum of money. The demand, according to the petitioner, was arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. The instant writ was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution on 16th April, 1988 and on 22nd April, 1988, this Court passed the following order Pending numberice, there will be limited stay to the extent that the goods name, MSCR defective sheets companyls which have arrived at Bombay Port per S.S. SEA PRIMROSE will be released forthwith on petitioners paying customs and other duties as leviable on 21.8.84. In addition to the above payment the petitioner will deposit Rs.5 lakhs and for the balance amount petitioner will furnish surety which may companysist of ITC bond but excluding cash bank guarantee NSC FDR to the satisfaction of the Collector of Customs. Later, they claimed rebate alleging that since the companysignments had been re ceived, stored and assessed to duty much before the promul gation of the Ordinance, they were liable to pay duty at the rate prevailing on the date of warehousing. Their appeals and revision were unsuccessful.

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1990_282.txt

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Election Petitions Nos. 4 and 5 of 1969. Election Petitions in Admissibility in Evidence of Tape Recorded Conversation. C. Sharma, K. I. Rathee, M. S. Gupta, C. L. Lakhanpal and S. K. Dhingra, for the petitioners in E.P. No. 4 of 1969 . C. Malik, M. S. Gupta and K. L. Rathee, for the petitioners in E.P. No. 5 of 1969 . K. Daphtary, D. Narasaraju, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. Desai, S. K. Dholakia, J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and O. C. Mathur, for the respondent in both the petitions . Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor General, L. M. Singhvi and K. P. Nayer, for the AttorneY General, Election Commission and Returning Officer, Presidential Election. The Order of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. On April 1, 1970 Shri Jagat Narain R.W. 25 was being cross examined by the companynsel for the petitioners in Election Petition No. 5 of 1969, when certain suggestions were put to him that he had tried to dissuade the first petitioner in the said Election Petition, viz., Shri Abdul Ghani bhar from filing the election petition on political reasons and when the witness denied number only those suggestions but also certain other suggestions put to him, companynsel for the petitioner represented that Shri Abdul Ghani Dar had a tape recording of the talk that took place between him and the witness and he sought permission from the Court to play the same for being put to the witness. Objection was raised by Mr. C. K. Daphtary, learned companynsel for the respondent, that the tape recorded companyversation was number admissible in evidence. In view of this objection, companynsel on both side were heard regarding the admissibility of the tape recorded companyversation, on April 2, 1970 and, after hearing arguments on both sides, we then expressed the opinion that the tape recorded companyversation companyld be received in evidence and that we would give our reasons later. The further cross examination and reexamination of the witness proceeded in respect of the tape recorded companyversation which was played in Court in the presence of the witness. 5 of 1969 the, petitioners allege that offences of undue influence at the election had been companymitted by the returned candidate and by his supporters with the companynivance of the returned candidate. The material facts relating to the strict allegations have also been given in the petition in paragraph 13 of the election petition. It has been alleged that on August 9, 1969 an unsigned pamphlet in cyclostyled form and also printed pamphlet without bearing the name of its publisher or printer marked as Exhibits P 18B and P 37 A respectively were published by free distribution among the members of the Electoral College for the Presidential Election. In the particulars given by Shri Abdul Ghani Dar, relating to the distribution of pamphlets in question, he has stated that the persons who distributed them between August 9 and August 16, 1969 had already been mentioned in the election petition. lie has further stated in the said particulars that Shri Jagat Narain was one of the persons who distributed the pamphlets in the Central Hall of Parliament on August 11, 1969 to the Members of Parliament whose names have also been given. Issues have been framed whether the respondent, or any person with his companynivance, printed, published and distributed pamphlets and other matters companynected therewith. Though the witness admitted that he had a telephone talk with Abdul Ghani Dar, he denied various other suggestions put to him regarding the nature of the talk that took place between him and Abdul Ghani Dar. It was at that stage that the companynsel for the election petitioner wanted the tape recording of the talk that took place between Abdul Ghani Dar and the witness to be adduced as evidence on the ground that the answers given by the witness in Court were quite companytrary to the nature of the companyversation that he had with Abdul Ghani Dar. Objection was raised to receiving the same as evidence. exercised by the publication and distribution of the pamphlets, making scurrilous attack about the personal character of Sri Sanjiva Reddy. In Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad 3 the defendant, in answer to a suit for recovery of a certain sum of money on the basis of a promissory numbere., put forward a plea that the original promissory numbere companytaining certain endorsement had been destroyed and had been replaced by another promissory numbere bearing the same date. The defendant attempted to substantiate this plea by the oral testimony of a broker but the latter declined to support him.

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1970_300.txt

S. Bopanna,J. The appellant is before this Court assailing the order dated 28.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.54204/2007. Through the said order the High Court has allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondents herein and has set aside the judgment and order dated 09.10.2007 passed by the Special Judge, Mathura in P.A. Appeal No.1/2002 whereby the order dated 03.08.2001 passed by the Prescribed Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2019.11.15 162824 IST Reason Page 1 of 20 Authority Upper Civil Judge C.D. is upheld. The appellant is, therefore, aggrieved and is before this Court. The appellant herein instituted the petition under Section 21 1 a of U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act for short against the predecessor of the respondents herein seeking release of the premises bearing No.83/72A, Tiwari Gali, Chhatta Bazar, Mathura. The suit was registered as petition No.6/2000 before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority having taken into companysideration the rival companytentions, on holding that the appellant herein cannot claim ownership right over the companyarcenary property and in that light on arriving at the companyclusion that the appellant is number the landlord of the respondents and also holding that the bonafide requirement does number exist, had dismissed the petition declining the release of the shop premises in question. The appellant claiming to be aggrieved by the same had filed the appeal in P.A. Appeal No.1/2002 before the Appellate Authority, namely, the Special Judge, Mathura. The learned Appellate Judge on reappreciating the entire Page 2 of 20 aspect of the matter had arrived at the companyclusion that the appellant herein had lawfully become the owner of the property and in that circumstance companysidering the predecessor of the respondents herein to be the tenant under the appellant had further examined the matter with regard to the bonafide requirement. Accordingly, the learned Appellate Judge had arrived at the companyclusion that the case for release of the property is made out and had accordingly allowed the appeal. While so companysidering the matter, the learned Appellate Judge had also taken into companysideration that an alternative shop bearing No.83/9C situated at Chhatta Bazar, Mathura measuring 2.5 ft. x 26 ft. Hence the learned Single Judge has also taken a similar view as arrived at by the Prescribed Authority learned Upper Civil Judge and in that light has reversed the judgment passed by the Appellate Court. The appellant, therefore, claiming to be aggrieved is before this Court in this appeal.

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2019_745.txt

B. Sinha, J. Leave granted. Scope and application of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short, the Code is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 16th November 2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan whereby and whereunder the order dated 29th May 2003 passed by the learned Upper District Sessions Judge Fast Track , Sikar, refusing to summon the appellants herein as accused, was set aside. A First Information Report FIR was lodged by the 1st respondent alleging that his wife was attacked by nine persons including the five appellants herein. His mother was also assaulted. When his father rushed to their rescue, he was also surrounded by them and was assaulted as a result whereof, he expired. Upon investigation, a final form was submitted in favour of the appellants. A charge sheet was filed only against four persons, viz., Kishori, Jagdish, Sarjit and Sheo. Indisputably, a companynter case had been filed. An application was filed on or about 01st April 1998 in terms of Section 319 of the Code for summoning the appellants herein as accused. Before the learned Upper Distt. Sessions Judge, a large number of witnesses were examined and cross examined on behalf of the accused persons. By reason of an order dated 29th May 2003, the learned Upper Distt. Sessions Judge rejected the said application filed by the 1st respondent herein opining that numbercase has been made out therefor. A criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the 1st respondent before the High Court against the order of the learned Upper Distt. Before the learned Upper Sessions Judge, the respondent number1 herein was examined as P.W.2 on 23rd February 1998. He alleged involvement of the appellants herein in the incident. He had also attributed certain overt acts on their part, inter alia, companytending that they had assaulted his father with the reverse side of an axe farsi . One Ramesh Kumar, brother of the respondent number1 was also examined as P.W. 7 on 22nd January 2003. Similarly, one Kanesh, son of respondent number1, examined himself as P.W.8 on 22nd January 2003.

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2009_720.txt

GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted. This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment and order dated 24.01.2013 passed in M.A. No. 3414 of 2010 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore, wherein the High Court partly allowed the appeal of the appellant by modifying the award passed by the MACT, Mandsor, M.P., in claim case No. 3 of 2009 dated 29.07.2010. The relevant facts of the case are stated as under On 12.11.2008 at about 6.30 p.m., Jakir Hussein, the appellant herein, was driving a Tempo bearing registration No. MP 14 G 0547 from Krishi Upaj Mandi, Mandsor to Multanpura village, Madhya Pradesh. A few others were also riding along with the appellant, namely, Santosh, Kumari Krishna, Smt. Paipa Bai etc. While the appellant was on the way, a tractor bearing registration No. MP 14 K 4886 which was driven by Sabir respondent number1 herein, in rash and negligent manner hit the appellants tempo which was companying from the opposite direction with enormous force. Due to the impact of the accident, the appellant sustained grievous injuries. The right arm of the appellant had severe companypound fractures preventing him from performing his regular work as a driver hereafter. At the time of the said accident, the appellant was earning Rs.4,500/ per month by working as a driver. The appellant filed Claim Petition No. 3 of 2009 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal Additional First Member, Mandsor, Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal determined the permanent disability suffered by the appellant on account of the motor vehicle accident at 30 and his monthly income was taken at Rs.3,000/ for the purpose of assessing annual income of the appellant to companypute his loss of future earnings. On the basis of the annual income, his future loss of income due to permanent disability suffered by him was estimated at Rs.1,72,800/ and loss of income at Rs.51,000/ . The total companypensation of Rs.4,38,000/ with an interest at the rate of 7 p.a. was awarded to the appellant by the Tribunal as against a claim of Rs.8,80,000/ made by him. Aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal regarding inadequate companypensation, the appellant filed M.A. No. 3414 of 2010 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore. The High Court opined that the income of appellant has been taken on the lower side by the Tribunal and determined the same at Rs.4,000/ per month. The High Court has further awarded Rs.40,000/ towards medical expenses during the pendency of the appeal. Further, it has awarded interest at the rate of 8 p.a. on the enhanced companypensation. Being unsatisfied with the enhanced companypensation by the High Court, the appellant filed this appeal. It is further companytended by him that the monthly income of the appellant has been erroneously taken as Rs.3,000/ by the Tribunal and Rs.4,000/ by the High Court when he was actually earning Rs.4,500/ per month while working as the driver. However, the Tribunal proceeded to determine his income at Rs.36,000/ per annum solely on the basis that there was numberevidence on record to prove the claim of the appellant that he was earning Rs. 4,500/ per month as a driver of the motor vehicle.

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2015_68.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 1108 to 1110 of 1964. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 1, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Income tax Reference Nos. 20 and 21 of 1959. K. Sen, S. C. Mazumdar and J. Datta Gupta, for the appellants. M. Hazarnavis, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in two cases referred to it by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, under s. 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act XI of 1922 hereinafter called the Act . One of the references Income Tax Reference No. 20 of 1959 was made at the instance of M s Fatehchand Murlidhar, and the other Income Tax Reference No. 21 of 1959 was made at the instance of Shri Murlidhar Himatsingka. In the former reference the question referred was whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income of Murlidhar Himatsingka for his share in the firm of Messrs. Basantlal Ghanshyamdas for the assessment years 1952 53 and 1953 54 was rightly excluded from the income of the applicant firm. In the latter reference the question referred was whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the income of Murlidhar Himatsingha for his share in the firm of Messrs. Basantlal Ghanshyamdas for the assessment year 1955 56 was rightly included in his personal assessment for that year. The facts and circumstances out of which these references were made are companymon because the real question raised by these references is whether the income of Murlidhar Himatsingka, from the firm of M s Basantlal Ghanshyamdas, in which he was a partner, should be included in his personal assessment or in the assessment of the firm of Fatehchand Murlidhar, to which Murlidhar Himatsingka had purported to assign the profits and losses from M s Basantlal Ghanshyamdas. It is sufficient to take the facts from the statement of the case in Income Tax Reference No. 21 of 1959, made at the instance of Murlidhar Himatsingka. Murli dhar Himatsingka was carrying on business in shellac, jute, hessian etc. under the name and style of Fatehchand Murlidhar at 14/ 1, Clive Row and 71, Burtolla Street, Calcutta. He was also a partner in the registered firm, Messrs Basantlal Ghanshyamdas having /2/8 share. On December 21, 1949, a deed of partnership was executed by the said Murlidhar Himatsingka and his two sons, Madanlal Himatsingka and Radhaballav Himatsingka and a grandson named Mahabir Prasad Himatsingka. The deed recited that Murlidhar Himatsingka had become too old and infirm to look after the various businesses and that Madanlal and Radha Ballav were already practically managing the business and that they had signified their intention to become the partners of the said firm Fatehchand Murlidhar and had agreed to companytribute capital, Rupees ten thousand, Rupees five thousand and Rupees five thousand respectively. The parties further agreed to become and be partners in the business mentioned in the deed. Clause 5 of this deed is important for our purpose and reads as follows The profits and losses for the share of the said Murlidhar Himatsingka as partner in the said partnership firm of Basantlal Ghanshyamdas shall belong to the present partnership and shall be divided and borne by the parties hereto in accordance with the shares as specified hereafter, but the capital with its assets and liabilities will belong exclusively to Murlidhar Himatsingka the party hereto of the First Part and the Parties hereto of the Second, Third and Fourth parts shall have numberlien or claim upon the said share capital or assets of the party hereto of the first part in the business of the said Messrs Basantlal Ghanshyamdas. Clause 10 provides The Profits and losses if any of the partnership including the shares of the profits and losses of the said partnership firm of Basantlal Ghanshyamdas aforesaid shall be divided and borne by and between the parties in the following manner Party hereto of the First Part Six annas Murlidhar Himatsingka . Party hereto of the Second Part Four annas Madanlal Himatsingka . Party hereto of the Third Part Three annas Radhaballav Himatsingka . Party hereto of the Fourth Part Three annas Mahabirprasad Himatsingka . Murlidhar Himatsingka appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal heard this appeal together with the two appeals filed by M s Fatehchand Murlidhar. The Appellate Tribunal, agreeing with the views of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, dismissed the appeal. Murlidhar Himatsingka and M s Fatehchand Murlidhar having obtained special leave, the appeals are number before us.

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1966_204.txt

Shah, J. By an agreement dated October 29, 1928, Ciba India Ltd. hereinafter called the principles appointed one Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla selling agent for the District of Ahmedabad in respect of certain kinds of dyes and dye stuffs, and agreed to pay him companymission at the rate of 12 1/2 on sales by him of dyes and dye stuffs of the principals. The companymission was to include all charges in companynection with the upkeep of offices and godown, turnover rebates and companytingency expense, etc. The terms relating to companymission were modified by agreement dated August 20, 1935, and out of the companymission agreed to be paid, 7 1/2 was to be treated as the selling companymission and 5 was to be treated as companypensation in lieu of the companytingency expenses which the selling agent had to meet, such as companymission to dyeing masters, agents, etc The rights of the selling agent were assigned with the companysent of the principals to the respondent companypany with effect from October 27, 1947. In assessing the income of the companypany for the assessment year 1949 50, the Income tax Officer included in the taxable income Rs. 58,025, being the difference between Rs. 1,90,538 received by the companypany as 5 companymission and Rs. 1,32,512 spent by the companypany for meeting the charges which the selling agent was to meet. The Income tax Appellant Tribunal, however, upheld the companytention of the companypany that in the companyputation of the income of the companypany, the 5 companymission was wholly exempt by virtue of section 4 3 vi of the Income tax Act, 1922. The Commissioner then moved the Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case and to refer the following question to the High Court of Judicature, at Bombay Whether, on the facts of the case, a portion, viz., 5 of the selling agency companymission of 12 1/2 received by the assessee company from M s. Ciba Ltd. in the companyrse of carrying on the selling agency business, is exempt from tax under section 4 3 vi of the Act ? But the Tribunal only referred the following question Whether the assessee company held an office or employment of profit within the meaning of section 4 3 vi of the Indian Income tax Act ? The application preferred by the Commissioner to the High Court for calling upon the Tribunal to submit a statement on the question originally submitted was rejected, and the High Court answered the question referred by the Tribunal in the affirmative, observing that it had been companyclusively determined by their earlier decision in Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla v. Commissioner of Income tax 1948 16 I.T.R. 260. Against the order passed by the High Court recording an answer in the affirmative on the question referred by the Tribunal and against the order dismissing the numberice of motion, the Commissioner appealed to this companyrt. This companyrt set aside the order passed by the High Court dismissing the application of the Commissioner and without expressing any opinion on the companyrectness or otherwise of the answer recorded by the High Court on the question referred by the Tribunal, remanded the case to the High Court with a direction that the Tribunal be called upon to state a case on the question raised in the application of the Commissioner. The Commissioner has again appealed to this companyrt against the answer recorded by the High Court on the original and supplementary question. The clause grants exemption in respect of expenses incurred, but on that account an allowance granted to meet expenses to be incurred in future in the performance of the duties of an office or employment of profit is number outside the exemption claimed.

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1967_277.txt

M. Ahmadi, C.J Special leave granted in SLP C Nos. 5813 14 of 1982. The assessee in all these cases is a Co operative Society registered under the Madhya Pradesh Co operative Societies Amalgamation Act, 1957, hereinafter called the Act. While framing assessment for the relevant assessment years in question, the income Tax Officer, included in the taxable income of the assessee interest earned on securities earmarked against reserves and interest earned on Provident Fund deposits. The assessee companytended that it was entitled to the benefit of Section 81 of the Income Tax Act as in force at all material time. The Income Tax Officer rejected this claim of exemption form tax put forward by the assessee. Since the assessees companytention did number find favour at the higher levels also, including the reference to the High Court, the assessee has approached this Court.

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1996_10.txt

Leave granted. We have heard the companynsel on both sides. The facts are that in the evening of December 6, 1989, the deceased Rati Ram, who was Lambardar of the village, had gone on stroll outside the village. While he was companying at about 8.30 p.m., the appellants emerged from their house and each of them having been armed with massals, A 1 had attacked the deceased when he came in front of their house, on the head and hit him three times on different parts. When the deceased had fallen, A 2 again beaten him thrice on chest, abdomen and other parts of the body. PW 6 and 7, the son and brother of the deceased, who were companying in search of him had witnessed the occurrence. When PW 7 raised the cry, the accused had gone in and went away. The deceased was taken to the hospital. He died five days thereafter. The doctor, PW 9, R.M. Singh, companyducted autopsy. He numbered seven injuries and injury number.2 and 3 were head injuries. This number a disease. In other words, head injury is the cause of death. The injuries found on the person of the deceased companyld be caused by musals Ex. Thus this appeal by special leave.

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1996_2138.txt

Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Six appellants, along with accused Dularey, were companyvicted by the Trial Court under Section 304 Part II/149 of the Indian Penal Code hereinafter referred to as I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. They were further companyvicted under Sections 147 and 148 I.P.C. but numberseparate sentence was awarded on any of these companynts. Convictions have been companyfirmed by the High Court on appeal being preferred by the accused persons. So far as accused Dularey is companycerned, it appears that he did number move this Court whereas this appeal by special leave has been filed by the remaining six accused persons. Conviction of the appellants is based upon the evidence of Roop Lal W.1 and Satrohan P.W.2 , who claimed to be eye witnesses. These two witnesses have companysistently supported the prosecution case and numberinfirmity companyld be pointed out therein.

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2008_2135.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2472 of 1989. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.4.1987 of the Orissa High Court in M.A. No. 332 of 1984. K. Panda for the Appellant. K. Sahoo for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. This appeal by special leave by the State of Orissa is directed against the judgment of the Orissa High Court rejecting its appeal under s. 39 of the Arbitration Act. The respondent executed certain work under a written agreement with the appellant and a dispute arose thereunder which was referred to arbitration. The Arbitration made an award which was filed in Court. On service of numberice the appellant raised several objections which the trial companyrt overruled. The award was made a rule of the companyrt. The award is a numberspeaking one and in paragraph 1 it says that the appellant shall pay the claimant Rs. 1,29,000 in full satis faction of the claims. In paragraph 2 of the award it is held that the claimant is entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the above principal sum of Rs. 1,29,000 from 1.10.1978 till the payment of the decree.

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1989_518.txt

W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO.3693 OF 2000 B. SINHA, J These two appeals involving identical question of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. The factual matrix is, however, being numbericed from Civil Appeal No.1382 of 1999. On or about 6.8.1981, the respondent was appointed as Sewing Teacher on regular basis in the pay scale of Rs.480 880/ by the District Education Officer, Ferozepur. She claimed same scale of pay payable to Classical and Vernacular Teachers. The said representation of the respondent was, however, rejected. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, a writ petition was filed by her before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which by reason of the impugned judgment was allowed relying on or on the basis of the earlier decisions of the said companyrt in Amarjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab 1988 4 SLR 199 and Prabjot Kaur vs. State of Punjab 1994 3 SCT 262. In Amarjit Kaur supra , the writ petitioner therein had been granted a revised scale of pay and the same was wrongly withdrawn on the ground that she was companyfirmed with effect from 22.5.1974 by mistake.

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2004_248.txt

C. Lahoti, J. LITTTTTTTJ Respondent, K. Subramanian was havildar in the rank of number companymissioned officers. During 1985, a companyrt of inquiry was held for enquiring into certain irregularities relating to distribution of ration and accounting during the period 1981 1984. The name of the respondent also figured in the inquiry. Mainly it was the lack of supervision that was attributed to the respondent. However, those who were found guilty were proceeded against by holding companyrt martial. No such action was initiated against the respondent. Other persons were punished in accordance with the finding and sentence pronounced by the companyrt martial and companyfirmed by the companypetent authority. On 26th July, 1988 the respondent was served with a numberice under Section 20 1 of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules requiring him to show cause why his services should number be terminated. The respondent gave a reply. On 4.4.1989 he was ordered to be dismissed from service. Putting in issue the order of dismissal, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka which was heard by a learned single Judge who vide order dated 5.12.1989 directed the order of dismissal to be quashed mainly on the ground of number compliance with principles of natural justice. In between on 13th November, 1987 the respondent had been directed to be promoted as subedar which order was, however, number given effect to. The Union of India preferred a writ appeal against the order of learned single Judge. The writ appeal was partly allowed on 5.12.1989 permitting a further enquiry being held. In its judgment dated 5.12.1989 the Division Bench observed inter alia that though the disciplinary authority was number precluded from holding a further enquiry but it seemed to the companyrt that regard being had to the facts of this case indicating that the petitioner had number much to do with the disappearance of the stock of food from the government stores in relation to which an investigation had been companyducted by the Court of Inquiry the authority may well companysider whether it is just and proper at all to proceed with a further inquiry. However, a further inquiry was held. The members of the previous Court of Inquiry were number available and hence a fresh Court of Inquiry was companystituted. The respondent was once again issued a numberice to show cause against termination and vide order dated 29.10.1991 he was once again directed to be dismissed from service. The respondent filed a writ petition which was allowed by learned single Judge of the high companyrt who has directed the impugned order of dismissal from service to be quashed. A writ appeal preferred by Union of India has been dismissed by a Division Bench of the high companyrt on 18.6.1997 which is sought to be impugned by filing this petition for special leave.

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2001_876.txt

Y. Eqbal, J. The appellant was put on trial along with companyaccused Sarbananda Das for offence under section 302/326/34 of the Indian Penal Code for short the IPC . The Additional Sessions Judge, Jorhat by judgment dated 30.03.2006 in Sessions Case No.27 J.J. of 2005, acquitted the companyaccused Sarbananda Das but held the appellant guilty of offence under section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.1,000/ with default clause. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred appeal before the High Court. The High Court by impugned judgment and order dated 20.03.2007 passed in Criminal Appeal No.118 of 2006, affirmed the companyviction and sentence of the appellant and dismissed the said appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred this appeal by special leave. According to the prosecution, the appellant accused Tanua Rabidas was working as an Assistant in the Social Welfare Department. He was married with Meera Saikia Rabidas and both were living together and had numberissue. On the day of their marriage anniversary, it was alleged that the accused appellant along with companyaccused Sarbananda Das were present in the house. The appellant poured kerosene oil upon his wife and set her on fire. She was immediately removed to Mission Hospital, Jorhat and therefrom to Dibrugarh Medical College Hospital. The victim succumbed to the burn injuries. The First Information Report for short the FIR was lodged at Jorhat Police Station Case No.496/99 by PW 1 Atul Saikia the brother of the victim. After usual investigation, the police submitted the charge sheet against both the accused under sections 302/326/34 IPC and the case was accordingly companymitted to the Sessions Court. The prosecution examined as many as seven witnesses. PW 1 Atul Saikia the brother of the victim in his evidence stated that his sister was married with the accused appellant nine years before the incident. He deposed that the accused appellant had two wives prior to the marriage with his sister and he had deserted first wife before marrying his sister. He, on being informed about the incident went to the Hospital and was advised by the Doctor to take his sister to the Dibrugarh Medical College Hospital for better treatment. PW 2 is the son of the accused appellant from his first wife. He was living with the companyple but he deposed that after hearing a companymotion he saw his step mother near the gateway. PW 3 and PW 4 are the neighbourers of the victim. After hearing the companymotion, they also saw the victim near the gateway. PW 8 had accompanied PW 1 to the hospital and deposed that the deceased had made a dying declaration in their presence stating that her husband had set her on fire. Another person present at the time of the occurrence was Mamu Borbora, a maid servant. Her statement was recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but she companyld number be examined because of her absence and she was traceless. Dr. Rupak Kr. Gogoi, who companyducted autopsy over the dead body of the victim, was examined. He opined that the death was caused due to shock resulting from the ante mortem flame burn injuries involving of 90 body surface and of dermo epidermal in severity. Besides the oral dying declaration, the victim also made a dying declaration before PW6 Dr. Imnuksungba Langkumer who is working at Jorhat Christian Hospital. This witness has deposed that on 04.12.1999, he had examined the victim who was brought to the hospital in burned companydition. The witnesses has deposed that he had enquired from the patient as to how she sustained burn injuries whereupon she reported that her husband poured kerosene oil upon her and ignited it. While recording the case history, PW 6 Dr. Langkumer has also recorded the statement made by the victim in the said report Ex.6 . The evidence of PW 6 Dr. Langkumer was supported by PW 7 Nabanita Barauh a nurse who was attending the victim in the said hospital. On the basis of evidence adduced from the side of the prosecution including the two dying declarations, the trial companyrt found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 IPC and accordingly sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/ with default clause. The High Court on appeal filed by the appellant re appreciated the entire evidence and affirmed the finding recorded by the trial companyrt and dismissed the appeal.

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2014_696.txt

THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1997 Present Honble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy Honble Mr. Justice G.t. Nanavati C. Verma, S.P. Khera and R.B. Misra, Advs. for the appellants. Lalita Kohli, C. Siddarth, Majoh M. Misra and Manoj Swarup, Advs. for the Respondents. O R D E R The following Order of the Court was delivered Delay companydoned. Leave granted. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad, made on September 22, 1995 in Second Appeal No.1959 of 1991. The admitted position is that Mahadeo Prasad Vishwanath Prasad Girls High School Harraiya was functioning as an upgraded school from July 14, 1977. The companyrts below granted the decree which has been, on appeal, companyfirmed by the High Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave. We directed the respondents to produce the record of the returns given by the Management with regard to the teachers working in the institution after the upgradation w.e.f. July 14, 1977. This factual position was also accepted by the District Judge but he held that she cannot be penaalised for the mistake of the Management in number sending the name of the first respondent.

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1997_101.txt

K. SIKRI, J. The question of law that arises for companysideration in all these appeals which are filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Rajkot hereinafter referred to as the Revenue is companymon. The respondents in all these appeals are also companymon. The three respondents hereinafter referred to as the assessee are brothers. The respondents are three brothers. Their father died leaving the land admeasuring 17 acres and 11 gunthas to the three brothers and two other persons who relinquished their rights in favour of the three brothers. A part of this bequeathed land was acquired by the State Government and companypensation was paid for it. On appeal, the companypensation amount was enhanced and additional companypensation alongwith interest was awarded. The respondents filed their return of income for each assessment years claiming the status of individual. Two questions arose for companysideration before the Assessing Officer. One was as to whether these three brothers companyld file separate returns claiming the status of the individual or they were to be treated as Association of Persons AoP . Second question was regarding the taxability of the interest on enhanced companypensation and this interest which was received in a particular year was to be assessed in the year of receipt or it companyld be spread over the period of time. Without going into the detail as to how this question traversed and decided by one forum to other, suffice it is to state that the Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order by treating their status as that of a AoP. The Assessing Officer had also refused to spread the interest income over the years and treated it as taxable in the year of receipt.

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1947_342.txt

NAGAPPAN, J. Leave granted. CRMP No.12896 of 2011 seeking impleadment as a party is dismissed. This appeal is preferred against order dated June 29, 2010, passed by the High Court of Calcutta in CRR No.1978 of 2006 in FIR No.251 dated 10.11.2005 on the file of Amherst Street Police Station registered for the alleged offences under Section 420/120B IPC including the order dated 28.10.2005 in case No. C/949 of 2005 passed by the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. Briefly the facts are as follows The appellant herein/ companyplainant was looking for a plot of land for companystruction of residential house in January 2005 and accused No.2, Masud Alam, a public servant represented that he companyld arrange for the said plot and introduced the appellant to respondent No.1/accused No.1 who stated that he had a plot of land and the appellant believing the representation made by the accused No.2 entered into an agreement for sale with respondent No.1 herein accused No.1 and also paid a sum of Rs.5,00,001/ in cash. The respondent No.1 herein refused to hand over the necessary title documents to the appellant which led to issuance of legal numberice by the appellant. All other methods to companypel respondent No.1 to companyplete the sale having failed the appellant filed a companyplaint on 28.10.2005 in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta against respondent No.1 herein accused No.1 and accused No.2 for the offences punishable under Section 420, read with Section 120B of the IPC. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate forwarded the companyplaint to the officer in charge of the Amherst Street Police Station for causing investigation under Section 156 3 of Criminal Procedure Code by treating the companyplaint as First Information Report. Respondent No.1 herein accused No.1 filed application under Section 482 of Cr. PC for quashing the said proceedings including the FIR. Though the appellant herein companyplainant was impleaded as a party numberattempt was made to serve numberice on him with the result that the learned single Judge of the High Court quashed the companyplaint proceedings in the absence of the appellant herein. Challenging the said order the appellant herein preferred appeal to this Court in Criminal Appeal No.852 of 2008 and this Court by judgment dated May 09, 2008 allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. Thereafter the High Court heard both the parties and by impugned order dated June, 29, 2010 allowed the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C and quashed the companyplaint proceedings. Aggrieved by the same the companyplainant has preferred the present appeal.

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1947_207.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 3317 of 1981. Appeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20th November. 1981 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 696 of 1981. K. Venugopal and S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant. Soli J. Sorabjee, D.K. Katare and S.S. Khanduja for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J. A fond hope that a decision of this Court with the sanction of Article 141 of the Constitution that the law laid down therein will be the law of the land would put an end to a raging companytroversy amongst various High Courts stands to some extent rudely shaken when the companytroversy with a slight variation has again been placed in the lap of this Court. For highlighting and then resolving the companytroversy facts in dispute have a little or numberrelevance save and except mentioning certain events. Respondent Yadav Engineer Contractor, a partnership firm filed a suit against Food Corporation of India, 1st defendant and Shyam Narain Nigam, District Manager of 1st defendant as 2nd defendant, for a declaration that the companytract between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant for handling and transportation of the goods of the 1st defendant Corporation was subsisting on the date of the suit and restraining the defendant from companymitting breach of the same by handing over that work to some one other than the plaintiff. The suit was instituted on June 1, 1981, in the Court of the III Civil Judge, Class I, Gwalior. In the suit a numberice of motion was taken out purporting to be under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 read with s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for an interim injunction restraining the defendants from companymitting a breach of companytract and from interfering with the work of handling and transport of goods of the 1st defendant Corpora tion by the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. On the numberice of motion being taken out the Court directed numberice of the same to be served and the same was made returnable on the next day, June 2, 1981. On the returnable date the 2nd defendant, District Manager of the 1st defendant Corporation who had office in the City of Gwalior was served and he appeared through one Shri N.K. Modi, Advocate, filed the letter of authority Vakalat in favour of the learned advocate on behalf of 2nd defendant and the learned advocate prayed for time for reply and arguments to the plaintiffs application for temporary injunction. The companyrt acceded to the request and posted the matter on June 3, 1981. An endorsement appears in the record that the 1st defendant Food Corporation of India was number served though the endorsement reads absent. However, the last line in the proceeding makes it clear that the case was posted on June 3, 1981 for reply arguments and awaiting service on June 3, 1981. When the matter came up on the next day, i.e. June 3, 1981, an application was moved on behalf of 1st defendant inviting the attention of the Court to the subsisting arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant and which agreement authorised the Managing Director of the 1st defendant to appoint an arbritrator in respect of any dispute arising out of the companytract between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. It was also stated that the 1st defendant desires to have the dispute, if any, resolved by arbitration under the subsisting arbitration agreement and that the defendant is fully ready and willing ichhuk to go to arbitration. The application companycluded with a prayer that under the circumstances the suit may be stayed as provided in s. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 Act for short . The learned trial Judge was of the view that the dispute between the parties is companyered by the arbitration agreement set out in Article 19 of the companytract between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. The learned Judge negatived the companytention that an application made by the 2nd defendant for filing reply to the numberice of motion taken out by the plaintiff for interim injunction is a step taken in the proceedings in view of the binding decision of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sansar Chand Deshraj v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 1 The learned judge accordingly granted stay of further proceedings in the suit as prayed for on behalf of the 1st defendant. Plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Gwalior. The learned III Additional District Judge, before whom the appeal came up for hearing, agreed with the view taken by the learned trial judge and companyfirmed the order granting stay of further proceedings in the suit and dismissed the appeal. Hence this appeal by special leave.

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1982_97.txt

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Review Petition No. 2 of 1977. Petition for review of this Courts order dated 22 9 1976 in Crl. M.P. Nos. 1567, 1600 1601/76 . Sital A.K. Dhar, for the petitioner. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. If survival after death may aptly describe any litigative phenomenon, the present review proceeding may well qualify for that quaint claim. The relief of review relates to the death penalty imposed upon the petitioner by the trial companyrt, companyfirmed in appeal, and dismissed even at the stage of special leave by this Court. A treacherous murder of a tender school boy by the petitioner, the circumstances of which were so heartless and heinous, terminated companydiguly at the trial companyrt and the High Court, the extreme penalty having been visited on the offender for his horrendous killing. This Court refused special leave to appeal, drawing the dark curtain on the criminal proceedings. The petitioner struggled to extricate himself from the executioner by a sequence of desperate steps.

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1977_119.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 145 of 1965. Appeal by special leave fro.m the judgment and order dated September 24, 1956 of Madhya Pradesh Now Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior in Civil Misc. Application No. 91 of 1955. S. Bindra, P.W. Sahasrabudde and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant. Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Bharat in Civil Miscellaneous Application No,. 91 of 1955, read with Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 92 of 1955, filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution by Rao Jagdish Singh and others. By this judgment the High Court accepted the applications and quashed the decision of the Board of Revenue and dismissed the claim of Lallu Yeshwant Singh, son of Nahar Singh, number deceased, represented by Babu Singh, appellant before us. The relevant facts for appreciating the points arising in the appeal are as follows. Yeshwant Singh and other sons of Lallu Nahar Singh, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs, filed a suit against Rao Jagdish Singh and 4 others Revenue Case No. 24 of 2000 S.Y. in the Court of Tehsildar, Pargana Pichhore, District Gwalior, for the possession of some agricultural land under s. 326 of Qanoon Mal. The plaintiffs case, in brief, was that they were gairdakhilkar cultivators and that Rao Jagdish Singh, defendant No. 1, had forcibly prevented the plaintiffs from doing cultivation and got the disputed land cultivated by defendants Nos. 2 and 3, by interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs prayed that a decree for possession may be passed in their favour against all the defendants. The defendants case, in brief, was that the village in which the land in dispute iS situated is Ryotwari village and numbersuit companyld be instituted against Jagirdars under s. 326. The defendants further alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to pay revenue and their rights had been extinguished under s. 82 of Qanoon Ryotwari. The Tehsildar decreed the suit. The Collector on appeal upheld the order. The Commissioner on further appeal also upheld the order. On revision, the Board of Revenue agreed with the Commissioner and dismissed the revision.

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1967_166.txt

WITH SLP C Nos. 3944 4087/92. Civil Appeal Nos. 2849/89. 4198/89. SLP C Nos. 13148/89, 2222 26/91, Writ Petition Nos. 523/88, 791/88, 1030/88, 1288/88, 1173/88, 623/90, 624/90, 626/90, 668/90, 669/90, 412/91, 155/89, SLP C Nos. 10772/94, 11244 11250/94, 11253 11255/94 and 14253 60/91 J U D G M E N T Paripoornan,J., J. In this batch of cases writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and civil appeals and special leave petitions filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India substantially similar questions arise for companysideration. The matter arises under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The validity of Sections 44AC and 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act is posed for companysideration. Various assesses challenged the aforesaid provisions as ultra vires and beyond legislative companypetence and also violative of Articles 14 and 19 1 g of the Constitution of India in a few High Courts. Substantially, the challenge was number accepted by all the High Courts. Dissatisfied by the same, the assesses have companye up in appeal. Feeling aggrieved by the reading down of Section 44AC of the Act, the Union of India has companye up in appeals. Those are companyered by civil appeals. Certain other assesses have challenged the aforesaid provisions directly under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Those are companyered by writ petitions. A few assesses, feeling aggrieved by the decisions of the High Courts, have filed special leave petitions seeking leave of this Court to file appeals. Since all these three classes of cases involved companysideration of the validity or otherwise of Sections 44AC and 206C of the Act, they were heard together. Section 44AC of the Act was inserted by the Direct Tax Laws Amendment Act, 1989 with effect from 1.4.1989. 5, p.5139 . The matter at issue came up for companysideration before the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab and Haryana and Patna, in different forms. The decisions therein are A. Sanyasi Rao and another v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others 178 ITR 31 Andhra Pradesh. P. Kunhammed Kutty Haji and others v. Union of India and others 176 ITR 481 Single Bench Kerala. T.K. Aboobacker and others v. Union of India and others 177 ITR 358 Division Bench Kerala. Gian Chand Ashok Kumar and Company and others v. Union of India and others 187 ITR 188 Himachal Pradesh. Sri Venkateswara Timber Depot Union of India and others 189 ITR 741 Orissa. State of Bihar and another v. Commissioner of Income Tax and others 202 ITR 535 Patna. Ramjee Prasad Sahu and others Union of India and others 202 ITR 800 Patna. Madan Mohan Gupta v. Union of India and others 204 ITR 384 Patna. Bhagwan Singh and others v. Union of India and others 209 ITR 824 Patna. The said decision was substantially followed by the Orissa and the Punjab and Haryana High Courts in the decisions reported in Sri Venkateswara Timber Depots case 189 ITR 741 and Sat Pal and Companys case 185 ITR 375 . The appellant herein was the petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. The said petition was heard along with a number of other similar petitions and the High Court rendered a companymon judgment dated 2.8.1989. The appellant petitioner in the writ petition is running the business of liquor companytractor in the State of Haryana. Respondent No. 1 auctioned the vending of companyntry liquor for the year 1989 90 in the Camp area of Yamuna Nagar, Damra and Harmal. The appellant was the highest bidder. The purchaser of companyntry liquor is required to deposit the excise duty payable in respect of the quota of liquor purchased by him in the State of Haryana. On production of the vouchers showing the deposit of excise duty the Excise authority authorises the appellant to make a purchase of the companyntry liquor from the distillery. The permit is issued to the appellant companytractor thereafter. That entitles him to purchase the companyntry liquor, transport and sell it for human companysumption. The price charged by the distillery includes the price of liquor and other charges on bottling, labelling, etc. 155 of 1989.

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1996_189.txt

The appellant entrusted certain companystruction work to the first respondent. On account of number settlement of its claims, the first respondent raised some disputes which were referred to arbitration. Respondent Nos. 2 3 appointed as arbitrators, entered upon the reference on 20.5.1992 and made an award dated 19.6.1998. The arbitrators suo motu filed their award before the High Court on 26.10.1999. It was registered as O.P No. 150/2000. On receiving the numberice of filing of the award the first respondent also made an application Appln. No.2731/2000 in O.P.No. 150/2000 for making the award, a rule of the companyrt. Appellant also companytended that under Article 119 a of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation to file an application under the Act, for filing the award in companyrt, was 30 days from the date of service of numberice of making of the award and if such an application was number filed by a party under section 14 2 of the Act, within 30 days of service of numberice, the award companyld number be filed thereafter, being barred under Article 119 a of Limitation Act, 1963. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court, by the impugned order dated 15.6.2006, negatived the companytentions of the appellant and held that the award companyld be filed suo motu by the Arbitrators and received by the companyrt. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

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2009_613.txt

1995 1 Suppl. SCR 330 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. Leave granted. The appellant, Ramnarayan Satyanarayan Agrawal Distilleries Pvt. Ltd., and Associated Alcohols Breweries Ltd, the respondent No. 1 are both manufactures of potable alcohol. The respondent No. 1 belongs to Kedia Group of Distilleries Companies and enjoys a virtual monopoly in the manufacture of potable alcohol in the State of Madhya Pradesh along with two other business houses. According to the appellant, this monopoly companytinued until the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal Jaiswal, AIR 1987 SC 251, in which the policy decision of the State Government to grant licence to set up new distilleries at new sites was upheld. On 26th April, 1993, the Under Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Commercial Taxation Department, issued an order to the Excise Commissioner. By this order, this State Government granted permission to give licence in favour of the appellant to manufacture potable alcohol in the interest of more companypetition. The order was to the following effect No. B 1 64/85/VA.KAR/5 Bhopal dated 26th April, 1993 To The Excise Commissioner, P. Gwalior. Subject Regarding grant of DI licence to Messers Ramnarayan Satyanarayan Agrawal, Bilaspur for manufacture of industrial alcohol. Reference Your memo No. 3/2/670 dated 20.4.93. The State Government grants permission for manufacture of potable alcohol in order to encourage greater companypetition for issuance of licence to Messers Ramnarayan Satyanarayan Agrawal Distilleries Pvt. Ltd., Chherka Bench, Bilaspur, which produces industrial alcohol. In accordance with earlier cases the distiller would be responsible for the other licence permissible which they may be required to obtain from Government of India and other departments of the State Government for the manufacture of potable alcohol. By order and in name of the Governor of Madhya Pradesh S. DUBEY Government of Madhya Pradesh Commercial Taxation Department. This was followed up by another order, issued by the Additional Excise Commissioner on 29th April, 1993 which was as under OFFICE OF THE EXCISE COMMISSIONER MADHYA PRADESH, MOTI MAHAL, GWALIOR. 3/2/19 83/920 Gwalior dated 29.4.93. To M s. Ramanarayan Satyanarayan Agrawal Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. Chherpha Bandha, Bilaspur, Madhya Pradesh. Subject Regarding grant of licence DI to M s. Ramanarayan Satyanarayan Agrawal, Bilaspur for manufacture of industrial alcohol. B l 64/85/Va. Kar 5 dated 26.4.93 of the State Government, Commercial Taxation Department. With reference to the aforesaid government order, permission is granted to you to manufacture potable alcohol under the DI licence granted to you on the companydition that you would be responsible for obtaining the necessary licence permission from the Government of India and other departments of the State Government according to rules applicable thereto and further that you would be required to follow all the necessary terms and companyditions under the Excise Act. Sd Additional Excise Commissioner Madhya Pradesh. The aforesaid two orders were passed in pursuance to the appellants application for permission to manufacture potable alcohol. The appellant has claimed that the order dated 26.4.93 clearly states that it shall be the responsibility of the appellant to obtain such licence permission, as necessary, from any other department of the Central Government and the State Government. All other distilleries in Madhya Pradesh are being run on similar terms and companyditions. The same procedure was followed by the State of Madhya Pradesh in respect of all distilleries in Madhya Pradesh, including the distilleries belonging to Associated Alcohol Breweries Ltd., the respondent No. 1 and Anand Kumar Kedia, the respondent No. According to the appellant, the trouble started b this case when the Excise Commissioner issued a numberice dated 8.7.1993 inviting tenders for supply of companyntry liquor in 19 supply areas of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did number directly submit any tender, but another companycern of the Kedia Group i.e. Castle Douglas Industries Limited, submitted its tender. The prices tendered by the appellant and the Castle Douglas Industries Limited were as under. Price tendered by the appellant Bilaspur Raipur Rs. 5.21 Rs. 5.71 Price tendered by Castle Douglas Industries Ltd. Bilaspur Raipur Rs. 14.71 Rs. 14.71 The tender of the appellant was much lower than the tender of Castle Douglas Industries Limited. There was numberother companytender. The tender of Castle Douglas was almost three times the appellants tender. If the tender of Castle Douglas Industries Limited were accepted, the Exchequer would have suffered huge loss. Having failed b open companypetition the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are number trying to perpetuate their monopoly by legal process. Initially, a writ petition was moved in the name Arvind Kashiv on 3.5,1993 P.No. 1035/1993 . Arvind Kashiv claimed to be a journalist interested in public causes. Arvind Kashiv failed to obtain ex parte stay of acceptance of the appellants tender. Thereafter, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 came out in the open and filed a writ petition M.P. No. 1320/1993 out of which this appeal by special leave arises. In the writ petition, they questioned the right of the appellant to make its tender on the following grounds That the appellant only holds an authorisation from the State Government b that the State Government had numberpower, authority or jurisdiction in the matter of licensing the manufacture of potable alcohol c that only the Central Government possesses such licensing authority and d that the appellant did number hold any licence from the Central Government. It was held in that case by a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court that the alcohol industry can be set up only after obtaining a licence from the Government of India and thereafter the State shall have the companytrol of the industry in terms of Entry 8 of list II of the Constitution which gives power to the State to legislate in respect of intoxicating liquor i.e. to say the production, manufacture, possession and transport. Without a licence from the Central Government, an industrial undertaking for production or manufacture of alcohol cannot be set up. As regards the individual cases of respondents Nos. 4 and 5, in that writ petition, it was held that the respondent No. 4 shall be entitled to companytinue its business as before but respondent number 5 the appellant herein had to obtain a licence from the Central Government for setting up of an industry for manufacture of potable alcohol. The Court held We have already held above that licences for setting up of industries for manufacture of potable alcohol and industrial alcohol has to be obtained separately and it cannot be treated as one and the same product. Licence obtained for setting up of an industry for manufacture of industrial alcohol cannot be allowed to produce potable alcohol unless a licence in that behalf is obtained from the Central Government. Therefore, whenever a unit obtains a licence from the Government of India, for setting up a plant for producing industrial alcohol, it cannot without obtaining a licence from the Government of India, companyvert that licence for producing potable alcohol, by obtaining the permission or licence issued by the State Government.

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1995_449.txt

PRAFULLA C. PANT, J. This appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 27.8.2009, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, in Special Appeal No. 1167 of 1999, whereby said Court has partly allowed the appeal, and substituted the punishment of removal awarded to the appellant, by companypulsory retirement from service. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the papers on record. Briefly stated, the facts are that the appellant was a cashier with Life Insurance Corporation of India hereinafter referred to as LIC and posted at Bilaspur, District Rampur in U.P. A policy holder, Bhograj Singh, deposited with the appellant an amount of Rs.533/ towards half yearly insurance premium on 13.8.1990 but the same was number deposited with LIC number credited in the account of the policy holder till 27.11.1990, though a receipt was issued on 13.8.1990 by the appellant. It appears that when the LIC agent did number get his companymission out of the premium deposited, and made enquiries in this regard, aforesaid amount of Rs.533/ was shown deposited by the appellant with late fee of Rs.15.90/ , and entry was made in the cash register on 28.11.1990. Also, a forged entry was made in ledger sheet on back date. In companynection with the above misconduct on the part of the appellant, a charge sheet was served on him on 29.4.1991 on two companynts, namely, temporary embezzlement of Rs.533/ for the period 13.8.1990 to 27.11.1990, and forging entry of Rs.533/ in the carbon companyy of the ledger sheet dated 13.8.1990 between entry Nos. 12 and 13. On companyclusion of the departmental enquiry, the appellant was found guilty, and served with companyy of enquiry report, whereafter he was removed from service vide order dated 21.1.1992. The departmental appeal appears to have been dismissed by the authority companycerned on 22.2.1992. Challenging the order of removal from service and that of the appellate authority, the appellant filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 10308 of 1999 before the High Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge on 6.9.1999. Aggrieved by said order of the learned Single Judge, Special Appeal was filed before Division Bench of the High Court, by the employer i.e. L.I.C. The Division Bench, after hearing the parties, came to the companyclusion that the appellant appears to have companymitted the forgery to companyer his mistake, and partly allowed the appeal by substituting punishment of companypulsory retirement in place of removal from service. Leave was granted by this Court on 19.4.2010.

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2015_721.txt

In these appeals relating to the assessment years 1957 58 to 1974 75, the main question which is involved for companysideration is whether the appellant Trust being a public charitable trust, is eligible for exemption from income tax. On 28th November, 1941, a partnership deed was executed between K. Rajgopal and V.S. Nanjappa Chettiar. By this document, the said parties agreed to carry on business in partnership but clauses 4 to 8 of the Deed companytained an agreement amongst the partners that out of the net profits of the business, after payment of all charges and expenses, 80 per cent shall be set apart and allotted to charitable and religious objects. The amounts which were to be credited to the Charity Account in the books of business were to be utilised by the trustee for carrying out the objects of the Trust. The partnership deed appointed one T.N. Venkatarama Chettiar, son of one of the partners as the sole trustee. The power which was given to the said sole trustee was companytained in para 8 of the Deed which reads as follows The said T.N. Venkatarama Chettiar shall from time to time after acceptance of the trust, operate on the fund in execution of the trust and spend out of the said fund in companynection with temple festivals in Madras and other places like Conjeevaram, Tirupathi, Srirangam, Salem and other places, medical relief, the giving of alms including food to the poor on occasions of Hindu festivals as selected by him in his discretion of the gift of sums of money to poor deserving persons for celebration of marriage and generally on any object of Chcultries, work houses hospitals etc. By a subsequent document executed on 26th August, 1943 this clause companytaining the power of revocation was deleted. On 1st July, 1944, the sole trustee executed a document purporting to be a declaration of trust. It referred to the carrying on of the partnership business by the earlier founders of the trust and for establishment of the trust for charitable and religious objects and then proceeded to make a declaration of trust specifying a number of objects, most of which were different from the ones companytained in the partnership deed of 28th November, 1941. One of the clauses in this deed of 1st July. 1944 was regarded by the Income Tax Department as number being charitable in nature. It appears that one M s. East India Industries Madras Pvt. Ltd. a donor to the appellant Trust in respect of the donation given to the Trust claimed exemption from tax under section 158 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. While companysidering the case relating to this donation, the Income Tax Officer in East India Industries case came to the companyclusion that by virtue of this clause relating to number charitable object, the Trust created by the Deed dated 1st July, 1944 companyld number be regarded as a Trust having charitable object and , therefore, number entitled to exemption under the Income Tax Act. This matter was carried to this Court and in the judgment reported as East India Industries Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 65 ITR 611 the view of the Department was affirmed and it was held that the document dated 1st July, 1944 did number establish a public charitable trust because one of the objects was number charitable in nature and there was numberhing in the Trust Deed which prevented the trustees from applying the whole or any part of the Trust property for that purpose. In the assessment for the years 1957 58 to 1974 75 of the appellant, the question arose whether it companyld be regarded as a public charitable trust entitled to the benefits under the Income Tax Act The Income Tax Officer as well as the Appellate Commissioner came to the companyclusion that the appellant was number a public charitable trust. Before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, it was companytended on behalf of the appellant Trust that the Trust had companye into existence by virtue of Deed dated 28th November, 1941 and the Declaration of Trust under a deed dated 1st July, 1944 was invalid. By a detailed order the Income Tax Tribunal came to the companyclusion that the question as to whether the Deed dated 1st July, 1944 was validly executed was number in issue in East India Industries case. It further held that since an irrevocable trust had been created by virtue of partnership deed dated 28th November, 1941 neither the founders number the trustees had any right, in law, to vary the objects of that Trust by executing another document dated 1st July, 1944. The Tribunal, therefore, companycluded that the decision of this Court in East India Industries case companyld number prevent it from examining the terms of the objects of the Trust companytained in partnership deed dated 28th November, 1941 inasmuch as that a deed dated 1st July, 1944 being regarded as void, companytinued to exist. After examining the objects of the Trust as companytained in the Deed dated 28th November, 1941 the Tribunal came to the companyclusion that the objects of the Trust were charitable in nature and, therefore, the appellant was entitled to be regarded as public charitable Trust which would enable it to get the benefits under the Act. At the instance of the Revenue, in respect of the assessment years 1957 58 to 1961 62 the Tribunal referred the following five questions of law to the High Court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was a trust companystituted by the deed, dated November 28, 1941, and number by the deed dated July 1, 1944? Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellant Tribunal was right in holding that the question whether the assessee was a trust, whose objects are wholly charitable and religious has to be determined solely with reference to the trust deed dated November 28, 1941, and number with reference to the trust deed dated July 1, 1944? Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the trust created by the partnership deed dated November 28, 1941, companytinued even after the dissolution of the partnership and the assesses trust was the trust companystituted by the deed dated November 28, 1941? Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that giving cash grants for the needy and deserving persons to meet marriage expenses is a charitable object and the assessee was entitled to exemption under section 4 3 l of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922? Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assesse trust was entitled to the exemption under section 4 3 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 in respect of the income attributable to the trust created under the deed dated November 28, 1941? In respect of the assessment for subsequent years, viz., 1962 63 to 1973 74, the Tribunal referred only one question which was as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income of the assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11 of the Income tax Act, 1961, read with section 13 and was number, therefore, assessable to tax for the assessment years 1962 63 to 1973 74?

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1998_1050.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 641 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 27, 1964 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Special Civil Application No. 32 of 1964. V. S. Mani, for the appellant. The respondent did number appear. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. In this appeal, by special leave, the appellant attacks the judgment and order, dated July 27, 1964, of the Nagpur Bench, of the Bombay High Court, dismissing Special Civil Application No. 322 of 1964. The appellant, the Managing Trustee of the said Trust, filed an application, under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Vidarbha Region Act, 1958 Bombay Act XCIX of 1958 here inafter called the Act , before the Naib Tehsildar, Balapur the third respondent, herein , to direct the fourth respondent, the tenant, to surrender four acres of land, on the ground that the lands were required for being cultivated personally. According to the appellant, the necessary numberices, terminating the tenancy of the fourth respondent, had been given, under the Act, and that he was entitled to get possession of the lands, in question. The fourth respondent raised various objections, on merits but all those objections were over ruled, by the third respondent. The fourth respondent raised a legal companytention that, inasmuch as the lands, in question, belonged to the Trust, the appellant Managing Trustee companyld number be companysidered to be the landlord. He further companytended that the Trust itself companyld number cultivate personally the lands and, therefore, the application, filed by the appellant, was number maintainable. The third, respondent overruled these objections, on the ground that the Managing Trustee was a person in whom the properties of theTrustee vested in law and, therefore, it was open to him to make a claim for possession of the lands from a tenant, on the ground that they were required for personal cultivation. In this view, the third respondent further held that the Managing Trustee was a landlord, under the Act, entitled to get possession of the lands. Finally, the third respondent ordered the tenant to surrender possession of the land, as required by the appellant. The order of the third respondent was challenged, by the tenant, in appeal, before the Special Deputy Collector, Tenancy Appeals, Akola the second respondent . The latter, by order dated October 30, 1963, reversed the decision of the Naib Tehisildar. The second respondent accepted the appellants plea that he was the Managing Trustee of the Trust, in question, but took the view that a claim, on behalf of a Trust, for personal cultivation, under the Act, companyld number be made, as a Trust was incapable of cultivating lands personally. The second respondent followed, in this regard, the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in Shri Kalanka Devi Sansthan, Patur v. Pandu Maroti 1 , which had held that a Deity or Sansthan, which is a juristic person, companyld hold property, but companyld number act, except through a Wahiwatdar or Manager, and, as such, was incapable of cultivating lands personally. In this view the second respondent held that the appellant was number a person capable of cultivating land personally and, as such, was number entitled to ask for surrender of the lands, from the tenant. The appellant went up, in revision, against this order, before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal Nagpur the first respondent . That Tribunal took the view that the case was governed by the decision of the Bombay High Court, in Buvasaheb v. Yesu Krishna , and dismissed the revision. The High Court summarily rejected the writ petition, filed by the appellant, against this order.

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1968_315.txt

Suddenly the appellant got down from the bicycle and stabbed Bibhishan on his stomach and back and started to press his neck. The accused tried to run away from the spot but was caught by the villagers and handed over to the police. Victim was taken to the hospital. The accused preferred an appeal before the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench.

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2004_487.txt

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCriminal Appeals Nos. 48 and 80 of 1960. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated December 11, 1959 and March 2, 1960 of the Bombay High Court Rajkot Now Gujarat High Court In criminal Revision Application No. 100 of 1959. N. Keswani, for the appellants in both the appeals . R. Prom and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondent in both the appeals . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. The two appeals by special leave arise out of the same criminal trial before a magistrate at Porbunder and will be dealt with together. The three appellants along with one more person, namely, Keshavlal Nagjibhai were prosecuted under s. 167 81 of the Sea Customs Act, No. 8 of 1878, hereinafter referred to as the Act . The prosecution case briefly was that Vallabhdas Liladhar, who is number dead, came in companytact with an Arab from whom he purchased smuggled gold weighing a little more than 84 tolas on December 1, 1956. Before this, Vallabhdas Liladhar had borrowed Rs. 3,600/ from the other two appellants and Keshavlal about November 28, 1956, in order to make the purchase. After making the purchase, Vallabhdas Liladhar came to Porbunder to the house of the other two appellants and Keshavlal and informed them of the purchase and wanted their help in the disposal of the gold. The other two appellants namely, Narandas Nagjibhai and Vallabhdas Nagjibhai are brothers. Keshavlal was also the brother of these two appellants. The prosecution case further was that Narandas Nagjibhai asked Vallabhdas Nagjibhai to take the gold to Bantwa and sell it at the rate of Rs. Vallabhdas Nagjibhai was also instructed that in case he companyld number sell the gold at that rate he should companytact Vallabhdas Liladhar and Narandas Nagjibhai at Bantwa bus stand from where they were to go to Junagadh to dispose of the gold if numbersuitable buyer companyld be found in Bantwa. Consequently Vallabhdas Nagjibhai proceeded to Bantwa by bus on December 2, 1956 in the afternoon. In the meantime information was received by Mehta who was Inspector of Customs about the smuggling of this gold. He companysequently followed the bus in which Vallabhdas Nagjibhai was travelling and intercepted him at Kutiyana bus stand at about 3 p.m. The Deputy Superintendent of Customs was also with Inspector Mehta and Vallabhdas Nagjibhai was taken down from the bus at Kutiyana. On search in the presence of witnesses, five bars of gold weighing about 84 tolas were recovered from his possession. All these five bars bore marks of foreign origin and were taken in possession by the customs authorities after preparing a recovery list. Further investigation was made in the matter and eventually on October 7, 1957, the Collector of Central Excise Baroda companyfiscated the gold bars under s. 167 8 of the Act read with s. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and also imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,000/ each on the three appellants and a penalty of Rs. 500/ on Keshavlal. Thereafter a companyplaint was filed by the Assistant Collector of Customs under s. 167 81 of the Act before the magistrate at Porbunder on June 27. The case of Vallabhdas Liladhar was that he had number purchased the gold from any Arab but had brought it with him from Karachi in the year 1946. Vallabhdas Nagjibhai admitted the recovery of gold from him but said that it belonged to Vallabhdas Liladhar and he was carrying it at the request of the latter and that he did number know that it was smuggled gold. Narandas Nagjibhai also, admitted that Vallabhdas Liladhar had companye to their house with the gold but added that it was number smuggled gold and that Vallabhdas Liladhar had told him that it belonged to him and was for sale. Keshavlal, the fourth person, who has been acquitted, said that he did number know anything about the matter and had numberconnection with it. It may be added that the three appellants had made statements before the customs authorities and those statements were also put in evidence in support of the prosecution case. In those statements, they practically admitted the prosecution case that the gold was smuggled gold and they were trying to dispose it of. The magistrate companyvicted all the four persons under s. 167 81 of the Act and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 500/ He relied on the statements made by the appellants and Keshavlal before the customs authorities and also on the evidence produced before him, which was mainly about the recovery of gold. All the four companyvicted persons appealed to the Sessions Judge. The appeal was heard by the Additional Sessions Judge, Porbunder who acquitted Keshavlal. The appeal of the other three namely, the three appellants number before us was dismissed and their companyvictions and sentences Were upheld. The three appellants then went in revision to the High Court. The High Court rejected the revisions of Vallabhdas Liladhar and Vallabhdas Nagjibhai summarily. The revision application of Narandas Nagjibhai was admitted but was eventually dismissed. The three appellants then applied for leave to appeal to this Court which was refused. They then prayed for special leave from this Court, which was granted, and that is how the matter has companye up before us. It only remains to companysider the appeal of Vallabhdas Nagjibhai Cr. In addition to the above circumstances, all the companyrts relied on the statements made by the two appellants before the customs authorities and the presumption under s. 178 A of the Act was raised and on that basis companyvicted the appellants, though the High Court held that even without the presumption under s. 178 A the evidence was sufficient to companyvict the appellants.

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1964_210.txt

ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION Crl. NO.5540 OF 2002 VENKATARAMA REDDI, J. Leave granted. It is the case of the appellant that his mother who is numbermore entered in to a written agreement on 13.10.1981 with the first respondent firm for the purchase of flat No. 606 in the multistoried companyplex proposed to be companystructed at Prabha Devi, Mumbai by the said firm, pursuant to which she paid earnest money initially and later on after the companystruction of the building companymenced in 1987, she tendered a sum of Rs.50,000 through a demand draft on 28.1.1987. About a year later, the appellants mother received a letter from the respondent denying the agreement and the draft of Rs.50,000 was also returned along with the letter. After exchange of numberices, appellants mother filed a suit being suit No. 82 of 1989 in the High Court of Delhi seeking the relief of specific performance. The respondent firm filed a written statement on 19.5.1989 setting up the plea that the flat in question was sold to one Sukhbinder Singh by an agreement of sale dated 30.7.1981. On 8.7.1991, the respondent filed a photocopy of the alleged agreement dated 30.7.1981 according to which the flat was agreed to be sold to Sukhbinder Singh. However, the original agreement has number been filed in the Court till number. It is alleged that the appellants mother, on getting certain information from the alleged purchaser, filed a private companyplaint under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 474 etc. of IPC in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi alleging that she was duped and a fabricated forged agreement has been set up in the suit, a photocopy of which was filed. On recording the statement of the companyplainant on 8.3.2001, it appears that the learned Magistrate took companynizance of the offence and issued summons to the accused as well as to Sukhbinder Singh. In the meanwhile, the appellants mother i.e. the companyplainant died in May, 2001 and the appellant has been substituted as companyplainant in the case. In May, 2002 a petition was filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. in the High Court of Delhi for quashing the criminal companyplaint. By the impugned order, the said application came to be allowed by the High Court on the ground of delay in preferring the companyplaint. It is against this order the SLP has been preferred by the companyplainant. It appears that two questions were raised before the High Courtone is about the bar under Section 195 Cr. P.C. and the other regarding limitation. As regards the bar under Section 195 Cr.

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2004_961.txt

This appeal by way of special leave arises out of the judgment and order dated 22.07.2004 in Criminal Appeal No. 481 of 1999 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana whereby the High Court had allowed the appeal filed by the accused respondent Rajinder Singh setting aside his companyviction and sentence of life imprisonment and fine under Section 302 IPC and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, by giving him the benefit of doubt and had also dismissed the appeal against acquittal filed by the appellant State against the acquittal of Kuldip Singh and Rachhpal Singh, by the Sessions Judge, Faridkot. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as follows Madan Lal P.W. 2, the father of the deceased Harinder Kumar was the companyowner of brick kilns in villages Madooke and Ajitwal with Rajinder Singh, respondent herein. About one year prior to the occurrence, a settlement had been arrived at between the parties aforesaid and the brick kiln in village Madooke had fallen to the share of Madan Lal and the one in Ajitwal to the share of Rajinder Singh. As per the settlement, a truck bearing registration No. PJB 2155 had also companye to the share of Rajinder Singh who was to pay a sum of Rs. 1,68,000/ to Madan Lal in lieu thereof. On 30th November, 1995, Madan Lal and his son Harinder Kumar, the deceased along with P.W. 3 Shamsher Singh and W. 4 Anil Kumar had visited the brick kiln at Madooke to make payment to the labour and as they reached that place at about 730a.m., they observed that bricks were being loaded onto a tractor trolley by Rajinder Singh, and Kuldip Singh armed with shotguns assisted by four or five persons. As soon as the companyplainant party intervened Rachhpal Singh who too was present, raised a lalkara calling on Rajinder Singh to fire on the companyplainant party. Rajinder Singh thereupon fired a shot which hit Harinder Kumar near his left eye. Rachhpal Singh and Kuldip Singh thereafter fired shots towards the companyplainant party but on an alarm raised by the latter, the accused ran away firing shots in the air. The tractor trolley with the bricks loaded thereon was also driven away. Madan Lal, accompanied by Shamsher Singh and Anil Kumar, attempted to move Harinder Kumar to the hospital at Moga in a car but he died along the way. A First Information Report was thereafter lodged by Madan Lal at Police Station, Mehna. The body of the deceased was also subjected to a post mortem examination and P.W. 1 Dr. Iqbal Singh opined that the injury appeared to have been caused with a shot from a rifle, though the possibility that it had been caused with a shot from a 12 bore gun, using single projectile cartridge, companyld number be ruled out. W. 9 ASI Devinder Singh of P.S. Mehna also visited the place of incident and picked up two spent cartridges of a .315 bore rifle, four spent cartridge cases of a 12 bore shot gun and nine catridges of 12 bore which were taken into possession and sent for examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh. In the meanwhile, Rajinder Singh and Mohinder Singh, who too had also received injuries in the incident, got themselves examined at the Civil Hospital, Jagraon, and on receiving this information P.W. 9 ASI Devinder Singh obtained their medical reports from Jagraon Police Station and also recorded their statements. A rifle of .315 bore belonging to P.W. 4 Anil Kumar and a 12 bore gun belonging to P.W. 2 Madan Lal allegedly used in causing the injuries to Rajinder Singh and Mohinder Singh were also taken into possession by the ASI. On the companypletion of the investigation, Rajinder Singh was charged for an offence punishable under Section 302 whereas the other accused were charged under Section 302/34 of the IPC read with Section 120B of the IPC and all the three were also charged under Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution in support of its case relied on the evidence of W. 1 Dr. Iqbal Singh, P.W. 2 Madan Lal, P.W. 3 Shamsher Singh and P.W. 4 Anil Kumar, the last three named being eye witnesses, P.W. 9 ASI Devinder Singh who had investigated the case for a day or so and P.W. 12 Sub Inspector Mal Singh who had taken over the investigation from him was the main Investigating Officer. The prosecution case was then put to the accused and their statements were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They pleaded false implication. In their defence, the accused examined eight witnesses in an attempt to show that they were in fact the victims at the hands of the deceased and his father Madan Lal and had suffered gun shot injuries at their hands. The Sessions Judge, Faridkot in an elaborate judgment held that the participation of Kuldip Singh and Rachhpal Singh was doubtful as they had number caused any injury to the deceased and that the three eye witnesses were also discordant as to their role in the incident. On a philosophical numbere, the Sessions Judge companycluded that The settled law is that it is safe to acquit 10 accused persons rather than to companyvict one innocent. Weighing the above dictum in the scale of justice, I am of the companysidered opinion that when there is a doubt with regard to the participation of accused Kuldip Singh in the present occurrence, then it is safe to give him the benefit of doubt and acquit him. Thus by giving him the benefit of doubt, accused Kuldip Singh is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The Sessions Judge, accordingly, holding Rajinder Singh guilty of murder companyvicted and sentenced him under Section 302 of the IPC and under Section 27 of the Arms Act as already indicated above, but acquitted Kuldip Singh and Rachhpal Singh. The matter was thereafter taken to the High Court by way of two appeals one by the State of Punjab challenging the acquittal of Kuldip Singh and Rachhpal Singh and the other by the companyvicted accused Rajinder Singh. The High Court by its judgment dated 07.01.2002 dismissed the appeal filed by the State and allowed the appeal filed by Rajinder Singh primarily on two grounds that as per the eye witnesses Madan Lal and Shamsher Singh in particular, the weapon used in causing the fatal injury was a shot gun but the injury found on the deceased was by a shot from a rifle and ii that the injuries on the person of Rajinder Singh and Mohinder Singh had number been explained which cast a doubt on the entire prosecution story. A Special Leave Petition was thereafter filed in this Court against the judgment of the High Court. Clotted blood was present. All other organs were numbermal. As per the ocular account, the shot gun had been fired from a distance of 10 or 12 karm i.e., 50 or 60 feet or about 20 yards. In this situation, and if the prosecution story was to be accepted the pellets would have entered the body making individual pellet holes and number en masse as appears in this case. General companydition of the injured was satisfactory. Pulse was 78 per minute. No vomiting was present. RAJINDER SINGH Irregular lacerated wound 15 cms X 7 cms muscle deep on back of right lower leg in calf region about 9 cms. from the popliteal fossa and going downwards and medically from the upper outer end. There was tattooing of skin 1.75 cms X 1.5 cms., on upper and outer part of upper end of a wound and on sides of upper end of the wound. The heirs were partially burnt in the ara. The upper and outer end of the wound for 3 cms. The muscle for about 1.5 cms depth was lacerated. Subcutaneous tissues and muscles were blackened in upper and outer part of the wound. Bleeding was present from the wound. There were three holes in the right side leg of the pyjama and the pyjama was also blood stained. There was blackening around two smaller holes in the pyjama. X ray of the right lower leg were impaired and painful. Injury was kept under observation and weapon was also kept under observation.

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2009_1114.txt

With Civil Appeal Nos 10760 11058, 11062 66 of 1995 arising out of SLP C Nos. 13203 13213, 13137 13140, 13933 13934, 14009 14030, 14031 14036, 14037 14042, 14050 14067, 16237 16238, 15281 15435, 17114, 17292 17294, 14759, 19408, 21949, 22649, 23059, 22650 22669, 22671 22677, 22678 22687, 22688 22692 of 1994, and 1041, 1243 1245, CC.254 and 255, SLP C No.2, CC.974, SLP C No. 7095 and 7912, CC.1557 and 2302 SLP C Nos.8110, 11091, 8164 8166, 13548 and 8900 of 1995. J U D G M E N T HANSARIA, J. I have had the benefit of perusing the judgment of learned brother Ramaswamy, J. in draft. Despite the great respect he companymands at my hand, I have number been able to persuade myself to agree with him. The same came to be challenged again before the High Court. We were also addressed at length by various companynsel appearing for the appellants so too by the State companynsel.

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1995_1181.txt

1999 Supp 2 SCR 318 JUDGMENT P. Mohapatra, J. Though the cases from which these appeals arise were disposed of by judgments rendered by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh on different dates the questions of fact and law involved in all the cases are similar. With the companysent of learned Counsel for the parties all the cases were heard together and they are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. The State of Himachal Pradesh is well known throughout the companyntry for its apples. Precaution was taken to ensure that the procured apples were number re cycled. In this operation about 30000 tons of Scab affected apple were procured and destroyed at 195 centers set up for the purpose and companypensation 50 paise per kilogram was paid to the companycerned growers. Complaints of large scale bungling and misappropriation of Government money were received from different quarters. The State Government appointed Shri Roop Singh Thakur, the then District and Sessions Judge, Shimla as one man enquiry Commission to examine the matter. The Commission came to the companyclusion that some persons had obtained false payments by showing inflated quantities of scabbed apple and had, thereby cheated the State Government. The Commission had also companye to the companyclusion that the bungling had been done in companynivance with the members of the team engaged in the procurement and destruction of the fruits. On the basis of the said enquiry report a number of criminal companyplaints were lodged against the public servants who were members of the team and also the companycerned growers. The cases were sent to the companyrt of the special Judge, Shimla for trial. In these cases it was alleged inter alia that the accused persons entered into a criminal companyspiracy with a view to cheat the State Government by preparing false records showing inflated quantities of scabbed apple brought by the growers and thereby caused loss to the Government exchequer. The gist of the prosecution case was that the growers had brought much lesser quantities of scabbed apple than the quantity entered in the official records and received amount in lieu of the same. On these allegations all the accused persons were charged for offences punishable Under Section 468, 420, 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused persons denied the charges. They stood by the official records and refuted the allegations that inflated quantities of the stock of apple procured and destroyed were entered in the record with a view to cheat the State Government. At the trial the prosecution case was sought to be proved by circumstantial evidence which was brought on record by the testimony of Shri P.C. Panwar the then District Horticulture Officer, Shimla, who was examined as an expert for assessing the fruit bearing capacity of the orchards in question. According to the prosecution the evidence of this expert showed that the quantity of scabbed apple brought by the accused to the procurement centers as reflected in the records was grossly inflated. From the evidence the prosecution sought to establish the case that the whole transaction was an outcome of a criminal companyspiracy to cheat the State Government, and to misappropriate public funds and the public servants companycerned having been parties to the companyspiracy, the purpose companyld be easily achieved. It is relevant to numbere here that numberdirect evidence was produced for showing the apple crop of the orchards in question during the year 1983. It is on record that Shri P.C. Panwar visited the orchards in November 1984 after even the crop of the succeeding year had been harvested. On behalf of the defence Shri D.R. Thakur a retired professor of Horticulture and Shri Shamsher Singh a grower, were examined to companynter the evidence of Shri Panwar. The High Court was of the view that the evidence of Shri P.C. Panwar fell very much short of the requirement of law and therefore companyld number be relied upon. Accordingly, the High Court acquitted the accused persons of all the charges. Hence these appeals filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh. The main companytention of Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant was that the learned trial judge had thoroughly discussed the evidence and given companyent reasons for accepting the prosecution case while the High Court without closely examining the reasons stated in the trial companyrt judgment, on a superficial approach has rejected the prosecution case and acquitted the accused persons.

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1999_636.txt

L. Untwalia, J. Appellant Asgar has been companyvicted Under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for intentionally causing the murder of one Ram Swarup Singh on account of an alleged dispute companycerning repayment of some debt by the latter to the former which Ram Swarup is said to be owing to the appellants father. The prosecution case was that the appellant fired a shot on the lower part of the abdomen of Ram Swarup at the instigation of his brother. His brother has been acquitted but the shot given by the appellant has been found to have caused the death of Ram Swarup. The appellant was companyvicted under Section 302 of the Penal Code and given the extreme penalty of death sentence by the trial companyrt. The High Court has companyfirmed the sentence. Special leave was granted by this Court limited to the question of sentence only. We have heard learned Counsel for the appellant and learned Counsel for the State. The trial of this case was companycluded before companying into force of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

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1977_203.txt

BHAN, J. Assessee has filed these appeals under section 35L b of the Central Excise Act, 1944 hereinafter called the Act against the final order number1419 1420/Cal/2000 dated 31st August 2000 in appeal number E R 156 157/99 passed by the Customs, Excise Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, Eastern Bench, Calcutta hereinafter called the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein. FACTS Acting on the basis of intelligence, a team of officers from CPO of Calcutta I Central Excise Commissionerate, Headquarters visited the factory cum office of the appellant on 5th September, 1997 and companyducted a search operation. Search resulted in seizure of 3 files, 9700 pieces of Philips Ultra cleaner, 500 pieces of degreasing cleansing fluid, 700 pieces of Switch cleaning oil all bearing brand name of Philips. These were detained and later seized on 9th February, 1998. Also, some 13 files belonging to M s. T. Paul Sons were tendered by the partner of the appellant firm. Certain other documents were also handed over to seized by the raiding party. On the basis of the statements made by Shri Arun Kanti Paul partner of the appellant and other records recovered from the said premises on the day of search, it was found that the orders were being received from M s. Philips India Ltd., by M s. T. Paul Sons and the same were executed by the appellant on the basis of arrangement with M s. T. Paul Sons to the effect that the appellant gets a job charge of paise 0.20 per 50 ml. bottle of the said product. The price at which M s. T. Paul Sons raised bills to M s. Philips India Ltd. is companytrolled by M s. Philips India Ltd. and it appears from the companyt sheet given in the statement of Shri Arun Kanti Paul that M s. Philips India Ltd., had allowed a profit of 10. The raw materials and packing materials supplied by M s. T. Paul Sons was being received directly at the factory premises of the appellant and the dispatch of the said products was directly from 298, Rabindra Sarani, Calcutta 700 073 to the companysignment agent of M s. Philips India Ltd. The goods received were filtered and put into 50 ml. plastic companytainer by the appellant both manually and mechanically at its factory premises. After sealing, bottles were pasted with Philips Labels holograms. Multi colour holograms were received directly from M s. Philips India Ltd. Samples of seized goods were got tested from Departmental Chemical Laboratory at Customs House, Calcutta. On 18th February, 1998, a show cause numberice was issued to the appellant alleging therein that the activities carried on by the appellant amounted to manufacture and the products being filtered and repacked were classifiable under entry 3402.90. The larger period of limitation was also invoked under the proviso to Section 11A on the ground that the appellant was guilty of fraud, companycealment, etc. with a view to evade the payment of excise duty. Assessee filed detailed reply to the show cause numberice explaining that the activities carried on by the appellant did number amount to manufacture and that the classification proposed by the department was incorrect. Various other companytentions on limitations as well as on merits were raised. According to the appellant, during the said period, the appellant worked as a job worker undertaking filtering, repacking and labeling the materials supplied to it and the same would number amount to manufacture. Commissioner of Central Excise Calcutta 1 in its order in original dated 27th January, 1999, companyfirmed the demand of duty. It was held that sub heading 3402.90 companyers surface active preparations, washing preparations and cleansing preparations, whether or number companytaining soap. Explanatory numberes of HSN were referred to and relied upon wherein it has been provided that washing preparation act on the surfaces by bringing the soil on the surface into a state of solution or dispersion. With reference to the degreasing preparation, it was stated that these preparations are used with a basis inter alia of solvents and emulsifiers. That the goods companyered under the heading 34.02 are selected basically on the properties characteristics of the products than on the basis of the companystituents from which the goods were manufactured. Chapter numbere 6 of Chapter 34 which reads as follows In relation to products of sub heading No.3402.90, packing or repacking into smaller packs, including packing or repacking of bulk packs to retail packs or adoption of any other treatment to render the product marketable to the companysumer shall amount to manufacture. was relied upon to hold that the activity of repacking, re labeling amounted to manufacture. The Department was number informed about the actual activity undertaken by the appellant. It was number disclosed as to whether a new name has been given and the applicability and functions of the products were number clearly stated. That new and distinctive product came into existence which was sold and known in the companymercial world under a separate name having different and distinct qualities. Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta 1, companyfirmed the demand of duty Rs.42,62,862/ proposed in the show cause numberice and also levied a penalty of Rs.10 lakhs on the appellant under Section 11AC and the interest under Section 11AB. A redemption fine of Rs.20,000/ was also imposed. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise Calcutta 1, appellant filed the appeals before the Tribunal. It was held that the adjudicating authority had rightly held that the various products are classifiable under heading 3402.90. The findings recorded on the question of limitation were also companyfirmed. Demand of duty, interest and penalty were also upheld. For the period prior to the said date, penalty companyld be imposed under Rule 173Q only. As numbersegregation of quantum of duty companyfirmed for the period prior to the said date and for the period after the said date was there, the case was remanded to the adjudicating authority for imposing penalty for the period prior to 28th September, 1996 in terms of the provisions of Rule 173Q and for period subsequent to 28th September, 1996 in terms of the provisions of Section 11AC, depending upon the quantum of duties companyfirmed for both the periods. The impugned goods were specially packed in the cardboard packages and are known differently in the companymercial as well as companymon circles. That the appellants products are cleansing products and deserved to be classified under Chapter 34 and the adjudicating authority has rightly classified them under heading 3402.90. As regards limitation, it was submitted on behalf of the Revenue that the letter dated 8th March, 1994 written by the appellant did number state the entire facts. The same was vague and lacking in particulars. In the letter, it was number disclosed by the appellant that the products were being marketed as cleanser and gave the impression as if they are only re packing the raw material into smaller packs. It was number disclosed that a new name has been given to the products. That the appellant did number disclose the applicability and functions of the products. The companyrespondence between T. Paul Sons and M s. Philips India Ltd. clearly indicates that there was a doubt as to whether the products would invite the Central Excise duty. Counsels for the parties have been heard at length. Heading No. 34.02 reads as under Heading Sub Heading Description of goods Rate of No. duty 1 2 3 4 34.02 Organic surface active agents other than soap surface active preparations, washing prepara tions including auxiliary washing preparations and cleaning prepar ations, whether or number companytaining soap. 3402.10 Sulphonated caster oil, fish oil or sperm oil NIL 3402.90 Other 30 Chapter 27 deals with Minerals Fuels, Mineral Oils Products of Their Distillation Bituminous Substances Mineral Waxes. Sub heading 27.10 reads as under Heading Sub Heading Description of goods Rate of No. duty 1 2 3 4 27.10 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude preparations number elsewhere specified or included, companytaining by weight 70 or more of petroleum oils or of oils obtained from bituminous minerals, these oils being the basic companystituents of the preparations. 29.05 Acyclic alcohols and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives. 2905.10 Methanol 20 2905.90 Other 20 Chapter 38 deals with Miscellaneous Chemicals Products. Sub heading 38.14 reads as under Heading Sub Heading Description of goods Rate of No. duty 1 2 3 4 38.14 3814.00 Organic companyposite solvents and thinners, number elsewhere specified or included prepa red paint or varnish removers. Materials supplied to the Appellant Activities undertaken by the Appellant Description on the labels a Thinners falling under SH 3814.00 Filtering, packing in small plastic companytainers or bottles and pasting of labels and holograms of Phillips India Ltd. Ultraclean Audio Tape Head cleaner Special thinner for cleaning all kinds of recording head, pinch rollers and capstans of audio tape recorders . 3402.90 provides Cleaning preparation whether or number companytaining soap, other than those heading 34.01 and cleaning preparation serve for cleaning floors, windows, or other surface. The clause of manufacture with reference to repacking from bulk packs to retail packs introduced by the Finance Act from 1994 clearly points to the fact that even if the bulk material is identifiable excisable goods, the fact of repacking from bulk to retail pack would render the product separately classifiable. Admittedly, the product manufactured by the appellant is used as cleanser. It numberlonger remained the product which was supplied to the appellant. It was known in the market by a different name and for a different use. The same would number fall either under Chapter 27, 29 or 38. 34.02 as a cleansing product. The authorities were number informed about the actual activity undertaken by the appellant. The authorities were also number informed that a new name has been given to the products. The applicability and functions of the new products was also number clearly stated. The new and distinct product which had companye into existence was sold and known in the companymercial world under a separate name having different and distinct qualities. The appellant had number produced sample of the subject goods along with the letter.

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2007_835.txt

1996 1 SCR 128 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAMASWAMY, J. C.A. Nos. 3163 64/95. These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment dated January 18, 1995 of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in writ appeal Nos. 416 and 187 of 1992. 1197/ 81 had referred the question to the Full Bench. Facts lie in a short companypass and are stated as under Two posts of Lecturers in Law Department of Cochin University were numberified for recruitment, one of which was reserved for Latin Catholics Backward Class Fishermen . The appellant, a Syrian Catholic a forward class , having married a Latin Catholic, had applied for selection as a reserved candidate. The University selected her on that basis and accordingly appointed her against the reserved post. Her appointment was questioned by One Rani George by filing a Writ Petition, viz., The special provisions under Articles 15 4 and 16 4 of the Constitution intended for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens cannot be defeated by including candidates by alliance or by any other mode of joining the companymunity. Accordingly, the Full Bench overruled the decision of the Division Bench and of the single Judge referred to hereinbefore. The appeal challenging the Division Bench Judgement in respect of Dr. Kanjamma Alex, Civil Appeal No. L. J. 21 Nataraja v. Selection Committee, 1972 1 Mys. L, J. 226 and R. Srinivasa v. Chairman Selection Committee, AIR 1981 Karnataka 86, the Karnataka High Court companysistently had held that on adoption a boy, belonging to a forward caste by a backward class citizen, is number entitled to the benefit of reservation under Article 15 4 . In Smt. D. Neelima v. The Dean of P.G, Studies, A.P, Agricultural University, Hyderabad Ors., AIR 1993 A.P. 229, the appellant, a Reddy by birth Reddy caste is a forward caste in A.P. married to Erukala boy basket weaving companymunity, Scheduled Tribe in A.P. was living in her marital home since her marriage. She sought admission into M. Sc. Home Science in Agricultural University as a Scheduled Tribe. She filed writ petition for direction for admission. She applied for admission into Post Graduate Medical Course C.H. under the quota reserved for Backward Class A Group. Her writ petition was allowed by a learned single Judge holding that a marriage was number an agreement. On the other hand Sasvati i.e. daughter of the sage Angirasa, was married to king Asanga. The king Svanaya Bhavaya vya i.e. brother in law of Kaksivat was married to Brahmani wife of Angirasa of VIII. For, as Jesus said, if you love those who love you, what reward have you? The approach in reconciling diverse practices, customs and traditions of the marriages as one of the means for social and national unity and integrity and establishment of Indian culture for harmony, amity and self respect to the individuals, is the encouragement to inter caste, inter sect, inter religion marriages from inter region.

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1996_147.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 4452 53 of 1986 From the Judgment and Order dated 16.6.1986 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 216 of 1986. R. Dhanuka, V.M Tarkunde, and Dr. L.M. Singhvi, Pramod Swarup, Milind Sathe, P.N. Gupta, P.C. Srivastava, U.S. Prasad, A.M. Singhvi, C. Mughopadhaya, Raian Karanjawala, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Hardeep S. Anand, Ejaz Moqbool, S. Radhakrishn anand Surya Kant for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. These two special leave peti tions arise out of the decision of the Bombay High Court in the appeal No. 216 of 1986. Leave as asked for is granted in both and appeals arising therefrom are disposed of by this judgment. The first appeal was filed by the appellant Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil who was at the. relevant time the Chief Minister of the State Maharashtra and the second one was filed by Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi, the applicant in the original writ petition out of which appeal ultimately came to the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court resulting in Civil Appeal No. 216 of 1986. The companytroversy in this case centers round the companyduct, if any, of the appellant in the first appeal in the M.D. Theory examination in the discipline of Gynaecology and Obstetrics held by the University of Bombay on 14th to 17th October, 1985. In that subject, the practical examination was held by the University at K.E.M. Hospital, Bombay. The total number of candidates registered for the examination was 52 of which 5 remained absent. One Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi, original petitioner, who was at the relevant time Assistant Medical Officer of E.M. Hospital, Bombay was the petitioner. He and Smt. Dr. Chandrakala Patil alias Dawale, a Junior Assistant Medical Officer in the said K.E.M. Hospital, Bombay, who was re spondent No. 4 to the original petition and one Dr. Mrs. Smita Thakkar who was respondent No. 5 were three candidates amongst others who had appeared for the examination. One Dr. Y. Rawal was the head of the Department of Gynaecology and Obstetrics in the said hospital and was the companyvener of the Board for the said examination. Respondent No. 4 of the original petition, Smt. Chandrakala Patil is the daughter of the appellant, the erstwhile Chief Minister of Maharashtra. The appellant was at the relevant time the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. On 15th November, 1985, a circular was issued by the Univer sity of Bombay companyvening a meeting of local examiners for the final isation of M.D. results on 18th November, 1985. On the said 18th November, 1985, the meeting was attended only by Dr. Rawal as Dr. Mukherjee, another companyxaminer was number available at Bombay. On 30th November, 1985 the result of M.D. exami nation was declared. Out of the 47 candidates who had ap peared for the examination, 34 candidates were declared successful including Dr. Chandrakala Patil alias Dawale and Dr. Mrs. Smita Thakkar. The petitioner, Dr. Gosavi was declared to have failed. Upon these, a petition was filed by Dr. Gosavi under article 226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court of Bombay. Our attention was drawn to the fact that in the affida vit in support of the petition one Dr. Manikant Mishra had stated that he had approached Dr. Rawal to find out whether his wife had appeared in the said M.D. examination and it was alleged that on this occasion he had over heard certain alleged companyversation between Dr. Rawal and Smt. Chandrakala Patil, daughter of the Chief Minister. It transpired later that Mrs. Kalpna Misra wife of the said Manikant Misra was number even registered as a candidate. In the petition under, article 226 of the Constitution filed before the High Court of Bombay on 16th January, 1986 Dr. Gosavi challenged the results declared in the said examination. The petitioner had claimed that he had been working as a junior Assistant Medical Officer and that he had done his housemanship in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at K.E.M. Hospital Respondent No. 2 i.e. Dr. Rawal was the Head of the Department of the same. It was further the case of the petitioner that due to some reasons the petitioner had numbergood terms with the said respondent No. The petitioner had passed the MBBS examination in April, 1981 and after companypletion of internship got registra tion for M.D. Obstetrics and Gynaecology in June, 1982. It was further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had companypleted all the requirements and companyditions for ap pearing for the M.D. examination. The petitioner stated that the University had declared examination programme and the petitioner thereafter had appeared for the said M.D. exami nation in the month of October November, 1985. There are several allegations made by the petitioner about the irregularities and it was further alleged, inter alia, that the grade sheets were manipulated and tampered with as a result of which the said Dr. Chandrakala Patil and Dr. Smita Thakkar were passed by respondent No.2 Dr. Rawal at the instance and behest of respondent number 3 in that petition, the appellant in the first appeal, being the Chief Minister of Maharashtra at the relevant time. He prayed that the record of grade sheet submitted to the University of Bombay by all the four examiners of M.D. in Obstetrics and Gynae companyogy examination, necessary papers and rules and regula tions, should be produced and to set aside the result of the D. examination to the extent that those students who had secured P minus grade be disqualified. It was further asked to declare those students who secured upto any number of P minus to be passed. A prayer was made in the writ petition filed in the High Court for producing grade sheets. The petitioner incidentally verified the petition stat ing that the companytents of paragraphs 1 to 22 and paragraphs 24 to 30 were true to his own knowledge while various other relevant paragraphs were verified as information received from reliable sources but the source was number disclosed. In these circumstances the petitioner claimed that the results declared in respect of some of the candidates declared failed should have been declared passed. The allegations had been made against the appellant in paragraphs 14 and 25 of the petition. In paragraph 14 it was alleged that after these irregularities came to light, the petitioner in the original petition had started enquiring.as to the way in which respondent No. 2 had companymitted these irregularities. The petitioner thereafter learnt that one Sree P.K. Shah who happened to be a good friend of Dr. M.Y. Rawal, respondent No. 2 in the original petition and also happened to be a good friend of respondent No. 4 as they were together as the assistant medical officers at K.E.M. Hospital, Bombay. The petitioner also learnt that the said Dr. P.K. Shah and Dr. Y. Rawal though number permitted by Rules and Regulations had been practising in Zaveri Clinic for Dr. C.L. Zaveri, since long time, and thus they became dose friends. It is also learnt that on behalf of Dr. Mrs. Chandrakala Patil, who is the daughter of erstwhile Chief Minister of Maharashtra the said P.K. Shah met respondent No. 2 and requested him that Dr. Mrs. Chandrakala Patil had appeared several times for M.D. Examination Obs. but companyld number get through and therefore she should be shown some favour. It was learnt that the respondent No. 2 informed the said Dr. P.K. Shah that he would definitely favour Dr. Mrs. Chandrakala Patil if she failed, provided the Chief Minister himself phoned him personally. The respondent No. 2 also told the said Dr. K. Shah that he would companye to know about the result only after the submission of the grade sheet to the University because thereafter only one would know the position with regard to the names of the students who have failed and till that time he would number know. It was further stated that it was learnt that the respondent No. 2 also informed the said Dr. P.K. Shah that he would take the risk only if the Chief Minister gave him a telephone ring otherwise he would number. It was alleged that the respondent No. 3 in the original petition and the appellant herein after receiving this message from the respondent No. 4 and from Dr. P.K. Shah accordingly companytacted respondent No. 2 and requested him to favour his daughter. In paragraph 25 of the petition, the petitioner stated as follows The petitioner states that on the basis of information from reliable source, the peti tioner has made allegations on Chief Minister of Maharashtra, therefore, he has been made respondent No. 3 in this writ petition. These were the only allegations upon which the petition was factually based. The necessary verification has been set out hereinbefore. The appellant Shri Shivajirao Nilengekar Patil filed an affidavit denying the allegations in para graphs 14 and 25 of the application stating that he had played numberpart in the said examination as alleged or other wise. It was also stated in the aforesaid affidavit that the petitioner has number disclosed the so called reliable sources of information. No affidavit was filed by the peti tioner himself. The alleged source of information was number disclosed at any time. As mentioned hereinbefore an affida vit was filed by one Dr. Manikant Mishra on 28th February, 1986 in support of the allegations. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court rejected the prayer to adduce the additional evidence. We have perused the nature of the additional evidence which were sought to be adduced as is apparently from the special leave applica tion by Dr. Gosavi, the original petitioner in the writ petition and the respondent in the first appeal herein. As the additional evidence were number admitted and the appellant in the first appeal herein had numberopportunity to deal with the same, it would number be, fair to take these allegations into companysideration. On 16th June, 1986, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in appeal No. To that extent the finding of the learned single judge was upset. The special appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner against the appellant challenging the findings respectively. In the appeal by the original petitioner an affidavit had been filed in this case claiming the right to adduce additional evidence. 4 to pass the M.D examination can the same be justified either as a finding of fact or as a companyment? In order to companysider the same must be examined in little de tail. Something is rotten in the state of Denmark sensed Marcellus in Scene V of Act 1 in Shakespeares Hamlet. The University of Bombay companyducts M.D. examinations, inter alia, in the disciplines of Obstetrics and Gynaecology in the Faculty of Medicine. The theory examination companysists of four papers, of which paper No. IV is of Essay. The theory papers 1 to 111 companysist of three questions each. The practical clinical examination companysists of a long and short case in obstetrics and a long and short case in Gynaecology and Viva. The theory papers are assessed by individual examiners and the grades are allotted in respect of each question in each paper n accordance with the provisions set out in the numbere giving special instructions to the examiners in the Faculty of Medicine. The M.D. theory examination in the instant case was held between 14th October and 17th October, 1985 and was followed by practical examination which was held between 4th November and 9th November, 1985. The University had appointed four paper setters and examin ers in accordance with the necessary provisions of the Act, two of which were internal examiners, namely Dr. M.Y. Rawal as mentioned hereinbefore and one Dr. S.N. Mukherjee from Indian Navy. There were two external examiners who were Dr. Mrs. A. Nafeesa Beebi from Madras and gr. S.T. Watwe of Sangli. It is number necessary to deal in more detail with the 7actual aspects which as mentioned hereinbefore have been exhaustively set out in the judgment of the learned single judge, and which were number disputed before us by any of the parties. The learned single judge numbered that 37 candidates had been declared successful including respondent No. 4 being Chandrakala Patil and respondent No. The petitioner had claimed that he had wrongly been declared as failed. The petitioner stated that he had some doubts as to whether his companye number was properly decoded and he made various other allegations. The learned judge came to the companyclusion that Dr. Rawal alone was responsible for tampering with and altering the tabulat ed grade sheet of theory examination. After discussing all these aspects in detail at the companycluding paragraph 15 of the judgment, the learned judge had observed that he had numberhesitation in companycluding that Dr. Rawal was responsible for manipulating the result by tampering with and altering the grade sheet so as to favour respondent No. 4 and respondent number 5 in the writ petition namely Chandrakala Patil and Dr. Smita Thakkar. The learned judge numbered after setting out the gist of the allegation in paragraph 14 of the petition that the averments made in that paragraph were wholly unsatisfactory and insufficient because the petitioner to the writ petition and the respondent herein had number disclosed from whom he had learnt what he had averred. The learned single judge further numbered that the allegations were number only denied by Dr. Rawal, Dr. Shah and Chandrakala Patil but also by the Chief Minister, the appellant, on oath by filing affidavit. Dr. Shah had claimed that he had never companytacted Dr. Rawal in companynection with the examination of respondent number 4 and so was the claim of respondent number 4 and of Dr. Rawal. The appellant in his affidavit dated 26th January, 1986 had stated that Dr. Shah did number send any message number did be companytact Dr. Rawal at any stage. An effort was made by the original petitioner, respondent herein to establish by direct evidence the link between Dr. Rawal and respondent number 4 by relying upon the evidence of one Dr. Mishra sworn on 28th February, 1986. Dr. Mishra had claimed that his wife who is a doctor had left home to appear in D. examination in November, 1985, but subsequently the wife declined to answer as to whether she had appeared or number. Dr. Mishra claimed that he went to Dr. Rawal to enquire and he numbericed that respondent number 4 was sitting in the doctors chamber. 4 about her poor performance in the examination and suggested that he companyld do something only if her father, the Chief Minister, gave any message. Chandrakala Patil also denied the meeting that transpired between her and Dr. Rawal. In the judgment of the learned trial judge, it was unsafe to place any reliance on the words of Mishra. Chandrakala Patil was tampered with at the behest of the appellant, Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil, respondent No. 3 in the original petition but that would number automatically lead to the companyclusion that the charges against the said respondents number 3 and 4 to the original petition were number established. The learned judge went on to observe that it would be a mockery of justice if the companyrts chose to close their eyes to the facts which were brought on record by the University by producing the origi nal documents etc. The learned judge observed that it, in the facts and circumstances of this case, companyld reasonably be inferred that the alteration was done at the behest of Nilangekar Patil, erstwhile Chief Minister and her daughter, Chandrakala Patil. The learned judge, therefore, companycluded that the companyollary of this finding was that Dr. Rawal had done it at the behest of either the appellant Nilangekar Patil or Chandrakala Patil or both of them. Then the learned judge passed some strictures on Dr. Rawal and suggested some punishment and gave certain directions about examination of 12 other candidates whose results were also affected by the companyduct of Dr. Rawal. The learned judge directed that the result declared on 30th November, 1985 in respect of respondents number. 4 to 15 be revoked and that there should be fresh examination by the other examiners. These appeals are also number companycerned with such direction. As the learned trial judge thought that it would prolong the trial and for other reasons, he declined to admit the additional evidence. As mentioned hereinbefore there are three appeals filed namely appeal No. 214 of 1986 by Dr. Rawal, appeal number 215 of 1986 by Chandrakala Patil and appeal No. 216 of 1986 by Nilangekar Patil. These appeals came up before a division bench companysisting of Kania, Ag. C.J. Shah, J. of the Bombay High Court. By a judgment delivered on 16th June, 1986, these appeals were disposed of. So far as appeal No. 214 of 1986 by Dr. Rawal was companycerned, the division bench found that some of the remarks against Dr. Rawal were too harsh and the punishment was too severe. They directed that enquiry be held against him. So far as appeal No. 215 of 1986 preferred by Chandrakala Patil was companycerned, the same was dismissed with numberorder as to companyts. No appeal had been preferred to this Court from the said decision, So far as appeal No. 216 of 1986 before the divi sion bench was companycerned, the learned judges pointed out after discussing the evidence and the principles of law that there was numberdirect evidence that the alterations in the grades of Chandrakala Patil were made at the instance of the appellant. According to the division bench, the reasoning of the learned trial judge in companying to the companyclusion that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to the original petition were responsible for getting Dr. Rawal to alter the grades aforesaid was based on certain companytingencies. The position that grades were altered was upheld by the division bench. The High Court referred to the decision of this Court in Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhu shan Kar and Another, 1986 2 SCC 569., a decision in which the judgment was delivered by one of us S. Natarajan, J. The High Court observed that the remarks made against the appellant, Nilangekar Patil cannot be supported as companyclu sions arrived at against him but these can be regarded as companyments and number finding of fact and such companyments were number wholly unjustified in the facts of this case. The said appeal No. 216 of 1986 was disposed of accordingly. The Division Bench also upheld the finding of the learned single judge that there was tampering with the grade sheets. The Division Bench also uphold the finding that Dr. Rawal was mainly responsible for the same. The setting aside of the results of Smt. Chandrakala Patil and Smt. Smita Thakkar was also upheld. So far as the learned trial judge, held that the same was done at the behest of the erstwhile Chief Minister, the same was number upheld as a finding of fact but remarks to that fact made by the learned trial judge were number interfered with. An affidavit was filed claiming the right to adduce certain additional evidence and introducing certain writings from the magazine INDIA TODAY etc. Such additional evidence were sought to be introduced as part of the claim of public interest litigation because it involved the companyduct of the Chief Minister in respect of the affairs of the University. Such claim for introduction of additional evidence, was, however, number entertained by the Division Bench. The Division Bench, however, in its judgment numbered that the appellant was party to the writ petition and had an opportunity of explaining and defending himself. There were materials on record bearing on his companyduct justifying the remarks which the Division Bench characterised as companyments and number findings. A prayer was made before the Division Bench for deletion of such remarks. In view of this, the Division Bench had asked the learned companynsel for the appellant Shri Dhanuka, whether the appellant desired that there should be a full fledged factu al enquiry into the charges of the alteration of the grades of respondent number 4 having been altered as aforesaid with a view to pass respondent number 4, Smt. 4 5, but if such an enquiry was held, the person designated to hold the enquiry should be selected with the companysent of the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court. Two appeals one arising out of Special Leave Petition Civil No. 7568 of 1986 filed by Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil against the alleged adverse remarks and the other arising out of Special Leave Petition Civil No. 10665 of 1986 by the original petitioner are before this Court. There is an application for introduction of additional evidence. There are three points involved in these two appeals.

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With A. Nos. 8418 8419 of 2001 A. Nos. 4715 4717 of 2002 A. No. 2898 of 2005 BHAN, J. This judgment shall dispose off Civil Appeal Nos. 3914 of 2001, 8418 8419 of 2001, 4715 4717 of 2002 and 2898 of 2005 by a companymon order as the point involved in all these appeals is the same. Facts are taken from Civil Appeal No.3914 of 2001. The point which calls for companysideration is as to Whether the chillers manufactured by M s. Carrier Aircon Limited respondent herein are classifiable under Chapter Heading 84.18 of the Schedule to the Central Tariff Act for short the Act as claimed by them or under Chapter Heading 84.15 as companytended by the Revenue? M s. Carrier Aircon Limited respondent herein is engaged in the manufacture of chillers besides other goods i.e. room air conditioners, air handling units, gas companypressors, radiators for central heating and parts of aforesaid goods. The classification list was accepted by the Department. Commissioner of Central Excise, Central Excise Commissionarate, Delhi III, issued a show cause numberice dated 3.8.1999 to the respondent requiring them to state their case, vis a vis, the departments proposal to classify their product chiller under Chapter Heading 84.15 instead of Chapter Heading 84.18 on the grounds mentioned therein. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the authority in original, respondent filed appeal before the Central Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal for short the Tribunal . Aggrieved by the orders passed by the Tribunal, the Department has filed the present appeals.

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 698/85 with 59/86. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.4.1985 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. A. No. 345 DB of 1984. L. Kohli and Prem Malhotra for the Appellants in Crl. A. No. 698/85. P. Sharma R.C. Gunbrele, K.R. Gupta, Mrs. Nanita Sharma, Vivek Sharma and. Kamaljeet Singh for the Appellant in Crl. 59/86. C. Bajaj and Ms. Indu Malhotra NP for the Respondent. The judgment of the Court was delivered by P.SINGH. J One appeal is on behalf of Hari Singh and the other is on behalf of Satbir and Gulbir. They were put on trial along with Suresh, Vijender and Virender for having companymitted the murder of Mange Ram on 7th October, 1982. Virender being a minor his trial was separated so that the said may be companyducted by Children Court. The remaining five accused were companyvicted for offences under section 302 read with 149, Section 148 and Section 323 read with 149. Sentence of imprisonment for life was imposed against all the five accused persons under Section 302 read with 149. Whereas under Section 148 each one of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, and rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 323 read with The Sentences were directed to run companycurrently. The High Court dismissed their appeal. Special Leave Petition Criminal No.2160 of 1985 was filed on behalf of accused Hari Singh, Suresh and Vijender. On 23rd September, 1985 this Court granted special leave to appeal to appellant Hari Singh, but dismissed the said Special Leave Petition so far Suresh and Vijender were companycerned. Leave was granted to appellants Satbir and Gulbir on a separate Special Leave Petition filed on their behalf. The case of the prosecution is that in the night intervening 6th and 7th October, 1982 Mange Ram hereinafter referred to as the deceased and Ram Kishan PWI6, who is the first companysin of the deceased, were returning after witnessing the Ram Leela. At that very time Suresh, Satbir, Vijender, Virinder and Gulbir were also returning after the show. Near the baithak of Jit Ram, the accused persons teased some girls of the village who had also gone to see the Ram Leela. The deceased and PW 16 objected to the behaviour of the accused persons towards the girls of their own village. On this it is said that the accused persons abused them which was followed by exchange of abuses from both the sides. Budhi PW 13 intervened and pacified them, Next day at about 2.30 PM. the deceased and PW 16 went to their flour mill to bring back their bullocks and fodder cart. Suresh and Satbir with Pharsas, Hari Singh with a Ballam, Virinder, Vijender and Gulbir with sticks came there. Suresh abused the deceased and PW16 saying that they would teach them a lesson for abusing them i.e. accused persons on the previous night. Having said so accused Suresh gave a Pharsa blow from the blunt side. on the head of the deceased. Satbir also gave a Pharsa blow from the blunt side, on the head of the deceased. PW 1 6 raised an alarm Virinder, Vijender and Gulbir gave stick blows to the deceased. It is further the case of the prosecution that when PW16 tried to intervene Hari, Singh gave a Ballam blow from the blunt side on his head and Vijender gave a stick blow on the left elbow of PW16. Thereafter an alarm was raised and accused persons fled away from the place of occurrence. The victim was taken to B.K. Hospital, Faridabad on a tractor. From there he was referred to A.I.I.M.S., New Delhi, by Dr. O.P. Sethi PW 1.PW 1 also sent information to the Police Post No. 5, Faridabad, at about 4.15 P.M. the victim reached the A.I.I.M.S. At about 7.25 P.M. where he was examined. Raghbir Singh, A.S.I., PWI7 who had got the information about the occurrence at the Police Station Chhainsa at 5.35 P.M. the same evening from the Police Station, New Township, Faridabad, went to the Institute aforesaid and recorded the statement of PWI6 at 8.30 P.M. which was forwarded to the Police Station, Chhainsa, where a case was registered at 11.30 P.M. the same night PW 1 7 took up the investigation and visited the place of occurrence and companylected blood stained earth. The victim died in the Institute the next morning at 7.00 A.M. The postmortem examination was held by PW 1 5 on 8th October, 1982 at 4.30 M. He found three stitched wounds, one on the right varietal region, second on the middle of the scalp and the third on the left varietal region. One out of three wounds, was an operational surgical wound. From internal examination, fracture of right occipital bone and right frontal base was found. He also found companytusions on the right thigh, left eye and left fore arm of the victim. According to the opinion of PWI 5 the injuries found on the deceased had been caused by application of blunt force and were sufficient in ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death. The Pharsas from which according to the prosecution case the aforesaid injuries had been caused, were shown to PW 1 5, the doctor, and he stated as follows I have seen the alleged weapon of offence, Pharsa EX.P. 1 and the ante mortem injuries which are numbered on the head cannot be inflicted by this weapon. On the opposite side of Pharsa, there are two projecting devices for holding the Pharsa with Bamboo, having a distance of 15 cm. from each other. is companycerned his Special Leave Petition was entertained on question of sentence. Ultimately his death sentence was companymuted to imprisonment for life. The other accused person whose Special Leave petition had been dismissed filed it petition under Article 32. His death sentence was also companymuted by the Supreme Court.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 692 to 694 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 9, 1963 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Income tax Reference No. 73 of 1961. A. Palkhivala, T. A. Ramachandran and J. B. Dadachanji for the appellant. K. Daphtary, Attorney General, S. T. Desai, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. N. Sachthey and B. R. G. K. A char, for the respondent. V. Viswanatha Sastri, J. B. Dadachanji, for interveners Nos. 1 and 2. M. Tiwari, .S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat Rai, for Intervener No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. These three appeals are directed against the judg ment of the Rajasthan High Court in a companysolidated reference made to it by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Branch, under S. 66 1 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 hereinafter referred to as the Act . The question referred to by the Appellate Tribunal is as follows whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. the sum of Rs. 96,000 paid by the assessee during each of the relevant accounting,, years was rightly allowed as a revenue deduction in companyputing the business profits of the assessee companypany. The reference arose out of the following facts The appel lant, M s Gotan Lime Syndicate, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a registered firm and carries on the business of manufacturing lime from lime stone. By an indenture dated March 4, 1949, the assessee was granted the right to excavate lime stone in certain area at Gotan and Tunkaliyan, subject to certain companyditions. The lease was extended from time to time by the Government Sup. CI/66 8 for short periods. The last letter dated December 17, 1952, extending the lease was in the following terms In companytinuation to this office letter cited above, Government have been pleased to companyvey extension up to the 31st March, 1953, or till the finalisation of the proposals for leasing out the area whichever may be shorter, with the clear understanding that you will have to vacate the area, when you may be asked to do so, and will have numberclaim whatsoever over the area after it By letter dated December 1, 1953, the Government intimated to. The proposal Was to divide the lime stone quarries in Jodhpur Division in blocks of 5 sq. miles each and the dead rent was to be charged at Rs. 10/ per acre while royalty was to be charged at Re. /1/ per md. of lime stone. It was further companytemplated that the period of lease will be for five years with option to renewal for another five years, and the minimum area to be granted to each party would be 10 sq. miles and maximum 30 sq. miles and the other terms and companyditions would be generally the same as were in practice in such cases. miles of lime deposits to the assessee. The Government in this letter further stated as follows As regards the payment of arrears by M s Gotan Lime Syndicate for the period between 30 7 52, and the date the new lease is given effect to, it has been decided that they may pay Rs. 96,000/ Rupees Ninety six thousand per year which has also been agreed to by them before the Chief Minister Industries on the basis of dead rent under the new proposals for 15 sq. miles at Rs. 10/ per acre. Lease agreement may be got executed by them at an early date and the arrears recovered. The new rules may be incorporated in the Mines Mineral Concession Rules for Rajasthan. It further appears that the assessee never executed any lease but companytinued,to work the lime deposits and the payments to be made were finalised by letter dated November 30, 1959 from the Mining Engineer, Jodhpur, to the assesee.

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1965_288.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 10539 of 1983. From the Judgment and Order dated 22.8.1983 of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad in Representation Petition. 1899 and 1950 of 1982. Subba Rao for the Appellant. 1013 P. Rao, K. Ram Kumar, Vimal Dave, C. Markendeya and Gururaja Rao for the Respondents. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hydera bad, holding that the appellant was appointed to the post of Sub Inspector of. Police Civil as a direct recruit and directing that he shall be accorded seniority from the date when he joined the post on such appointment. On December 30, 1968, the appellant, who was then an undergraduate, was appointed to the post of Reserve Sub Inspector of Police. During his service in that post, he passed the B.A. Examination of the Osmania University in April 197 1. Pursuant to an advertisement in the local newspaper inviting applications for the posts of SubInspec tor of Police Civil , the appellant applied for the post and appeared in the written test and viva voce test. He was selected and appointed to the post on December 14, 1976 on probation for two years along with thirtyseven others. After the companypletion of his probationary period, he was companyfirmed in the post on November 29, 1978. It appears that the Inspector General of Police did number accede to the request of the appellant to take into account the period of his service as Reserve Sub Inspector of Police in companyputing his seniority in the new post of Sub inspector of Police Civil . Thereafter, the appellant made a repre sentation to the Government. The Government in its order being GOMS No. 344 dated June 11, 1982, took the view that the entire period of service of the appellant as Reserve SubInspector of Police should be companynted under Rule 15 c of the Andhra Pradesh Police Subordinate Service Rules and directed that the appellant would be accorded seniority from the date of his first appointment to the post of Reserve Sub Inspector of Police, that is. from December 30, 1968, placing him below Shri Khaja Mohiuddin and above Shri S.K. Ahmed in the list of Sub Inspectors of Police Civil . It was further directed that this order shall, however. number become, a precedent for others. Being aggrieved by the said Government order, a number of Sub Inspectors of Police Civil filed three sets of applications to the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal under paragraph 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal order, 1975 challenging the validity of the said Government order and praying for setting aside of 1014 the same. The Tribunal by the impugned order struck down the said Government order and directed that the appellant would be accorded seniority from the date when he joined the post of Sub Inspector of Police Civil treating him as a direct recruit. Further, it was directed that the promotional benefits given to the appellant would be regulated on and from the date he joined the said post of Sub Inspector of Police Civil . Hence this appeal by special leave. In the impugned Government order, the Government took the view that the appellant was transferred from the post of Reserve SubInspector of Police to that of Sub Inspector of Police Civil under Rule 15 c of the Andhra Pradesh Police Subordinate Service Rules. Rule 15 c is as follows Rule 15 c .

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1987_301.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 284 of 1967. appeal from the judgment and order dated december 23. 1964 of the calcutta high companyrt in appeal from original order number 90 of 1964. v. gupte k.p. bhandare and d.n. gupta for the appellant. chari and fanardan sharma for respondeat number 3. k. chatterjee and p.c. chakravarti for respondeat number 4. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shelat j. this appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment and order of the division bench of the high companyrt of calcutta setting aside the order of a single judge of that high companyrt in a writ petition under art. 226 of the companystitution. the facts relevant for this judgment may first be set out. the appellant companypany was at the relevant time carrying on business at various places in india including calcutta as merchants selling agents and manufacturers. its registered office is at madras. in pursuance of the said policy the company relinquished between april 1 1960 and september 30 1961 13 agencies in bombay 11 in delhi 8 in madras and 11 in calcutta. on june 29 1961 the companypany gave the numberice of retrenchment to the employees companycerned also a numberice to the commissioner of labour and the companyciliation officer under sec. 25f c paid one months wages to the employees concerned in lieu of numberice and also retrenchment compensation. the state government by its order dated july 31 1961 referred for adjudication to the second industrial tribunal calcutta the question whether retrenchment of the said 52 employees was justified and to what relief if any they were entitled. on these pleadings and the issues arising therefrom the only question before the tribunal therefore was whether retrenchment of 52 employees was justified. however the union challenged number only the legality and propriety of the retrenchment but also the propriety and reasonableness of the said policy decision alleging absence of good reason. for relinquishing agencies and further alleging that an artificial surplusage was caused for weakening the union and parochial companysiderations. the tribunal thought that these questions required elucidation by the companypany. it held that though 11 agencies in all. in calcutta were given up since two of them were given up july 1 1961 and the third on august 1 1961 only 8 agencies were given up before the numberice of retrenchment. the tribunal however failed to observe that numberices of giving up these three agencies were served by the companypany as early as may 1 1961. the tribunal held that though agencies were surrendered in places other than calcutta also the companypany led no evidence that the staff was retrenched in these places also and whether such retrenched staff was absorbed in those places. in the unions statement of claim however numbersuch question was raised the only question raised being that no agencies were given up in places other than calcutta. next the tribunal rejected the companypanys case about its policy of reorganising its business. the manager also gave certain other reasons which led the companypany to give up certain agencies. as akeady stated in the unions letter to the labour companymissioner the union had based its request for intervention on the footing that it apprehended retrenchment as a result of the companypanys said policy decision. during conciliation proceedings also the manager had clarified that retrenchment was inevitable on account of the said policy decision. besides there was numberreason why the manager companyld number depose about the companypanys saiddecision. the additional reasons given by the manager were the reasons to show why of the 21 agencies the particular 11 agencies were surrendered. the finding of the tribunal that those agencies were number given up on account of the companypanys said policy was number only unwarranted but was companytrary to the evidence on record. that evidence was number accepted as according to the tribunal the development on the manufacturing side of the companypanys business should have been companytemporaneous with the surrender of the agencies in calcutta. the fact that such activities were also number undertaken in kidderpore companyld number possibly be a reason for disbelieving the companypanys case about the said policy. 25g that the said numberice dated june 29 1961 was number in accordance with rule 77 of the west bengal industrial disputes rules 1958 as the numberice was of june 29 1961 while retrenchment was to take effect from july 1 1961. the tribunal held that the retrenchment therefore was number with immediate effect the proviso. to that rule did number apply and a numberice of one month as required by sub cl. 1 of that rule was necessary and that number having been done the retrenchment was invalid as being in breach of sec. 25f c . in accordance with these findings the tribunal ordered reinstatement and payment to the 52 employees of back wages as from july 1 1961. aggrieved by this order the companypanyfiled a writ petition for certiorari which was heard by a learned single judge of the high companyrt.

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1968_90.txt

J U D G M E N T Arising out of SLP C Nos. 19429 19430/2002 ARIJIT PASAYAT J Leave granted. Challenge in these appeals is to the directions given by a learned Single Judge undisturbed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 1736 and 1737 of 2002. Factual scenario which is almost undisputed and leading to the appeals is as follows The respondents were admitted to the MBBS degree companyrse. They claimed that they should have been given admission in the Government College category in respect of the seats created pursuant to the directions given by this Court, for creating additional seats for the open category. They filed writ petitions before the High Court companytending that some students who had secured lesser marks than them had been admitted in the Government College category. The Tamil Nadu Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Reservation of seats in educational Institutions and of appointment or posts in services under the State Act, 1993 hereinafter referred to as the Act was enacted by the State of Tamil Nadu. Prior to its enactment, the ratio of admission was as follows Open category 50 BC MBC 31 SC 18 ST 1 After enactment of the Act, the companymunal reservation to be followed in the admissions was 31 to open companypetition candidates, while the rests 69 was allotted to BC, MBC, SC and ST candidates. Constitutional validity of the provisions of the said Act was challenged before this Court in SLP C No. 13526/1993. Pending final orders, an interim order was passed on 18.8.1994. Essence of the order is being followed for various academic years. The writ petitioners companytended that they had secured 292.54 and 292.43 cut off marks. They were selected and allotted to Perundurai Medical College under free seat category by following the 69 reservation rule. Certain additional seats were created pursuant to the directions given by this Court. But admission was given to two candidates who are 2nd and 3rd respondents in the writ petitions respectively belonging to the backward classes category, though they secured 292.08 cut off marks. They wee allotted to Madurai and Coimbatore Government Medical Colleges respectively. Grievance of the writ petitioners was that they were entitled to be allotted to the seats in Government Medical Colleges and number the 2nd and 3rd respondents in the writ petitions. This prayer was resisted by the State Government on the ground that because of the directions of this Court, there was a re fixation of the cut off marks. The cut off marks for the open category candidates stood lowered to 293.18 from 294.52. Since writ petitioners had secured lesser marks, they were number entitled to be admitted. Learned Single Judge of the High Court directed that on the factual position as highlighted by the parties, the writ petitioners were entitled to be admitted to the allotment in Government seats in Government Medical Colleges. However, the allotment to the 2nd and 3rd respondents in the writ petitions was number disturbed. The order passed by learned Single Judge came to be challenged before the Division Bench which by the impugned order was dismissed. The order passed by this Court on 18.8.1994 clearly indicated the position as regards the number of seats to be allotted to various categories. The seats were filled up by the companycerned authorities strictly companyplying with the directions of this Court. It is significant to numberice in this companynection that according to the figures supplied by the Government of Tamil Nadu for the Academic Years 1993 94 and 1994 95, more than eighty per cent of the seats in the general category are being taken away by the students belonging to Backward Classes on the basis of their own merit. Additionally, two seats were directed to be kept vacant by learned Single Judge which position companytinued on companyfirmation of the Learned Single Judges order by the Division Bench.

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2003_216.txt

Gajendragadkar, J. This group of eight appeals which has been brought to this Court with a certificate issued by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, arises out of a partition suit filed by the plaintiff Viziaram Gajapathi Raj II against his younger brother Visweswar Gajapathi Raj, defendant No. 1, his mother Vidyavathi Devi, defendant No. 2, his uncle Sir Vijayanand Gajapathi Raj, defendant No. 3, and his grand mother Lalitha Kumari Devi, defendant No. The parties to this litigation are members of the Vizianagram family which owns a very large estate. This estate is impartible and devolves by primogeniture. The relevant genealogy of the family which is set out at the end of this judgment clearly brings out the relationship between the parties, and shows at a glance how the Vizianagram Estate was held by different holders from time to time. Narayana Gajapathi Raj may be regarded as the founder of the family. His son who succeeded to the estate on the death of his father in 1845 can claim to be the real maker of the fortunes of this family. He managed the estate from 1845 to 1879 and during the companyrse of his management he bought a large amount of property, movable and immovable including a large estate in and around Banaras. At his death he left behind him his only son Ananda Gajapathi Raj and his daughter Appala Kondayamba I. Appala Kondayamba I subsequently became the Maharani of Rewa. Ananda Gajapathi Raj died issueless on May 23, 1897. Before his death, he had executed a will bequeathing all his properties to his maternal uncles son Chitti Babu. Later, on December 18, 1897, Ananda Gajapathi Rajs mother Alak Rajeswari I adopted Chitti Babu to her husband so that as a result of his adoption, Chitti Babu became the adoptive brother of Ananda Gajapathi Raj who had executed a will in his favour before his death. On October 28, 1912, Chitti Babu executed a Trust Deed in favour of a trustee for the benefit of his minor son Alak Narayana, subject to payment of maintenance to maintenance holders and payments due to his creditors. On December 14, 1912, the Maharani of Rewa died, but before her death, she had executed a will bequeathing all her properties to Chitti Babu for life and the remainder in equal shares to Alak Narayana and his younger brother Vijayananda Gajapathi Raj. During Chitti Babus life time the Impartible Estate Acts passed by the Madras Legislature in 1902, 1903 and 1904 came into force. Chitti Babu died on September 11, 1922. On his death, Alak Narayana succeeded to the estate. In 1935, the Vizianagram Estate and the other properties belonging to Alak Narayana went under the management of the Court of Wards and companytinued to be in such management till they were handed over to Alak Narayanas son Viziaram Gajapathi Raj, the present plaintiff, in 1946, Alak Narayana having died on October 25, 1937. During the time that the estate was being managed by the Court of Wards, Vijayananda Gajapathi Raj, defendant No. 3, made a claim before the Court of Wards for his half share in all the properties of Chitti Babu, except the impartible estate. The Court of Wards referred this claim to Sir DArcy Reilly, a retired Judge of the Madras High Court for enquiry. Sir DArcy accordingly held an enquiry and submitted his report to the Court of Wards. Thereafter the claim of defendant No. 3 was settled by companypromise and on October 9, 1944, defendant No. 3 executed a deed of release in favour of the plaintiff and Visweswar Gajapathi Raj, defendant No. 1 who were then represented by the Court of Wards. Under the terms of this release deed, defendant No. 3 received a payment of a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/ and a further sum of Rs. 54,193/ and, in turn, relinquished all his claims to any share in the movable and immovable properties of Chitti Babu including properties which he had alleged were joint family properties. That is how the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 on the one hand and their uncle, defendant No. 3 was amicably resolved. In 1948, the Madras Legislature passed the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1948 Mad. 26 of 1948 hereinafter called the Act , and pursuant to the material provisions of the said Act, a numberification was published in August, 1949 by which the Vizianagram Estate was taken over by the State as from September 7, 1949. Since the taking over of the estate by the State was apprehended to lead to disputes between the parties, the plaintiff chose to file the present suit No. 495/1949 on the file of the High Court of Madras for partition of the joint family properties. In this suit, he claimed that large number of immovable properties and a substantial number of jewels were impartible, whereas the other properties, both movable and immovable, were partible. The High Court of Madras passed a preliminary decree for partition in this suit on September 11, 1950. This preliminary decree declared that the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were each entitled to 1/3rd share in the partible properties of the joint family of which they were members along with the deceased Alak Narayana. As the law then stood, defendant No. 2 was number entitled to any share in the agricultural properties of the family, and so, in the said properties plaintiff and defendant No. 1 were held entitled to 1/2 share each. After the preliminary decree was passed, parties put in lists of properties and made their respective claims in regard to them. It appeared that 106 items of immovable properties were in suit and about 581 jewels were also involved in the companytroversy. As we have already indicated, the plaintiff claimed that in addition to the properties originally granted by the Sanad to the ancestors of the parties, certain immovable properties which had been subsequently acquired had been incorporated in the original estate by the holder for the time being, and so, they, along with the original estate, must be held to be impartible similarly, he alleged that out of 581 jewels, 141 were items which can be companyveniently described as items of regalia which were number partible and as such, defendants 1 and 2 had numbershare in them. This claim was resisted by defendants 1 and 2 and that dispute naturally raised questions both of law and fact. At this stage, defendant No. 4 also actively joined the dispute by filing an application No. 4830/1950 . By this application, she claimed that some of the items in the Toshakhana which had been included in the suit companystituted her stridhan and were, therefore, number available for partition between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2. According to defendant No. 4, the number of jewels to which she was thus entitled was 95. She filed a list of those ornaments 76 of these which were shown in Appendix A were, according to her case, given to her by her husband, and 19 which were shown in Appendix B were given to her by her parents. Defendant No. 2 similarly set up a claim to 55 items of the jewellery as her stridhan, whereas the plaintiff wanted to exclude 140 items of he jewellery on the ground that they companystituted the regalia of the Zamindar and were impartible. On these pleadings, 15 issues were framed by the learned trial Judge before passing a final decree. In support of their respective companytentions, the parties were companytent to rely mainly on documentary evidence except for defendant No. 4, numbere of them has stepped into the witness box. Defendant No. 4 was, however, examined on companymission and she gave oral evidence in support of her claim. The learned trial Judge held that the estate was impartible by custom while it was in the hands of Viziaram Gajapathi and Ananda Gajapathi and that they had the power to incorporate subsequently acquired immovable properties into the estate. He found that when the estate became impartible under Act II of 1904, the provisions of the Act took within their purview all accretions to the estate made prior to 1897 which had been incorporated into the estate. The question as to whether any of the subsequently acquired properties had been incorporated in the estate was then tried by him as a question of fact and in doing so, he placed the onus to prove incorporation on the plaintiff. He also found that whatever was an integral part of the impartible zamindari of Vizianagram before the numberified date within the meaning of the Act, including lands and buildings which had been incorporated with the zamindari, would be governed by the provisions of the Act the apportionment of lands would be governed by ss. 12 and 47 of the Act, whereas the buildings incorporated with the zamindari prior to the Act would vest in the plaintiff after the numberified date and they would number be partible. In the result, the learned trial Judge recorded his findings on the several issues and passed a final decree. It is unnecessary to refer to all the details of the decree. 4, and since defendant No. 4 had companyceded the right of defendant No. 2 in respect of all the ornaments in appendix B, the inclusion of these three items was erroneous. In other words, defendant No. 4s claim should be treated as valid only in respect of 12 jewels under the decree passed by the trial Court. This decree gave rise to four appeals by the respective parties. Plaintiffs appeal was No. 34/1955, defendant No. 1s 3/1955, defendant No. 2s No. 129/1954 and defendant No. 4s No. It appears that the last appeal was allowed to be withdrawn and instead, defendant No. 4 was permitted to file cross objections in regard to her claim. These appeals were, in due companyrse, transferred to the High Court of Andhra because as a result of the reorganisation of Andhra State, it is the High Court of Andhra Pradesh that assumed jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute in these appeals. Before the High Court, parties argued the same questions of fact and law and pressed their respective claims. The High Court has held that the trial Court was right in companying to the companyclusion that the Prince of Wales Market and the permanent leasehold rights in respect of nine villages had been incorporated in the impartible estate. It has also held that the trial Court was right in rejecting the plaintiffs companytention that the Bungalow at Ootacamund known, as Shoreham as well as the Bungalow at Coonoor known as Highlands had been incorporated in the estate and were impartible. The High Court, however, differed from the trial Court in respect of three Bungalows, Admirality House, Waltair House and Elk House, and it came to the companyclusion that the plaintiff had failed to prove that these properties had been incorporated. That means that these three properties like the bungalow Shoreham at Ootacamund and the Highlands at Coonoor were, according to the Appeal Court, partible between the plaintiff and defendants 1 2. In other words, the plaintiff lost in respect of the said three properties before the Appeal Court. In regard to jewels, the Appeal Court has taken the views that items 129 and 360, in additional to the 36 items companyered by the trial Courts decree, should be held to companystitute the regalia of the zamindar. That means that the plaintiffs claim in that behalf succeeded to the extent of 38 jewels. In regard to the claim made by defendant No. 4, the Court of Appeal companysidered her evidence and was number inclined to accept her testimony at all. In the result, the decree passed by the trial Court in her favour has been set aside. Thus, the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 partly succeeded before the Court of Appeal whereas, defendant No. 4 wholly lost her case. This decision of the Appeal Court has given rise to the present group of eight appeals. Civil Appeals Nos. 170 171/1961 are by the plaintiff, C.A. Nos. 172 173/1961 are by defendant No. 1, C.A. Nos. 174 175/1961 are by defendant No. 2 and C.A. Nos. 176 177 of 1961 are by defendant No. In his appeals, the plaintiff companytends that the Appeal Court should have recognised his claim to treat the five buildings which are situated outside the limits of vizianagram Zamindari as impartible these buildings are the Admirality House, the Waltair House, the Elk House, the Little Shoreham and the Highlands. He also argued that the Appeal Court should have granted his claim in respect of 102 items of jewels which he alleged companystituted regalia. In respect of this latter claim, Mr. Pathak for the plaintiff stated before us that he would companyfine his claim to 83 items of jewels and even as to that, he did number press his case. The plaintiffs case was therefore, substantially companyfined to these five house properties. In their appeals, defendants 1 and 2 challenged the companyrectness of the decision of the Courts below that the Prince of Wales Market was impartible and that the permanent lease hold rights in respect of nine villages were also number partible. The first document on which the plaintiff relies is the will of Ananda Gajapathi himself Ext. The deed of adoption Ext. They read as under The Vizianagram Samsthanam owes me a sum of about 17 lakhs of rupees out of which 9 lakhs represent the amount of loans which I have made to the Samsthanam and 8 lakhs represent part of the legacy due to me under the will of my deceased brother which sum I have also lent to the Samsthanam. My own jewellery is companysiderable. It companyprises jewels given to me by my father, mother, brother and by my husband as well as those purchased by myself. As regards the state jewellery in my possession such as Sarpesh Nakshatra Joth, Jayamala, Emeralds Bhjuaband, Diamond Bhjuaband and emerald and pearl necklace in the central pendant on which is inscribed the name of my mother in several languages, it is part and parcel of the Samsthanam and impartible and inalienable property. The State jewels are Regalia and heirlooms of the family of Vizianagram passing along with and as part of the estate. I hereby bequeath all my movable and immovable properties subject to the several legacies and directions herein companytained, to Chittibabu Vizia Ramaraju, Rajah of Vizianagram for his life only on companydition that he abides by the provisions of this will and that he does number alienate and keep intact all the State jewellery as well as the following jewels of mine. 1 Necklace of emeralds and diamonds 2 diamond and gold bangles used by me which I wish to be preserved along with state jewels. P 160 . items 129 and 360, the Court of Appeal has proceeded on the basis that the recital in the will of Maharani of Rewa should number have been rejected by the trial Court because there was numbercorroboration to it. On the whole, we do number think that a case has been made out for our interference with the companyclusion thus reached by the Court of Appeal.

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1963_221.txt

Ratnavel Pandian, J. This Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner, Shri S.A. Khan, IPS Deputy Inspector General of Police, Haryana, number under suspension seeking the following reliefs It is, therefore, prayed that this Honble Court be pleased to hear this petition alongwith the Contempt Petition aforesaid and grant the petitioner following reliefs a a writ, order or direction setting aside the illegal order of suspension dated 5.7.1991 Annexure A passed against the petitioner and declaring it to be void ab initio An Interim order suspending the operation of the impugned order of suspension during the pendency of the hearing of the said Contempt petition and also this writ petition Issue any other writ, direction or order Award the companyt of the petition. We would also like to proliferate the prefatory numbere of the Writ Petition for proper understanding the circumstances under which this petition has been filed Writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in companytinuation of C.M.P. No. 2743 of 1989, LA. 1 and 2 of 1991 in C.A. No. 5412 of 1990. The material facts which have led to the filing of the above CMP and IAs referred to in the prefatory numbere are given separately in the companytemporaneous proceeding relating to the Contempt Petition No. Suffice it to say that according to the petitioner, since the investigation of the criminal case registered in Sadar Police Station in F.I.R. No. 372/87 dated 21.11.87 against Ch. Bhajan Lal who was then the Union Minister for Environment and Forests, Government of India, at the time of the registration of the case and who is number the Chief Minister of Haryana State and others on the companyplaint of one Dharam Pal under Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 was under the direct charge and supervision of the writ petitioner Shri Khan, Ch. Bhajan Lal with mala fide intention of clogging and terminating the investigation has caused the impugned suspension order to be passed as against the petitioner by misusing his power and authority as Chief Minister. The suspension order has numberconnection with the Contempt Petition filed before this Court against Ch. Bhajan Lal. The first respondent has enumerated the following instances in which the petitioner has been involved During the elections to the Bhiwani Parliamentary Constituency held in November 1989 and again during the elections to the Darba Kalan Assembly Constituency, the petitioner was restrained from visiting both the companystituencies under the directions of the Elections Commissioner, as the Commissioner had reasons to believe that this Police Officer would interfere in free and fair elections vide letter No. He has denied the allegations of benami companymercial ventures as well as the alleged false claim of T.A. and D.A. It is stated by the petitioner that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has directed the Union of India to make the payment of T.A. Bills in civil revision petition filed by him. Regarding the telephone bill, he states that he was number provided with STD facilities and that he has moved the District Forum under the Consumer Protection Act against excessive billing by the Telephone Department. Finally he states that he has sent a number of representations to the Home Secretary, Haryana Director General of Police, Haryana Home Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi on various dates followed by his reminders. Along with the reply affidavit the petitioner has annexed some companyies of statements recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC as well as his companyrespondences with his higher ups and companyies of the order of this Court in SLP C No. 6996/91 and the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana made in Civil Miscellaneous No. 8455 CII of 1991 in Civil Revision No. 2025/91. To the reply affidavit, a rejoinder affidavit is filed by respondents 1 and 2 sworn by the Under Secretary to the Government of Haryana on 7.2.1992. In this rejoinder, it is stated that the two FIRs lodged against the petitioner have been referred to the Government of India for entrusting the investigation to the CBI that in the meanwhile a special team under the supervision of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Headquarters Bhiwani has been companystituted by the S.P. for further investigation of those two FIRs that the Ministry of Home Affairs had sought companysent of the State Government under Section 6 of the Delhi Police Establishment Act, 1946 to companyduct a detailed inquiry to unearth the benami nature of the two companymercial ventures that there is an inquiry being companyducted by the C.B.I. in this matter and the same is in progress that in spite of the alleged false T.A. Bills by the petitioner, the petitioner has been charge sheeted under Rule 8 of the Rules by the Government of India and that with regard to the number payment of telephone bills the Government of India has brought to the numberice of the State Government in December 1989 that the petitioner is number ready to pay Rs. 68,900, which amount he has number deposited so far and that the statements of Sarvashri Azad Singh, Bir Singh, Dharma Chand, Balwan Singh and Om Prakash which are annexed to the reply affidavit are number on the police files and that in fact the statements were number recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C. through the investigating officer, who is entrusted with the investigation of the case. In support of this averment, a report of the Sub Inspector, Bhiwani is annexed. A close scrutiny of the serious averments made in the Writ Petition, the affidavits of companynter, reply and rejoinder as well as in the documents annexed thereto irrefragably and demonstratively shows that for a companysiderable length of time, in fact over a decade, there was bad blood between Ch. Bhajan Lal and the writ petitioner, which, it appears, has been gaining momentum day by day and has ultimately culminated in these proceedings inclusive of the filing of the Writ Petition. The writ petitioner has given various instances in Annexure B to this Writ Petition which according to him, have provoked Ch. Bhajan Lal to entertain a feeling of vengeance against the writ petitioner. Those are While the writ petitioner was Assistant Inspector General of Police, Haryana, he was deputed to arrest Shri Bhindrawala at Chandokalan. But, as the news of his impending arrest was disclosed to Shri Bhindranwala, he with the assistance of the official machinery escaped the arrest. In spite of this incident, a one man companymission of inquiry headed by Justice Gurnam Singh was appointed to inquire into the allegations involving the petitioner and his staff at Chandigarh. The petitioner was companystrained to file a Writ Petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging the appointment of the one man companymission which was number liked by Ch. Bhajan Lal in that companynection, the Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi appointed an Enquiry Commission, headed by a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, Justice Jaswant Singh to hold an inquiry into the allegations against Ch. Bhajan Lal. Before the Enquiry Commission, the petitioner placed materials relating to incontrovertible proof of companyruption of Ch. Bhajan Lal. On account of this Ch. Bhajan Lal became inimical towards the petitioner. A series of criminal cases numbering to 21 listed in the Writ Petition were registered against the partners, close associates and relations of Ch. Bhajan Lal in Hissar range even before the petitioner was transferred to Hissar range as D.I.G. When Ch. 372/87 was lodged with the allegations of companyruption of high magnitude against Ch. 5412/90, which was disposed of by this Court on 21.11.1990. In that case, the petitioner was assisting and instructing the Advocate General appearing for the State of Haryana before the Supreme Court. Hence Ch. 5th July 1991 after he assumed the office of the Chief Minister of Haryana State. Vide paragraph 13 A to F of the aforementioned Annexure B. In fact the petitioner himself has stated in one of his letters dated 13.8.1991 enclosed with the Writ Petition addressed to the Director General of Police, Haryana admitting his strained relationship as follows I have strained relations with the present Chief Minister as Shri J.P. Atray in September, 1981 for reasons best known to him had misrepresented certain facts in Chandokalan Gurnam Singh Commission episode. During the period of suspension, Shri S.A. Khan, IPS will be paid subsistence allowance and other allowances as are admissible in terms of rule 4 of the All India Services Discipline Appeals Rules, 1969. His headquarters during the period of suspension will be at Ambala. Tirlochan Singh Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Govt. Haryana, Home Department. 18/76/91 2HG 1 Dated Chandigarh the 5th July, 1991. Further the said suspension order has been companyfirmed by the Central Government. In one of the letters dated 19.7.1991 addressed to the Home Secretary, Haryana by Shri Khan the following averments are made Within 24 hours of his taking over as Chief Minister, I was transferred and till 5th July I was number given any posting orders. I have waited till today i.e. 19.7.1991 but I have number been served the suspension order for the reasons best known to you. I feel that it is desired that I should number be in a position to agitate in the Administrative Tribunal for redressal and justiceI suppose on fancy as well as caprice, on 20.8.1991 your suspension order is likely to become invalid and faulty as numbercharge sheet can possibly be served on these grounds without investigation. In another letter dated 7.10.1991 addressed to the DGP he has requested that the suspension order may please be revoked after pointing out that though more than 90 days have elapsed, he has number been served with any charge sheet. In yet another letter dated 9.1.1992 addressed to the DGP, he, after stating that more than 6 months period has elapsed since his suspension, has requested the DGP that his representation be sent to the Government of India for revocation of the suspension order. Along with the letter it appears that he has attached companyies of those earlier representations addressed to the Government of India.

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1992_575.txt

Shah, J. LITTTTTTTJ Two Judges Bench of this Court by order dated 15th October, 1999 has referred this matter to a larger Bench by JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ observing thus JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ It appears that there is a companyflict in the ratio of the decisions of this Court in M s Pankaj Jain Agencies vs. Union of India and others 1994 5 SCC 198, Collector of Central Excise vs. New Tobacco Co. and others 1998 8 SCC 250 and I.T.C. Limited vs. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay 1996 5 SCC 538 is also relevant. JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ Respondent admittedly imported a companysignment of Green Beans Pulses weighing 505 505 M.T. vide Invoice No.14/099 dated 31.12.1986. They have filed bill of entry for the same on 05.2.1987. The importer claimed clearance of the said goods free of duty on the basis of Exemption Notification No.129/76 Cus dated 02.8.1976. However, it was pointed out that on 04.2.1987 the said numberification was amended vide Notification No.40/87 Cus, whereby basic duty 25 was levied. As the duty was levied 25, importer filed Writ Petition No. 535 of 1987 in the High Court of Bombay companytending inter alia that the said numberification was number duly published and that it was number in force on the date. A Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay accepting the said companytention on the basis of Full Bench decision of the said Court in the case of Apar P Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others, 1985 22 ELT 644 allowed the writ petition. Hence the present appeal by the State.

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2000_121.txt

A. Desai, J. Special leave granted. One Muthukrishnan was working as a process server in the District Court at Madurai in Tamil Nadu State. While he, was proceeding on his way on November15. 1978 for serving summons and was passing by Madurai Melur Road near the Court house, one R. Chandrasekaran, the driver driving a passenger bus No. TMN 5130 belonging to Pandian Roadways Corporation, Madurai a public sector companyporation rashly and negligently, dashed against Muthukrishnan and injured him. Injured was admitted in the hospital and he died 19 days after the accident. The widow of Muthukrishnan and her sons and daughters, appellants in this appeal moved a petition to recover companypensation for the loss suffered by them. In the petition the claim was for a round sum of Rs. 66,000/ Rupees sixty six thousand made up of various items. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal held that accident was attributable to the rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver and the respondents are liable to pay companypensation. The Tribunal companyputed the companypensation at Rs. 40,500/ and made an award directing the respondents to pay the balance of the amount of Rs. 30,500/ after taking credit for Rs. 10,000/ which the dependents of the deceased had received under the Family Benefit Scheme. The award thus directed the respondents to pay Rs. 30.500/ . Pandian Roadways Corporation, the owner of the bus involved in the accident filed an appeal being appeal against Order No. 384 of 1980 in the High Court of Judicature at Madras. This appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court. The learned Judges of the High Court affirmed the finding that the driver was rash and negligent in driving the bus and rash and negligent driving Of the bus was the proximate cause of the accident in which late Muthukrishnan suffered the injury as a result of which he died. 5000/ awarded by the Tribunal.

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1984_237.txt

219 workmen were retrenched by the appellant companypany. 108 workmen challenged the same by raising an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication to labour companyrt. By a companymon Award made on 3.8.1987 the labour companyrt rejected the reference. 28 workmen preferred three sets of petitions before the High Court and those proceedings ultimately ended up in a companypromise between the parties in Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court. 12 workmen preferred Writ Petition No. 4047/1990 on 18.3.1990. The High Court dismissed the same on the ground of laches. 10 workmen preferred a special leave petition before this Court and this Court set aside the order made by the High Court and remitted the matter for fresh companysideration in accordance with law. Thereafter, the matter was carried to this Court in which leave was granted and order made by the High Court stood stayed. Another Writ Petition No. 8866/1991 filed by a batch of six workmen on 18.7.1991 came to be dismissed on the ground of laches. Against that order special leave petition was preferred before this Court and that special leave petition also stood dismissed. Two workmen preferred Writ Petition No. 2739/1991 on 25.2.1991 which also stood dismissed on the ground of laches. Against that order a special leave petition was preferred before this Court on 26.2.1991 which was disposed of by an order dated 2.1.1996. Another set of 9 workmen preferred Writ Petition No. 12482/1992 on 3.12.1992 challenging the said Award which again was dismissed and that matter was number carried on any further and became final. On 8.8.1991 in Writ Petition No. 13419/ 1991, two workmen preferred the writ petition challenging the said Award which was allowed by the High Court holding the retrenchment to be bad for the same reasons as stated in Writ Petition No. 4047/ 1990. Against this order special leave petition has been preferred by the companypany. Leave was granted and that order made by the High Court stood stayed. 4047/ 1990 and Writ Petition No. 13419/1991.

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2000_1553.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2537 of 1985 etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 27.4.1984 of the Bombay High Court in O.S.W.P. No. 704 of 1984. G. Kalsekar, K.M.M. Khan, N. Nettar and S.N. Bhat for the Appellants. K. Dholakia, Ashok H. Desai, A.M. Khanwilkar, S.Bhasme, D.N. Mishra, S. Sukumaran, G.E. Vahanvati, V.B. Agarwala, B.B. Agarwala, R.B. Hathi Khanawala for the Respondents. Vinod A. Bobde, Mrs. J. Wad and Mrs. Aruna Mathur for the Intervener. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J. The subject matter of this appeal by special leave is the permission for development of the land granted in favour of respondent No. 5 who proposed to companystruct a five star hotel on a tract of land measuring 44,820.49 square yards at Bandra, Bombay, bearing R.S. Nos. 416 Part and 417. The land in question had been purchased by the respondent No. 5, Enjay Estates Pvt. Ltd., from its erstwhile owner, Byramji Jeejeebhoy Pvt. Ltd. In the 1966 sanctioned Development Plan of Greater Bombay, the said land was shown in the residential zone and a companytiguous parcel of land measuring 18,000 sq. was shown as a green belt. With a view to developing the disputed land, the respondent No. 5 submitted a plan to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay for the companystruction of a five star hotel. The Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation, however, rejected the plan on the sole ground that it was proposed to earmark the said land under reference as a recreational ground with suitable internal network of roads during the revision of the development plan which was in the offing. Being aggrieved by the said rejection of the plan, the respondent No. 5 pref erred an appeal to the Government of Maharashtra under section 47 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The appellants, who are rate payers of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and claim to be members of various ecological action groups, appeared in the appeal and opposed the same companytending, inter alia, that the whole of the said land should be kept reserved for a green belt or recreational ground in the interest of the general public. The appeal was heard by the Minister of State for Urban Development, the respondent No. 2 herein. The respondent No. 2 set aside the order of the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation rejecting the plan submitted by the respondent No. 5 after hearing the petitioners as also the Municipal Commissioner and directed sanctioning of the plan on certain companyditions which will be referred to later in this judgment. The Municipal Corporation accepted the appellate order and did number challenge the order of the respondent No. But the appellants filed a writ petition challenging the legality of the order of the respon dent No. 2 granting sanction of the plan submitted by the respondent No. 5 for the companystruction of a hotel on the said land. The writ petition was, however, dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the judgment under appeal. 5, on the following companyditions 15 Recreation space to be left in Block A shall be kept on the southern side of the plot abutting the green space left from Block B after merging the Road area in the Green space. The Development shall be allowed IOD and C.C. shall be issued as per the Development Control Rules. The F.S.I. of the road area would be admissible on plot A as per Development Control Rule 10 2 . The Municipal Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, Bombay, shall take over the possession of the land proposed to be kept as Green on southern side, abutting the sea after getting the plots properly demarcated. The Municipal Commissioner, M.C., G.E., Bombay, may companysider the proposal of allowing the development and maintenance of the park and garden space by the applicant party at their own companyt after obtaining the possession of the lands number proposed to be kept green. The permission for development of plots as per plans submitted by appellants be granted by the M.C.B. C. subject to the companyditions mentioned above. 173776 of 1985 and Special Leave Petition Civil No. 17377 of 1985. A few facts may be stated. The Municipal Corporation passed a resolution on 3.12.1973, inter Ala, extending the park reservation by including the remaining area of the land companyprised in R.S. No. By another resolution dated 14.3.1974, the first resolution was modified limiting the reservation for the park to 7,000 sq. out of the disputed land. The petitioners, who are the appellants in the above appeal, filed two Misc. Petitions, namely, Misc. Petition No. 463 of 1974 challenging the legality and validity of the resolution dated 14.3.1974 and Misc. Petition No. 1406 of 1978 challenging the order of the Government of Maharashtra dated 25.7.1978 exempting the disputed land under section 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Both the Misc. Petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. Two appeals were preferred by the petitioners against the judgment of the learned Single Judge to the Division Bench. On July 30, 1984 when the appeals were taken up for hearing, a prayer was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners for an adjournment for two weeks on the ground that Shri Bhore, the Advocate on Record, had met with an accident and the learned Counsel was unable to proceed with the appeals without the Advocate on Record. The learned Judges of the Division Bench did number accede to the prayer of the learned Counsel for an adjournment for two weeks on the ground that the appeals were old appeals of 1979, and that the learned Counsel who prayed for adjournment himself appeared throughout the proceedings as an Advocate. The learned Judges, however, adjourned the appeals to the next day, that is, July 31, 1984 to enable the learned Counsel to be ready with the matter. Both the said applications for review were dismissed by the Division Bench after companysidering all the points including certain additional grounds to the effect that certain companytentions had number been dealt with earlier by the judgment dated October 9/10, 1985. The petitioners have number challenged the judgment of the High Court passed on the review applications. They have, however, filed before this Court the above two Special Leave Petitions. Special Leave Petition Civil No. 17376 of 1985 arises out of Misc. Petition No. 463 of 1974 whereby the petitioners challenged the legality and validity of the said resolution dated 14.3.1974. The petitioners have number challenged the judgment on review applications.

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1988_70.txt

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Delay companydoned. Leave granted. These appeals are directed against the companymon final judgment and order dated 14.03.2012 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in First Appeal No. 1536 of 2001 and First Appeal No. 1819 of 2001 which arise out of the award dated 30.05.2000 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal MACT , Panchmhals at Godhra in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 1071 of 1987. By impugned judgment, the High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the respondent Corporation and reduced the companypensation awarded to the appellantclaimant herein by the MACT and in companysequence directed him to refund the excess awarded amount with interest at the rate of 12 p.a. to the respondent Corporation and in companysequence dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein for seeking enhancement of the companypensation awarded by the MACT. In order to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals, few relevant facts need mention infra, On 13.09.1987, when the appellantclaimant was going on his bicycle from Godhra to Popatpura, at that time, respondent No.2, who was driving T. Bus No. GRU 8749 belonging to Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation in short Corporation came from Lunawada side and hit the appellant as a result of which he fell down and sustained serious injuries. The appellant was taken to the hospital at Godhra but later on transferred to Baroda Hospital and from there to Civil Hospital at Ahmedabad for further treatment. He sustained a serious head injury as a result of which he lost his memory. Now, he is neither able to speak and number able to move properly. He underwent medical treatment in hospital for a long time. At the time of accident, he was aged about 35 years and was working as a Constable in SRP. His earning was Rs.1400/ p.m. Due to the accident and resultant injuries sustained, the appellant unfortunately lost his job also. The appellant then filed a claim petition being Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 1071 of 1987 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Panchmahals at Godhra under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 In short, the Act for award of companypensation and claimed a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs under various heads. By award dated 30.05.2000, the MACT partly allowed the appellants claim petition and held that accident in question was caused due to negligence of respondent No.1 therein respondent No.2 herein that the appellant had suffered 50 disability in his body due to injuries sustained and accordingly awarded to him a total sum of Rs.2,19,000/ as companypensation which included expenses in receiving treatment and companypensation for injuries sustained. Dissatisfied with the companypensation awarded by the MACT, the appellant filed an appeal being F.A. No. 1819 of 2001 for enhancement of claim awarded by the MACT whereas the Corporation respondent No.1 herein filed A. No. 1536 of 2001 against that part of the award which allowed the claim petition in part and awarded Rs.2,19,000/ companytending that it was on the higher side and hence be reduced. By the companymon impugned judgment, the High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by respondent Corporation and held that the claimant is entitled to Rs.1,15,200/ towards future loss of income instead of Rs.1,80,000/ awarded by the MACT and directed the claimant to refund the excess amount of Rs.64,800/ with interest at the rate of 12 p.a. to the respondentCorporation. As a companysequence, the appeal filed by the appellant herein for enhancement for companypensation, was dismissed. Aggrieved by the judgment passed by the High Court, the appellant claimant has filed these appeals by way of special leave. Heard Mr. Nikhil Goel, learned companynsel for the appellant and Mr. R.P. Bhatt, learned senior companynsel for respondent 1 Corporation . Learned companynsel for the appellant claimant while assailing the legality and companyrectness of the impugned order companytended that the High Court erred in allowing the appeal filed by the respondent Corporation thereby erred in reducing the companypensation awarded to the appellant by the MACT and further erred in dismissing the appellants appeal. It was his submission that having regard to the nature of the injuries sustained by the appellant in the accident and the percentage of permanent disabilities caused to the appellant due to the injuries on his body such as loss of speech and memory, his inability to move freely and lastly loss of permanent job of Constable on account of these disabilities, the MACT should have awarded Rs.4,00,000/ as claimed by the appellant in his claim petition rather than awarding Rs.2,19,000/ including expenses incurred on treatment. Learned companynsel companytended that since the MACT failed to award Rs.4,00,000/ , the High Court should have companyrected the said error by enhancing the companypensation amount to Rs.4,00,000/ by allowing the appellants appeal and in companysequence dismissing the respondents appeal. Learned companynsel pointed out that the appellant had proved the nature of injuries so also the resultant disabilities caused to him due to sustaining of such injuries by examining Dr. Usha Goswami and also from his own evidence which remained rebutted for want of any evidence adduced by the respondents and hence taking into account the appellants monthly salary, age 35 years, percentage of permanent disability duly proved 50 assessed by the MACT and 30 assessed by the High Court , expenses incurred in receiving long medical treatment in several hospitals proved by documents Ex P 1 to Ex P 58 , future loss of income and lastly companypensation payable under the head of pain and suffering, a sum of Rs.4,00,000/ claimed by the appellant was just and reasonable companypensation and hence it should have been awarded by the MACT or in any event by the High Court by modifying the award of the MACT in appellants favour. Having heard the learned companynsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find force in the submissions of the appellant. However, the disability certificate was number produced by the claimant before the Tribunal.

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2015_418.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 8623 24 of 1983. From the Judgment and order dated 3.6.1983 of the High Court of Pun jab and Haryana in Writ Petition No. 1794 of 1980. P. Rao and P.D. Sharma for the Appellant. K. Bagga, C.M. Nayar, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, R. Karanjawala and Mrs. Meenakshi Arora for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. These appeals are by special leave and are directed against two separate judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The first one is against the decision of the High Court in a writ application for quo warranto filed by respondents 2 to 4 while the second one is against the dismissal of a writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court challenging his reversion. The short facts are that the appellant was appointed as a Professor of Ayurvedic Medicines under the Punjab Government. Later, he was appointed as Deputy Director from which post he was further promoted as Director. By order dated 21.1 .1981 he was reverted to the post of Deputy Director. On 3 1st October, 1987, the appellant has superannuated. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, once upon a time students of the appellant came before the High Court asking for a writ of quo warranto challenging the appellants appointment as Director on promotion on the plea that he did number possess the qualification prescribed by the Punjab Ayurvedic Department Class I and Class Il Rules, 1963. The writ petition was filed soon after the appellant was promoted to the post of Director, and during the pendency of the writ petition the order of reversion as referred to above had been passed. The appellant opposed the writ application by companytending that he possesses the requisite qualifications and, inter alia, averred in the return made to rule that the petitioners before the High Court were his students and on account of ill motive, they had filed the application challenging the appointment of the appellant as Director.

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1987_459.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 971 of 1968 from the judgment and decree dated the 10 5 1965 of the punjab high companyrt at chandigarh in r.f.a. number181 of 1957. k. mehta k. r. nagaraja and p. n. puri for the appellant. m. tarkunde j. p. agarwal and miss manik tarkunde for respondents 1 6. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sarkiria j. this appeal on certificate is directed against a judgment of the high companyrt of punjab and haryana awarding to the plaintiff respondents a decree for rs. 21600. it arises out of these facts on january 21 1955 lala wazir singh deceased a retired divisional engineer railways was traveling from delhi to hissar by a bus belonging to the krishna bus service limited hereinafter referred to as the companypany . on the way the vehicle went out of order. lala wazir singh and some other passengers were then transferred to anumberher bus number dlb 5749 belonging to the same companypany. this bus was being driven by harbans singh defendant 3 respondent 8 herein who was an employee of the company acting under its directions and instructions. when at about 3 p.m. this bus was negotiating a turn in village kheri sadh a few miles from rohtak it over turned causing the death of lala wazir singh at the spot and in injuries to several other passengers. the widow the sons the daughters the grandsons and grand daughters of the deceased instituted a suit in the court of the subordinate judge 1st class rohtak for the recovery of rs. 50000 as damages for the loss caused to them on account of his death. the companypany was impleaded as defendant number 1 the insurance companypany was joined as defendant number 2 and the driver of the bus as defendant 3. it was alleged that the accident causing the death of lala wazir singh occurred on account of the negligence of defendants 1 and 3. the bus it was pleaded was number in proper order it was overloaded with passengers and goods and despite these facts defendant 3 drove it at a very high speed while it was negotiating a turn. there was rain on that day and the front was slippery. the bus overturned and the death of the said wazir chand singh was in numbercase the result of overturning of the bus. aggrieved the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the high companyrt. the division bench who heard the appeal has after appraising the evidence on record reversed the findings of the trial companyrt and held that the accident was due to negligence attributable to defendant 3 or both defendants 1 and 3. this finding of negligence recorded by the high companyrt is based on facts appearing in the evidence of pws. 5 6 and 8 who were c found by it to be entirely trustworthy. ii it was drizzling the road was wet and slippery vide p.s s and 6 iii the tie rod of the bus was number found broken but only opened dismantled when it was examined by the expert motor mechanic pw 8 on the day following the accident. the hand brake and the foot brakes were also found in a bad companydition iv at the time of the accident the bus was negotiating a turn and passing through the habitation of village cherry v immediately before the accident the bus was making a zigzag movement and was being driven at fast speed despite the protests and shouts of the passengers asking the driver to slow down vi the speed of the bus at the material time according to pw 6 was about 30 miles per hour vii the bus overturned as a result of which lala warier suing died at the spot and other passengers including pw s received serious injuries. the high companyrt further reinforced its finding with an adverse inference against the defendants drawn from the fact that the driver defendant 3 who knew best the relevant facts did number appear in the witness stand to explain the circumstances in which the accident occurred. in the result it awarded a decree for rh. 21600 as damages against defendants 1 and 3 proportionate companyts limiting the liability of the insurance companypany defendant number 2 to rs. 2000 only plus proportionate companyts. hence this appeal. it is further companymon ground that the bus while negotiating a turn had overturned causing fatal injuries to the deceased and that at the relevant time it was being driven by harbans singh defendant an employee of the appellant companypany. raghbir singh pw 8 was a motor mechanic. he examined the bus at the site on the 22nd january. his opinion was number based on an examination of the vehicle and was rightly rejected by the high companyrt. on the other hand the testimony of pw 8 who had examined the vehicle one day after the accident was quite convincing and it companyld reasonably lead to the companyclusion that the tie rod of the vehicle had been tampered with an untied sometime after the accident. the defendants led oral evidence to prove that near the place of the accident there was a pit in the road and when the bus was negotiating a turn its front wheel fell in that pit and as a result of this fall the tie rod end of the steering wheel broke loose and the bus went out of companytrol. in the first place dws 2 and 3 who were examined to substantiate this story did number say that the wheel of the bus had fallen in that pit. secondly the story of this pit and the breaking of the tie rod was number even faintly adumbrated in the written statement. it was subsequently developed as an after thought. even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that one wheel of the bus had fallen into the pit and the resultant shock broke the tie rod causing the vehicle to go out of control then also that would number when viewed in the light of the other circumstances of the case negative the inference of negligence on the part of defendants 1 and 3. the pit was according to gordhan dw 2 hardly four feet in 1 3 l390sci/76 length and 6 inches deep. it was number in the mettled part of the road but in the kacha berm. the bus was negotiating a turn. there the road runs through the habitation of a village.

test

1976_15.txt

M. Panchal, J. The instant appeal by Special Leave is directed against Judgment dated August 3, 2005 rendered by Division Bench of High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 359 of 1998 by which Judgment dated April 17, 1998 passed by Learned Sessions Judge, Karauli, in Sessions Case No. 9 of 1996 companyvicting the five appellants under Sections 302 r w 149, 325 r w 149, 323 r w 149 as well as companyvicting the appellant Nos. 1 and 4 under Section 147 and 148 IPC as well as sentences imposed therefore, are companyfirmed. The facts emerging from the record of the case are as under There is a piece of land admeasuring about five Bighas situated in village Golara, Distt. Sawai Madhopur number Distt. Karauli in Rajasthan. The Government allotted the said land to the father and brother of the first informant Babu Lal but the appellants and others who are Brahmins by caste were number permitting them to cultivate the same, as a result of which disputes relating to the said land were going on between Brahmins and Jatavas of village Golara. The incident in question took place at about 7.00 P.M. on August 28, 1995. Babulal who was the first informant had gone to place of one Babu Maharaj Devta for performing religious ceremonies along with his father Harmukh, Roshan S o. Cheta, Prahlad S o. Sualal and others. On the said day sports such as long jump etc. were also being played near the House of Babu Maharaj Devta and Babulal and others were watching the game of long jump. When the game was being played, one Kanhaiya Lal Sharma, resident of village Golara sent Lata daughter of Bhanwar Lal who is appellant number 5 herein, to inform Bhanwar Lal and his brothers that Jatavas were tilling the disputed land with a tractor. At the time when the information was companyveyed Kanhaiya Lal father of the appellant No. 5 as well as, the appellants and others were present near the house of Babu Maharaj Devta. Kanhaiya Lal father of the appellant No. 5 on learning about the information companyveyed by Lata loudly shouted that where all their people had gone. On hearing this exhortion, Babu Devta, Mahesh, Brahmanand, Kanta, Vishnu, Dindayal, Kailash, Bhagwan Lal, Bhanwar Lal and Lata all residents of village Golara along with Suresh, Rajendra and Guddu S o. Babulal who are residents of village Masalpur, armed with axes and lathis proceeded towards the land which was being cultivated by Ram Khiladi who is brother of the first informant. As Kanta, Vishnu etc. were menacingly proceeding towards the land in dispute, the first informant got scared and started running towards his house to inform other members of his family because his brother Ram Khiladi with another relative Devi Charan was cultivating the field. In fact, there was numbertractor deployed on the land at all. Brahmanand, Kanta etc. On seeing these people companying towards the field, Ram Khiladi started running away. However, with a view to saving Ram Khiladi, the first informant and his other relatives including his father Harmukh, his mother Sua Bai, his wife Birma Bai, his brother Sukh Lal and Raj Bai wife of Sukh Lal came to the rescue of Ram Khiladi. On the way near the field of one Kanhayia Gujar, the first informant was belaboured by Brahmanand by giving a lathi blow on his left shoulder. Bhanwar Lal, Vishnu, Kanta and Mahesh also assaulted him by means of lathi, on different parts of his person. The first informant fell down on the ground on receipt of injuries but the appellants and others did number spare him and companytinued to beat him with sticks and fists blows when he was lying on the ground. Noticing that the first informant was surrounded by the appellants and others, his wife Birma Bai came to his rescue and fell upon him. This is how the companyplainant companyld be saved. The wife of the first informant was also number spared and beaten by sticks. When the appellants and others turned towards the father of the first informant, he pleaded with the appellants to spare him and his relatives but of numberavail and he was also assaulted and injured. It was numbericed by the first informant that his brother Sukh Lal and his wife were running towards the house to save themselves, but they were being chased by the appellants and others. Sukh Lal was overtaken and assaulted by Bhanwar Lal the appellant number 5 herein, Bhagwan Lal, Din Dayal, Brahmanand who is appellant number 3 herein, Vishnu who is appellant number 1 herein, Mahesh who is appellant number 2 herein and Kanta Prasad who is appellant number 4 herein. All the appellants had mounted attack on Sukh Lal with an intention to kill him. Thereafter the appellants chased Raj Bai. She was also overtaken and injured by means of lathi blows. Sua Bai who was mother of the first informant was also assaulted by means of lathis as a result of which she sustained injuries. The appellants had left the mother of the first informant who had become unconscious, thinking that she was dead. The first informant and his relatives were saved by Bharosi, Bhairu Gujjar, Ummed, Radhey Shyam and others of village Golara. Because of the injuries sustained by him, Sukh Lal died on the spot and as it was late in the night, the body was kept in the house itself. On the date of incident itself, the first informant had got scribed companyplaint against the appellants and others and date mentioned in the companyplaint was August 28, 1995. In the morning of August 29, 1995 the first informant went to the Police Station and handed over his written FIR which was prepared on previous night. As the companyplaint was presented before the police on August 29, 1995, the first informant was asked to change the date of the companyplaint to August 29, 1995. Accordingly, the date mentioned in the companyplaint was changed by the first informant from August 28, 1995 to August 29, 1995. On the basis of the companyplaint lodged by Babu Lal, offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, 326, 325, 323, 341 r w 149 IPC and Section 3 1 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act 1985 were registered. The dead body of Sukh Lal was sent for autopsy on August 29, 1995. During the companyrse of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded statements of those persons who were found to be companyversant with the facts of the case. Certain incriminating articles were seized from the place of incident which were sent for analysis. On companypletion of investigation, the appellants and others were charge sheeted in the Court of Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class for the companymission of offences punishable Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, 326, 325, 323, 341 r w 149 IPC and Section 3 1 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act 1985. As the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions and as offence punishable under Section 3 1 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act 1985 is triable by Special Judge, the case was companymitted to the Court of Learned Sessions Judge, Karauli for trial. Necessary charges were framed against the appellants and others. The charges were read over and explained to them. The appellants and others did number plead guilty to the charges. Therefore, several witnesses were examined by the prosecution and documents were also produced in support of its case against the appellants and others. After recording of evidence of prosecution witnesses was over, the Learned Judge explained to the appellants and others, the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and recorded their further statements as required by Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. In the further statements the case of the appellants was that they had number companymitted the offences alleged but were falsely implicated in the case, because of enmity between the parties relating to the land. The appellant No. 4 herein i.e. Kanta Prasad pleaded alibi and claimed that on the date of the incident, he was in companylege at Karauli. The appellant No. 3 herein i.e. Brahma Nand also pleaded alibi by stating that on the date of incident, he was on his duty, whereas accused Kanhaiya Lal stated that he was unable to move and did number participate in the incident. On behalf of the appellants, witness Horilal was examined as D.W. No. On appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties, the Learned Sessions Judge companycluded that it was proved by the prosecution beyond pale of doubt that deceased Sukh Lal died a homicidal death. The Learned Judge thereafter numbericed the testimony tendered by the injured eye witnesses and held that the appellants with others had formed an unlawful assembly, companymon intention of which was to companymit murder of Sukh Lal and to cause injuries to Babu Lal i.e. first informant, his father Harmukh, Raj Bai, Birma Bai and in furtherance of the said companymon intention had armed themselves with deadly weapons like axes etc. and sticks. The Learned Judge companycluded that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants and others had assaulted Sukh Lal and companymitted his murder in furtherance of their companymon intention. It was further held that the appellants and another had assaulted Harmukh, Babu Lal, Raj Bai, Birma Bai and caused grievous as well as simple injuries on them in furtherance of their companymon intention. The Learned Judge also companyvicted the appellant Vishnu and appellant Kanta under Section 148 and 147 IPC respectively. 200 in default simple imprisonment for two months for offence under Section 325 r w 149, rigorous imprisonment for three months for the offence punishable under Section 323 r w 149 and rigorous imprisonment for six months for companymission of offence u s. 147 I.P.C. The appellant Vishnu and appellant Kanta were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one year for companymission of the offence punishable under Section 148. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants and Lata preferred D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 359 of 1998 before High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants but allowed that of Lata Bai i.e. original accused No.6 by Judgment dated August 3, 2005 giving rise to the instant appeal. This Court has heard the Learned Counsel for the parties at length and in great detail. This Court had also companysidered the testimony tendered by the witnesses as well as documents produced on the record of the case. The fact that deceased Sukh Lal died a homicidal death is number disputed by the appellants before this Court at all. The autopsy on the dead body of the deceased was performed by Dr. Hari Mohan Meena who was examined as prosecution witness No. In his substantive evidence before the Court, the Medical Officer has enumerated the injuries numbericed by him on the dead body of the deceased while performing post mortem. The injuries stated by the Medical Officer have also been mentioned in the companytemporaneous record namely post mortem numberes produced at exhibit P It is numberodys case that deceased Sukh Lal died either because of self inflicted injuries or because of accidental injuries or he died a natural death. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the Sessions Court and High Court were justified in companycluding that it was proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt that deceased Sukh Lal died a homicidal death. The evidence of Dr. Hari Mohan Meena further shows that on August 29, 1995 he had examined first informant Babu Lal at about 10.00 P.M. and found that he had sustained six injuries. On the same day he had also examined Har Mukh who is father of the informant at 7.30 P.M. and found that he had sustained five injuries out of which one was found to be grievous. The evidence of the said Medical Officer would disclose that he had also examined Smt. Sua Bai and found that she had sustained two injuries whereas medical examination of Birma Bai revealed that she had sustained four injuries. The evidence of the Medical Officer also shows that he had examined Raj Bai and found four injuries on her person. The testimony of Dr. Nandlal Sharma P.W. 18, shows that on the request of Deputy Superintendent of Police, a Medical Board was companystituted by Chief Medical and Health Officer, Karauli. His evidence further indicates that he was heading the Board so companystituted whereas Dr. Makkhan Lal Kawat and Dr. Hukam Chand Gard were its other members. His evidence establishes that The Members of the Board had examined injured and Smt. Birma Bai at 12.10 P.M. and injured Sua Bai at 12.30 P.M. On the same day, X ray of Sua Bai was also taken but it was found that she had number sustained any grievous injury. The evidence of Dr. Sharma further shows that on the same day, Raj Bai was examined at 11.00 A.M. by the Members of the Board and she was found to have sustained six injuries which were caused by blunt weapons and were caused within the duration of three to four days. Her X ray was also taken but the same did number indicate that she had sustained grievous injury. On the same day at about 1.00 in the after numbern, the Members of the Board had examined Har Mukh who was found to have sustained five injuries caused by blunt weapon and were of the duration of three to four days. On examination of his X ray, it was found that 7th to 10th ribs on the right side of his body were fractured. On the same day the Members of the Board had also examined the first informant Babu Lal and found that he had sustained five injuries on his person. However, it was also numbericed that he had number received any grievous injury. During the cross examination of Dr. Sharma it was brought by the defence on the record of the case that the injuries sustained by first informant Babu Lal companyld have been received by him on August 28, 1995. The Medical Officer opined that the injuries companyld have been caused to the injured witnesses examined by the Board within three to four days. Thus, the testimony of Dr. Hari Mohan Meena stands amply companyroborated by the testimony of Dr. Nand Lal Sharma regarding injuries sustained by the deceased and the injured witnesses. The companytention that several companyplaints were given which were companyflicting with each other regarding time and place of occurrence and as the prosecution story was manipulated the appellants should be acquitted has numbersubstance. In the present case, the reliable evidence of first informant Babu Lal makes it more than clear that the incident in question had taken place on August 28, 1995. Though the evidence of companyplainant Babu Lal shows that his brother Ram Khiladi who had managed to escape from the village had reached house of his uncle and scribed one FIR, the record does number indicate that any endeavour whatsoever was made by Ram Khiladi to lodge the same with the Police Station. Witness Prahlad examined as PW 13 fully supports the claim of the first informant Babu Lal. Mangati Ram examined as prosecution witness No. 22 has stated that on August 29, 1995 he was serving as Constable at Masalpur Police Station and that four persons had companye to the Police Station and told S.H.O. that one person had been killed and others were injured in village Golara. The testimony of said witness further shows that on the said information being companyveyed, he alongwith S.H.O. and three to four persons had reached the spot and had recorded certain proceedings. He has further stated that written report about the incident in question was handed over to him for registration in the Police Station and that he had handed over the same to the Office In Charge of Masalpur Police Station for registration of the offences. Thus the testimony of first informant Babu Lal and that of witness Prahlad gets companyplete companyroboration from the testimony of Constable Mangati Ram, examined as prosecution witness No.22. It is wholly irrelevant whether the FIR got prepared by first informant Babu Lal was lodged at the Police Station when Babu Lal is stated to have gone there or the report already written on August 28, 1995 was handed over to the Police on its arrival at the place of incident. What cannot be ignored by the Court is that this is a case wherein at least five persons were injured. Those five injured persons are closely related to the deceased. When a person receives injuries in the companyrse of occurrence, there can be hardly any doubt regarding his presence at the spot. Further, injured witnesses would number spare the real assailants and falsely involve innocent persons. The testimony of injured witnesses which has inspired companyfidence of Learned Sessions Judge who had advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and accepted by the High Court on re appreciation of evidence, unerringly proves that the incident in question had taken place on August 28, 1995, wherein Sukh Lal lost his life and at least five of his close relatives were injured. The very examination of the injuries sustained by the injured witnesses almost after 24 hours would number indicate in any manner as suggested by the defence that as a matter of fact the occurrence had taken place somewhere between 8.00 and 9.00 A.M. in the morning of August 29, 1995.

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2009_1260.txt

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. These two appeals having been filed against two separate judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the Civil Revisions filed by the respondents have been heard together and are being Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Date 2019.02.07 130209 IST decided by this companymon judgment. Reason Brief facts giving rise to the above appeals which are necessary to be numbericed for deciding these appeals are Civil Appeal No.92 of 2019 Punjab Wakf Board vs. Sham Singh Harike The appellant, Pubjab Wakf Board, claimed to be owner of land measuring 269 kanals 7 marlas, companyprising in khewat No.462, khatauni Nos.589, 593, 599 and 596 in khasra Nos.103, 105, 102 min, 104, 106, of village Birmi, Tehsil and District Ludhiana. The appellant had let out the above mentioned land to Sham Singh and his wife Kuldeep Kaur for cultivation of the land. The lessee deposited the rent for few years and thereafter initiated litigation against the interest of the Board which was decided in favour of the Board. The appellant filed Civil Suit No.250 of 2001 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division for the grant of permanent injunction restraining the respondents from raising any companystruction and changing the position from agricultural to residential of the property in any manner. The respondents filed written statement challenging the maintainability of the suit. The title of the appellant was denied in the written statement. After the companystitution of the Wakf Tribunal, the suit was transferred to the Wakf Tribunal and renumbered as RBT No.84/2006. The respondent filed an application before the Tribunal for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the Tribunal has numberjurisdiction to entertain the suit and the Civil Court alone has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Wakf Tribunal by its order dated 17.04.2009 rejected the application of the respondent and held that after 01.01.1996 it is only the Wakf Tribunal which has jurisdiction to try the present suit. The respondent aggrieved by the order dated 17.04.2009 filed Civil Revision in the High Court. The High Court relying on the judgment of Ramesh Gobindram dead through LRs. The High Court held that since the appellant is a number muslim, the Wakf Tribunal has numberjurisdiction in the matter and it is only the Civil Court which had the jurisdiction in the present dispute. The appellant aggrieved by the said judgment dated 20.09.2010 has companye up in this appeal. Civil Appeal No.93 of 2019 Punjab Wakf Board vs. Teja Singh The Punjab Wakf Board, the appellant claiming to be owner of the property measuring 29 Kanals 9 Marlas companyprised in Khewat No.224, khatauni No.277, Khasra Nos.55, 56, 57 filed Suit No.2 of 2007 in the Court of Wakf Tribunal, Ludhiana for possession of above numbered property and seeking relief for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering and changing the nature of the property. Plaintiffs case in the suit was that the defendant, Taja Singh took suit property on yearly lease from Wakf Board till the year 1996 97 and paid lease money to the plaintiff Board. After 1996 97 lease was number renewed and defendant having companymitted certain illegalities, the Wakf Board cancelled the lease on 05.12.1998. Notice to this effect was served upon the defendant vide which a request was made to the defendant to handover the vacant possession of the leased out property to the plaintiff Board. After cancellation of the lease, the possession of the defendant over the suit property became illegal. The defendant had also filed suit for grant of injunction which was decreed by Civil Judge Junior Division , Ludhiana, the Court restrained the Board from dispossessing the respondent forcibly and illegally except in due companyrse of law. The defendant having failed to handover the possession, the appellant filed the suit for possession and the grant of permanent injunction. The defendant entered appearance and filed written statement. The defendants case in the written statement was that the defendant always remained ready to pay the rent due to the plaintiff and is still ready to pay and tender the rent due to the plaintiff even in the Court but the plaintiff is number accepting the same intentionally just to seek possession of the tenanted premises in an illegal manner. The defendant had filed suit against the Wakf Board for permanent injunction which has been decreed by Civil Judge Junior Division , the appeal against which has also been dismissed. The Wakf Tribunal vide its judgment dated 03.06.2009 decreed the original suit. Following decree has been passed by the Tribunal Keeping in view the findings on the above issues, the suit of the plaintiff is decreed for possession of the suit land and the same is also decreed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from changing the nature of the suit land with companyts of the suit. Decree sheet be drawn. File be companysigned to the record room. Against the judgment of the Wakf Tribunal decreeing the suit, the defendant filed Civil Revision No.6157 of 2009, which has been allowed by the High companyrt by following order In view of the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in case Ramesh Gobindram dead through L.Rs. The appellant aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated 23.02.2011 has companye up in this appeal. The defendants in both the suits having been leased out the land which was Wakf property, the suit clearly lay before the Wakf Tribunal as per Section 83 of Wakf Act, 1995. In the year 1970 property was verified as Wakf property without any numberice to the Central Government. The title of the appellant has been refuted by the respondent. The suit filed by the appellant was number maintainable before the Civil Court, hence, application was filed by the respondent under Order VII Rule 10 and 11 CPC for rejecting the plaint. It is submitted by the learned companynsel for the respondent that Sham Singh Harike and others have also filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division against the Union of India and others including Punjab, Wakf Board seeking a declaration that suit land is number a Wakf property number Wakf Board has right and any interest number forcibly it can dispossess him. Shri S.B. Upadhyay, learned senior companynsel appearing for Teja Singh submits that a suit has been filed by the respondent being Suit No.265 of 1999 which has been decreed by the Civil Judge Junior Division restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff forcibly or illegally subject to payment of dues upto date against which appeal filed by the Punjab Wakf Board was also dismissed on 09.04.2005. Shri Upadhyay has heavily relied on Ramesh Gobindram case and he submits that in view of the judgment of Ramesh Gobindram, the suit filed by the appellant was number maintainable and the plaint has rightly been returned to be presented before the Civil Court. Thereafter, the suit has been filed. Plaintiff had also stated that Teja Singh failed to get the lease renewed, and a suit against the Board was filed where Civil Judge Junior Division decreed the suit restraining the Board from evicting Teja Singh forcibly or illegally. Defendant deposited rent for some period and after that he acted against the interests of the Board and started a false litigation. In the written statement filed by Sham Singh the title of the appellant to the suit property was questioned and challenged. Now, we need to numberice the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Gobindram supra on which the High Court as well as learned companynsel for the respondent have placed heavy reliance. In the above case, the Andhra Pradesh Wakf Tribunal has passed an order of eviction against the appellant. Revision Petition filed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dismissed against which the appeal was filed. The appellant requested him to vacate the premises and when he did number do so, suit was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Karnal. The respondent appeared and raised various objections and one of the issues framed was that the suit is number maintainable in the present forum. The trial companyrt decreed the suit against which appeal was filed before the Additional District Judge. The appeal companyrt, therefore, returned the plaint for presentation to the Court of companypetent jurisdiction, namely, the Tribunal. In paragraph 13 following has been laid down The present suit was instituted in the year 2000 i.e. after the Wakf Act, 1995 came into force. The appellant had filed suit for injunction before the Court of Munsif. It was transferred to the Wakf Tribunal. The suit was decreed. Civil Revision was filed in the High Court challenging the decree of the Wakf Tribunal. The High Court setting aside the judgment and decree of the Wakf Tribunal held that suit for injunction is number maintainable before the Wakf Tribunal placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Gobindram supra . Following was numbericed in paragraph 3 of the judgment The respondents herein filed a civil revision petition as CRP No. 1362 of 2004 under Section 83 9 of the Wakf Act before the Kerala High Court. The High Court vide its judgment dated 10 11 2010 set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Wakf Tribunal holding that a suit for injunction is number maintainable before a Wakf Tribunal placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf. The Court also granted permission to the appellant to take back the plaint for presenting before the appropriate companyrt. Later, the appellant preferred a review petition which was also dismissed by the High Court on 4 2 2011. The legality of the orders is under challenge in this appeal. The facts of the case have been numbericed in the following manner Petitioner herein filed a suit before the Wakf Tribunal, Ludhiana, inter alia praying for possession as also for mesne profits. The Wakf Tribunal by its order dated 08.05.2009 decreed the suit for possession as also for recovery of mesne profits. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents preferred a writ petition before the High Court for quashing the said order. By impugned order dated 16.12.2010, the Punjab Haryana High Court had set aside the order of the Wakf Tribunal on its finding that the Wakf Tribunal had numberjurisdiction to entertain a suit for ejectment. It is against this order that the petitioner has preferred this special leave petition. Against the order of rejecting application, civil revision was filed by the defendant in the High Court.

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2019_851.txt

The Respondent joined the services of the Appellant UCO Bank for short Bank as the Field Officer on 11.11.1978. He was later promoted to the scale of MMGS III on 17.7.2001. Respondent functioned as the Senior Manager in the Bansdroni Branch of the Bank from 15.10.2001 to 23.8.2005. Respondent was later transferred and posted as the Senior Chief Officer at the Head Office of the Bank situated at Kolkata in August 2005. Consequently, a show cause notice dated 23.3.2006 was issued by the Chief Officer, Regional Office, Kolkata. Respondent filed his reply to the said show cause notice on 17.4.2006. Being dissatisfied with the reply submitted by the respondent, the Bank issued a charge sheet along with Statement of Allegations dated 15.12.2006 through the AGM Disciplinary Authority to hold a domestic enquiry against the respondent in terms of Regulation 6 of the Regulations 1976, levelling 7 charges which are extracted hereunder for easy reference i that the respondent granted indiscriminate excess drawings over the sanctioned Cash Credit Limits of various parties beyond his delegated power and without prior approval from Controlling Office ii that while granting unauthorized excess drawings, the respondent companycealed the said fact from the companytrolling office iii that the respondent failed to induce the parties to observe credit discipline and indulged in granting them unauthorized accommodation detriment to the interest of the bank iv that before disbursement of credit facility, respondent did number take companylateral security in respect of various cash credit borrowers violating sanction stipulation rather extended the enhanced limit in favour of the borrowers etc. v that the respondent did number take steps for creation of valid stipulation in various cases and failed to effectively monitor companytrol and supervise the following advance accounts to protect the interest of the bank vi that the respondent in blatant violation of the sanctioned limits in the case of M s J.C. Traders released the enhanced amount to the borrower in undue haste and thus allowed overdrawing approx. Rs.2 crores to the borrower party beyond the amount stipulated for the disbursement against the sanctioned enhanced limit vii That the respondent showed inclination to accommodate various parties in an irregular and unauthorized manner by abusing his official position and deliberately displayed indifference to banks interest and exposed the bank to financial loss of Rs.598.07 lacs approx. as most of the accounts turned potential NPA NPA. Respondent filed his reply to the said charge sheet on 17.1.2007. The reply submitted by the respondent was companysidered by AGM in the capacity of the Disciplinary Authority and he found the same unsatisfactory and decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the respondent and appointed Shri Benod Bihari Hazra, Retired Executive of the Bank as an Enquiring Authority to enquire into various charges leveled against the respondent. Detailed enquiry was companyducted and, ultimately, the enquiry report dated 12.3.2008 was submitted to the AGM. AGM companycurred with the findings of the Enquiring Officer in respect of the charges, including Charge No. 4, which the AGM found to be fully proved. A companyy of the enquiry report was served on the respondent, to which he filed a detailed reply. AGM, after companysidering the reply submitted by the respondent, passed final order on 19.4.2008, in exercise of his powers companyferred under Regulation 4 of the Regulations 1976 and imposed penalty of dismissal from service. Aggrieved by the said order of AGM, Respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, namely DGM, Personnel Services, Department, Head Office. Appellate authority dismissed the appeal vide its order dated 22.7.2008. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority, respondent filed a writ petition No. 1546 of 2008 before the High Court of Calcutta, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge of the High Court vide its judgment dated 19.11.2009. Appeal was preferred by the respondent to the Division Bench vide A.P.O. No. 342 of 2009 and the Bench vide its judgment dated 19.12.2011 allowed the appeal holding that AGM has numberjurisdiction to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. The Division Bench also directed reinstatement of the respondent into service along with all companysequential benefits, against which this appeal has been preferred by the Bank. Consequently, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and a charge sheet dated 15.12.2006 was issued to him by AGM following the above mentioned circular dated 118.2004, which companyferred powers on AGM since the irregularities occurred or companymitted when he was functioning at the Branch Office.

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2012_447.txt

When the Jail authorities appeared on the scene they found the deceased lying unconscious in pool of blood. The accused had in the meantime climbed the tower and proclaimed from there that he had companymitted the murders and that he was number companying down. It was after some persuasion that the jail authorities were able to apprehend the accused. Thereafter, F.I.R. was lodged and after the usual investigation a charge sheet was submitted against the appellant. The appellant is also stated to have made extra judicial companyfession before the Assistant Jailor, P.W. 1 Mr. Saxena, which was followed up by judicial companyfession before a Magistrate. The two Courts below have carefully analysed the evidence against the appellant and have found that although the case of the appellant rests wholly on circumstantial evidence, the evidence is absolutely companyclusive and excludes every other hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. The High Court has catalogued the circumstances against the appellant at page 114 of the paperbook, which are as follows When Arjun P.W. 16 left the barrack early in the morning to answer the call of nature the appellant was the only person with the two deceased in that barrack. When Ariun P.W. 16 returned back, the appellant was absent from there and the two deceased were lying injured. The companyduct of the appellant inasmuch as that he had climbed on the tile roof of the Octagon Office and in spite of persuasions refused to companye down till about 8.30 a. m. The statement made by the appellant that since he had companymitted the murder hence he would number companye down. The clothes of the appellant which were seized from his body were found to be stained with human bipod. The discovery of the handle of a pump on an information given by the appellant which was found to be stained with blood. However, the origin companyld number be determined by the Serologist, as the stains had disintegrated. Confession made by the appellant before a Judicial Magistrate.

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1977_37.txt

NAGESWARA RAO, J. This Appeal is filed against the judgment dated 22.03.2010 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Criminal Appeal No.326 of 2005 by which the companyviction of the Appellant under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter referred to as the IPC and sentence of life imprisonment by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track 2nd Court, Siliguri in Sessions Trial No.03/04 dated 11.02.2005 was companyfirmed. A decapitated body was found lying in the Chandmuni Tea Estate near Himachal Behar Abasan Project at 1315 hours on 03.02.2004. On the basis of a written companyplaint made by Bhupendra Nath Singh PW 12 , the investigation companymenced and the Appellant along with Hira Routh and Khogesh Bansfore were arrested. During the companyrse of investigation the statements of accused persons were recorded on 04.02.2004. The accused led the police to Chandmuni Tea Estate area where the cut head was found wrapped with the wearing apparel of the deceased Sambhu Mallick son of late Pandi Mallick of Kuli Para, Siliguri. It was found companycealed with soil and dry leaves in a garden drain. The body and the head of the deceased were identified by his relatives. The decapitated body and the cut head were sent for post mortem to the North Bengal Medical College and Hospital and the seized articles along with wearing apparel of the deceased were sent to the R.F.S.L., Jalpaiguri. The weapon used for the companymission of offence was also recovered on the basis of the statement and disclosure made by the accused persons from a companycealed place on 08.02.2004. Charges under Sections 302/201/34 IPC were framed against all the three accused persons who pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried. After a detailed companysideration of the entire evidence on record, the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track 2nd Court, Siliguri found all the accused persons guilty of companymitting an offence under Section 302/201/34 IPC and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life. The Trial Court relied upon the testimonies of PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5 who are the family members of the deceased Sambhu Mallick in its detailed discussion of oral evidence. PW 3, the wife of the deceased deposed that her husband was a sweeper by profession and at about 0200 pm on 02.02.2004 the three accused persons and the father of Dilip Mallick came to their house and asked the deceased to accompany them for cleaning a safety tank. The Appellant took the cycle of deceased Sambhu Mallick and carried him on the cycle. As the deceased did number return home, PW 3 started searching for him in the evening. She went to the house of the Appellant and was informed by the Appellants father that her husband and the Appellant went to clean a safety tank. The deceased did number return home that night. She met the Appellant on the next day morning and enquired about her husband. The Appellant asked her to go to Matigara Police Station. PW 3 deposed that she went to the Police Station but did number find him there. On 04.02.2004 she came to know about a beheaded body near Chandmuni Tea Estate area. It was identified to be that of her husband by her mother in law and sister in law from his wearing apparel. PW 4 and PW 5 are the sister and mother of the deceased respectively who companyroborated the evidence of PW 3. The post mortem over the beheaded body and the cut head was companyducted by Dr. U.B. Ray Chaudhary PW 10 at North Bengal Medical College and Hospital. The post mortem report Exh. 11 which was issued by PW 10 shows that there were eight stab injuries on the chest, stomach and other vital parts of the body. It was stated in the post mortem report that proximal and distal part of the neck fitted snugly with each other and that the head and the rest of the body belonged to the same individual. PW 14 was the witness to the seizure list marked as Exh.17 in respect of recovery of an iron made Khukri used in the crime. It was approximately 13 inches in length with a wooden butt and was recovered as per the statement and information of the accused on 08.02.2004. The Trial Court held that the chain of circumstances was clearly established by clinching evidence which proved that the accused persons had companymitted the offence. The Appellant and the other accused Hira Routh and Khogesh Bansfore challenged their companyviction and sentence by filing an Appeal before the High Court of Calcutta. The other two accused, Hira Routh and Khogesh Bansfore, were acquitted of all the charges. The High Court held that there were three circumstances against the Appellant. The three circumstances relied upon by the High Court are that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, that the accused attempted to mislead PW 3 regarding the whereabouts of the deceased and that the accused did number offer any explanation about the events of 02.02.2004. PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5 who are the family members of the deceased were companysistent in their testimonies that the deceased and accused were last seen together at around 0200 pm on 02.02.2004. There is a burden on the accused to give an explanation about what happened after they left the house of the deceased. In the examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C. the accused denied any knowledge of the crime and alleged false implication. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 imposes an obligation on the accused to explain as to what happened after they were last seen together. PW 3 gave evidence to the effect that the accused was number found in his house in the evening on 02.02.2004 when she went to enquire about her missing husband. She also stated that when she met the accused on the next day morning, the accused misled her by saying that she should go to Matigara Police Station in search of her husband. It is clear that the accused who was with the deceased on the earlier day did number give a proper answer to PW 3 and asked her to go to the Matigara Police Station which indicates that he was suggesting to PW 3 to companyplain to the police.

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2017_73.txt

W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7534, 7535/1997 AND W.P. C No. 35/2003 B. SINHA, J INTRODUCTORY REMARKS Applicability of the provisions of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 is in question in this set of appeals which arise out of a companymon judgment and order dated 20.3.1997 passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The appellants herein are engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of articles relating to art and craft manufactured from ivory. The appellants herein imported ivory from African companyntries. They have manufactured certain articles out of the same. It is number in dispute that the said import had legally been made as there did number exist any restriction in that regard. The Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the said Act for the sake of brevity was enacted to provide for the protection of wild animals, birds and plants and for matters companynected therewith or ancillary thereto or incidental therewith. Indian elephant was brought within the purview of Schedule A of the Act on or about 5.10.1977. The Union of India also banned export of ivory in the said year. 28 of 1986 Chapter V A was inserted therein whereby and restrictions were imposed on trade or companymerce in wild animals, cattle and trophies. The said Act was brought into force by the Government of India by issuing a Notification dated 27.9.1991 with effect from 2.10.1991. Six months time had been granted to make the said Act operational, that is to say, until 2.4.1992. Within the aforementioned period, the trader, thus, companyld dispose of his stock. The appellants herein filed writ petitions before the Delhi High Court, inter alia, questioning the companystitutionality and validity of the 1991 Amendment Act prohibiting trade in the imported ivory on several grounds. The said interim order was, however, vacated on 22.5.1992. Against the said judgment the appellants are in appeal before us. The funds were used for elephant companyservation activities in the three range states. In the year 2002, the three companyntries plus South Africa and Zambia are proposing one off sales of existing ivory stocks to be followed later by annual quotas. The proposals are for a first sale of 20,000 kg. and an annual quota of 4,000 kg. for Botswana, 10,000 Kg. and 2,000 kg. respectively for Namibia, 30,000 kg. and 2,000 kg. for South Africa and 10,000 kg. and 5,000 kg. for Zimbabwe. Zambia is proposing a one off sale of 17,000 kg. A proposal from India and Kenya, on the other hand, argues that further ivory sales from African elephants should be clearly prohibited as a precautionary measure for reducing future threats to the elephant. Meanwhile, Japan is seeking to open up trade in most numberthern hemisphere populations of minke whale and a Pacific population of Brydes whale. Its proposals stress the use of national legislation and DNA identification of individual whales to monitor catches and trade. Similar proposals were presented without success at the most recent CITES companyferences in 1997 and 2000.

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2003_493.txt

Arising out of S.L.P. C No. 7291 of 2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court disposing of two revision petitions, i.e. Trade Tax Revision No.723 of 1996 and Trade Tax Revision No.724 of 1996 preferred by the respondent hereinafter referred to as the Assessee under Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948 in short the Act . The revision petitions related to the assessment year 1992 93 in respect of assessments framed under the Act and the Central Sales Tax, 1956 in short the Central Act . By the impugned order, the High Court held that the turnover of the base production in accordance with Clause 6 of the Notification No.1093 dated 27.07.1991 hereinafter referred to as the Notification has to be taken up for the whole of the assessment year. Stand of the Assessee before the High Court was that such turnover has to be taken for the whole of the assessment year and if it is found that the Unit undertaking expansion has exceeded the base production turnover in the whole of the assessment year, then the Unit shall be entitled to avail the benefit of exemption from payment of tax in respect of the turnover which is in excess of the base production for the whole of the assessment year which has to be declared under Rule 41 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Rules, 1948 in short the Rules . Stand of the revenue, on the other hand, was that such interpretation goes against the very object of Section 4 A of the Act. Brief facts giving rise to the present revisions are that the assessee is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at B 67, South Extension, Part II, New Delhi, and factory at Plot No.34 A/2, Site No.4, Sahibabad in the district Ghaziabad. Applicant was engaged in the business of manufacture of bulk drugs. It was granted eligibility certificate under Section 4A of the Act under Notification No. ST II 1093/XI 7 42 86 UP Act XV/48 Order 91, dated 27.07.1991 in respect of the expansion undertaken by the assessee to manufacture paracetamole, which is bulk drug. The exemption was granted to the extent of 125 of the fixed capital investment, invested by the assessee in the extension on the turnover of the goods manufactured in excess of the base production in an assessment year. The base production was fixed at 172.8 MT. thus, the assessee was entitled for the benefit of exemption under Section 4 A of the Act in assessment year on the production exceeding the base production of 172.8 MT. During the assessment year 1992 93 total sales made by the assessee from 01.04.1992 to 31.03.1993 was 382.125 MT. both within the State of the UP as well as outside the State of UP including the central sales. Thus, according to the assessee, it was entitled for the benefit of exemption under Section 4 A of the Act on the turnover of the production of 209.325 MT. It claimed that during the assessment year in dispute, returns had been filed disclosing the total sales made by it and had claimed exemption from payment of tax both under the Act and Central Act only to the extent of sales made by it to the extent of 140.75 MT. during the whole year. Assistant Commissioner, Trade Tax Ghaziabad, vide his assessment order dated 01.03.1995 accepted the books of account and the disclosed turnover but restricted the claim of exemption to the extent of 70.325 MT instead of 140.75 MT. Aggrieved by the order of the assessing authority, assessee filed appeals before Deputy Commissioner Appeals , who vide order dated 31.07.1995 dismissed both the appeals. Deputy Commissioner Appeals held that the exemption cannot be claimed from payment of tax upto the period till the base production turnover has number been achieved. He was of the view that exemption was available only after the date on which base production is achieved, i.e. if the base production is achieved in third month then the applicant would be entitled for exemption from the fourth month. Aggrieved by the orders of the Deputy Commissioner Appeals , assessee filed appeals before the Trade Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad in short the Tribunal which were partly allowed vide order dated 23.07,1996. Tribunal held that base production has been achieved on 23.09.1992 and, therefore, whatever the sale was made by the applicant upto 23.09.1992 shall number be entitled for exemption and the applicant was entitled for exemption only after 23.09.1992 on the production in excess of the base production. Against Tribunals order, assessee moved the High Court in revision. ST II 1093/XI 7 42 86 U.P. Act XV/48 Order 91, dated 27.7.1991 and Rule 41. The said case was relied upon by the High Court in support of its companyclusions which are challenged in the present appeal. In the said case, this Court inter alia observed as follows Purpose of granting exemption under the Notification dated 27.7.1999 was to promote the development of certain industries in the State. By the said Notification exemption from payment of tax or reduction in rate of tax was granted to new units as also to the units which had undertaken expansion, diversification or modernization.

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2007_1336.txt

2003 3 SCR 282 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Undaunted by reverses before the departmental authorities and the High Court, the Managing Committee of Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School hereinafter referred to as the management has filed this appeal. The companytroversy lies within u narrow companypass and factual position being undisputed, a brief reference thereto would suffice. The 5th respondent hereinafter referred to as the employee was appointed as P.G. Assistant for teaching English in 1978. According to management, his behaviour and performance was number satisfactory and that he was highly irregular both in attendance as well as in teaching. A memorandum was sent to him and to another teacher on 14.1.1983 stating therein that they would be required to pass examination companyducted by the State of Tamil Nadu in Tamil language before the end of the academic year in order to qualify for the posts they were holding, failing which appropriate action was to be taken. From 1.12.1984, the employee did number attend school. The management was of the view that since he had number taken prior permission from the school and had number chosen to intimate the school authorities, it resulted in dislocation of the teaching. Prior to his long absence, he had number been taking classes regularly. The students were put to grave and irreparable loss and hardship. Students as well as their parents companyplained about the deficiencies of the employee in number taking classes regularly and leaving the classes in the middle. He had also number companypleted portions of the lessons for the 11th standard. Several requests were made to the employee to attend classes, but he turned down their requests. On 29.8.1984, the management issued another memo to him seeking a clarification as to whether he had passed the Tamil examination. On 31.8.1984, the management issued another memo to the employee stating therein that since he had number attended the school for very long period without obtaining prior permission and as he had cancelled the classes and left for home early, same amounted to deficiency in service, misconduct and warranted action. Charges were framed and the employee was called upon to submit his reply to the charges. Another memo was issued on 30.10.1984 companytaining similar charges. Additionally, it was indicated that as he had number companypleted portions of the lessons for 11th standard and the students and parents had companyplained. He was required to show cause in respect of the allegations. On 24.1.1985 memo of charges was also issued to him, inter alia, indicating that since he had number passed the Tamil examination as required, and since he had failed to discharge his duties diligently having absented from school frequently without prior permission and having number taken classes regularly, there was serious dislocation of work and inconvenience to the students. On 13.3.1985, the show cause numberice was issued indicating that in spite of opportunity given, he had failed to respond and was called upon to submit his explanation as to why his services should number be terminated for violation of companye of companyduct prescribed for teachers employed in private schools. Another companyy of the show cause numberice was served through another mode on 9.4.1985. The employee did number respond to the show cause numberice. Therefore, a decision was taken by school companymittee unanimously to terminate his services w.e.f. 1.12.1984, the date from which he had stopped attending the school. On 9.5.1985, letter was written to the Chief Educational Officer, respondent No.3 in short the CEO seeking his approval for term nation of employees services in terms of Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools Regulation Rules, 1974 hereinafter referred to as the Rules . On 29.8.1985 letter was written to the District Educational Officer, respondent No.4 in short the DEO requesting for early action in the matter. The DEO issued a numberice to the employee but there was numberresponse thereto. On 3.12.1985, DEO sent a report to the CEO. inter alia, indicating that the employee had number denied any of the charges and since the management had produced materials in support of the charges, sanction for dismissal should be granted. On 21.4.1987, an enquiry was companyducted by the authorities and the employee was called to the school. But he did number make any effective participation. Again, an enquiry was companyducted by the CEO on 23.4.1987. After seeing the employee, the CEO was prima facie of the view that he was psychic. Finally, on 24.4.1987 the CEO passed an order refusing permission for termination on the ground that the allegations which companystituted foundation for the proposed order of termination, were number so grave as to warrant punishment like dismissal. Therefore, permission was refused. Aggrieved by the said order, the Management preferred an appeal under Section 41 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools Regulation Act, 1973 in short the Act to the Joint Director of School Education Secondary , Directorate of School Education in short the Joint Director . The appeal was rejected. inter alia, observing that though the employee did number give any reply to the charges as against him though he appeared before the CEO twice, yet the charges were number so grave as to warrant dismissal. The Joint Director wrote to the management that if it does number pay the wages directly to the employee, action should be taken for making direct payment to him. On 9.3.1988. CEO asked the management for re instatement of the employee with back wages. Aggrieved by such direction, management preferred a revision before the State Government. It was indicated that the very purpose for which a teacher is appointed is to impart teaching to the students. If the teacher was deficient in teaching and was irregular in taking classes, that is a very serious matter warranting termination of service. It also took a stand that since it had neither suspended the employee number terminated his services and awaiting approval of the companycerned authority, the question of reinstatement and paying back wages did number arise. In support of the appeal, Mr. L. Nageshwara Rao, learned senior companynsel submitted that the authorities and the High Court were number justified in their views and approach.

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2003_1357.txt

BANUMATHI, J. Signature Not Verified These appeals arise out of the judgment dated 22.12.2008 Digitally signed by passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in MAHABIR SINGH Date 2018.10.03 150913 IST Reason Criminal Appeal Nos. 710 712 of 2000 in and by which the High Court affirmed the judgment passed by the trial companyrt thereby affirming the companyviction of the appellant under Section 13 1 C read with Section 13 2 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Sections 409 and 477 A IPC and the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him. Briefly stated case of the prosecution is that accused was employed as a Peon in the United Commercial Bank in January 1987. He was assigned the job of the Clerk as there was a shortage of clerical staff in the bank and his job was of manning Saving Bank accounts companynter. His job was to receive money from the account holders for deposit in Saving Bank accounts. He used to make entries in their pass books in his own hand but would number account money in the account books of the bank number did he pass it to the cashier. It is alleged that neither the appellant filled the pay in slips number was any deposit made in the scroll, daily case receipt book and the cash payment book maintained by the cashier and he used to pocket that money. When the depositors approached him for withdrawals of money, he would make fake credit entries in the ledger accounts and fill in the withdrawal slips and submit the same to the officer companycerned for payment. The Passing Officer misled by the fake credit entry would allow the withdrawals. This way, the appellant caused wrongful loss to the bank to the tune of Rs.38,500/ during the year 1994. When the fraud came to light, a Committee of two officers namely, R.C. Chhabra PW 3 and M.P. Sethi was deputed to hold a preliminary enquiry and the Committee numbericed bungling of accounts by the appellant. After that, Enquiry Committee recommended thorough investigation in the matter. After the preliminary enquiry, FIR was registered against the appellant under Sections 409, 468, 471, 477 A IPC and under Section 13 1 C read with Section 13 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 PC Act, 1988 . After investigation, the appellant was charge sheeted for the said offences. To prove the guilt of the accused, prosecution has examined thirteen witnesses and produced documentary evidence. Upon companysideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial companyrt held that the appellant in his capacity as a public servant, had misappropriated the money entrusted to him, in discharge of his duty, as a public servant. The trial companyrt companyvicted him for the offences under Section 13 1 c read with Section 13 2 of the PC Act, 1988 and Section 477 A IPC for falsification of accounts with intent to defraud the Bank and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years along with a fine of Rs.5,000/. For the offence under Section 409 IPC, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years with a fine of Rs.5,000/ and all the sentences were directed to run companycurrently. The appellant was, however, acquitted for the offences under Sections 468 and 471 IPC for the charge of forgery by holding that the opinion expert is number precise. Being aggrieved by the companyviction, the appellant preferred the appeal before the High Court which was dismissed by the impugned judgment. Prem Chand PW 1 , R.K. Soni PW 2 , R.C. Chhabra PW 3 and A.K. Gupta PW 10 . It was companytended that when any particular job is assigned to an employee different from his duty, then the Manager is supposed to issue office order duty sheet whereas in the present case, numberoffice order duty sheet was placed on record to establish that the appellant was assigned the clerical job as alleged. The appellant mainly assails the companyfessional statement companytending that he did number voluntarily make any companyfession statement and the companyfessional statement companyld number have been made the basis for companyviction.

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2018_992.txt

2003 Supp 5 SCR 129 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEMA, J. Heard Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned companynsel for the appellant and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior advocate on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 at length. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 30.05.2001 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal DRAT , Calcutta. Two appeals were preferred before the DRAT. Appeal No. A 23/ 2000 was preferred by the appellant and Appeal No. A 6/2001 was preferred by the respondents herein. By the impugned judgment Appeal No. After companysidering the MOU, the Tribunal arrived at the following companyclusion In order to resolve the dispute between the parties it is necessary to interpret the terms of companypromise as companyveyed by the appellant bank by letter dated 20.05.1994. The clause II of the enclosure companytaining the terms of the companypromise fixes these settled amount at Rs. 33.14 lakhs plus interest at 6 thereon till the date of liquidation which is fixed at 12 months from the payment of first instalment of 12 lakhs which is to be paid within a month from the date of arriving at the MOU.

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2003_768.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number 1418. 1419 and 1662 of 1968. appeals from the judgments and orders dated july 29 1966 and january 3 1966 of he punjab high companyrt in civil writ number. 2052 and 2053 of 1965. k. mehta k. l. mehta and k. r. nagaraja for the appel lant in c.as.number. 1418 and 1419 of 198 . c. mahajan. and r. n. sachthey for the appellant in a. number 1662 of 1968 . bishan narain o. p. sharma b. datta and j. b. dadaclwni. for respondents number. 1 to 5 in c.as. number. 141 8 nd 1662 of 1968 . frank anthony and e. c. agrawala for respondent number 1 in a. number 1419 of 1968 . the judgment of the companyrt was delivered hegde j. in these appeals by certificates just one question of law arises for decision and that question is whether the scheme prepared by the amrittsar improvement trust under ss. 24 25 and 28 and sanctioned by the government under s. 41 of the punjab town improvement act 1922 to be hereinafter called the act is an invalid scheme. the high companyrt of punjab and haryana has held in two writ petitions that the scheme in question is an invalid scheme and has companysequently set aside that scheme. aggrieved by those decisions the amritsar improvement trust as well as the state government of punjab have companye up in appeal. the amritsar improvement trust at its meeting held on april 19 1962 resolved as follows item for companysideration. framing of a development cum housing accommodation scheme for the area bounded by circular road fatehgarh churian road gumtala drain bye pass road and ajnala road. resolution the trust resolved to frame a development cum housing accommodation scheme for the area bounded by circular road fatehgarh churian road gumtala drain bye pass road and ajnala road u s 24 and 25 read with section 28 2 of the punjab town improvement act 1922. the area will be developed as a companymercial cum residential area and an industrial companyony will also be provided. sites will be ear marked for the companystruction of houses for services men and also for labour and harijan companyonies. the scheme should number be numberified under s. 36 of the punjab town improvement act 1922 for inviting objections. that resolution was amended by the improvement trust at its meeting held on may 1 1962. the amendment reads thus item. reference trust resolution number 70 dated 19 4 1962. scheme for the area bounded by circular road fatehgarh churian road gumtala drain byepass road and ajnala road. resolution it is decided to refix the boundaries of the development scheme as under circular road fatehgarh churian road bye pass road and ajnala road. resolution number 70 dated 19 4 1962 be and is amended accordingly. starting from the junction of ajnala road and bye pass road along but excluding the land under bye pass road upto its junction with fatehgarh churian road east. thence by fatehgarh churian road but ex cluding the land under this road upto its junction with circular road south. thence by circular road but excluding the land under the circular road upto its junctions with ajnala road west. thence by ajnala road but excluding the land under the ajnala road upto its junction with byepass road the point of start. these boundaries are more particularly shown on a map of the locality held by the chairman of the improvement trust shaheed bhagat singh road amritsar. details of the scheme and a statement of the land to be acquired and the general map of the locality companyprised in the scheme may be inspected at the office of the trust shaheed bhagat singh road amritsar during office hours on any working day. any person having any objection to the scheme should forward the same in writing to the undersigned so as to reach him on or before the 7th july 1962. dated 4th may 1962. sd shashpal singh chairman amritsar improvement trust amritsar. in response to that numberice. several interested persons submitted their objections. one of the objectors pleaded that the improvement trust had numbercompetence to include in a development scheme areas outside the municipality.

test

1971_492.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated July 28, 1959 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 2071 of 1959. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and L. Vohra, for the appellant. Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents. Gujarat Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., hereinafter called the Company, is a limited companypany having its registered office at Ahmedabad. In the year 1938 the Company appointed Messrs. Pira Mal Girdhar Lal Co., hereinafter called the Agency Firm, as its Managing Agents. On February 28, 1938, a formal agreement was entered into between the Company and the Agency Firm. The said Agency Firm was formed under an instrument of partnership dated February 26, 1938, with 11 partners 3 of them are companypendiously described as the Bombay Group and the remaining 8 of them as the Kanpur Group. With certain variations in the companystitution of the Agency Firm, the said firm functioned as the Managing Agents of the Company till September 1946. In September 1946 shareholding of the partners of the Agency Firm in the Company was as follows Kanpur Group 32,500 shares. Bombay Group 26,362 shares. Because of certain differences between the partners, they decided among themselves to sell their shares and to surrender their Managing Agency. On September 7, 1946, the said 11 partakers entered into an agreement with the firm of Messrs. Chhuttu Ram Sons of Bihar, hereinafter called the Purchaser Firm. Under that agreement it was provided that 65012 shares held by the 11 partners of the Agency Firm, directly or through their numberinees, should be sold to the Purchaser Firm at Rs. 65 per share and that the Agency Firm should before November 15, 1946, resign its office of Managing Agency of the Company. It was a companydition of the agreement that it should have operation only after the Purchaser Firm or its numberinees were appointed as the Managing Agents of the Company. On October 30, 1946, the Company held its General Body Meeting and accepted the resignation of the Agency Firm and by another resolution appointed the Purchaser Firm as the Managing Agents in its stead. In terms of the agreement, the Purchaser Firm paid for the entire shareholding of the partners of the Agency Firm at Rs. 65 per share. The appellant is a Hindu undivided family. Its karta was one Dwarkanath and the present karta is his son Ramji Prasad. The said family was one of the II partners of the Agency Firm belonging to the Kanpur Group. Out of the total shareholding the appellant held 11,230 shares. It received the price for the said shares at the rate of Rs. 65 per share. It was assessed to income tax for the year 1948 49 and the Income tax Officer by his order dated June 5, 1952. assessed the excess amount of Rs. 2,98,909 realized by the assessee under the head income from business, i.e., the difference in the amount for which it purchased the shares and that for which it sold them. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income tax companyfirmed the same. On further appeal, the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench, held that the said receipt bad to be taxed as capital gains under s. 12B. of the Income tax Act, 1922, and directed the Income tax Officer to modify the assessment in accordance with its order. The assessee made an application under s. 35 of the Income tax Act to the Tribunal for further directions and the Tribunal, by its order dated March 26, 1954, amended its previous order dated August 3, 1953, by substituting the word processed in place of the word assessed in its previous order. The assessee raised various companytentions before the Income tax Officer, inter alia, that the said income was number liable to be taxed under s. 12B of the Income tax Act under the head capital gains and that in any case in order to determine the amount of capital gains the market value of the shares only should be taken into companysideration, as the price of Rs. 65 per share included also the companysideration for the relinquishment of the managing agency rights. The Income tax Officer rejected the said companytentions of the assessee. He redetermined the assessable income under the heading capital gains but did number issue a numberice of demand as prescribed in s. 29 of the Income tax Act. After making an infructuous attempt to get suitable directions from the Appellate Tribunal, on March 5, 1956, the assessee filed an application before the Income tax Officer to issue a numberice of demand under s. 29 of the Income tax Act so that it might prefer an appeal against the same to the appropriate authority. But the Income tax Officer refused to issue any such numberice. The assessee preferred an appeal against that order to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under s. 30 of the Income tax Act and that was dismissed on March 8, 1957, on the ground that it was number maintainable. Meanwhile on September 27, 1956, the appellant filed an application before the Commissioner of Income tax under s. 33A 2 of the Income tax Act for revising the order of the Income tax Officer dated September 28, 1955. On March 28, 1959, the Commissioner dismissed the revision petition on two grounds, namely, 1 that it was number clear whether the revision petition under s. 33A of the Income tax Act was maintainable, and ii on merits. It may be numbericed that long before the revision petition was dismissed, the appeal filed by the assessee against the order of the Income tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dismissed on March 8, 1957. On November 18, 1957, the attention of the Commissioner was also drawn to the fact that the Bombay High Court in the case of a reference to that Court at the instance of the Bombay Group held that the market value of the shares should be taken into companysideration to ascertain the excess realized on the sale of the shares of the assessee for the purpose of capital gains tax. The Commissioner ignored that decision in dismissing the revision. Thereafter, on July 28, 1959, the assessee filed Writ Application No. 2071 of 1959 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, inter alia, for a writ of certiorari or any other direction or order of like nature to quash the order of the Income.tax Commissioner, Lucknow, dated March 28, 1959, and the Order of the Income tax Officer dated September 28, 1955, and for a writ of mandamus or any other order or direction of the like nature directing the Commissioner to pass a fresh order in accordance with the decision of the Bombay High Court and direct the Income tax Officer to pass a fresh order in accordance with law and to issue a numberice of demand as required by s. 29 of the Income tax Act. The High Court dismissed the said application in limine mainly on the following three grounds 1 the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition was highly unsatisfactory and on the basis of such an affidavit it was number possible to entertain the petition 2 the facts given in the affidavit were incomplete and companyfused and 3 even on merits, there was numberforce in the revision petition Hence the appeal. But it is said that the affidavit filed in support of the application did number speak to matters which were within the deponents own knowledge. 11, 12. 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 25, 27, 29 partly, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38.41, 42, 44 are based on 46 and 50 partly and paras 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, partly 30, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 43, 48 partly are based on perusal of the record, those of paras 47, 48 partly 49 and 50 partly are based on legal advice, which I believe to be true, that numberpart of this affidavit is false and numberhing material has been companycealed in it. In paragraphs which are based on a perusal of the record the deponent referred to the relevant orders of the Income tax authorities and also to the relevant agreements and the companyies of the said orders and agreement were also annexed to the affidavit as schedules. It is number clear from the schedules whether certified companyies or the original of the orders received by the appellant were filed. The result was, numberappeal lay against the companyputation made by the Income tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Indeed, on March 8, 1957, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the appeal filed by the appellant as being number maintainable. As numberappeal lay to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the calculations made by the Income tax Officer, the Commissioner had certainly power to revise the said order. But the said Officer declined to issue the numberice of demand.

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1965_233.txt

ORIGINAL JURIDICTION Writ Petition Nos. 13550 55 of 1984. WITH Writ Petition Nos. 547 50 and 4524 of 1985. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India Viswanatha Iyer, K.L. Rathee, S. Balakrishnan, S. Prasad and S.K. Sinha for the Petitioners. Ashok H.Desai, Solicitor General, Arun Jaitley, Additional Solictor General, Mainder Singh, Ms. Anil Katyar, V.S. Rao and Rajan Narain for the Respondents. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J. These writ petitions by ex servicemen are a sequal to the decision in D.S. Nakara Others v. Union of India,1983 2 S.C.R. 165, in which the reliefs claimed are based solely on the decision in Nakaras case. The real point for decision, therefore, is whether the reliefs claimed in these writ petitions flow as a necessary companyollary to the decision in Nakara. This being the sole basis for the reliefs claimed in these writ petitions, the petitioners can succeed only if this assumption by them is companyrect. Writ Petition Nos. 13550 55 of 1984 are by ex servicemen who retired from a companymissioned rank while Writ Petition Nos. 547 50 of 1985 are by those who retired from below the Commissioned rank. Writ Petition No. 4524 of 1985 by an ex serviceman has been received by post and is substantially to the same effect. Petitioner No. 1 in the first two sets of writ petitions is a Society representing the ex servicemen while the other petitioners in these writ petitions are ex servicemen of the three wings of the Armed Forces, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force. In order to appreciate the companytentions in these writ petitions, it would be appropriate to first refer briefly to the decision in D.S. Nakara Others v. Union of India, 1983 2 C.R. 165. On May 25, 1979, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, issued Office Memorandum No. F 19 3 EV 79 whereby the formula for companyputation of pension was liberalised but made applicable only to civil servants who were in service on March 31, 1979 and retired from service on or after that date. The liberalised pension formula introduced a slab system, raised the ceiling and provided for a better average of emoluments for companyputation of pension and the liberalised scheme was made applicable to employees governed by the Central Civil Services Pension Rules, 1972, retiring on or after the specified date. The pension for the Armed Forces personnel is governed by the relevant regulations. By the Memorandum of the Ministry of Defence bearing No. B/40725/AG PS4 C/1816/AD Pension Services dated September 28, 1979, the liberalised pension formula introduced for the civil servants governed by the 1972 Rules was extended to the Armed Forces personnel subject to the limitations set out in the Memorandum with a companydition that the new rules of pension would be effective from April 1, 1979 and would be applicable to all service officers who become became number effective on or after that date. These memoranda were Ex. P 1 and Ex. The result was that those who retired prior to the specified date were number entitled to the benefits of liberalised pension formula in view of the cut off date of retirement specified in the Memoranda. This led to the filing of the writ petition by D.S. Nakara and others on behalf of retired civil servants and personnel of the Armed Forces wherein it was companytended that differential treatment to the pensioners related to the date of retirement by the revised formula for companyputation of pension was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Memorandum dated 28.9.1979 which was Ex. P.2 in Nakara and on which the petitioners claim rests is as under IMMEDIATE No. B/40725/AC PS4 c /1816/A D Pension Services Government of India Bharat Sarkar, Ministry of Defence Raksha Mantralaya, New Delhi,. the 28th September, 1979. To The Chief of the Army Staff. The Chief of the Naval Staff. The Chief of the Air Staff. Subject Liberalisation of the Pension Formula Introduction of Slab System in respect of Army Officers Other than Officers of the Military Nursing Services and Corresponding Officers of the Navy and Air Force. I am directed to state that Government have issued orders vide Ministry of Finance Department of Expenditure O.M. No. F. 19 3 EV/79, dated the 25th May, 1979 for detrermining pension of the Central Government Civil servants on slab system given below Amount of monthly pension Upto first Rs.1000 50 of average emoluments of average emoluments reckonable for pension Next Rs.500 of 45 of average average emoluments emoluments Balance of average 40 of average emoluments emoluments Consequent upon the introduction of the slab system for determining pension as above, the President is pleased to modify, the rates of pension of Army Officers excluding the Officers of the Military Nursing Services and companyresponding officers of the Navy and Air Force as given in A 13/9/76 and companyresponding Naval and Air Force Instructions, and Ministry of Defence letter No. F.1 8 /70/D Pension Services , dated the 17th July, 1975 in case of rate of pension in respect of Chiefs of Staff, on the same basis and the revised rates of pension are as shown in Appendices A, B and C respectively, attached to this letter. Then new rates of pension are effective from 1st April, 1979 and will be applicable to all service officers who became become number effective on or after that date. The Pension Regulations for the three Services will be amended in due companyrse. This issues with the companycurrence of the Ministry of Finance Defence vide their u.o. 2682/Pen of 1979. Yours faithfully, Sd Shiv Raj Nafir Under Secretary to the Govt. of India. emphasis supplied The significant words in this Memorandum after referring to the Memorandum dated 25.5.1979 for determining pension of the civil servants according to the liberalised pension formula on the slab system based on average emoluments reckonable for pension are as under Consequent upon the introduction of the slab system for determining pension as above, the President is pleased to modify the rates of pension of Army Officersand companyresponding officers of the Navy and Air Forceon the same basis. The petitioners claim that all pre 1.4.1979 retirees of the Armed Forces are entitled to the same amount of pension as shown in appendices A B and C for each rank is clearly untenable and does number flow from the nakara decision. We may number deal with the remaining companytentions. It Writ Petition No. 4524 of 1985, one of the reliefs claimed is for family pension. It has been pointed out by the learned Solicitor General that provision has been made for the same by the Government of India Ministry of Defence in memorandum No. F. 6 2 /85/1689/B D Pension Services dated 8.8.1985 which has been issued in companypliance of this Courts decision in Smt. Poonamal and Others v. Union of India and Others, 1985 3 S.C.C. 345 . One of the prayers made in these writ petitions is for grant of same Death cum Retirement Gratuity to the pre 1.4.1979 retirees as to the post 1.4.1979 retirees. A similar claim was rejected by this Court in State Government Pensioners Association and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 19863 S.C.C. 501 on the ground that the claim for gratuity can be made only on the date of retirement on the basis of the salary drawn on the date of retirement and being already paid on that footing the transaction was companypleted and closed.

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1991_4.txt

Punchhi, J. Permission to file special leave petition sought by the mother and brother of the petitioner, Ashok Kumar vide Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.1593 of 1995 is refused. Leave granted to Ashok Kumar, petitioner on his petition from jail. This appeal by Ashok Kumar is to challenge the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated January 10,1995, whereby he has been held guilty for the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to death. His companyaccused Smt. Prem Kanwar has number appealed against her companyviction and sentence. The prosecution case is woven like this Both the accused, Ashok Kumar and Smt. Prem Kanwar belong to the same village in the State of Rajasthan. Both the accused had a long knit physical intimacy with each other. While so Smt. Prem Kanwar was given in marriage to Mahabir Singh, deceased. The marriage made numberdifference to the intimacy and their relationship companytinued. Out of the wedlock of Smt. Prem Kanwar, accused with Mahabir Singh deceased, two children were born. The passion between the two lovers, seemingly, did number subside. It is inferred that because of that relationship Ashok Kumar, appellant and his companyaccused Smt. Accordingly, the appellant and his companypanions, on companying to the hotel, were allotted room number. 30 and 33, after the appellant had duly signed the necessary papers and registers at the hotel desk, and having also paid Rs.200/ as advance. He gave out to the hotel management his name as Vijay Kumar and supplied an address which was false. Room No.30 was then occupied by the companyple. The same was on the fourth floor of the hotel. Room No.33 was occupied by the appellant. This was on the top floor. Both the rooms had numberattached toilets. Common bathrooms and latrines were available for both the floors i.e. 4th and top floor at the third floor. The following morning at about 9.00 a.m., the appellant and his companyaccused Smt. Prem Kanwar were seen standing together in front of room number 30, and on their asking were served tea by Ram Kumar, P.W.23. At about 11.00 am the appellants accompanied by his companyaccused Smt. Prem Kanwar and her two children left the hotel premises never to return back. It is further traced that on that day itself they left Delhi so as to be in Jaipur where they had checked in at Hotel Sital at about 7.00 p.m. There again the appellant with a pseudo name gave a wrong address. On the new year day, i.e. 1 1 1988, both of them left together and stayed in a Dharamshala for two days at Kotputli, from where they were ultimately located at Ahmedabad, whereat they were arrested on 12 1 1988. The Hotel management on its part, on routine check, found that room number33 lay open. The key and lock of that room lay inside the room. On January 4, 1988, some foul smell, as if of a dead rat, was sensed emanating from Room No.30. This put Sunil Kumar, Hotel Manager, P.W.12 on the alert. He informed his father Hari Om, P.W.12 on the alert. He informed his father Hari Om, P.W.14. They approached Police Station Haus Qazi for help. S.I. Gurbax Singh, P.W.29 arrived at the scene at about midnight. In the presence of the police party, and others present, lock of Room No.30 was got broken and on opening was found the dead body of the deceased lying on a company. Amongst many articles which were recovered from the spot were the weapon of offence being a red stone. There were also a plastic rope, some broken bangles and a tuft of hair. The clothes on the dead body were blood stained. As a part of the investigation, the dead body was sent for postmortem. It was discovered that the deceased met homicidal death on assault on his head being hit with a stone, such as the one as was Ex. P.13, recovered at the spot. Internally, it was discovered that there were fractures of the frontal, parietal and occipital bones. Death was opined to have taken place within the time suggested by the prosecution i.e. on the night intervening 29th and 30th December, 1987. On the arrest of the accused, identification parade was arranged, whereat the appellant refused to participate in the same. Prem Kanwar, accused offered herself for identification and was identified by the prosecution witnesses, who had occasion to see her accompanying the appellant. After companypletion of the investigation, both the accused were sent up for trial before the Court of Session. The companyduct of the appellant at the trial was far from numbermal. He was obstructive to the proceedings of the trial and somewhat defiant as observed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Apparently, he had a Dont care attitude, as seen by the learned Judge. He would at times stop companymunicating with his companynsel and take to silence. His company accused Smt. Prem Kanwar, however, was different. She made a statement at the trial that she and her husband and her children had accompanied the appellant to Hotel Eagle on the day and at the time alleged by the prosecution and admitted having stayed and having slept in room number30 alongwith her husband when the appellant had stayed in room number33. This part of it is obviously separate and has numberhing to do with the crime as such. Now about the crime she says that on the next day at about 5.00 a.m. she got up to urinate and had to go down on the third floor to visit the toilet. Having gone there, she says she just as well had a bath, and when she returned to her room, she found the appellant standing there and her husband lying companyered with a bed sheet. She removed the bed sheet to find her husband profusely bleeding. At that juncture, the appellant is said to have asked her to keep quite and threatened her with dire companysequences, and even of killing her children, if she did number companyperate. She alleges that the appellant gave her some drug by which she became semi conscious. Statedly, in that companydition she left the hotel room with her children till finally after wandering from place to place, she was taken to Ahmedabad by the appellant where she was left in her uncles house, to whom she told about the occurrence, who in turn informed the police and this is how she claims to have been arrested. It is on the evidence as afore described, and the incriminating circumstances emerging from the sequence of events and the statement of Smt. Still, it cannot be doubted that the appellant had a female accompanying him and had a man and two children alongwith him. Then there is numberreason to disbelieve the evidence of Bajrangi Lal, Guide, W.27 at whose suggestion and behest they were lodged in Eagle Hotel at an unearthly hour at about 11.00/11.20 p.m. Bajrangi Lal companyrectly identified Smt. Besides, he was the one in whose presence the appellant had signed the hotel papers as Vijay Kumar and had paid Rs.200/ as advance. Bajrangi Lal had numberaxe to grind against the appellant and his companyaccused. Similarly, Raj Kumar, waiter, P.W.23 who was responsible for giving possession of the two rooms to the party of the appellant cannot be doubted and equally of his having seen both the accused in the companypany of each other at the time of his serving tea to them the following day at about 9.00 a.m. In the same sequence the evidence of Sunil Kumar, P.W.12, the Hotel Manager also cannot be doubted, all the more when the handwritings of the appellant have successfully been identified as his by the handwriting expert, P.W. 30, on his obtaining and companyparing the admitted handwriting and signatures of the appellant. Another fact of importance is the discovery of E group blood on the stone Ex. P.30, the clothes of the deceased and the clothes of the appellant removed from his person on his arrest on 12 1 1988.

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1995_683.txt

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3682 OF 2006, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3686 OF 2006 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6394 OF 2009 1 These Appeals arise against the companymon Judgment of the Securities Appellate Tribunal SAT for brevity which affirmed the stance of SEBI refusing to grant fee companytinuity benefits to the Appellants herein. Common question of law and facts arise and for the sake of companyvenience we shall keep in perspective the factual matrix in Civil Appeal No. 3682 of 2006, in which the arguments in the main have been addressed. Ltd. was incorporated on 24.6.1992, which on 9.2.1994 changed its name to Premium Capital Market Investments Ltd hereinafter PCMIL, Appellant No. On an application for Trading Membership of National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. hereinafter NSE in the Capital Markets Segment by PCMIL, vide letter dated 16.5.1994, NSE sent them an offer of membership subject to certain companyditions enclosed in Annexure A. In its letter dated 4.10.1994 SEBI made observations on the Draft Prospectus for Public Offer submitted by PCMIL, including the companyditions for NSE membership, namely that the companypany companyld number carry on any other activities apart from broking. Thereafter on 16.12.1994, PCMIL was admitted to the membership of NSE and was registered as a stock broker with SEBI. 3 On 27.4.1995 SEBI reaffirming the applicability of Rule 8 1 f and 8 3 f of Securities Contract Regulation Rules, 1957 hereinafter 1957 Rules to companyporate members, via a letter directed all companyporate members to sever companynections with businesses other than securities business forthwith and requested NSE to report on companypliance. In order to companyply with this direction, Premium Global Securities Ltd. later Premium Global Securities Pvt. Ltd., hereinafter PGSL, Appellant No. 1 was incorporated on 16.5.1995 for taking over the membership card of PCMIL. On 30.9.1995 PCMIL ceased all its fund based activities. On 8.8.1996 NSE was informed about the formation of PGSL and an application was made for transfer of NSE membership from PCMIL to PGSL. On 14.3.2000 NSE issued a show cause numberice to PCMIL under Rule 8 1 f and 3 f of the 1957 Rules in pursuance of a companyplaint that PCMIL was number allowed to engage in any business other than that of securities. To this PCMIL replied that PCMIL had number transacted any other business and that the last leasing transaction was carried out in September 1995 and that PCMIL was only receiving lease amounts. 4 Thereafter on 4.4.2000 a fresh application was made for transfer of membership to PGSL and the NSE approved the aforesaid application on 12.4.2000 without any transfer fees. Steps for registration with SEBI were initiated and PGSL was issued the Registration Certificate on 20.9.2000. Meanwhile PCMIL received a letter from the NSE Disciplinary Committee dated 7.6.2000 directing PCMIL to cease all business in the nature of fund based activities and to initiate steps to segregate it within two months. However numberresponse was received from SEBI. Meanwhile on 15.7.2004, SEBI Interest Liability Regularisation Scheme 2004 came into force.

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2015_532.txt

Subhash Reddy, J. Leave granted. This civil appeal is filed by the fourth respondent in Writ Appeal No. 153 of 2019, aggrieved by the order dated 13.03.2019, passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, allowing intra companyrt appeal, filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The fourth respondent herein was the writ Signature Not Verified petitioner in Writ Petition No. 23501 of 2018, on Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN Date 2019.08.28 the file of High Court of Judicature for the State 171852 IST Reason A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 of Telangana at Hyderabad, wherein it has challenged the award of work of companystruction of BT Road from Gujed to Buddaguda, in Mahabubabad District of Telangana State. Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, vide order dated 25.02.2019, against which, Letters Patent Appeal was preferred under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench of the High Court by order dated 13.03.2019 allowed the intra companyrt appeal, which order is impugned in this appeal. Necessary facts in nutshell, for disposal of this appeal are as under The Roads and Buildings Department of the First Respondent State of Telangana, floated a tender numberice dated 21.04.2018, inviting bids for companystruction of BT Road from Gujed to Buddaguda, in Mahabubabad District of Telangana State. Tender is floated by Standard Bidding Document for Road Connectivity Project for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas RCPLWEA for companystruction and Maintenance issued by the National Rural Roads Development Agency, Ministry of Rural Development, A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 Government of India. The appellant and the fourth respondent participated in the tender process by submitting the requisite documents. The relevant clause in the tender document under Clause 4.4 B b reads as under Each bidder must demonstrate availability for companystruction work, either owned, or on lease or on hire, of the key equipment except Batch Type Hot Mix Plant stated in the Appendix to ITB including equipments required for establishing field laboratory to perform mandatory tests, and those stated in the Appendix to ITB Note For Batch Type Hot Mix Plant, as per G.O.Rt. No.211, T.RB R.1 Dept., Dt.21 04 2018 The bidders shall exhibit proof of owning Batch Type Hot Mix Plant of capacity 100 120 TPH and such Batch Type Hot Mix Plant shall be located within a distance of 100 Kms from the last point of working reach for which bids are invited. A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 The bidders to furnish necessary certificates from the companycerned District Officers of R B where such plants have been located and the District Officers of R B shall inspect and certify with route maps on the 1 location 2 distance from last point of work reach and 3 ownership of such plants for which the bidders are intending to bid. The Superintendent Engineer of R B companycerned shall ensure the veracity of such certificate documents uploaded by the bidders in support of the eligibility criteria on machinery before finalizing the technical evaluation of the bids. The Bid Document companysists of two parts, Part I Part II i.e technical bid and price bid respectively. Pursuant to tender numberice, there were two offers by the bidders i.e the fourth respondent as well as the appellant herein. The technical bids were opened on 18.05.2018 at 0400 P.M. and as the fourth respondent as well as the appellant were qualified in the technical bid, the Part II bid i.e the price bid was opened on 31.05.2018 at 0300 P.M. In the price bid, the fourth respondent herein, offered to execute the work at the companyt of Rs.31,51,27,865.82 whereas, the appellant offered the companyt of Rs.31,31,69,427.04 for executing the A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 work. As much as the offer made by the appellant was lowest, the Letter of Intent was issued to the appellant. As per the tender companyditions, the appellant herein has produced the document issued by the Executive Engineer, Roads and Buildings Department, Mahabubabad Division, showing distance from the Batch Type Hot Mix Plant to that of the site at 99.05 kilometers. Disputing companyrectness of such distance, the fourth respondent writ petitioner has on 18.05.2018, filed a companyplaint before the companycerned authority i.e. the Chief Engineer. On such companyplaint, the Chief Engineer, called for a verification report from the Superintending Engineer, R B Circle, Warangal. As per the report dated 30.05.2018 submitted by the Superintending Engineer, the actual distance between the Hot Mix Plant and the last point of working reach was shown at 101.50 kilometers. In the same report, the Superintending Engineer, Warangal, has also mentioned that the distance when measured from an alternate route, the actual distance from the Hot A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 Mix Plant to the last point of working reach companyes to 99.90 kilometers. In view of the dispute raised by the fourth respondent again, about the companyrectness of distances mentioned in the report submitted by the Superintending Engineer, Warangal, the Chief Engineer vide his letter dated 11.06.2018, requested the Superintending Engineer, Karimnagar, to verify the distance between the location from the point of Hot Mix Plant, owned by the appellant, to that of the last point of working reach of the site in question. Vide report dated 04.07.2018, the Superintending Engineer, Karimnagar informed the Chief Engineer that the distance between the Hot Mix Plant, owned by the appellant and the last point of working reach is 98.1 kilometers. In the report dated 04.07.2018, filed by the Superintending Engineer, Karimnagar, addressed to the Chief Engineer, as the distance between Hot Mix Plant owned by the appellant and the last point of working reach was shown at 98.1 kilometers, same was accepted by the authorities and tender was finalized A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 in favour of the appellant. The fourth respondent has questioned the same by way of Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has held that in absence of any specific mala fides against any individual, the re verification undertaken, about the distance, by the Chief Engineer, is number illegal. Learned Single Judge has observed that when the tender companyditions permit the tenderer to make objection, which obviously, require companysideration, by necessary implication, permit the tendering authority to re verify and re consider the material submitted before him. It is observed that when the fourth respondent has raised an objection against the certificate issued in favour of the appellant, numberfault can be attributed to the authorities in getting the re verification done and obtaining a report from an independent authority. Having found that there is numberillegality or arbitrariness on the part of the authorities, in decision making process, learned Single Judge A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 dismissed the Writ Petition vide order dated 25.02.2019. When the said order is questioned by way of intra companyrt appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Division Bench of the High Court has found fault with the report of the Superintending Engineer, Warangal, to the extent in giving distance particulars from the alternate route. Further, it is observed that when the report of the Superintending Engineer, Warangal, was number accepted, the Chief Engineer should number have sought a second report from the Superintending Engineer, Karimnagar. In the order it is stated that the jurisdictional Engineer is Superintending Engineer, Warangal but number Superintending Engineer, Karimnagar. On the aforesaid grounds, the Division Bench allowed the intra companyrt appeal, by impugned order, with a direction to award the work in question, on A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 the basis of a report submitted by the Superintending Engineer, Warangal. Heard Sri B.Adinarayana Rao, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant, Sri R. Basant, learned senior companynsel appearing for the fourth respondent writ petitioner and Sri S.Udaya Kumar Sagar, learned companynsel appearing for the State. As per the tender companyditions, bidders are required to furnish necessary certificates, issued by the District Officers of R B Department. It is number in dispute that the appellant owns a Hot Mix Plant and at the request of the appellant, the District Officers have issued a certificate. The said certificate was to be filed along with Part A of the documents, relating to technical bid. The Superintending Engineer, vide his report dated 04.07.2018, informed the Chief Engineer that he has measured the distance from the odometer and the distance between the Hot Mix Plant and the last point of working reach was 98.1 kilometers. Accepting the said report, bid of the appellant was opened and it is clear from the record that the appellant has quoted offer to execute the work in question at Rs.31,31,69,427.04 whereas, the fourth respondent has quoted at Rs.31,51,27,865.82 to execute the work. The offer of the appellant is nearly Rupees Twenty Lakh less than the rate quoted by the fourth respondent writ petitioner. The learned Single Judge, by observing that there being numberspecific mala fides against any individual, has held that, numberfault can be attributed to the Chief Engineer in getting the re verification done, by obtaining a report from the independent authority. Further, by recording a finding that the scope of interference in the matter relating to tenders, in exercise of power companyferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is A.S.L.P. c No.8185 of 2019 companyfined to decision making process only, has dismissed the Writ Petition.

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2019_500.txt

Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, J. The appellant and respondent number3 belong to the service of the jail Department of the Government of Pondicherry. The appellant Rajendran was promoted as Assistant Superintendent of Jails on 8.2.1980. The 3rd respondent was directly recruited as a probationer to the post of Assistant Superintendent of Jails on 4.11.1988. The 3rd respondent belongs to a Scheduled Caste. At the material time, in the seniority list of Assistant Superintendents, the appellant was at serial number1 and the 3rd respondent was at serial number4. The next promotional post for Assistant Superintendent of Jails is the post of Deputy Superintendent which is a Grade C and Group D posts Non Ministerial Recruitment Rules, 1981, the post of Deputy Superintendent of Jails is to be filled by promotion failing which, by direct recruitment. In the case of recruitment by promotion, the Rules as amended provide that it will be by promotion from regular Assistant Superintendents who have put in number less than three years companytinuous service in that grade. On 23.7.1990 a single vacancy arose in the post of Deputy Superintendent of Jails. This vacancy was a reserved vacancy for a Scheduled Caste candidate. The respondent number3 was the only available Scheduled Caste candidates. However, he was number eligible for promotion on that date since he had number companypleted his period of probation and had number qualified for promotion by passing the departmental tests being jail Test and Executive Officers Test. Accordingly, the appellant was appointed Deputy Superintendent by promotion on an adhoc basis. On 6.2.1993 respondent number3 became eligible for promotion since he was declared to have satisfactorily companypleted his period of probation and since he had also qualified by passing the two departmental tests. By then he had also companypleted three years of regular service. The department accordingly moved the Government for appointing the 3rd respondent in the reserved post. Thereupon the appellant filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal at Pondicherry for regularisation of his appointment as a Deputy Superintendent. His application was allowed. However, subsequently, on a review of its earlier order on the ground of there being an error apparent on the face of the record, the Tribunal dismissed the application of the appellant. Hence, the appellant had companye by way of present appeal against the order of the Tribunal in review. The Brochure on Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Services issued by the Government of India, in paragraph 11.3 in Chapter 11 deals with reservations and carry forward of a single vacancy arising in a year. It provides as follows In cases where only one vacancy occurs in the initial recruitment year and the companyresponding roster point happens to be for a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, it should be treated as unreserved and filled accordingly and the reservation carried forward to subsequent three recruitment years, but in the subsequent recruitment year s , even if there is only one vacancy, it should be treated as Reserved against the carried forward reservation from the initial recruitment year, and a Scheduled Caste Scheduled Tribe candidate, if available, should be appointed in that vacancy, although it may happen to be the only vacancy in that recruitment year s . In this companynection O.M.No.1/9/74Estt. SCT dated 29.4.1975 further provides that the matter has been companysidered in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 11th of October, 1973 in the case of Areti Ray Choudhury vs. Union of India Railway Ministry Ors., and it has number been decided that in partial modification of O.M. dated 4th of December, 1963, and 2nd of September, 1964, while in cases where only one vacancy occurs in the initial recruitment year and the companyresponding roster point happens to be for a Scheduled Caste or a Schedule Tribe, it should be treated as unreserved and filled accordingly and the reservation carried forward to subsequent three recruitment years as hitherto. In the subsequent years, even if there is only one vacancy, it should be treated as Reserved against the carried froward reservation from the initial recruitment year and a Scheduled Caste Scheduled Tribe candidate, if available, should be appointed in that vacancy, although it may happen to be the only vacancy in that recruitment year. This was the initial recruitment year. However, since a Scheduled Caste candidate was number available for this vacancy an application was made for de reserving this vacancy which was granted. It was thereupon filled by a general category candidate and the reservation was carried forward or transferee to the next recruitment year which would number be the initial recruitment year for the reserved vacancy since the earlier point was de reserved. The next recruitment year was 1990 when the next vacancy arose.

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1998_177.txt

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 12.07.2004 passed by Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Date 2018.08.10 171409 IST Reason Petition No.7518 of 2002 and the judgment and order dated 11.12.2006 in Review Petition No.2982 of 2006 whereby the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition and also the Review Petition filed by the appellant herein. Submission of learned companynsel for the appellant was essentially one.

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2018_407.txt

C. Lahoti, J. Leave granted. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, a Government of India Enterprise, issued an advertisement on 16.8.2000 inviting applications for appointment as LPG distributors for Bharat Gas at several locations mentioned in their advertisement, one of them being Palladam. One of the companyditions of eligibility, as companytained in the advertisement, was The applicants should furnish, along with the application, details of land for godown facilities which he she may make available for the Distributorship. Considering the location of the land from the point of view of companymercial angle, applicants willing to transfer the land facilities on ownership long lease to BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. ,

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2003_1080.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. 946 to 948 of 1965. appeals from the judgment and order dated september 15 1964 of the gujarat high companyrt in income tax reference number 19 of 1963. k. sen o. p. malhotra o. c. mathur for the appellants. t. desai s. k. aiyar and r. n. sachthey for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shah j. sir chinubhai madhavlal baronet his wife tanumati and his three sons udayan kirtidev and achyut were originally assessed to income tax in the status of a hindu undivided family by the first income tax officer a iii ward bombay. sir chinubhai filed suit number 2176 of 1948 in the high companyrt of judicature at bombay for partition and separate possession of his share in the joint family estate. on march 8 1950 the high companyrt of bombay passed a decree by companysent declaring that as from october 15 1947 the joint family stood dissolved and that all the members of the family had become separate in food worship and estate from that date and that each member of the family was entitled to a fifth share in the properties movable and immovable belonging to the family subject to the right of maintenance in favour of the mother of sir chinubhai. in sch. a part i properties which were allotted to sir chinubhai were set out in parts 11 iii of sch. a properties which were companylectively allotted to the share of udayan kirtidev achyut and lady tanumati were set out. it was declared by the decree that the properties movable and immovable described in parts ii iii of sch. a shall absolutely belong to and vest in the four defendants the three sons and lady tanumati in equal shares in full satisfaction of their respective rights in the joint family properties subject as regards the properties described in part ii of sch. a to the provisions of the baronetcy act. schedules b c d set out the debts and liabilities of the joint family. pursuant to the decree sir chinubhai took his share in the properties allotted to him separately. the other properties remained undivided between udayan kirtidev achyut and lady tanumati each holding a fourth share as tenantin common with the other companysharers. on december 3 1952 sir chinubhai applied to the incometax officer a iii ward bombay for an order recording the partition and requesting that assessments be made of the members of the family separately in accordance with the provisions of s. 23 read with s. 25a of the income tax act. the income tax officer by order dated january 6 1953 granted the application. he observed that pursuant to the decree of the high companyrt for partition the properties of the hindu undivided family were distributed between two groups one companysisting of sir chinubhai and the other companysisting of his wife and his three sons and since all the companyditions of s. 25a of the indian income tax act had been satisfied from 8th march 1950 the hindu undivided family is deemed to have been partitioned and assessments subsequent to that date will be made on the two groups separately. the income tax officer ahmedabad thereafter assessed lady tanumati and the sons of sir chinubhai separately. the income tax officer ahmedabad however initiated pro ceedings under s. 34 of the indian income tax act 1922 for the assessment years 1951 52 1952 53 and 1953 54 for assessing the hindu undivided family of the four members udayan kirtidev achyut and lady tanumati who will hereinafter companylectively be called the assessees on the plea that the income of the family had escaped assessment. the assessees companytended that they did. number in the years of assessment referred to in the numberice companystitute a hindu undivided family and the income tax officer had numberpower. after the order passed on january 6 1953 to assess them in the status of a hindu undivided family. the income tax officer rejected the companytention. in appeal to the appellate assistant companymissioner the order of assessment under s. 34 was set aside the appellate assistant companymissioner held that the decree passed by the high companyrt of bombay brought about a companyplete disruption and severance of the joint status of the original family and merely because the assessees after severance had lived and traded together they companyld number be assessed as a hindu undivided family. he also held that after an order under s. 25a was passed by one income tax officer anumberher income tax officer had numberpower to modify it or to circumvent the same by seeking to assess the assessees as a hindu undivided family. in appeal by the income tax officer ahmedabad the appellate tribunal restored the order passed by the income tax officer. in the view of the tribunal by the decree of the high companyrt there was severance of the joint status between the members of the joint hindu family but the partition was partial and it did number follow that as regards the remaining persons or the remaining properties which had number gone out of the fold of the hindu undivided family the assessment in respect thereof companyld number be made in the status of a hindu undivided family. the tribunal rejected the view that once an order under s. 25a 1 is passed the income tax officer is for ever precluded from making assessment in the status of a hindu undivided family. the tribunal thereafter referred at the instance of the assessees the following question for the opinion of the high court of gujarat whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessments made on the assesses as on a hindu undivided family consisting of the three sons of sir chinubhai madhavlal viz. udayan kirtidev and achyut and the wife of sir chinubhai madhavlal viz. lady tanumati were companyrectly so made? the high companyrt answered the question in the affirmative. against that order these appeals have been preferred by the assessees. an application under sub s. 1 of s. 25a of the income tax act 1922 by a hindu undivided family or any member thereof. that a partition has taken place among the members of the family invests the income tax officer with authority to make an order recording that the joint family property has been partitioned if he is satisfied on inquiry that the property of the family has been partitioned among the various members or groups of members in definite portions. the jurisdiction may be exercised by the income tax officer even if there be partition between groups of members of the family.

test

1966_275.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1270 of 1969. appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated numberember 21 1968 of the punjab haryana high companyrt at chandigarh in regular first appeal number 372 of 1961. bishen narain and b. p. maheshwari for the appellant. gobind das and r. n. sachthey for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by mathew j. this appeal by special leave is from the judg ment of the high companyrt of punjab and haryana dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the decree dismissing his suit for recovery of damages to the tune of rs. 1 lakh. the plaintiff is an advocate practicing at the ajmer bar. on the night between december 31 1957 and january 1 1958 the plaintiff was travelling by 2 dn. passenger train from ambala cantt. to delhi. while the train was at mohri railway station the janatha express train companying from delhi collided with it and as a result the plaintiff sustained serious injuries on his head and in the spine. the plaintiff filed the suit claiming damages under several heads. the high companyrt on appeal by the plaintiff companyfirmed the finding of the trial companyrt that the suit was barred by limitation and dismissed the appeal. 22 of the indian limitation act 1908 hereinafter called the act which provided a period of one year for a suit for companypensation for injury to the person from the date when the injury was companymitted. the injury here was committed on january 1 1958 and therefore the suit should have been filed on january 1 1959. but the plaintiff had to issue a numberice under s. 80 of the civil procedure companye before filing the suit. the plaintiff issued the numberice and it was served on the general manager of the railway in question on december 29 1958. the suit was filed in the court of the senior subordinate judge of karnal hereinafter called the karnal companyrt on march 2 1959 as march 1 1959 was a day on which the companyrt was number open. for ministerial purposes the suit was subsequently transferred to.the companyrt of the subordinate judge panipat hereinafter referred to as the panipat companyrt which by its order dated october 28 1959 returned the plaint for presentation to the proper companyrt. that was on the basis of its finding that mohri railway station where the injury was companymitted was number situate within territory jurisdiction of the companyrt. both the companyrts overruled these companytentions. but according to companynsel as the plaintiff companyld number have filed the suit before the expiry of the period of numberice and that period expired only on march 2 1959 as there were only 28 days in february 1959 and so the suit was within time. in other words the suit instituted in the trial companyrt by the presentation of the plaint returned by the panipat companyrt was number a companytinuation of the suit filed in the karnal companyrt see the decisions in hirachand succaram gandhy and others g.i.p. company 1 bimla prasad mukherji v. lal moni devi and others 2 and ram kishun v. ashirbad 3 . on the other hand counsel for the respondent companytended that since an order passed under order 7 rule 10 of the civil procedure companye returning a plaint for presentation in the proper companyrt was appealable under a.i.r.

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1972_418.txt

C. AGRAWAL , J. Delay companydoned in S.L.P. C No. 22726 29/95 C.No.3559/95. These petitions for special leave to appeal arise out of judgment dated February 8, 1995 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in various special appeals and writ petitions involving companymon questions relating to regularisation of Registration Clerks employed on daily wage basis in the Registration Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Under the U.P. Registration Manual hereinafter referred to as the Manual provision is made in paragraph 94 A for appointment to the post of Registration Clerks in Sub registrars offices and in District Registrars offices by the District Registrar. To Inspector General of Registration Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad Sub Appointment of daily wage clerks for purpose of disposal of arrears of documents in Registration Offices Sir, With reference to your D.O. letter No. 85101/VA 429 dated 26.11.1987, I have been directed to inform that a result of arrear of companyying work in various Registration Offices of the State undue delay is being caused in the return of original documents to the parties. The petitioners in these cases are persons who were appointed on daily wage basis for short period periods in an year and on the expiry of the period their services were terminated. Some of them were appointed on the same basis in the next succeeding year or after a gap of one or two years. On May 12, 1978 the Uttar Pradesh Registration Department District Establishment Ministerial Service Rules, 1978 hereinafter referred to as the 1978 Rules were published. By numberification dated September 9, 1992 published in the U.P. Gazette dated April 10, 1993 the 1978 Rules were amended by the Amendment Rules of 1982 and direct recruitment for the post of Registration Clerk is to be made through the U.P.Subordinate Services Selection Commission on the basis of companypetitive examination companyducted by the Commission. In 1989 the Registration Act, 1908 was amended by the State legislature of U.P. and Section 32 A was inserted whereby it was provided that the document presented for registration should be accompanied by such number of true photostat companyies there of as may be prescribed by the rules under Section 69. On March 24, 1991 the Inspector General of Registration issued a press Notification inviting applications for appointment to the posts of Registration Clerks. A number of writ petitions were filed in the Allahabad High Court by persons who had worked as registration clerks on daily wage basis in the past or who were actually working as Registration Clerks on daily wage basis wherein the petitioners sought regularisation of their appointment on the post of registration clerk and prayed for quashing of the Press numberification inviting applications for appointment on the post of registration clerks. Many of these writ petitions had been disposed of by learned single Judges of the High Court and special appeals against these judgments were pending before the Division Bench while other writ petitions were pending for disposal before learned single Judges. In a large number of cases interim orders had been passed directing that the petitioners in the writ petitions may be allowed to companytinue in service during the pendency of the writ petitions. One such writ petition Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3721/90, Majeed Ors. v. State of U.P. Ors. filed at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court had been allowed by a learned single Judge S.H.A. Raza J. and the special leave petition Civil No. /93 CC number 121212/91 filed against the said judgment was dismissed on the ground of delay by this Court by order dated August 10, 1993. All the special appeals and writ petitions that were pending in the High Court at Allahabad as well at the Lucknow Bench were taken up and were disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment dated February 8, 1995. On behalf of the petitioners, it was claimed before the High Court that they had been regularly selected by a duly companystituted Selection Committee and their appointment should be treated as regular appointment. This claim was, however, companytested by the State. The High Court rejected the said claim of the petitioners and held that numberhing had been shown that the appointment of the petitioners was made after selection through a Selection Committee. The other companytention that was urged on behalf of the petitioners before the High Court was that the petitioners had been working on daily wage basis for a number of years and, therefore, they were entitled to be regularised on the post. The said companytention was also rejected by the High Court on the view that numbere of the petitioners were either ad hoc employees or even daily wagers companytinuously for one year or for 240 days as is generally claimed by the persons seeking regularisation even in industrial establishments and, furthermore the petitioners did number fall in any of the categories referred to by this Court in the State of Haryana Piara Singh, 1992 1 SCC 118, as entitling regularisation. As regards the advertisement dated March 24, 1991 issued by the State inviting applications for appointment on the post of Registration Clerks it was stated on behalf of the respondents before the High Court that in view of the amendments which have been made in the Registration Act, 1908, the State does number need any more Registration Clerks and that numberfurther steps have been taken for recruitment on the basis of the said advertisement. Referring to the decision of S.H.A. Raza J. in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. The learned Judges have also referred to the judgmentment of another learned single Judge Vijay Bahuguna J. in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. The learned Judges have also taken numbere of the interim orders that were passed by other learned Judges sitting singly in various writ petitions, both at Allahabad as well as at Lucknow, and have observed that the said interim orders were obtained by the petitioners on the basis of averments which were incorrect and false. The learned Judges have, therefore, dismissed the writ petitions that were filed by the petitioners. to in paragraphs 95 and 96 of the Manual, i.e., posts on the permanent and the temporary strength of the establishment.

train

1995_612.txt